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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to research the concept and institution of punishment in three 
cultures and systems of classical Athens, Islam and International Criminal Justice. 
The second overall objective of this thesis is to establish how the insights from these 
three traditions can enrich our understanding of the concept of punishment and also 
designing humane, just and effective methods of punishment. I will argue that our 
response to wrongdoing can be divided into three distinct categories: punitive 
measures, impunity, and forgiveness. This thesis will contend that western-oriented 
concept and methods of punishment have paid inadequate attention to the third 
category, forgiveness. This imbalance between the three categories of responses to 
wrongdoing has led to the crises of self-definition and effectiveness of the leading 
theories and methods of punishment. I propose that in order to address some of the 
conceptual and institutional deficiencies of modern institutions of punishment, we 
must contemplate communitarian, restorative and cross-cultural approaches, in 
particular in the context of post-conflict justice and international criminal justice. I 
identify the Islamic concept and institution of punishment as a suitable model that can 
make valuable contributions to such an endeavour. In examining the concept and 
institution of punishment, I will also argue that the institution of punishment of a 
given society/tradition is a gateway that sheds light on other aspects and institutions 
of the society. As such a closer examination of the institution of punishment in the 
cultures under investigation would question the popular views and prejudices about 
democratic Athens, Islamic world, and liberal democracy. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The punishment of offenders is a common feature of almost every human society 
and aspect of social life. In fact, if one believes in the existence of paradise, one of the 
most important issues that differentiate an earthly life from that in paradise is the 
absence of punishment and any form of social controls in paradise. Wrongdoings 
prompt action, attitudes and judgements in all of us, if we view the act in question as 
wrongdoing. However the nature of responses to wrongdoing varies from one end of 
the spectrum to the other. The following examples illustrate the diversity of responses 
to wrongdoing. 
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, on the 
World Trade Centre in New York, Pres. Bush amid visiting the scene, asked one of 
the New York fire fighters, "What can I do for you? " And the man said, "Help the 
widows and orphans. " Pres. Bush replied, "No, what can I do for you? " and the man 
told the President, "You go find whichever m-f- did this and you kill him and his wife 
and his mother and his children and his dog and everyone who so much as served him 
a cup of coffee. " Bush assured him by saying that, "You won't be disappointed. "' 
Compared with those of the above New Yorker, the requests of some of the victims 
and the survivors of the Apartheid regime in South Africa revealed a contrasting part 
of the spectrum of the quest for punishment and revenge. Observers of the Truth and 
1 Quoted in The International Jerusalem Post, 24/10/03, p. 18. 
Reconciliation Commission have been struck by the exceedingly modest requests for 
reparation requested by the victims and the survivors, as the following examples 
reveal: A death certificate for a relative whose death was denied by the Apartheid 
regime; a tombstone; subsidies for their children's education; one woman who was 
shot repeatedly while hanging washing on a line asked for removal of the bullets that 
remained in her vagina. 2 
It is not only humans who respond differently to wrongdoing. The God of the Old 
Testament and the New Testament also acts very differently and disproportionally 
according to the biblical account. From the God of the Old Testament who does not 
even spare the fourth generation of the unpunished guilty: 
"... Who [God] by no means acquits the guilty, but brings the iniquity of parents on 
children and grandchildren to the third and the fourth generations. "3 
To the God of the New Testament who sacrificed his own son for the sake of sinful 
mankind: 
"... Now he [Jesus Christ] has appeared once for all at the end of the ages to do away 
with sin by the sacrifice of himself'. 4 
Responses to wrongdoing can be divided into three distinct categories: punitive 
measures, impunity, and forgiveness. Each of these three measures is 
multidimensional. Johan Galtung's description of peace can be utilised to describe 
each of the three distinct categories of our responses to wrongdoing. In Galtung's 
description: Peace = direct peace + structural peace + cultural peace. 5 
2 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass 
Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), p. 105. 3 Exodus , 34 : 6-7. 4 Hebrews, 9: 26. 
2 
Hence with respect to the three categories of responses to wrongdoing, it can be said 
that punitive measures consist of punitive acts, the institutional mechanism in charge 
of implementing punitive acts and the culture that legitimises and commands punitive 
responses to wrongdoing. Although the second category, impunity, is not as prevalent 
and institutionalised as the first category, it is present with respect to certain 
wrongdoings and wrongdoers. The general amnesty that many dictators grant 
themselves before handing power over to democratic governments is equivalent to 
punitive measures. Legislative measures that exempt certain categories of individual 
from the reign of law are the structural mechanism of the category of impunity. A 
culture that condones the exemption of certain individuals from accountability can be 
described as an impunity culture. 
The third category, forgiveness, is neither as widespread as the punitive category, 
nor as limited as the impunity category. This category also has its own three 
components. When a victim voluntarily waives his right to seek punitive measures, by 
forgiving the transgressor, he enacts forgiveness. There are some criminal justice 
systems that have provided mechanisms that enable victims or their representatives to 
forgive some of the transgressors. Such mechanisms and institutional arrangements 
can be seen as the structural components of forgiveness. Those cultures that 
encourage their members to consider forgiveness as one of their responses to 
wrongdoing can be described as a forgiving culture. 
In addition to the spectrum of our responses to wrongdoing, there are other factors 
and players that are present in the acts and conceptions of punishment in one way or 
S Johan Galtrung, " Three Approaches to Peace: Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking" in 
Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research, vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975), p. 
298. 
3 
another. The institution of punishment comprises power, authority, legitimacy, 
normality, personhood, morality, victim, offender, onlookers, legislator, politician, 
lawyer, judge, prison officer, God, priest, mullah, philosopher, sociologist, 
criminologist, psychologist, and a host of other matters and players. 
In this thesis, I seek to examine the institution and concept of punishment in three 
cultures and traditions: classical Athens of ancient Greece, Islam and international 
criminal justice. The second overall objective of this thesis is to establish what and 
how the insights from these three traditions and systems can enrich our understanding 
of the multifaceted concept of punishment, and more importantly can enable us to 
design more humane, just and effective methods of punishment. 
The following are some of the questions that will be examined throughout this 
research: 
What constitutes punishment? What are the most effective methods of punishment? 
What constitutes humane methods of punishment? What are the relationships between 
the institution of punishment and other apparatus of social control? What are the 
socio-economic factors that underlie the institution of punishment? Can the institution 
of punishment of a given society shed light on other aspects and institutions of that 
society? With respect to the three cultures and systems under investigation, those of 
ancient Greek, Islam, and international criminal justice, to what extent do these 
systems manage to achieve a balance between the three categories of responses 
(punitive measures, impunity and forgiveness) to wrongdoing? 
4 
The following chapter, which examines the institution of punishment, will argue 
that there is no one rigorous and coherent theory of punishment that can satisfy the 
criteria of a just, humane and effective institution of punishment. The conceptual and 
theoretical inadequacy of the leading theories of punishment has been compounded by 
the absence of effective and just methods of punishment in criminal justice systems of 
many countries, including western criminal justice systems. The institution of 
punishment faces crises of self-definition and effectiveness. In other words, it is not 
only that we have difficulties in understanding and controlling crimes, but the 
punishment of offenders has also become a chronic social and moral problem. I will 
contend that one of the main reasons for the crises of legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the institution of punishment is the imbalance between the three categories of 
responses to wrongdoing. I will argue that the inadequate place of forgiveness in our 
vocabulary and practices of punishment has been coupled with granting and 
condoning impunity to certain individuals, institutions and structures. 
I propose that in order to address some of the conceptual and institutional 
deficiencies of modern institutions of punishment we must contemplate 
communitarian, distributive and cross-cultural approaches, which can help us balance 
the three categories of responses to wrongdoing. I will call for a reconceptualisation 
of today's retributive, criminal-oriented theory of punishment to a restorative and 
victim-oriented institution of punishment. Such a reconceptualisation also entails 
changing our view of the criminal as an evil-doer to a fellow member of our human 
family. Our method of punishment must also be reconsidered and changed from the 
incarceration to a more humane, community-based methods. I will also argue that a 
victim-oriented institution of punishment can incorporate forgiveness as one of the 
5 
essential components of the institution of punishment, both conceptually and 
institutionally. I will draw attention to the Islamic institution of punishment as a 
suitable model that can make a valuable contribution to such an endeavour. 
This thesis above all calls for a hybrid and cross-cultural approach to issues of 
punishment and forgiveness. Such an approach draws attention to unrecognised 
richness of non-western traditions and cautions on overestimation of western ones. 
Such an approach may be interpreted as idealising the former and dismissing the 
latter. But it needs not to be seen as such. All traditions possess many good features 
and some bad ones. A hybrid and cross-cultural approach aims to discover the good 
features and creatively make connection between them. 
This thesis has been divided into three sections: 
" Section One, comprises the introductory chapter and Chapter Two. This, the 
introductory chapter, discusses the methodology of the thesis and also 
provides a brief introduction to each of the following chapters. Chapter Two 
examines the concept and institution of punishment. 
Section Two comprises three chapters, numbers three, four and five, devoted 
respectively to the three cases studies of the thesis: classical Athens, Islam 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
6 
Section Three comprises Chapters Six (forgiveness) and the concluding 
chapter, the epilogue. This section seeks explicitly to diagnose the present and 
make a prognosis for the future. 
However, assessing the past, diagnosing the present and making prognoses for the 
future will not be the prerogatives of each of the three sections of the thesis. If the 
question arises, each section and chapter will not shy away from engaging with the 
past or present developments or the ways forward. 
As mentioned earlier the present chapter introduces the methodology of the research 
and also the subsequent chapters. It is divided into two parts. The first part is an 
examination of the notion of cross-cultural encounter and dialogue, which is the main 
methodological approach of the thesis. The second part will provide a brief 
introduction to each of the subsequent six chapters. This chapter will conclude by 
highlighting the circumstances and the context in which this thesis was written. 
I. The Cross-cultural and Historical Approaches 
This part will begin with. a brief examination of the relationship between the 
disciplines of international relations (IR) and history. It will then proceed to discuss 
the discourse of cross-cultural and civilisational approaches and studies. The 
concluding section will draw attention to Afghanistan, which has been enriched and 
cursed by diverse cultures, civilisations, and religions throughout 4000 years of its 
7 
history and will show how present Afghanistan can inspire others as to how to 
reconcile their conflicting identities. 
A. History and Study of International Relations 
Richard Ned Lebow has succinctly captured the prevailing nature of the relationship 
between the two disciplines of political science and history. He characterises it as 
"cold war". 6 As with the real Cold War, there are a number of reasons and players that 
commenced and maintained the cold war between political scientists and historians. 
But there have also been voices, in both disciplines, that constitute "the Non-Aligned 
Movement" within this metaphorical cold war. Jack S. Levy has shed light on some of 
the purported differences between the two disciplines. According to him: 
Historians focus primarily on the past; international relations scholars, and political 
scientists more generally, aim to make theoretically informed and policy-relevant 
predictions about the future. Historians seek to understand single unique events, the 
milieu et moment; political scientists aim to generalize about classes of events and to 
construct theories that are valid across time and space. Historians tend to favour 
complex interpretations; political scientists aim for elegant and, parsimonious causal 
explanations. Historians construct narrative-based explanations; political scientists 
construct theory-based explanations. Political scientists are explicit about their 
theoretical assumptions and causal argument; historians are more implicit. 7 
Borrowing from the late Isaiah Berlin's account of the Greek poet Archilochus's 
distinction between hedgehogs and foxes, Ned Lebow analogises historians to foxes 
who know many things, are inventive, and tailor their strategies to circumstances, 
6 Richard Ned Lebow "Social Science and History: Two and a Half Cheers for International Relations 
Methods", edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, 
Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 135. 
Jack S. Levy "Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the 
Analysis of International Relations", in Elman & Elman, op. cit., p. 40. 
8 
whereas, for him, social scientists are more likely to be hedgehogs, who know one big 
thing, know it very well, and succeed by invoking it repeatedly. 8 
Another distinct difference between political scientists and historians is the explicit 
attempt of the latter to provide a normative and judgemental account of their studies, 
whereas political scientists attempt to present their stories in a value-free, scientific 
and objective language. 9 
With respect to the discipline of international relations, judging by the tendencies of 
the mainstream perspectives in it, at best it can be described as ahistorical and, 
critically, as an anti-historical discipline. A discipline that regards 1648, when the 
new polity of the nation-state was born, as the beginning of the modern state-based 
international system is bound to be sceptical of the pre- 1648 period and the non-state 
actors. Furthermore, the dominant position of realism and positivism in the field, in 
particular in the US, has provided ample ammunition for the warriors of the 
interdisciplinary cold war. Realist and positivistic tendencies and forces not only have 
consolidated the Euro-centric and State-centric tendencies of IR, they also have 
privileged certain periods of history and components of the international system and 
the diverse interactions between and among states. 
The insignificant place of historical studies in the mainstream international relations 
literature is one of the main reasons for the underdevelopment of many important 
conceptual issues in the discipline. For example, Barry Buzan and Richard Little 
blamed ahistoricism as one of the five reasons for the underdeveloped conceptual 
8 Ned Lebow, pp. cit., p. 123. 9 Notwithstanding, the post-modernists, the proponents of critical theories, hermeneutics, and 
constructivists who have cast doubt on the alleged neutrality and objectivity of political scientists. 
However the epistemological arguments are not the focus of this line of enquiry. 
9 
basis of the international system. The other four are: Presentism, Eurocentrism, 
Anarchophilia, and State-Centrism. 1° Yale Feguson and Richard Mansbach cited the 
dominant position of " the crude, often ahistorical- even antihistorical - empiricism" 
that dominated research in international relations as one of their main reasons for 
writing their book, Polities. t1 
The authors referred to above are among a growing number of scholars who have 
recognised the importance and significance of an inter-disciplinary dialogue between 
political science and history, and follow the example of Aristotle in having a pro- 
active approach to other historical periods and also other traditions. The fact that 
Aristotle compared the Athenian constitution with over one hundred different 
constitutions, suggests that comparative political studies are as old as the study of 
politics. In addition to personalities such as Aristotle, Hegel, Marx, Wallerstein who 
gave prominence to history in their works, there are a number of authors who have 
primarily focused on history from an international relations perspective. 
Adda Bozeman's Politics and Culture in International History was the first and most 
comprehensive attempt in this regard in the 1960s. F. S. C. Northrop's Meeting of East 
and West, and Donald Puchala's Theory and History in International Relations are the 
most recent works in this field. In recent years in major conferences related to 
international relations such as the British International Studies Association (BISA), 
panels on historical sociology have appeared regularly, heralding the beginning of an 
era of regular dialogue between international relations scholars and historians. 
10 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 18-20. 
11 Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Polities: Authority, Identities and, Change (Colombia 
SC: South Carolina University Press, 1996), p. 6. 
10 
The foci of such historically - conscious studies vary from the rise and decline of 
empires; cycles of power; cycles of ideological diffusion and dissolution; cycle of 
civilisational eminence and decline; to the different stage of the development of a 
given norm. Therefore, and amid the third "great debate" in international relations, 
there are few who can publicly refute Levy's call, when he asserted that "history is 
too important to leäve to the historians, and theory is too important to leave to the 
theorists. " 12 
The institution of punishment is an important institution of every culture and 
society. It can be a gateway to direct us to other aspects and institutions of our society 
and tradition. In judging other cultures and traditions, the institution of punishment is 
among the factors that inform our view about them. For example, some methods of 
punishment in Islamic penal code, such as "chopping hands" are among the most 
widely-cited factors that have informed the western view of the Islamic world. 
Therefore a better understanding of the institution of punishment in other cultures and 
traditions can enhance our understanding of the society and the culture as a whole. In 
other words, the institution of punishment is a gateway to other aspects of the society. 
The next section examines cross-cultural and civilisational discourse, which is one of 
themes of inter-disciplinary dialogue. 
12 Levy, op. cit, p. 83. 
11 
B. Cross Cultural Approach to Social Institutions 
A genuine cross-cultural approach is sensitive to the five charges of Buzan and 
Little against mainstream approaches in the study of international relations. As such, 
it tries to distance itself from Presentism, Eurocentrism, Ahistoricism, Anarchophilia 
and State-Centrism. A cross-cultural approach is committed to de-centreism, but not 
the erasure of selfhood. Conscious of the presence of different cycles of fortunes and 
misfortunes, a cross-cultural approach strives to attribute meaning and interpretation 
to an event, or institution in the context and the presence of related factors and 
attributions. An author following the cross-cultural approach does not allow his view 
of the X aspect of Y to determine his judgement about the entirety of Y. For the latter 
purpose, the following Persian proverb offers insight, which says "when a rich woman 
wears a fake piece of jewellery, everyone assumes it is genuine, whereas when a poor 
woman wears a genuine piece of jewellery (e. g. inherited from her grandmother), 
everyone thinks it is fake. " 
In the words of Mehta, the Indian philosopher, cross-cultural understanding is 
concerned with a "mutual sharing of horizons, " not with "discovering a formula for 
the `other' culture" or "grasping it in a concept. " 13 
Fred Dallmayr's distinction between different modes of cross-cultural encounters 
shows how different modes of understanding influence one's mode of encounter. 
13 Cited in Fred Dallmayr. Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter (New York: New 
York State University Press, 1996), p. 98. 
12 
He identified different possibilities or modes, ranging from outright domination over a 
number of intermediary stages to benign or empowering forms of self-other. They 
include: 
Conquest: incorporation of alien territories and populations through conquest. 
Conversion: this entails the physical subjugation of alien populations and 
sometimes also their forced cultural assimilation; where the latter feature 
predominates, conquest gives way to conversion. 
Assimilation and Acculturation: apart from colonial expansion in foreign 
lands, cultural hegemony may also be exercised in a "domestic" context by 
assimilating marginalized groups into the hegemonic one(s). While 
assimilation is usually applied to policies in some western or westernising 
nations, the term acculturation applies to situations ranging from domestic 
contacts to global interactions between the hegemonic western culture and 
developing non-western societies. 
Partial Assimilation or Cultural Borrowing: for such adaptation to happen, the 
respective cultures must face each other on a more nearly equal or roughly 
comparable basis. It involves greater subtlety in self-other relations. 
Liberalism and Minimal Engagement: sometimes cultures are content to live 
or co-exist side by side in a mode of relative indifference; this is true mainly 
of contacts occurring under the aegis of modem liberalism, particularly its 
"procedural" variant. 
" Conflict and Class Struggle: as a mode of social and cultural interaction, 
conflict (even of the radical sort) occupies a prominent place in the annals of 
13 
human history and in the literature of social-political thought by such authors 
as Thomas Hobbes, Machiavelli, Engels and Marx. 
Dialogical Engagement: this is an engagement, which preserves reciprocal 
freedom, involving distance and engagement, recognition of inalienable 
otherness and genuine "care" for difference, generating and sustaining an 
attitude of agonal interdependence. '4 
One of the few statesmen that have concurred with Dallmayr's call for dialogical 
engagement was the former Iranian president, Mr. Khatami. In the first year of his 
presidency, 1997, he proposed the "Dialogue among Civilisations" as a new theme in 
international relations. Following his call, the UN declared year 2001 as the year of 
the "Dialogue among Civilisations". In August 2005, the General Secretary of the UN 
appointed a panel, including the former Iranian president, to promote the idea of 
dialogue globally. 15 
With respect to cross-civilisational encounters, Donald Puchala's distinction among 
the three modes of encounter among civilisations can be helpful. They are as follows: 
1. Those that involve two fully developed or mature civilisations; 
2. Those that involve one fully developed or mature civilisation and another in an 
earlier stage of development; and 
3. Those that involve civilisations and other kinds of communities like hordes, 
tribes, or nations, historically categorised as barbarians. 16 
to Dallmayr, op. cit., pp. 3-37. 
15 For a full account of Mr. Khatami' s idea and also the works to promote his idea see, the website of 
the Tehran-based centre for the Dialogue among civilisations in this address: 
http: //www. dialoguecentre. org 
16 Donald J. Puchala, Theory and History in International Relations (New York: Rouledge, 2003), 
p. 125. 
14 
He also elaborated the nature, process and the possible outcome of each mode of 
encounter, as the table one shows: 17 
17 Ibid. p. 135. 
15 
Table 1. Encounters, Results, and Analogues 
Encounters Levels of Civilisation Main Direction of Main Result of Analogous 
involved cultural influence encounter encounter 
Germans and Romans, Noncivilisation versus Romans to Germans Absorption Macedonians and Greeks (300 BC) 
c. 600 CE. civilisation Mongols and Chinese (c. 1200) 
Manchus and Chinese (c. 1700-1900) 
Romans and Greeks, Emergent civilisation versus Greeks to Romans Hybridisation Carolingians and Moslems (c. 800) 
c 200 CE. mature civilisation 
T'ang Chinese and Mature civilisation versus Chinese to Hegemony Europe and Russia, (c. 1700) 
Japanese/Koreans, c. 700 emergent civilisation Japanese/Koreans Europe and Japan, (1876+) 
Hellenes and Persians/ Mature civilisation versus Initially: Hellenes to others Rejection/ Europeans and Indians, 
Egyptians, c. 300 BC mature civilisation Later: Others to Hellenes resurgence (1700- 1994) 
Spanish and Aztecs, Mature civilisation versus Spanish to Aztecs Genocide/cultural Moslems and Hindus 
1500 + mature civilisation obliteration (c. 1100-1600) 
Ottomans and Europeans, Mature civilisation versus Little appreciable flow Isolation, insulation, Japan and Europe 
c. 1300- 1870 mature civilisation of cultural influence suspicion, hostility (c. 1600-1850) 
Russians and Westerners 
(1900-1990) 
Bactria,. Mature civilisation versus Mixing and merging of Creative cross- Syria (200 BC-600 CE) 
c. I00 BC 200 CE myriad cultural influences flows from many directions fertilisation Southeast Asia, Paris 
New York City, 







The concluding chapter, the epilogue, will return to the discourse of cross-cultural 
encounter, focusing on the reasons why mature civilisations in encountering one 
another, cause different outcomes. The last section of this part looks closely at the 
last case, Bactria, and examines how it managed to achieve such a high degree of 
harmony. This section also looks modem day Afghanistan, to see to what extent 
Afghans have managed to follow their ancestors in reconciling their competing 
identities. 
C. Bactria: the "Land of the Thousand Cities 9918 
Modern Afghanistan would be one of the last places on earth that many would 
associate with anything but foreign occupation, warlordism, opium or a bloody civil 
war. However, a little distance back from today's news headlines a very different 
story is presented. In the words of Puchala, "Bactria, today northern Afghanistan, was 
one of the few places in which the human race has managed willy-nilly to short- 
circuit historical obstacles of pride, prejudice, and fear that have hampered 
intercultural learning between and among civilisations". 19. Barnet Rubin 
characterised Afghanistan, as a "mirror of the world". 20 According to Adda Bozeman, 
"it was one of the most fascinating chapters in cultural interpretation and political 
cooperation. , 21 
18 This was the characterisation that the ancient sources and authors referred to Bactria. 
19 Puchala, op. cit ., p. 
38. 
20 Barnet A. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System, tem, 2°d edition (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 2. 
21 Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1960), pp. 113-14. 
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The region between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus (then known as Bactria) and its 
extension between the Oxus and the Jaxartes (then known as Sogdiana) was a frontier 
province of the Persian empire. As a result of Alexander's conquest Bactria was made 
a Greek colony, and, after breaking away from the post-Alexandrian Seleucid 
monarchy around 250 BC., it became an autonomous Hellenic state that survived until 
55 CE. During its history, Bactria expanded southward from its capital Ai Khanum 
and gained control over a large portion of what is today northern India. 22 As Adda 
Bozeman noted, until the very end of its political existence, Bactria was also at a 
junction of the landroutes from China and India to the West and a meeting place of 
numerous and dynamic nations and cultures. As such, it was a filter through which 
artistic styles, religious forms, and political ideas radiated in all directions. 23 
Adda Bozeman cited three reasons that may explain the extraordinary success of the 
Bactrian state: the extraordinary talent of its rulers; that the dynasty's founder, 
Euthydemids chose to rule Bactria by respecting the dual composition of their 
citizenry; and Bactria's cultural and political dualism had in no way sapped the 
community's general vitality and creativity. 24 Bactria constituted what Toynbee 
identifies as a cultural roundabout. Such roundabouts are geographic locations 
"where traffic coming in from any point of the compass can be switched to any other 
point in a great number of alternative combinations and permutations. "25 
22 Peter Green, Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age (Berkeley and 
Los Angles: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 330-35. 
23 Bozeman, op. cit. p. 117. 
24 Ibid., pp. 115-16. 
25 Arnold Toynbee with Jane Caplan, A Study of History. revised and abridged ed. (New York: 
Portland House, 1986), p. 395. 
18 
Archaeological findings on the site of the tall mound of the citadel, the Kasr-Naranj 
in the old city of Kandahar, south of Afghanistan, also shed light on the extent of the 
interactions between different cultures and civilisations in early parts of Afghanistan's 
history. The British Institute of Afghan Studies excavated the site in 1974 and 1975. 
In the first year a trench was cut in the city wall, which revealed layers from five 
periods, of which the first roughly corresponds to that of Mundigak VI and may be as 
early as the first half of the first millennium BC. The pottery finds in the second layer 
seem to belong to the Achaemenid city of Harakuwatis. Period III is characterised by 
unbaked bricks and was, most probably, Greek, while the defences of Period IV 
which consisted of a solid brick wall, are believed to be Kushan (first century AD. ) 
The layer of Period V is Islamic. 26 
The nationalities and professions of some recent residents of an area in the vicinity 
of the old city of Kandahar also revealed some interesting facts. Osama Bin Laden 
rented some properties in Kandahar and occasionally lived there from 1996 to 2001. 
The US oil and gas company "Unocal" also rented a house in central Kandahar 
directly across the street from one of Bin Laden's compounds. 27 Unocal's 
representatives in Kandahar, the stronghold of the Taliban, were hoping to seek the 
Taliban leadership's consent to build a pipeline to transfer gas from Turkmenistan via 
Afghanistan to Pakistan. 
A closer look at the contemporary composition of ethnic groups in Afghanistan and 
the nature and scope of the international community's involvement in Afghanistan, 
after the toppling of the Taliban regime, reveals that the many characterisations of the 
26 Edgar Knobloch, Monuments of Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), p. 224. 
27 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10,2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 342. 
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"land of the thousand cities" continue to be present today in Afghanistan. The new 
Afghan constitution is a good guide for learning more about the diversity of the 
Afghan nation. 
Article four of the new Constitution states, "The nation of Afghanistan consists of 
ethnic Pashtu, Tajik, Hazarrah, Uzbik, Turkmine, Baluch, Pashaiei, Nouristani, 
Eaimagh, Arab, Kerghis, Ghazalbash, Ghojar, Brahavi; and other communities and 
ethnic groups. " 
Article Sixteen of the Constitution refers to some of the spoken languages of the 
country: " Among the languages of Pashtu, Dari [Persian], Uzbaki, Turkmanie, 
Baluchie, Pashaie, Nouristani, Pamiry and other spoken languages of the country, 
Pasutho and Dari are the official languages of the state. " 
With respect to the religious affiliation of the nation, the Constitution states in 
Article Two, "Islam is the religion of the state of the Islamic republic of Afghanistan. 
The followers of other religions are free to follow their own religious convictions 
within the law ... " 
28 
The involvement of the international community in reconstructing Afghanistan also 
demonstrates some unprecedented cases of cooperation. Since the toppling of the 
Taliban regime in December 2001 and the subsequent commitment of the 
international community to rebuild Afghanistan, there has been an unofficial division 
of labour, in which one or some countries assume responsibility to work in specific 
fields and sectors. The following examples highlight some of them: 
`° For an English translation of Afghanistan new constitution see this website: www. unama- 
afg. org/docs/Docs. htm 
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The Criminal Justice System: Italy 
The National Police: Germany and the US 
The Anti-narcotic Campaign: the UK and Iran 
The Aviation Sector: India 
The National Army: the US and France 
The Higher Education sector: Iran, the US and Germany 
Disarmament of the former militias: Japan 
Road Reconstruction: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan 
Training new Afghan diplomats: China and India 
Peace Keeping and Security sector: NATO 
The Civil Society sector: the UN, and NGO's 
Notwithstanding some of the shortcomings of the international community's 
involvement and policies and also the numerous remaining challenges, Afghanistan 
has the potential to become once again the "roundabout" of the world's civilisations 
and cultures. President Karzai' s characterisation of Afghanistan as the focus and a 
model of "cooperation among civilisations" is an indication of the readiness of many 
Afghans to become once again the "land of the thousand cities". 29 
29 The Afghan state run news agency is called Bakhtar, which is the Persian version of Bactria, and an 
example of the continuing prominent place of Bactria in Afghanistan today. 
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II. Brief Introduction of Each Chapter 
Prior to introducing each subsequent chapter, I should mention that space 
limitations do not permit an adequate treatment and even acknowledgment of other 
cultures and civilisations that do not appear in this thesis. However, as the concluding 
chapter of the thesis will discuss, in the context of post-conflict justice and 
international criminal justice, it is imperative to welcome and embrace proactively 
non-western perspectives both conceptually and institutionally. And a homogenising 
and conforming approach to the institution of punishment, in the context of 
international criminal justice and post-conflict justice not only attract the charge of 
Eurocentrism but it will also transfer the problems of western prisons and courts to 
international criminal justice. 
The following brief introduction to each chapter, will explain some of the reasons for 
selecting that particular tradition, each headed as in the thesis. 
Chapter Two: The Concept of Punishment 
In this chapter three important issues related to the concept and institution of 
punishment will be examined. The first section will provide a philosophical and 
jurisprudential account of punishment. The second part will discuss the institution of 
punishment from the perspective of three sociologists: Durkheim, Michel Foucault, 
and Norbert Elias. The Marxist's perspective on punishment will also be briefly 
examined in this part of the chapter. The third part will focus on the notion of ,I 
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collective responsibility and collective punishment, which is an important discourse in 
the context of international criminal justice and post-conflict justice. 
Chapter Three: The Institution of Punishment in Classical Athens: 
The Power and the Politics of Punishment 
Although the Greeks and the Greek culture had encounters with other cultures and 
communities such as Rome, ancient Egypt, Judaism and Muslims, and made 
significant contributions to these communities, it is the secular west that has had 
unrivalled relations with ancient Greece, in particular with classical Athens. In 
addition to the Greeks' contribution to the development of philosophy, art, 
architecture, political philosophy, ethics, and theatre in the secular west, the Ancient 
Greeks had a profound romantic and psychological influence in shaping and 
informing many aspects of the secular west. Such a psychological influence provided 
the secular west with a foundation and an ancestor. The displacement of Christianity 
from the public realm and the subsequent consolidation of secularism in the west 
deprived the secular west of some of the mythical, assuring and comforting aspects of 
Christianity, which provided an account for the origin of man and the universe. The 
revival of interest in the classical world provided an opportunity for the secular West 
to gradually construct classical Greece as its ancestor. The concept and the institution 
of democracy is one of the most visible aspects of contemporary western societies that 
reflect the ancient Greek heritage and legacy. Judging by the rhetoric and the stated 
policies of the US-led war on terrorism, democracy has now become the perceived 
remedy for many ills of the non-western world, in particular the Muslim world. 
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A closer examination of an important aspect of one of the world's first democracies, 
Athens, can provide us with insight into the less-publicised aspects of democratic 
societies. Benefiting from Michel Foucault and Karl Marx's perspectives on 
punishment, the chapter on the institution of punishment in Athens will draw attention 
to a hierarchical order that prevailed in Athens. This hierarchical order was composed 
from the top to bottom as follows: gods, the Athenian elite, Athenian male citizens, 
metics (alien residents), female citizens, slaves, and beasts. The institution of 
punishment both conceptually and procedurally reflected and simultaneously 
reinforced this hierarchical order. 
Chapter Four: The Islamic Institution of Punishment: A Mosaic of 
Sacred and Humanistic Forms and Norms 
The events of September 11,2001 and subsequent developments not only have 
strengthened the proponents of the clash of civilisations in the West and to a lesser 
extent in the Islamic world, they have also intensified the civil war within the west 
between secular forces and religious ones. Although the latter case is more prominent 
and visible in the US, it is also likely that a more fierce and open confrontation 
between liberals and religious forces will appear in Western Europe. The new Pope's 
systematic attack on secularism has provided the religious forces in Europe with an 
invaluable ally. In the context of the discourse of "clash of civilisations" and the 
emerging battle between religious and secular forces in the west, Muslims and Islamic 
discourses are faced with diverse opponents. On one hand, Muslims are subjected to 
the charges and attacks of the secular who treat Islam as a religion, and on the other 
hand, certain segments within Christianity such as the evangelical Christians, and also 
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some Jewish supporters of Israel who see Islam as an impostor religion and thus 
incompatible with Christianity's teaching, and a grave danger to the existence of the 
state of Israel. Added to the above two forces, are a segment of Muslims who concur 
with the secular view by advocating the incompatibility of Islam with democratic and 
liberal values. Violent actions of Al-Qaheda's sympathisers and followers and certain 
aspects of Islamic penal code have also provided ample ammunition for the diverse 
opponents of Islam and the prevailing negative view of Muslims and Islam in the 
west. 
Through a detailed examination of some aspects of the Islamic institution of 
punishment, this chapter aims to confront such a highly-misunderstood and ill- 
informed perception of the Islamic world, and its penal code, in particular. This 
chapter will show that not only has the Islamic penal code incorporated many 
progressive, egalitarian and humane provisions associated with the liberal tradition; it 
also has components that can rectify some of the shortcomings of the modern 
institutions of punishment. Consideration of the Islamic institution of punishment will 
show that Islamic civilisation not only is not a threat or incompatible with many tenets 
of liberal values and of Christianity, but that it also can be a peacemaker between the 
secular world and the religious one (in its Christian manifestation), due to the 
conscious efforts of Muslims to combine the sacred and humanistic values and norms 
as the title of this chapter indicates. 
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Chapter Five: The International Criminal Court: A Grotian Moment 
Or a Legless Giant? 
Despite the frequency and ferocity of many conflicts of the previous century, the 
gradual emergence of the discourse of accountability for gross and systematic 
violation of human rights has been an encouraging development since the 
establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. In recent years, the question as 
to how to deal with atrocities of war and civil conflicts has become an important issue 
for any post-conflict settlement. Nowadays the issue of accountability for alleged 
violation of human rights is not the question of "if' but it is the question of "how". 
The successful establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was a truly 
universal attempt to institutionalise accountability for mass and systematic violation 
of human rights both in times of war and peace, committed by states or non-state 
actors. This chapter reviews the major events and developments that led to the official 
establishment of the ICC in July 2002. While reflecting upon the potential of the ICC, 
this chapter also draws attention to some of the in-built constraints in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, which would likely inhibit the Court in having an effective role in 
confronting the culture of impunity that prevails in many parts of the world, in 
particular those countries that are privileged by their military and economic power. 
Chapter Six: The Lure of Forgiveness: The Promise of Forgiveness 
In this chapter I will argue that prosecution or impunity should not necessarily be 
viewed as the only tools at our disposal to deal with wrongdoing. Human beings have 
an unrecognised capacity to confidently grant forgiveness to their abusers. However, 
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this chapter shows that many contemporary approaches to punishment have 
discounted the importance of forgiveness for a number of reasons, such as its 
perceived theological underpinning and its association with Christianity. By reflecting 
on a summary of different perspectives on forgiveness, in particular the Rumi and 
Kant's, this chapter will argue why and how we can and should incorporate 
forgiveness as an important aspect of our conceptual and institutional approach to the 
institution of punishment. 
Chapter Seven: The Epilogue 
The concluding chapter will discuss in greater details four different but related 
issues: 
1. The importance of the cross-cultural and historical approach and awareness in 
understanding many social institutions such as punishment; 
2. The concept of justice (mainly substantive justice, or goodness) and why it 
should be an important aspect of our moral and political vocabulary and 
practices, in particular how an elevated status of the concept of goodness or 
substantive justice can enrich our understanding and also practices of 
punishment; 
3. An examination of the recent hybrid-courts; and 
4. An examination of the concept of "Restorative Justice" 
To conclude this chapter, highlighting two issues concerning the methodology and 
the normative stance of the thesis are in order. This thesis is written by a citizen of the 
"land of the thousand cities", and, therefore, must take a cross-cultural and 
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interdisciplinary approach in seeking to understand the institution of punishment. 
Secondly, it is not a political science-oriented project, if political science is about 
deliberate efforts to be indifferent and neutral to morality and normative aspects of 
one's investigation. It will try to re-assure Paul Schroeder who stated that he could 
never be a political scientist, who in his view, is reluctant to abstract from self- 
knowledge and the moral dimension of their works. 30 Like all research, this thesis is 
a product of its time and circumstance. Before discussing the remaining chapters, it 
may be relevant to highlight the context in which this thesis was written. My original 
plan and decision was to write my thesis on the International Criminal Court. 
However, the events of international politics and also the existing literature on the 
ICC pushed me gradually further away from The Hague. My arrival in St Andrews in 
September 2001 coincided with the beginning of one of the most decisive periods in 
the post-Cold War environment in the form of the launch of the Global "War" on 
terrorism. 
As a citizen of Afghanistan, I was already one of the witnesses of the previous 
world war, the Cold War. The US-led war on terrorism, which was coined by the 
former CIA director as the Fourth World War31 elevated Afghanistan to one of the 
centres of the new world war. Furthermore, since "the Clash of Civilisations" has 
become the ideological framework of the new war in many quarters, Islam has also 
become one of the main targets and focus of the warriors of the new world war. In 
other words, as an Afghan/British/Muslim (in an alphabetical order), my personal 
involvement and engagement in the new world war was inevitable. I recall my first 
30 Paul W. Schroeder, "International History: Why Historians Do It Differently than Political 
Scientists" Elman & Elman, W. cit., p. 416. 31 Former CIA Director described the US-Led war on terrorism as the Fourth World War. See: 
http: //www. newsmax. com/archives/articies/2002/7/24/230153. shtml 
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months in St Andrews. On one hand I was very much concerned about the safety of 
my family in Afghanistan, who were in grave danger from the Taliban's scorched 
earth policy against civilians, and equally from the "collateral" damage of the US-led 
military attack on the Taliban. On the other hand, I had to deal with the suspicion and 
intrusion of the local police who were keen to satisfy their curiosity and suspicion 
about my background and my political and ideological allegiance. Also, to a lesser 
extent and on some occasions, I encountered such curiosity displayed and uttered by 
some individuals in the town and the University. 
I was, however, privileged to witness the evolving events of the world. from 
different perspectives. For example, on my first visit to Afghanistan following the 
collapse of the Taliban, witnessing the US forces in Afghanistan revived my past 
memories of the Russians and the Taliban. My home city, Herat, in the west of 
Afghanistan, was one of the most prosperous cities of the "land of the thousand cities" 
during the ancient and medieval periods. It also has an important geographic position 
due to its location at the cross roads of different countries and regions. At the highest 
point in the city, which is now the city centre, there is a military fortress that was built 
by Alexander the Great during his military odyssey to Asia. Because of the strategic 
location of the fortress, succeeding invading armies have used it as one of their main 
military posts in the city and the region. In my lifetime, I have had the "opportunity" 
to encounter with the last three invading armies, though in different capacity and 
circumstance. They were the Red Army, the Taliban/Al-Qaheda, and the US army. 
Despite some differences among the three, they demonstrated some striking parallels 
with one another. All three charäcterised themselves as liberating armies; they were 
keen to transplant their ideology and political values and institutions to the country; 
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they organised local apparatus to support and implement their "liberating" missions; 
they were sensitive to winning the minds and the hearts of the local population; and 
many more similar parallel policies and approaches. 
I studied how religious and ethnic minorities were treated during the time of 
hostilities, such as the Jewish, the Irish, and the American Japanese. The events of 
post-September 11200 1, allowed me to witness to what extent western nations and 
institutions were determined not to repeat the mistake of their predecessors. A recent 
UK Education Secretary's speech to the head of UK universities provided an example 
of how the menaces of suspicion and uncertainty have reached even these seats of 
learning. In the context of the challenge of terrorism, Ruth Kelly advised Higher 
Education Institutions of the "need to identify and confront unacceptable behaviour 
on their premises and within their community. They should alter and be unafraid to 
set their own boundaries ... That means 
informing the police where criminal offences 
"32 are being perpetrated or where there may be concerns about possible criminal acts. 
Her colleagues at the Home Office have also been active in providing a list of 
possible unacceptable behaviours and new criminal offences such as glorifying 
terrorism. 33 Equally I have witnessed how a large number of individuals have resisted 
being manipulated by the politics of fear and division. 
Therefore, I came to the view that an exclusive and narrow focus on the ICC might 
not provide answers to all of my questions, and, gradually shifted towards the 
examination of other cultures, traditions, and approaches in making sense of the 
institution of punishment. 
32 For the full text of her speech see, http: //education. guardian. co. uk/0,3858,5286738-108229,00. html 
(September 15,2005) 
33 For the list of latest addition of the UK's anti-terror legislative activities see, UK Home Office 
Website at: http: //www. homeoffice. gov. uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/ 
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Chapter 2 
The Concept of Punishment 
Every act or omission that is regarded as a transgression, in any given society, 
promotes a responsive attitude, judgement or action, which are some of the 
characteristics of the institution of punishment. The institution of punishment is a 
multifaceted and a multidimensional one, which has been studied in different 
disciplines. Criminologists and criminal justice practitioners view punishment more or 
less exclusively as a technique of crime control. Penal institutions and the processes 
of punishment are seen by penology as the means to a fairly self-evident end: the 
reduction of crime rates and the restraint of individual criminals. Moral philosophers 
have been studying the philosophy of punishment for many centuries, examining the 
normative foundations on which the penal system rests or ought to rest. In recent 
years a third style of thinking about punishment has begun to develop and to offer a 
different framework for the analysis of penal issues. Instead of viewing punishment as 
a means to an end or a stock problem for moral philosophy, sociologists and 
historians have begun to conceptualise punishment as a social institution and to pose a 
series of questions that stem from this approach. 34 
The discipline of international relations has also had its share of interest on the 
question of punishment. The growing literature and initiatives on the issues of war 
crimes, transitional justice, and international criminal tribunals have made the 
34David Garland, "Sociological Perspectives on Punishment" in Crime and Justice. Vol. 14 (1991), p. 
119. 
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discourse of accountability at the international level a major concern and interest both 
for the theorists and the practitioners. 
This introductory chapter aims to provide a summary of the main issues related to 
the institution of punishment. Its aim is to serve as a building block of the thesis 
argument. The first part focuses on the philosophical/jurisprudential account of 
punishment. It will be followed by an examination of the sociological aspect of the 
institution of punishment. The third part focuses on the notion of collective 
responsibility/punishment which is an important concept in understanding the 
institution of punishment in the contexts of war crimes, transitional justice and 
punishing states. 
I. The Philosophical/Jurisprudential Discussion of 
Punishment 
This part will begin by looking at some of the main definitions of punishment that 
have been articulated. It then proceeds to examine the two principal perspectives on 
the justification and the aim of punishment, Retributivism and Consequentialism. 
A. What is Punishment? 
In order for an act to be an act to be seen as punishment, the active presence of 
different players/agents is required. They are the victim, perpetrator, onlookers, and 
the penalising authority. The occasion for the inflicting of suffering (punishment) is 
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either the commission of a proscribed act or the omission of a required one. Nigel 
Walker's definition of punishment explains the nature of the relationship between the 
different components of punishment. He identifies seven features of punishment as 
follows: 
1. It involves the infliction of something which is assumed to be unwelcome to 
the recipient. 
2. The infliction is intentional and is done for a reason. 
3. Those who are ordered it are regarded - by the members of the society, 
organisation, or family- as having the right to do so. 
4. The occasion for the infliction is an action or omission which infringes a law, 
rule, or custom. 
5. The person punished has played a voluntary part in the infringement, or at 
least his punishers believe or pretend to believe that he has done so. 
6. The punisher's reason for punishing must include a justification for doing so. 
It must not be mere sadism, for example. 
7. It is the belief or intention of the person who orders something to be done, and 
not the belief or intention of the person to whom it is done, that settles the 
question as to whether or not it is punishment. 35 
Although suffering and pain seem to be the most prominent features of punishment, 
it is the occasion for the infliction that is most important. For example some painful 
acts such as medical treatment, intensive military training or euthanasia are not 
punishment, whereas some denunciatory acts such as excommunication, or the 
35 Nigel Walker, Why Punishment? Theories of Punishment Reassessed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), pp. 1-3. 
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severance of the mutual relationship between the punisher and punishee are regarded 
as punishment. 
The occasion for infliction of punishment determines the identity of victim(s) and 
the punishing authority. Some acts wrong either specific victims, such as murder, or a 
group of them, such as a blasphemous act. The latter crimes/wrongs are viewed by 
society not only as violation of the right of the immediate victim (i. e. God) but also as 
an affront to their moral values and sensitivity. In such an occasion, the victim 
(society) can also act as punishing authority through its representative. Some 
occasions also seem to lack any identifiable victim (s) such as treason, tax evasion or 
the so-called victimless crimes. 
Intentionality is another important component of justifiable infliction of 
punishment, in particular for those who subscribe to "just punishment". Intentionality 
raises the notion of responsibility and culpability. The correlation between 
responsibility and culpability is a fairly modem notion in the Western legal systems, 36 
although Islamic jurisprudence recognised it fourteen centuries ago, as this verse of 
the Koran shows: "God forgives those who commit evil in ignorance... ". 37 
In order to hold an individual criminally responsible there must be demonstration of 
an intent (mental element, mens rea), entailing awareness of the act of participation 
and a conscious decision to participate. The other requirement of individual criminal 
responsibility is the physical element (actus reus), which means there must be a 
36 Mary Margaret Mackenzie, Plato On Punishment (Los Angles: University of California Press, 1981), 
8. 
All references to the Koran are to the English translation of the Penguin books, 2003 edition. Koran 
is abbreviated to `K' and references to it cite the chapters and verse numbers. Koran, Chapter 4: 18. 
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participation that contributed to the commission of crime. However, three factors 
render the notion of responsibility opaque. The first is a question of metaphysics. If 
determinism is true, can we make any sense of the condition that the agent acted 
freely? The second is a question of moral psychology. Henry is adjudged guilty, not 
insane. But how do we know that all guilt is not a symptom of insanity? The third 
question is one of the legal relation between an agent and his act. Although there are 
straightforward cases where the criminals physically commit the crime, there are 
others where, either morally or legally, the ascription of responsibility is indirect. 38 
The occasion for inflicting suffering can sometimes be in conflict with either the 
legal system or the moral values of either the perpetrator or the victim. Such 
circumstances would prompt the old question of the conflict between legality and 
morality. For example someone who "steals" his neighbour's car in order to take his 
dying child to the hospital clearly commits an illegal act, but not an immoral act in the 
view of the majority of us. On the other hand there are acts, which are legally 
authorised or tolerated, but are in violation of moral requirements. The prime example 
of the clash between morality and legality was demonstrated by many of the 
defendants of the Nuremberg tribunal, who challenged the tribunal to establish the 
illegality of their involvement in the Nazi atrocities. 
Joel Feinberg has identified several features of legal responsibility which suggest 
analogies and contrast with moral responsibility. According to him, judgements of 
legal responsibility are strongly influenced by ulterior practical purposes; there is an 
irreducible margin of vagueness in the legal concept of responsibility; legal 
38 Margaret Mackenzie, W. cit., p. 9. 
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responsibility in problematic cases is relative to a variety of conflicting interests, 
purposes, and policies. 
In contrast to judgments of legal responsibility, judgements of moral responsibility 
can often be safely avoided, for nothing practical need hinge on them; moral 
responsibility must carry an immunity to vagueness; judgements of moral 
responsibility are absolute in the related sense of having an unqualified finality about 
them; and fourthly, moral responsibility must be regular and predicable. 39 
The often contrasting nature of moral responsibility and legal responsibility is 
demonstrated by the fact that some of the most famous personalities of history were 
declared common criminals by their respective justice systems, such as Jesus Christ, 
Mahatma Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela, whereas some of notorious individuals such 
as Stalin, spared any legal responsibility. The recent ruling by the Israeli Army on the 
entitlement of the victims of terrorists to compensation provides a contemporary case 
of the political nature and ulterior purpose of legal responsibility. Israel's defence 
ministry ruled in August 2005, that the four Arab Israelis shot dead by an Israeli 
soldier opposed to the closure of the Gaza Strip settlements were not victims of 
"terror" because their killer was Jewish. As such the Army rejected the application by 
the families of the slain Arabs for the usual compensation for life payable to victims 
of terrorist attacks. The ministry concluded that the law only recognises terrorism as 
committed by "organisations hostile to Israel". 40 Further definitions and examination 
of different aspects of punishment will be presented throughout this chapter and the 
proceeding ones. The next section will discuss the main contending paradigms on the 
justifications and the aims of punishment. 
39 Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: ys in The Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), pp. 26-31. 
40 http: //www. guardian. co. uk/0,3 858,5275084-10368 1,00. htmi. (01/09/2005) 
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1. Retributivism 
In the period after 1945 the dominant orthodoxy in many parts of the world, in 
particular in western countries, was consequentialism: a system of punishment must, 
it was thought, be justified by its consequential benefits - most obviously by its 
efficiency as a method of preventing or reducing crime. Punishment could serve that 
end in various ways: by deterring potential offenders, or by incapacitating offenders 
whose past crimes showed them to be in need of such reformative treatment. The 
1970s saw a growing revolt, involving both academic philosophers and more 
practically oriented theorists, against this consequentialist orthodoxy. 41 This new 
retributivism firmly rejected rehabilitation and deterrence as proper aims of 
punishment. Some held that punishment must be justified purely as a matter of 
imposing retribution for past wrongdoing. However, in recent years, a new revolt has 
been gradually emerging against retributivism by the advocates of "restorative 
justice". In this chapter consequentialism and retributivism will be examined. The 
concluding chapter of this thesis will focus on the discourse and tradition of 
"restorative justice". 
According to retributivism, punishment should take place because the criminal 
deserves it. Desert is a necessary and sufficient condition for his being punished. Why 
we punish, whom and how severely we punish are all determined by a single 
principle, which is desert. The absolute requirement of desert implies that 
retributivism regards the criminal as an autonomous and rational agent. Immanuel 
41 Antony Duff (ed. ) Punishment (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1993), p. xi. 
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Kant has provided one of the most articulate accounts of the autonomy of the 
individual and the need to respect him/her, by saying that, 
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other 
good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be 
imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being 
can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else... He 
must first be found to be deserving of punishment before any consideration is given to 
the utility of this punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens. 42 
The theory of retributivism is divided into "negative" and "positive" variants. 
Negative retributivism holds that it is morally wrong to punish an innocent person 
even if society might benefit from the action. Positive retributivism is more 
controversial. It takes the stronger position that not only must an innocent person 
never be punished; but, affirmatively, one who is guilty of an offence must be 
punished. In other words, retribution is a necessary and sufficient condition and 
rationale for punishment. Positive retributivism is further divided into two categories, 
"assaultive" and "protective" retribution. According to the former, it is right to 
despise criminals. The latter, protective retribution, is based on the proposition that 
not only does a just society have a right to punish voluntary wrongdoers, but that 
criminals also have a right to be punished 43 
Lex Talionis or jus talionis (return like for like) is the guiding principle of 
retributivism. It may be understood either "formally" or "materially". Understood 
42 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice. trans. John Ladd (Indianapolis: Boobs-Merrill, 
1965), p. 331. 
43 Joshua Dreeler, "Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good be Wrong? ", in 
Michigan Law Review Vol. 88, (1990), pp. 1451-52. 
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formally denotes that punishment should be proportional to the gravity of the offence, 
or otherwise made to "fit the crime". Understood "materially" it means that 
punishment should be proportional (in part at least) to harm done (or, perhaps, to be 
limited by the harm done). 44 
The most common criticism levelled at retributivism has been the claim that the 
principle ofjus talionis (return like for like) cannot be taken literally and its 
application would be too cruel and barbaric, since it entails theft for theft, robbery for 
robbery, an eye for eye, a tooth for a tooth. But this objection is superficial. The 
principle ofjus talionis, though requiring likening of punishment, does not require 
exact likeness in all respects. 
Von Hirsch articulates the notion of "Ordinal" and "Cardinal" proportionality to 
implement the requirement of the principle ofjus talionis. Ordinal proportionality 
relates to comparative punishments, and its requirements are reasonably specific. 
Persons convicted of crimes of comparable gravity should receive punishments of 
comparable severity (save under mitigating or aggravating circumstances altering the 
harmfulness of the conduct or the culpability of the actor). Persons convicted of 
crimes of differing gravity should receive punishments correspondingly graded in 
their degree of severity. 
Cardinal proportionality deals with the overall magnitude of reference on a penalty 
scale. If the state has set the penalties for certain crimes, then it can fix the penalty for 
44 Michael Davis "Harm and Retribution", in Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 
1986), pp. 190-1. 
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armed robbery by comparing the typical seriousness of this crime with the seriousness 
of those other crimes 45 
Margaret Fall proposes a further condition to protect the principle ofjus talionis 
from the charge of being cruel and inhumane. According to her, in addition to other 
requirements, punishment is justified only if the one suffering it remains capable of 
reflectively responding to the treatment being received and the condemnation it 
communicates. 46 Acts such as causing death, carrying out lobotomies, torture, and 
painfully maiming the criminal's body do not allow reflective moral assessment, and 
therefore, they cannot be justified by the retributive system. The requirement of 
respect for the criminal as an autonomous and rational agent prohibits the infliction of 
any cruel and inhumane methods of punishment, a condition that the consequentialists 
cannot satisfy. 
There are two distinctive questions about the justification(s) for punishment. They 
are the "general justifying aim" of punishment and the principles of its distribution. A 
punishment, therefore, may be justified in two different ways: either according to its 
general aim, or according to how it is to be distributed. With respect to retributivism, 
its proponents have proposed different justifications. They include: 
1. Debts to Society: since some of the crimes involve violation of society's 
rights, punishment satisfies the criminal's debt to society. 
45 Andrew von Hirsch, "Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From "Why Punish? " to 
"How Much? ", in Criminal Law Forum Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter 1990), p. 282. 46 M. Margaret Falls, "Retribution, Reciprocity, And Respect for Persons", in Law and Philosophy 
Vol. 6 (1987), p. 47. 
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2. Annulment: it is argued that a crime is a denial of a victim's right, whether 
to life, to property, or something else-and that punishment is a public 
declaration that the denial of such a right was mistaken. 
3. Rectifying Unfair Advantage: a law-breaker has taken unfair advantage, 
which can then be taken away from him by a penalty. He has usurped 
property, pleasure, or power in a way that is not open to the law-abiding 
man, who either has to go without or work harder for the same 
desiderandum. Penalties put matters right, either by removing what the 
offender has gained or by imposing disadvantages, as do penalties in 
games. 
4. A Metaphysical Justification: according to Kant, the duty to punish was a 
"categorical imperative". Many imperatives were "hypothetical", their 
force depending on their practical consequences. Categorical imperatives 
were of the moral variety, which do not depend on consequences. His 
famous remark in the Rechtslehre about "the last murderer" shows his 
view of categorical imperative: "Even if a civil society were to dissolve 
itself by common agreement ... the 
last murderer remaining in prison must 
first be executed so that.. . the 
blood-guilt thereof will not be fixed on the 
people... 147 
5. Spiritual Improvement: punishment can also involve a purification process 
for a wrongdoer, a process of healing. As Herbert Morris has written, 
experiencing the pain of punishment can be a kind of catharsis for the 
47 The locus classicus for his views on this subject is the short section on `The Right of Punishing' in I. 
Kant, Rechtslehre (1796-7), trans. W. Hasties as Philosophy of Law (Edinburgh: Clark, 1887). But for 
his explanations of 'categorical imperatives' see his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , trans. T. K. Abbott as Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (London: Longmans Green, 1883) 
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criminal, a way of "burning out" the evil in his sou1.48 Novelists like 
Dostoevesky have explored the criminal's need, born of guilt and shame, 
to experience pain at the hands of the society he has wronged in order to 
be reconciled with it. 49 Repentance or similar acts are the religious 
counterpart of purifying aspect of punishment. 
6. Retribution as Denunciation: a dictum stated by Lord Denning reflects the 
denunciatory aspect of punishment according to retributivist theory: "The 
ultimate justification of any punishment is not that it is a deterrent but it is 
the emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime. "so 
7. Only Connect: according to Robert Nozick, "the wrongdoer has become 
disconnected from correct values, and the purpose of punishment is to (re) 
connect him. It is not that this connection is a desired further effect of 
punishment: the act of retributive punishment itself effects this 
connection... "51 
The following remarks look at some of the questions on the shortcomings of 
retributivism that remain to be answered by its proponents. 
Margaret Mackenzie has identified three areas where the charge of incoherence or 
obscurantism can be levelled against retributivism. First, the notion of justice is 
48 Herbert Morris, "A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment", in American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 
18, (1981), p. 267. 
49 Jean Hampton, "The Moral Education Theory of Punishment", in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 12 (1984), p. 234. 
so Quoted in John Cottingham, "Varieties of Retribution", in Philosophical Review Vol. 29 (1979), p. 
245. 
51 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 363- 
97. 
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doubtful. Second, the assessment of desert is fraught with ignorance, which renders it 
indeterminate and imponderable, and therefore crime and punishment are 
incommensurable. And third, we should be sceptical that the question of the 
responsibility of the criminal can be determined. Philosophers from Plato onwards 
have debated the problem of intentionality, and the debate continues. 52 
Retributivists rightly place primary importance on justice. However, many of them 
reduce their focus to retributive justice and overlook the primacy of distributive 
justice. As Wojciech Sadurski has observed, "the principles of just distribution of 
socio-economic benefits have not been widely thought to be directly relevant to our 
thinking about the grounds of standards of criminal penalties. "53 If we refuse to draw 
the distinction between factors, which determine the worth of freedom and factors 
constitutive of freedom itself-then important socio-economic inequalities produce 
inequalities in the autonomy we enjoy. 54 The concluding section of the ICC chapter 
will further examine the relation between distributive justice and retributive justice in 
the context of international criminal justice. 
Another area to which retributivists have paid inadequate attention deals with the 
needs of the victims. Victims are one of the principal components of the institution of 
punishment. Retributivism' s primary focus on the criminal may not always 
correspond to the needs and demands of the victims. Victims may not always opt for 
retributive punishment and may consider other courses of action such as forgiveness 
52 Margaret Mackenzie, op. cit , p. 
33. 
53 Wojciech Sadurski, "Theory of Punishment, Social Justice, and Liberal Neutrality", in Law and 
Philosophy, Vol., 7 (1989), pp. 351. 
54 Ibid, p. 367. 
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and compensation. The chapter on forgiveness will further examine this line of 
enquiry. 
Another area that retributivists have paid inadequate attention is the adverse effect 
of punishment on the dependants of the criminal, which are the inevitable by-products 
of trials, sentence and imprisonment. If the offender is a husband or father, wife or 
mother, imprisonment usually entails distress for an innocent spouse or child. 
Although the harm done is not intentional and should be regarded as a regrettable 
injustice, a theory that prides itself on being the champion of justice, should not 
defend practices that often produce regrettable injustice. As the chapter on the Islamic 
institution of punishment will show, one of the main reasons that Muslim jurists have 
been reluctant to consider imprisonment as a method of punishment is their concern 
for the family of the prisoners. 
The following section on consequentialism's justification of punishment will also 
look at the various grounds of conflict between retributivism and consequentialism. 
2. Consequentialism 
As a result of the primary importance and place of desert in retributivism, it is seen 
to be a"backward" looking theory. Its rival theories claim to be "forward looking" or 
consequentialist. Restitution theory is somewhat different from both retributivism and 
consequentialism, and will be examined after consequentialism. 
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Consequentialism is divided into three sub-groups: deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. Deterrence means the inhibiting effect of sanctions on the criminal and 
also on the public. Incapacitation means isolating an identified offender from society 
at large, thereby preventing him or her from committing crimes in that society. 
Rehabilitation means the reform or correction of the offender through treatment, 
education, training, or any other mechanism which changes that part of the actor or 
his character that contributed to his criminal conduct. 55 
Consequentialist accounts are also often understood as utilitarian approaches. 
Sidgwick' s definition of utilitarianism captures its main essence: "The conduct 
which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce 
the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose 
"s6 happiness is affected by the conduct. 
Within utilitarianism we should distinguish between two types of theory: 
1. Act-Utilitarianism argues that each individual decision should be made ad hoc, 
favouring whatever action will produce the greatest good in the particular 
case. 
2. Rule-utilitarianism supposes that individual actions should be dictated by rules 
derived from the principle of utility, and therefore acts are only indirectly ` 
utilitarian. 57 
The following section looks at each of the three categories of consequentialism. 
55 Paul H. Robinson, "Hybrid Principles For The Distribution of Criminal Sanction", in Northwestern 
University Law Review, Vol. 82, (1987), p. 19, n. 1. 
56 H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1907), p. 411. 
57 Margaret Mackenzie, op. cit. , p. 35. 
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i. Deterrence 
There are two different concepts of deterrence, general and specific deterrence. The 
focus of the former is the public, in particular the potential offenders who observe the 
penalties imposed on others. The latter concerns the offender who is actually 
punished. The justification of punishment, on utilitarian lines, is straightforward. A 
crime is considered to be a form of harm, and the principle of utility demands that 
harm should be reduced as much as possible. Punishment, therefore, should have a 
triple function: to deter potential criminals from committing crimes, to protect the 
potential victims of crimes from becoming actual victims, and to prevent criminals 
from committing the crimes they have in mind. A deterrent punishment exploits our 
fear of physical or mental suffering. When we are tempted to commit a crime, we will 
weigh the temptation against our fear of punishment and, it is hoped, refrain from the 
crime. 58 
The principle of utility does not, however, dictate against the following possibilities: 
1. A has committed no crime at all. Nevertheless, it is thought that his 
punishment may have a deterrent effect, perhaps because others think that he 
has committed a crime. Therefore, the general good will to be served by his 
being punished; so he is punished. 
2. B is a recidivist who has committed crimes, but not this one. Nevertheless, 
perhaps for preventative reasons, it is thought useful to punish B for his 
supposed crime; so he is punished. 
58 Ibid., p. 37. 
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3. C actually committed this crime. He is only partly responsible for it because 
he was coerced. Yet punishment may still deter him from repeating the 
offence (next time, for example, he may offer greater resistance to coercion); 
therefore he is responsible in the instrumental sense. Again utility demands 
59 that he be punished; so he is punished. 
It is clear that from the retributivist perspective, all three cases would have been 
wrongly decided, as in each case both responsibility and hence culpability are limited. 
The prospect of victimisation and exploitation is a clear violation of justice. 
Therefore, the great charge levelled against the' utilitarian approaches is their inherent 
difficulties with the requirements of justice. 
By justice I refer here to Kurt Baier' s definition of justice. He has identified five 
concepts of justice. The first one is probably the oldest and most widely held. On this 
view, justice consists in giving everyone his due, where something is due to someone 
if he has a right to it or if he deserves it. The second conception takes justice to be that 
part of morality, which has to do with what is morally required of one, what others 
have a right against one, and what can be justifiably extracted. The third conception of 
justice is understood as the impartial and conscientious administration of the 
institutions composing the basic structure of a society, that is, those institutions that 
determine people's rights and duties in a particular society. The fourth conception 
associates justice with a certain excellence of institutions, namely, conformance with 
a certain principle, which we could call the principle of equitability. The fifth 
conception combines the first, third, and fourth. It ties justice to certain special 
institutions but subjects these to the principle of equitability. At the same time, it 
59 Ibid, p. 43. 
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makes justice applicable not only to actions, persons, and institutions but also to 
judgements, states of affairs, and the world. 60 
In addition to the potential and actual of violation of justice, the methods of 
deterrence have proven inadequate in deterring not only the many offenders but also 
the potential law-breakers. The growing number of criminals, both the first - timer 
and also recidivists, are testimonies to the failure of the existing apparatus of 
punishment. Even capital punishment, which is the ultimate deterrent tool, has proven 
to be not a great success. All the statistical studies have failed to show that capital 
punishment is an effective deterrent. 61 
ii. Rehabilitation 
When an offender who has been penalised ceases to offend, it is often hard to know 
why. The stigma of being labelled a thief or a mugger may have forced him to show 
that he does not deserve the label. The unpleasant memory of the penalty may have 
discouraged him ('individual deterrence'). A parent or social worker may have 
reasoned with him and persuaded him that his behaviour was selfishly harmful to 
others ('reform'). A supervisor may have found him employment or at least some 
law-abiding activity to pass the time ('rehabilitation'). Two or more of these 
processes may have combined to produce the effect. Nigel Walker proposes that in 
order to avoid confusion, it is safer to refer to such offenders as "corrected". 62 
60 Kurt Baier, "Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy" in Ethics Vol. 99, No. 4 (Jul., 1989), pp. 
771-790. 
61 David A. Conway, "Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Considerations in Dialogue Form", in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 3 (1974), p. 262. 
62 Walker, op. cit., p. 42. 
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Closely connected with the notion of corrected/reformed, is the concept of the 
humanitarian approach. Margaret Mackenzie and some others characterise their 
reform-oriented theory as the humanitarian approach. Humanitarian punishment is the 
means to achieve reform of the criminal. The actual punishment, therefore, will be 
chosen and executed with reference to the needs of the subject, and by one or the 
combined approaches of the following three methods: 
1. Conditioning: here the penologist aims to establish, by more or less crude 
means, a response in criminal which will inhibit him, in the future, from 
committing crimes. 
2. Therapy: here the criminal is thought of as sick, and his disposition as an 
illness of which the crimes are the symptoms. The appropriate action to be 
taken, therefore, is to treat his illness, with a view to curing it. 
3. Education: according to a different explanation, crimes are committed as a 
result of intellectual deficiency. Punishment, therefore, should teach him what 
is right and what is wrong and should induce him, acting on his knowledge, to 
follow the right and eschew the wrong. Hence the purpose of punishment is to 
educate the criminal out of his disposition. 63 
As with other consequential/utilitarian theories of punishment, the humanitarian 
approach does not concern itself with the requirements of justice. Often justice 
recommends a course of actions that do not correspond with the aim of reformer. 
63 Margaret Mackenzie, U. cit., p. 60. 
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Moreover, the humanitarian approach disregards the individual autonomy and 
freedom of the criminal, and treats him/her as a sick/ignorant person in need of 
treatment and education. 
Another normative charge against the humanitarian approach is the question of 
values that reformer wishes to promote, and whether the ends are morally justified. 
Moreover, the humanitarian approach is silent about how to deal with many legally 
prohibited acts such as civil disobedience or those offenders that have been proven to 
be un-reformable. Even in the cases of detectable and hence reformable deviance, 
the great shortcoming of therapeutic methods is that our understanding of moral 
psychology is too limited to allow us to say whether crime is a disease or not, let 
alone what medical measures are appropriate for its treatment. 64 
iii. Incapacitation 
In some criminal justice systems the length of the sentences is determined by the 
offender' s susceptibility to recidivism. Those offenders, who are deemed likely to 
repeat the offence, will be sentenced to a lengthier period, in order to be incapacitated 
in committing further offences. "Preventive Detention" is another category of 
incapacitation. The detainees can be those suffering from some sort of psychological/ 
neurological breakdown or those who are deemed dangerous on social/political 
grounds. For the latter category, one can refer to the UK's policy of internment in the 
1970s Irish who were suspected of belonging to militant Irish groups, or the recent 
detention of some Muslims by the UK and the US. 
64 Ibid. , p. 60. 
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Nicola Lacey has identified three problems that need to be addressed in order to 
justify the selection and special treatment of dangerous offenders. They are: 
1. What is the underlying justification of the general penal policy in society? 
How is punishment inflicted on offenders by the criminal justice system to be 
justified? 
2. Whether the special class of offender which we must identify to carry through 
our proposed policy can in fact be identified. 
3. The question whether it is justifiable to treat that class differently from other 
offenders in pursuit of social protection would have to be confronted. And, if 
differentiation is justifiable at all, what measure of unequal treatment is 
justifiable? 65 
In addition to the doubts about the possibility of accurate estimation and prediction 
of the future behaviours of many so-called dangerous offenders, many such detentions 
are politically motivated. Media, reactive politicians, and the frightened public often 
exercise significant pressures on the judiciary to be tough on certain groups of 
offenders or undesirable persons. And since the majority of these groups of detainees 
come from marginalized and vulnerable communities and backgrounds, there is less 
institutional support offered to such individuals. Nonetheless, and despite many 
questions over the justice of preventive detention, these measures are undeniably 
65 Nicola Lacey, "Dangerousness and Criminal Justice: The Justification of Preventive Detention", in 
Current Legal Problems. Vol. 36, (1983), pp. 32-33. 
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effective for as long as they are allowed to last. 66 However, it does not necessarily 
mean that some of these individuals cease to be offenders. To the surprise of many, 
prisons are known to be one of the most conducive environments for committing 
crimes, which involve many of the supposedly incapacitated prisoners. 
3. Restitution 
Restitution is operated on a quid pro quo basis. It assumes that the principles of 
commerce are good ones, whereby any gain should be paid for, any loss repaired. And 
a crime, it is supposed, is an unfinished commercial exchange; it constitutes a gain to 
the criminal that has not been paid for and an uncompensated loss suffered by the 
victim. Another rationale for restitution is that it aims to make the victim "whole" 
again. Restitutive theory only considers crime, and need make no allowance for the 
responsibility of the criminal. For it is the effect of his act upon his victim, but not his 
intention towards the victim, that restitution aims to cancel out. 67 Restitution seems to 
be more compensation than punishment. 
The strength of restitutive theory is that it pays primary attention to the victim, 
unlike other theories, which treat victims as those who initiate the process. 
However, restitutive theory can also clash with the requirements of justice. Since 
satisfaction of the victim is the principal criterion, there would be occasions where the 
victim's requirement exceeds the threshold of the desert. Furthermore, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to make commensurable the suffering of the victim and the 
compensation paid. There are crimes that cannot be materially compensated 
66 Walker, Op. cit., p. 136. 
67 Margaret Mackenzie, U. cit., p. 18. 
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materially. Also, there would be groups of offenders who cannot afford financially to 
compensate their victims. 
The Islamic institution of punishment is among the few systems that have 
incorporated restitution into penal code. During the medieval period, and also in those 
present - day Muslim states, which enforce Islamic penal codes, at the beginning of 
each calendar year, the judiciary produces a scale of penalties in monetary terms for 
some offences, in particular violent crimes. The highest price is allocated to homicide 
and the loss of major organs, and less violent offences and injury to the victim equal 
with lesser amounts. The perpetrator will have to pay the amount of compensation as 
determined by the judiciary, according to this scale. 
B. Possible Alignments of the Theories of Punishment 
The concluding section of this part focuses on the irresolvable difficulties in 
combining two or more of the contending theories of punishment. As the foregoing 
sections demonstrated, in applying each of the contending theories of punishment one 
faces formidable theoretical and practical difficulties. Any attempt to combine them 
would also raise different problems. This section looks at some of these problems. 
Paul Robinson has identified sixteen theoretically possible alignments of the four 
purposes of punishment (desert, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation), which are 
mainly concerned with the offender. The number of alignments equals 2x, where x is 
the number of different purposes. The following seven alignments are samples of his 
calculation: 
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1. Deterrence vs. all others; 
2. Desert vs. all others; 
3. Incapacitation vs. all others; 
4. Rehabilitation vs. all others; 
5. Deterrence and desert vs. incapacitation and rehabilitation 
6. Deterrence and incapacitation vs. desert and rehabilitation 
7. Deterrence and rehabilitation vs. desert and incapacitation 68 
Had he added the restitutive theory to his formula, he would have to expand his list 
of possible alignments and hence more questions. Perhaps Robinson's admission is an 
appropriate and concise statement to conclude this part. According to him, there is 
almost universal failure to articulate a guiding principle. 69 
The next part examines the sociological perspective on punishment to establish 
whether the sociologists can explain the reason(s) for such 
a failure, and to what 
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II. The Sociological Perspective on Punishment 
Philosophers attempt to offer a priori theories, theories about how certain concepts 
are to be analysed and their application justified. 70 As such philosophical theories 
regarding punishment do not always concern themselves with the empirical facts on 
the ground. A sociological perspective sees punishment as a social institution, 
focusing on the various interactions between and among the facets of the institution of 
punishment. A mere philosophical account cannot shed light on the multiple facets of 
the institution of punishment, and should be complemented by a sociological account. 
This part will begin with a brief examination of the institution of punishment as 
articulated by one of the prominent contemporary authorities on the sociology of 
punishment, David Garland. It then proceeds to discuss the three important 
sociological perspectives on punishment by Emile Durkheim, Michel Foucault, and 
Norbert Elias. The Marxist perspective on punishment will also be briefly examined 
following Foucault. 
David Garland defines the sociology of punishment as " ... broadly conceived, to be 
that body of thought which explores the relations between punishment and society, its 
purpose being to understand punishment as a social phenomenon and thus trace its 
role in social life. "71 Moreover, he regards as inadequate the term "punishment" to 
capture the multiplicity of the institution of punishment, and thus proposes the term 
"penality" for such an end. The generic term "penality", according to him, "refers to 
70 Jeffries G. Murphy, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 103. 
71 David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), p. 10. 
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the network of laws, processes, discourses, representations and institutions which 
make up the penal realm. "72 
Unlike the limited focus of philosophical accounts of punishment and also 
penology, the sociology of punishment actively seeks to establish the interactions of 
the institution of punishment with other social processes and institutions. Unlike the 
former perspectives, which view punishment from within, in the words of Garland, 
"The sociology of punishment views them from the outside, as it were, and seeks to 
understand their role as one distinctive set of social processes situated within a wider 
social network. "73 Therefore, an outsider's account (sociological account) is needed to 
complement the insider's one (philosophical). As the following sections seek to 
demonstrate, despite the important and insightful accounts of leading sociological 
perspectives on punishment, each of them individually remains unable to provide a 
coherent and satisfactory account of punishment. 
A. Emile Durkheim 
The main components of Durkheim's account are punishment's moral and social- 
psychological roots as well as its putative solidarity-producing effects. For him, 
punishment is the straightforward embodiment of society's moral order, and an 
occasion that provides for the society to represent and sustain its moral order. 
Durkheim discussed punishment most extensively in three major texts: The Division 
of Labour (1895), `Two Laws of Penal Evolution' (1902), and the university lectures 
which came to form `Moral Education. (1902-3) 
72 Ibid. , p. 17. 73 Ibid.,. p. 10. 
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Durkheim's principal framework with respect to punishment, social solidarity, is 
discussed in The Division of Labour. He defined crime as acts that violate the sacred 
norms of the conscience collective, which then prompt a punitive reaction. His 
definition of the conscience collective or commune is "the totality of beliefs and 
sentiments common to the average citizen of the same society [which] forms a 
determinate system which has its own life. "74 Crimes, by violating the conscience 
collective, then produce an automatic solidarity, a spontaneous reaffirmation of 
mutual beliefs and relationships, which serve to strengthen the social bond: 
Although [punishment] proceeds from a quite mechanical reaction, from movements 
which are passionate and in great part non-reflective, it does play a useful role. Only 
this role is not where we ordinarily look for it. It does not serve, or else only serves 
quite secondarily, in correcting the culpable or in intimidating possible followers. 
From this point of view its efficacy is justly doubtful and, in any case, mediocre. Its 
true function is to maintain social cohesion intact, while maintaining all its vitality in 
the common conscience. 75 
Durkheim in his `Two Laws of Penal Evolution' attempted to locate his discussion 
of punishment within a historical context. According to Durkheim, the intensity of 
punishment has tended to become less, as societies have become more advanced and, 
at the same time, deprivation of liberty by imprisonment has emerged as the preferred 
form of punishment replacing the various capital and corporal methods, which pre- 
existed it. He argued that there is a direct relation between the intensity of punishment 
and the nature of the "conscience collective". According to him, primitive societies 
were primarily religious societies. The social moralities of such societies were severe, 
rigid, and demanding, and their rules were treated as transcendental laws, authorised 
74 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour translated by W. D. Halls (London, 1984), p. 79. 
75 Ibid. 
, p. 108. 
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by the gods. Crimes were, therefore, treated as an affront to gods, and punishment 
would be harsh and vengeful, not only against offenders but also against their kin. 
In contrast, advanced societies, according to Durkheim, lack the character of 
intensive religious morality, but are informed by values and virtues such as freedom, 
human dignity, reason, tolerance, and diversity. Such values and virtues give rise to a 
more humane and moderate reaction amid the violating of the conscience collective of 
modem societies. In the words of Durkheim, "... the same cause which sets in motion 
the repressive apparatus tends also to halt it. The same mental state drives us to punish 
and to moderate the punishment. Hence an extenuating influence cannot fail to make 
itself felt. "76 
Durkheim identifies an exception in his account of the progress of the humanising 
of punishment. Absolutism, in the form of totalitarian systems, has the same 
consequences for punishment, as do the collective sentiments of simple societies. He 
writes of such government as follows: 
Wherever the government takes this form, the one who controls it appears to people 
as divinity. When they do not make an actual God to him, they at the very least see in 
the power which is invested in him an emanation of divine power. From that moment, 
this religiosity cannot fail to have its usual effect on punishment. 77 
In his Moral Education, Durkheim focused on the moral importance and effects of 
punitive measures. As he puts it: 
76 Ibid., p. 126. 
77 Ibid., p. 129. 
58 
a moral violation demoralises... the law that has been violated must somehow bear 
witness that despite appearances it remains always itself, that it has lost none of its 
force or authority despite the act that repudiated it. In other words, it must assert itself 
in the face of the violation and react in such a way as to demonstrate a strength 
proportionate to that of the attack against it. Punishment is nothing but this 
meaningful demonstration. 78 
An important aspect of Durkheim's emphasis on the educative function of 
punishment is the application of such theory to modem secular societies. He reveals 
that even in modem society, "the domain of morality is as if surrounded by a 
mysterious barrier which keeps violators at arm's length, just as the religious domain 
"79 is protected from the reach of the profane. It is a sacred domain. 
There have been some criticisms levelled against the many components of 
Durkheim's account of punishment. Despite the crucial place of the concept of the 
conscience collective, we are not told how this common conscience comes into 
existence: we learn nothing about the history or conditions of emergence of this 
crucial entity. 8° More importantly, Durkheim seems to espouse an uncritical view of 
social morality. The moral outlook of a society may itself be morally questionable. 81 
Furthermore, establishing a society is not just a matter of socialising deviant 
individuals, it is also, critically, a matter of subduing competing social movements 
and social groups. David Garland refers to a "ruling morality", or a `dominant moral 
order" instead of the generalised and unrepresentative notion of collective 
conscience. 82 
78 Emile Durkheim, Moral Education (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 166. 
79 Ibid. p. 10. 
80 Garland, `Punishment & Modern Society', op. cit., p. 50. 
81 Igor Primoratz, "Punishment as Language", in Philosophy, Vol. 64 (1989), pp. 204-05. 
82 Garland, `Punishment & Modern Society', op. cit. , p. 
52. 
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Durkheim's division of societies into two distinctive groups, simple and advanced, 
not only does not represent the empirical realities of each of the group, it also ignores 
the intermediate group to which many societies seem to belong. 
Durkheim's efforts to highlight the humanistic and moderate methods of punishment 
of modem societies seem to be in contradiction to his account of secular states. As 
discussed above, according to Durkheim, with the exception of "absolutist" states, 
there has been an evolution from more intensive and harsh methods of punishment to 
more lenient forms. However, he concedes in Moral Education, that modem secular 
moralities are nonetheless perceived to be in some way "sacred" and "transcendental" 
and any violation or infringement of their rules prompts the same violent reprobation 
"that the blasphemer arouses in the soul of the believer. , 83 In other words, he fails to 
explain why he believes that there are fundamental differences between the reaction 
against a religious-oriented sacred and transcendent rule and a secularly-oriented 
sacred and transcendent rule. 
Michel Foucault's account of punishment in many respects can be seen as an 
attempt to highlight some issues that Durkheim's account failed to address. His 
account will be briefly examined in the next section. 
83 Durkheim, `Moral Education', op. cit., p. 9. 
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B. Michel Foucault 
Michel Foucault's account of punishment was part of his prolonged assault on what 
he regarded as the myths of the Enlightenment and modernity. What Durkheim 
celebrated, namely social bonds, Foucault despised. Durkheim investigated and 
championed normative social constraints, whereas Foucault investigated and found 
them intrinsically problematic. 84 In his masterpiece on punishment, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault draws our attention to three major and 
interrelated concepts which are the fundamentals of any structure of domination 
namely: power, knowledge, and the body. In the view of Foucault, prisons are not the 
only place that one can find the presence of normalising and disciplining powers in 
modern society, but they are present in many facets of modern societies: 
The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher- 
judge, the doctor judge, the educator judge, and "social worker" judge; it is on them 
that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he 
may find himself, subjects to its body, his gesture, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his 
achievement. 85 
Foucault argues that the real aims of modern criminal justice systems are neither 
leniency nor excessiveness of the punishment, but a certainty and comprehensiveness 
of application which would operate "down to the finest grain of the social body. "86 In 
addition to their punishing function, modern societies' disciplinary methods apply a 
84 Mark S. Cladis, "Durkheim and Foucault on Education and Punishment" in Durkheim and Foucault 
Perspectives on Education and Punishment, edited by Mark S. Cladis (Oxford: Durkheim Press, 1999), 
6. 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheriden (London: 
Penguin Groups, 1977), p. 304. 
86 Ibid., p. 80. 
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whole new method of sanctioning which Foucault calls "normalisation". This method 
is essentially corrective rather than punitive in orientation, concerned to induce 
conformity rather than to exact retribution or expiation. The examination is, for this 
system, a central method of control, allowing close observation, differentiation, 
assessment of standards, and the identification of any failure to conform. 87 
Foucault observed that the institutions of punishment combine to create a normative 
discourse that marks punishment as a central component of socio-political order. A 
societal and political institution denotes, "recognised and established usages 
governing the relations between individuals or groups". 88 An institution in this sense 
is "an enduring, complex, integrated, organised behaviour pattern through which 
social control is exerted and by means of which the fundamental social desires or 
needs are met". 89 
There has been a range of convincing critiques of some aspects of Foucault's 
account of punishment. For example, David Garland has challenged Foucault's 
interpretation of when the practice of public torture and execution in Western Europe 
was abandoned. Foucault locates this historical development between about 1750 and 
1820, whereas according to Garland's account, such a change began about 1600.90 
More importantly, Foucault seems to have given undue importance to the ruse of 
power in modern society. As such, he has ignored the contribution and role of other 
87 Garland, `Punishment and Modern Society', op. cit. p. 145. 
88 Morris Ginsberg, Sociology (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1934), p. 42. 
89 Dictionary of Sociology, edited by H. P. Fairchild (Iowa: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1995), p. 157. 
90 Ibid., p. 158. 
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influential ends such as justice, economy, vengeance, forgiveness, charity, 
evangelism, and so on. 91 
Foucault's obsession with power inhibited him from seeing that power is not evil 
per se, but its application and the ends that it pursues should determine our view of 
power and discipline. Only anarchists would reject the need to discipline and to 
control certain categories of individuals such as children, soldiers, wild animals or 
those who carry contagious diseases. As David Garland has observed, "Foucault's 
work refuses to make discerning judgements about the different purposes to which 
"power" can be put, and, in so doing, implies that one is no better than any other. , 92 
However, despite some questions over Foucault's account of punishment, he has 
provided an insightful account of the internal workings of the apparatus of 
punishment not only in modern societies, but also in societies that share some of their 
characteristics. The chapter on the Athenian institution of punishment will draw upon 
Foucault's perspective on punishment. 
C. Marxist Perspective 
The Marxist perspective on punishment also focuses on political and "authority- 
creating" and social conditions of punishment. It has been informed by the principal 
tenets of Marxism, in particular the class struggle. In commenting on Hegel's 
assertion that "punishment is the right of the criminal", Karl Marx wrote: 
91 Ibid., p. 163. 
92 Ibid. , p. 170. 
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There is no doubt something specious in this formula... Looking, however, more 
closely into the matter, we discover that German Idealism here, as in most other 
instances, has but given a transcendental sanction to the rules of existing society. Is it 
not a delusion to substitute for the individual with his real motives, with multifarious 
social circumstances pressing upon him, the abstraction of "free will"-one among the 
many qualities of man for man himself? ... Is there not a necessity 
for deeply 
reflecting upon an alteration of the system that breeds these crimes, instead of 
glorifying the hangman who executes a lot of criminals to make room only for the 
supply of new ones? 93 
William Bonger's Criminality and Economic Conditions (1916) has also provided 
an elaborated and sustained Marxist analysis of crime and punishment. According to 
him, 
The abnormal element in crime is a social, not a biological, element... We clearly see 
that [the egoistic tendencies of the present economic system and of its consequences] 
are very strong. Because of these tendencies the social instinct of man is not greatly 
developed ; they have weakened the moral force in man which combats the 
inclination towards egoistic act, and hence toward the crimes which are one form of 
these acts... 
As a consequence of the present environment, man has become very egoistic and 
hence more capable of crime, than if the environment had developed the germs of 
altruism ... 
94 
The Marxist perspective is important in enabling us to understand the political nature 
of many apparatus of administration of justice both domestically and internationally. 
But as with other perspectives, it has given undue importance to one or few facets of 
the institution of punishment, and ignoring the others. The next section of this part 
will be a brief account of Norbert Elias' perspective on punishment. 
93 Karl Marx, "Capital Punishment" New York Daily Tribune (18 February 1853), as quoted in Jeffries 
G. Murphy, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1979), 93. 
94 William Bonger, Criminality and Economic Conditions (Boston: Little, Brown, 1916), pp. 75-76 & 
An Introduction to Criminology (London: Methuen 1936), pp. 532,402, and 483 -84 in the order 
quoted. 
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D. Norbert Elias 
Another important issue surrounding the institution of punishment is the methods 
and forms of inflicting punishment. The "presential" aspect of punishment does not 
have a prominent place in any of the leading philosophical debates on the 
justifications of punishment. However, in recent years, this issue has appeared 
regularly in the debates over punishment. It is not unusual to hear that certain forms of 
punishment are characterised as "offensive", "repugnant", "barbaric", "savage", 
"inhumane", "cruel and unusual" and demands are made for "civilised" or "humane" 
forms of punishment. Such characterisations seem to have significant presence in the 
discussions over Islamic penal codes and also the methods of capital punishment. The 
opponents of both cases, Islamic penal code and capital punishment, would not 
hesitate to express their condemnation by resorting to labels such as barbaric and 
cruel. The label "civilised" is one of the widely used terms that many in the West 
have reserved for themselves and as a result "barbaric" has been a convenient term to 
describe those aspects of non-westerns which are manifestly different from the 
Western versions. 95 
The advocates of the progression of humanity and civilisation from primitive to 
more advanced, draw our attention to the evolution of methods of punishment from 
harsh to moderate forms in recent centuries, in particular in the West. Such a view of 
the correlation between one's degree of civility and the methods of punishment, is 
best captured in Winston Churchill's declaration that a society's penal methods are an 
index and measure of its civilisation. 
95 In the case of the death penalty, the US belongs to non-Western block. 
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Norbert Elias has conducted the most extensive study on this topic, in the context of 
the changed sensibilities of the west, since the late medieval period. In his two- 
volume account of The Civilising Process, first published in 1939, he sets out a 
detailed description of the ways in which western sensibilities have changed. He 
defines the concept of civilisation as "a specific transformation of human 
behaviour". 96 
Transformations of behavioural norms - and, eventually, of behaviour - are traced 
by Elias in several different spheres of social and personal life: table manners, 
attitudes towards bodily functions, the proper methods of spitting or blowing one's 
nose, behaviour in the bedroom, habits of washing and cleanliness, the expression of 
aggression, relationships between adults and children, the conduct of men in the 
presence of women, proper ways of addressing superiors or strangers - all these 
undergo important changes. According to Elias, the elite groups of court society 
pioneered many of these changes, in particular, their control of emotions and 
sensitivity to the feelings and intentions of others. 
In the development of cultural manners, a key feature which Elias identifies, is the 
process of privatisation whereby certain aspects of life disappear from the public 
arena to become hidden behind the scenes of social life such as sex, violence, bodily 
function, illness, suffering, and death. His description of the socially sanctioned 
methods of carving animal meat is an insightful example of the many changes to 
which Elias referred: 
96 Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process, I, The History of Manners (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978), p. 207. 
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The increasingly strong tendency to remove the distasteful from the sight of society 
clearly applies, with few exceptions, to the carving of the whole animal. This 
carving.. . was 
formerly a direct part of social life in the upper class. Then the 
spectacle is felt more and more to be distasteful. Carving itself does not disappear, 
since the animal must, of course, be cut when being eaten. But the distasteful is 
removed behind the scenes of social life. Specialists take care of it in the shop or the 
kitchen. It will be seen again and again how characteristic of the whole process that 
we call civilisation is this movement of segregation, this hiding `behind the scenes' of 
what has become distasteful. 97 
The above description can equally be utilised to describe the institution of 
punishment in modern societies. The "humanising" methods of execution in the US 
are a prime example of the sanitization and privatisation of modem judicial violence. 
To many onlookers, the gas chamber, lethal injection, or electric chairs are certainly 
more civilised than shooting or hanging. However, to paraphrase a Public Relations' 
concept, spinning out of the methods of the death penalty cannot change its inhumane 
nature. As Elias warned us, the closed walls of the prisons have disguised the brutal 
violence that prevails inside many prisons. 
The social degradation of having to share a tiny cell with strangers - which in 
Britain involves not only a lack of privacy and personal security but often the 
necessity of having to perform one's bodily functions in front of others, and then 
`slopping out' excrement - is, in a modern civilised society a brutalising and 
dehumanising punishment in itself. 98 Such brutality has been compounded by many 
overcrowded prisons across the industrial world. In the case of England and Wales, in 
July 2005, two-thirds of prisons were declared to be overcrowded. 99 The increasing 
number of prison suicides throughout the industrial countries can demonstrate the 
97Ibid. 
, p. 121. 98 Garland, `Punishment and Modern Society', op. cit. , p. 242. 99 http: //society. guardian. co. uk/0,3858,5261857-107705,00. html 
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extent of the sublimated violence that prevails behind the closed doors of the 
overcrowded prisons. In case of the UK, in year 2004, the UK Prison Service reported 
that ninety-five prisoners took their lives in England and Wales's prisons alone. '00 
Another brutalising aspect of modern criminal justice system in countries, such as 
the US, is the plight of inmates on death row. Albert Camus has captured such 
brutality as follows, "As a general rule, a man is undone by waiting for capital 
punishment well before he dies. Two deaths are inflicted on him, the first being worse 
than the second, whereas he killed but one. " °' 
The sanitized, and privatised but brutal violence behind much judicial punishment 
not only challenges the legitimacy of many aspects of modern criminal justice 
systems, but it also disguises the growing crises with respect to their competence and 
effectiveness. The concluding section of this part will draw attention to two different 
reports, concerning the number of reported violent offences in England, and the 
percentage of punished crimes in contemporary societies, which highlight the extent 
of challenges that modern criminal justice systems face in regard to their purported 
aims. 
The rise of violent crimes: according to latest figures from the British Police, violent 
offences in England and Wales reached record levels in 2004-5 with police recording 
one million crimes - up to 7% from the previous year. Police figures show 1,035,046 
violent incidents against the person, excluding sexual offences and robberies. '02 
100 News in Brief Guardian Weekly January 7-13, (2005 ), p. 9. 
101 Albert Camus, "Reflections on the Guillotine, " in Resistance, Rebellion and Death (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 205. 
102 http: //news. co. uk/hi/t/hi/uk/4096372. stm 
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Undoubtedly the number of actual offences exceeds by far more than the reported 
ones, as man), victims decline to inform the authorities. 
In September 2005. the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair publicly questioned the 
very foundation of the UK criminal justice system, saying, "... The system [criminal 
justice system) is the problem... " 103 
Although the case: of ling land and Wales may not be fully applicable to other 
nations. judging by the permanent place of" law and order" in the policies of many 
political parties in recent years across the industrial nations, it can be said that there is 
a growing trend in rising crime rates, in particular violent offences, in many countries. 
In contrast with the number of committed crimes, only a tiny percentage of all 
offences are actually processed to the point of punishment in many western societies 
(the official estimate is between 3 and 5%))04 
`Flic absence of a satisfying philosophical justification for the institution of 
punishment, and the failure of sociologists to come up with a coherent picture of the 
institution of punishment, coupled with the visible failure of many criminal justice 
systems, indicate that not only are there problems in understanding and preventing 
"crimes". but we are also puzzled trying to make sense of the institution of 
"punishment". 
To add to this complexity. there is the growing trend in the international community 
to prosecute the violators of human rights and war criminals. The next part will be a 
brief examination ofone aspect of international criminal justice, Collective 
Itcsponsihilityfi'unishsnent, and the chapter on the ICC will further examine this line 
of enquiry. 
"'t Sce the PM a ch to the Lahotu'nnual Conference available at 
http: //ww-w-. Iatvtit. orgt. uk! indc\. ptip? id-new,, 005&ux ncws[idl=acO5tb&cliash=d8 164 !? avid (; arland. - t)tirkhcint's Sociology of Punishin ent" in Clad is pL cit. p. 31. 
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III. Collective Responsibility/Punishment 
A. What Is Collective Responsibility/Punishment? 
In municipal laws notions such as agency, causation, fault, and liability are 
primarily discussed in the context of individual offenders. In particular, in the modem 
criminal justice system, it is now universally established that in order to ascribe 
liability to someone, he must first be held responsible. The correlation between 
responsibility and liability is an important advance in many legal systems, in 
particular the western traditions. Some cases still exist where such a correlation is still 
absent or weak. They include: strict liability, vicarious liability, and collective 
liabilities. '05 
Strict liability is any liability for which the contributory fault condition is weakened 
or absent. The best-known strict liability statutes in the criminal law are those creating 
"public welfare offences", related to industries such as pharmaceutical, automobile, 
diary product, etc. Vicarious liability is effected when the contributory fault, or some 
element of it, is properly ascribed to one party (or group of parties), but the liability is 
ascribed to a different party (or parties). Collective liability is the vicarious liability of 
an organised group (either a loosely organised impermanent collection or a corporate 
institution) for the actions of its constituent members. 106 However, in applying many 
of above rules, there are three distinct issues and concepts, which are not always 
followed consequently: liability, responsibility and punishment. Liability usually 
105 Joel Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility(Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), p. 223. 
106 Ibid., p. 233. 
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results in payment, or in corrective measures to reverse the harm, such as acts that are 
known to be tort or civil wrong, which does not generally result in acts analogous to 
punishment. Liability can transfer, but not agency, causation or fault. 
B. Types of Collective Punishment 
As with individual punishment, collective punishment is proceeded by collective 
responsibility/liability. Collective punishment can be manifested by certain responsive 
attitudes, judgements or actions. Acts of collective punishment are often associated 
with those acts that have retributive manifestation. However, acts of collective 
punishment can be manifestations of each of the four theories of punishment, 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. The deterrence types of 
collective punishment are acts that use the innocent members of a group in order to 
deter certain members from within the group or another group to engage in 
undesirable acts. 
With respect to the rehabilitative/reformative types of collective punishment, one 
can identify the imposition of a given political or ideological system on a given group 
as such types of collective punishment in the hope of altering the undesirable and 
dangerous characteristics of the group. 
The "incapacitation" types of collective punishment can be said to be acts that aim 
to destroy elements of the groups that present a danger. Such elements can be humans 
or physical infrastructures. The targeted individuals do not have to be known 
"offenders' or visibly dangerous. They can be perceived as prospective "offenders" or 
potential danger. 
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The practice of collective punishment is as old as the creation of the first man. If 
one subscribes to Christianity's account of the creation of man, one can trace back the 
origin of collective punishment to the creation of the first created man and the 
associated concept, the notion of " original sin". The latter implies that, as a result of 
Adam's disobedience to God, each of Adam's descendants inherits it (original sin), as 
the following verses of the New Testament show: 
"... The result of one trespass was condemnation for all men-through the 
disobedience of the one man the many were made sinners... "toi 
The secular world is not immune either from the charge of engaging in acts of 
collective punishment. One can trace the presence of acts of collective punishment in 
almost every military conflict either within states or between them, such as modem 
methods of warfare like aerial bombardment which result in deliberate or indirect loss 
of innocent civilians and non-combatants. In the former case, one can refer to 
examples where one party deliberately targets civilian populations as a means to put 
pressure on its opponents to submit to its will or meet its demands. 
The atomic bombing of the Japanese cities was prompted by a combination of three 
purposes of punishment: retribution (for Japan's role in commencing the war, and also 
for Japan' s perceived racial inferiority 108), deterrence (warning Japan about the price 
107 Roman, 5: 18-20. 
log During the inter-wars periods many restaurants in California carried the warning: "Dogs and Japs 
prohibited". It was the same period in which the Japan's request to insert racial equality into the 
Covenant of the League of Nations was refused. As the Dutch member of the Tokyo Tribunal 
observed: " They [Americans] were more or less indoctrinated to look on the Japanese as a sub-human 
race. The bombing of the Japanese cities, followed by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
was made possible by precisely that feeling that it was not human beings they were cremating by the 
hundreds of thousands. " Antonio Cassese ed The Tokyo Trials and Beyond: Reflections of a 
Peacemonger (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 24. 
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it would pay for its stubborn resistance), and incapacitation (to destroy the remaining 
Japanese industry and military complex). 
The most recent and ongoing act of collective punishment is Israel's treatment of 
the Palestinians. Since the second uprising of Palestinians, the Israeli army has 
subjected the entire Palestinian population to severe economic, and movement 
restrictions in the hope of breaking their will, and also punishing them for cultivating 
the militant Palestinians who confront Israel. 
The methods of groups such as Al-Qaheda also demonstrate retributive types of 
collective punishment. The statements that have been issued by Al-Qaheda spoke of 
targeting cities like Madrid and London as a response to the atrocities that the British 
or the Spanish have committed, or for their active role in the US-led war on terrorism, 
in particular the invasion of Iraq. 
Another example of the practice of collective punishment is the internment of the 
American-Japanese during World War II. In the name of military necessity during 
World War II, the US government swiftly removed some 120,000 persons, including 
70,000 US citizens from their homes and housed them in crude barracks or horse 
stalls and then shipped them to remote relocation centres where they were held in 
compounds guarded by military personnel. 109 The rationale and justification for 
military necessity are similar to the rational and justification that are used in cases of 
"preventive detention" or incapacitating those innocent individuals, who may commit 
offences in the future. 
109 Minos, op. cit., p. 95. 
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The most recent and ongoing acts of collective responsibility, from the perspective 
of the concerned individual, are the growing Islamophobic acts and sentiments across 
the western world since September 11,2001. The result of a recent survey shows the 
impact of such a trend in the UK. According to a poll conducted after the July 7th 
2005, London bombings, two-thirds of British Muslims consider leaving the UK as a 
result of increased Islamophobic incidents. ' 0 
Such Islamophobic acts and sentiments are effected and held by individuals, as 
such, they may not meet the judicial criteria of punishment, which requires, inter alia, 
a formal punishing authority. However, collective responsibility/punishment also 
entails attitudes and judgements, in addition to actions. Individuals can, therefore, 
hold such attitudes and judgments, independence of the judicial authority. Moreover, 
many of the anti-terrorism legislations and policies in the UK and other western 
nations have been informed by the pressures from the public, in particular in response 
to those individuals who hold the above critical attitudes and judgments about Islam 
and Muslims. 
For contemporary cases of "reformative/rehabilitative" types of collective 
punishment one can refer to the US doctrine of democratisation of the Greater Middle 
East as the examples of reformative/rehabilitative type of. collective punishment. 
The deterrence types of collective punishment are also present on both sides of the 
US-led war on terrorism. The US presented the toppling of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq as warnings to any country that dares to harbour 
terrorist groups. Furthermore, the publicised detentions of terrorist suspects in the 
Guantanamo Bay camp X Ray and elsewhere also shares some characteristics of 
1 10 http: //www. guardian. co. uk/0,3858,5247604-117070,00. html. (26/07/2005) 
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deterrence types of collective punishment. On the other side, such practices can be 
seen in the statements and actions of Al-Qaheda, which hopes its violent campaigns 
will discourage the west from other attempts to invade another Islamic country. 
The incapacitation types of collective punishment can be said to be aerial 
bombarding, economic sanctions, internment, or terrorists' targeting of specific 
targets such as transport systems or financial centres. 
Closely related to the concept of collective responsibility/punishment is the notion 
of punishing collectivity. In the case of collective punishment, the association of 
wrongdoer(s) with the collectivity prompts the subsequent responsibility and 
punishment of the collectivity itself. However, in the case of punishment of a 
collectivity, the "collectivity" is conceived of as being wrong/immoral or illegal and, 
thus, anyone who happens to be a member of that wrong/immoral/undesirable 
collectivity, would then become a wrongdoer, and liable to punishment. For instance, 
if a given political party is declared unlawful and proscribed, anyone who joins or 
continues to be a member of such a proscribed party becomes liable to punishment. 
In some cases, in ascribing liability and the prospect of punishment for those who 
are members of a proscribed collectivity, the individuals are given the choice between 
disassociation from the collectivity or bearing the consequences of their 
membership/association. For example, an infidel can evade punishment by becoming 
a believer. However, there are cases where such a choice is denied. If the black race 
is declared illegal or undesirable, those black individuals who wish to severe from the 
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black race are naturally unable to do so. In such a circumstance, both those black 
individuals who wish to cease being black and also the defiant ones are liable to 
punishment for belonging to an undesirable collectivity, the black race. In punishing 
collectivity, it is almost impossible to separate the constituent members of the 
collectivity from the collectivity itself. To punish the collectivity requires punishing 
all those who constitute the collectivity itself. 
The next section focuses on the possible rationale and plausible grounds for collective 
punishment and its relationship to justice. 
C. Justice & Collective Punishment 
This section examines on what grounds collective punishment can ever be justified, 
and secondly it explores those acts of collective punishment that are clearly 
incompatible with the requirements of justice. For the latter end, the questions of the 
personhood of state and the punishing state will be briefly examined in the concluding 
section of this part. 
As the sections on the contending theories of justifications of punishment showed, 
there has not yet been formulated a satisfying and coherent theory with respect to 
individual punishment. Therefore, it would be even more difficult to apply the 
existing theories to the cases of collective responsibility/punishment. In his discussion 
of collective liability, Joel Feinberg identified four logical distinct ways to describe 
collective responsibility. They are: 
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1. Whole groups can be held liable even though not all of their members are at 
fault. This case is still another form of liability without contributory fault 
similar to the cases of strict liability and vicarious liability. 
2. A group can be held collectively responsible through the fault, contributory or 
noncontributory, of each member, 
3. A group can be held collectively responsible through the contributory fault of 
each and every member. This case is simply the sum of all the individual 
responsibilities. Since each individual is co-responsible for the harm in 
question, no one's responsibility is vicarious. 
4. Through the collective but nondistributive fault of the group itself. 111 
Feinberg also proposed specific conditions that need to be satisfied in order to 
justify group liability. These conditions include group solidarity, prior notice, and 
opportunity for control. He defined group solidarity as the existence of a large 
community of interest among all the members, not merely a specific overlap of shared 
specialised interests, of the sort that unite the members of a corporation's board of 
directors, for example, no matter how strong. With respect to prior notice and 
opportunity to control, he stated, "justice requires that the system be part of the 
expected background of the group's way of life and that those held vicariously liable 
111 Feinberg, op. cit. , p. 
233. 
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have some reasonable degree of control over those for whom they are made 
sureties. "112 
He concluded that because these conditions are hardly ever satisfied in modem life, 
collective criminal responsibility is no longer an acceptable form of social 
organisation. 1 13 The criminal justice systems of many jurisdictions have now codified 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility. In public international law, the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility has also been fully recognised. This line 
of enquiry will be further examined in this chapter and also in the ICC chapter. 
Peter French's distinction between different types of groups is also insightful. In his 
discussion of collective and corporate responsibility, he identified three groups: 
random aggregates, non-random aggregates and conglomerates. Random aggregates 
are a set of individuals who are united by a contingent event, such as the passengers 
of an aeroplane. Non-random aggregates are a set of individuals who are grouped by 
ethnicity, gender, religious affiliation, and physical characteristics. A conglomerate is 
defined as a group united by a decision-making processes and an identifiable set of 
Purposes such as governments and corporations. 114 He came to the conclusion that 
the latter category, government and corporations, can be moral beings and hence 
liable to blame. They possess, French argues, "whatever privileges, rights and duties 
as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to all members of the moral 
community". 115 
12 Ibid. 
. 241. 11134 Lb 
p. 
241. X14 Peter French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984) 
I's Ibid., p. 32. 
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Punishing non-random aggregates resembles the case of punishing collectivity. 
Racial slurs, anti-Semitism, sexism, and negative stereotypes are all examples of 
wrongs or offences committed against non-random aggregates. It is more difficult to 
find pure examples of random aggregates, and thus of the punishment that such 
groups can be subjected to. Peter French's assertion about the blameworthiness of 
conglomerates will be further examined in the context of personhood of states. 
Another associated concept with the notion of collective responsibility is the issue 
of corporate crimes. The recent controversies over the scandals of some of the well- 
known US corporations such as Enron have intensified such a debate in the US. In the 
UK, growing numbers of incidents caused by some of the public service providers, 
such as train companies, have called for legislative measures to hold the corporations 
criminally responsible. 116 J. Braithwaite and G. Geis proposed six basic propositions 
to differentiate our understanding and approaches to traditional crimes and corporate 
crimes. They include: 
1. With most traditional crimes, the fact that an offence has occurred is readily 
apparent; with most corporate crimes, the effect is not readily apparent. 
2. Once an offence becomes apparent, apprehending a suspect can be difficult 
with traditional crime, but is almost always easy with corporate crime. 
3. Once the suspect has been apprehended, proving guilt is usually easy with 
traditional crime, but almost always difficult with corporate crime. 
1 16 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/I/hi/scotland/4177542. stm 
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4. Once an offender has been convicted, deterrence is doubtful with traditional 
crime, but may well be strong with corporate crime. 
5. Although incapacitation is not apt to be very effective or acceptable for 
controlling traditional crime in a humane society, it can be a highly successful 
strategy in the control of corporate crime. 
6. Even though rehabilitation has failed as a doctrine for the control of traditional 
crime, it can be succeed with corporate crime. "? 
The concept of corporate crime is a relatively new concept in modern criminal 
justice systems and many questions remain answered. For example, it is not clear 
whether it will focus on specific individuals for whom specific responsibilities can be 
found, or it succeeds in holding liable the corporation. Also, it appears that the focus 
of corporate crime is more preventative than retributive. 
As with individual punishment, the prospect of holding collective responsibility 
/liability raises the dichotomy of moral responsibility/liability and legal 
responsibility/liability. Karl Jaspers has introduced the further dimension of guilt in 
the context of collective responsibility and guilt. Karl Jaspers, reflecting on the 
Holocaust, distinguishes between four types of guilt: the criminal guilt of those who 
actually committed the crime; the political guilt of those who helped such people get 
to power; the moral guilt of those who stood by, doing nothing as the crimes were 
being committed; and the metaphysical guilt of those who survived while others were 
117 J. Braithwaite and G. Geis, "On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control", in Crime and 
Delinquency, Vol. 28 (1982), pp. 292-314. 
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killed, thereby failing in their responsibility to do all that they might have done to 
preserve the standards of civilised humanity. ' 18 Despite the plausibility of such a 
characterisation, it is not easy to define an appropriate method of response for each 
category of guilt, without violating the requirement of justice. The chapter on 
forgiveness will further elaborate this line of enquiry. 
The concluding section of this part examines another related concept of collective 
responsibility/punishment, which is the notion of punishing states. 
D. Can Sovereign Sates Be Punished? 
In order to answer the above question and to identify the grounds on which states 
can be punished, it is a prerequisite to establish the nature of the agency of the state. 
Peter French is among a number of writers who ascribe agency to states. Prior to the 
20`h century, many of the greatest political and social theorists of the day conceived of 
the state as an organism. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau suggested that: 
The body politics, taken individually, can be considered as an organised, living 
body and similar to that of a man... The body politics is, therefore, also a moral being 
which has a will, and this general will, which always tends towards the conservation 
and welfare of the whole and of each part, and which is the source of the laws, is, for 
all members of the state, in their relations to one another and to the state, the rule of 
what is just and unjust. ' 19 
"$ Karl Jaspers, "The Question of German Guilt. ", in Transitional Justice. vol. 1. edited by Neil Kritz 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995). 1 19 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rousseau's Political Writings, edited by Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway 
Bondanella (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), p. 61. 
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Grotius took a further step by entertaining the idea of punishing states. In his The 
Law of War and Peace, Grotius proposed three potential just causes for war: self- 
defence, taking back what has been stolen, and punishment. For the latter case, he 
argued that those who commit crimes "against nature" might be punished by any 
sovereign state through war. He also supported the proposition that the community 
can be punished if enough members know of the crime and have the ability to stop 
it. 120 
Alexander Wendt is among the most recent authors who have argued for the 
personhood of state. Wendt suggests, "States are real actors to which we can 
legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and 
intentionality. " 12 1 The September 11 attacks on the US have also prompted some 
authors to follow Grotius and to argue that punishing those responsible, including 
responsible states might be a legitimate reason for waging war. 122 
However, there have been many counterarguments against the question of 
personhood of the state and, hence, the justification of punishing states. The 
concluding part of this section briefly examines some of these arguments. 
Judging by the composition and the diverse characteristics of nearly 200 existing 
states, the first question is which of them can represent the average type of state. 
Patrick T. Jackson's response to A. Wendt succinctly illustrates the cases of many of 
the existing states: 
120 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, translated by Francis W. Kelsey, (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs- Merrill Company, 1925), Book 11.21.17 [543-544] 
121 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 197. 
122 See fro example, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in 
a Violent 
-Wworld (New York: Basic Books, 2003) 
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Individual frustrations and instances of distinction were yoked together into a 
coherent narrative that made sense of these disparate experiences: we Creoles are 
different from those peninsulares, `they' are not like `us'. All of a sudden we have a 
novel social actor, a `nation, in the name of which action can be legitimately 
performed: since `we' are all in this together, in some sense, it now makes sense to 
consider how `our' needs and interests and desires can best be met. 123 
As with any socially constructed entities, states do not really exist. Their existence 
should be qualified by "as if'. Thus, as with any "as if' entities, they are fictitious, 
convenient tools in the hands of different groups such as diplomats and politicians. 
With respect to the plausibility of the just punishing of states, three obstacles 
emerge: international law, practical obstacles; and more importantly the prospects of 
harming innocent people while punishing states. 
As Ian Brownlie has noted, "the nature of state responsibility is not based upon 
delict in the municipal sense, and `international responsibility' relates both to 
breaches of treaty and to other breaches of a legal duty. " 124 The International Law 
Commission's draft articles on States Responsibility further reinforced the rejection of 
the notion of "international crime" of states in 2001. Instead of the concept of 
"international Crimes and International Delicts", Article 40 of the Draft proposes 
"Serious Breaches of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International 
Law", which are: 
123 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Hegel's House, or `people are States too", in Review of International 
Studies Vol. 30, (2004), p. 287. 
124 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. 5`h ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 
437. 
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1. This Chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a 
serious breach of an obligation arising under peremptory norm of general 
international law. 
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic 
failure by the responsible State to fulfil its obligation. 125 
In addition to legal obstacles to the justification of punishing states, such a doctrine, 
punishing states, is highly impractical in the contemporary world, where increasing 
numbers of gross violations of human rights are committed by non-state actors or in 
failed/failing states or amid civil wars, where it is difficult to locate a coherent, 
rational, responsive actor, called a state. Punishing states is also difficult, if not 
impossible, in cases where the culpable are powerful states, such as the US, China, 
Russia or Israel. 
Recalling Feinberg's criteria for justifying collective liability, group solidarity, prior 
notice, and opportunity for control, it is impossible to find such entities on the 
international stage due to the presence of plural players and agendas in each of the 
existing states. Even if one establishes that the majority of constituent members of a 
"delinquent" state satisfy Feinberg's criteria, there would be a segment of the 
society/state that are bound to suffer undeservedly from any act of punishing states. 
The suffering of civilians was recently demonstrated by the hundreds of thousands of 
innocent Iraqi's lost during the UN embargo. If someone is willing to tolerate the 
harm imposed on such scale on innocent individuals, then we should question his 
125 For the full version of the Draft see, 
http: //www. un. org/law/i l c/texts/State_responsibility/respons ib i lityfra. htm 
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commitment to morality and justice and direct him to Immanuel Kant who states, " 
We should do no injustice though the heavens fall" or to this powerful condemnation 
of the Koran against killing innocent human beings: 
"... Whoever killed a human being, except as punishment for murder or other villainy 
in the land, shall be regarded as having killed all mankind... "126 
Conclusion: This chapter which serves as a building block of the thesis aimed to 
draw attention to the complexity of the institution of punishment, and the need to have 
a holistic approach in order to understand and make sense of its multifaceted nature. 
As the next chapters will show, it is not only the contemporary world that is 
struggling to find just, humane and effective responses to wrongdoing, but the 
previous generations also faced with such a struggle. A hybrid and cross-cultural 
approach, in particular in the context of the international criminal justice is one of the 
best way that can enable us to find just, humane and effective responses to whose who 
unjustly wrong us. 
126Koran, 5: 32. 
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Chapter 3 
The Institution of Punishment In Classical Athens: The 
Politics and Power of Punishment 
Preface: In the preceding section the concept and institution of punishment were 
examined from the perspectives of moral philosophy and sociology. Also briefly were 
discussed the notions of collective responsibility/punishment and punishing sovereign 
states. Section Two of the thesis examines the three case studies of the thesis: Athens, 
Islam and the International Criminal Court. The concluding section, chapters six and 
seven, will discuss how insights from the three cultures and systems under 
investigation can enrich our understanding of the concept of punishment and hence 
help in designing more humane, just and effective methods of punishment. 
From the outset, there seems to be little, if any, similarity between the three case 
studies: ancient Athens, medieval Islam and the ICC, which came to being in July 
2002. Furthermore, Athens as a city-state has little common with Islam as a 
monolithic religion of over one billion Muslims, whereas the ICC is a product of an 
international system that is constituted by sovereign nation-states, which are mainly 
secularly oriented. 
Despite the spatial and other differences between the three case studies, existing 
theories of punishment can enable us to compare and contrast some aspects of each 
tradition and system with the others. As stated in the previous chapters, the institution 
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of punishment is a feature of all societies and can provide helpful insights to the rest 
of us. The scope of the thesis does not allow adequate treatment of other traditions 
and systems. But as the concluding chapter will argue in the context of international 
criminal justice and also transitional justice in post-conflict societies, it is imperative 
to incorporate non-western perspectives into the our vocabulary and also the 
modalities of responses to wrongdoing. 
The land of Hellas gave birth to some of the world's influential personalities such as 
Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Thucydides, and Alexander the Great, and was the place 
where some of the important social and political institutions, such as democracy, 
playwriting, and the Olympic games were born or nourished. However, the most 
importance legacy of the Ancient Greeks has perhaps been their subsequent impact on 
and contribution to the construction of western civilisation's identity. "The ancient 
and classical world provided the foundation on which the European development was 
built. s127 Classical Greek civilisation continues to exercise a grip on the imagination 
of the west. "Such Greek ideas as citizenship and democracy, Plato's philosopher 
king, Sparta's "totalitarian" yet "mixed" constitution, and the power politics of 
Thucydides' Melian Dialogue, all have had a profound influence on western political 
life and thought. -128 Adda Bozeman has succinctly summarized the reasons why the 
Greeks had such an impact on western political thinking. According to her, 1) the 
Greeks were by all standards a remarkably creative people; 2) they had a `modern' 
sense for history 
equalled perhaps only by the Chinese; 3) they knew how to convey 
128 Suzan & Little, o Ferguson & Marsbach, 
op. cit., p. 111. 
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their history in terms meaningful to posterity; 4) their legacy remained accessible 
while that of other nations did not; 5) their experiences were directly relevant to 
history-conscious Western peoples; 6) their `discovery' was psychologically 
satisfying because the west could in this way come to an identifiable father and 
establish continuity of existence. 129 
The gradual displacement of Christianity by the Enlightenment from the public 
realm and the subsequent secularisation of Western political thought and institutions 
had a profound impact on the purported origin of newly-enlightened Western man. 
Darwin and his followers cast significant doubt on Christianity's doctrine of the origin 
of man and directed us to our biological ancestors. Darwinian findings downgraded 
man's original from an agent who was created in the image of God to one of many 
natural species, in particular of the ape family. Such a realisation compelled 
enlightened man to seek an origin that could correspond to his new progressive and 
rational pretences. The Ancient Greeks, in particular, Athens provided a safe haven 
for down-to-earth enlightened man. "Most historical treatments of western literature, 
art, science, philosophy, and government begin their story there, where the family tree 
of Western civilisation is supposed to root. "' 30 
The political and military hegemony of the West during the post-enlightenment 
period prompted many in the west not only to attribute the root of the Western 
civilisation to the ancient Greeks, but also to identify the Greeks as the founders of 
civilisation itself. John Stuart Mill is an example of such individuals. According to 
129 Bozeman, op. cit, p. 60, fh. 3. 
130Ibid., p. 59. 
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him, the Greeks were "the beginners of nearly everything, Christianity excepted, of 
which the modern world makes its boast. "131 
The West's view of ancient Greece and its purported ancestral connection with them 
also influenced its treatment of others. During the nineteenth century and early part of 
the twentieth century the Ottoman Empire was treated as the new Persia and was 
accorded the usual characterisations that the ancient Greeks attributed to Persia, such 
as barbarians and expansionists. The West's treatment of the Soviet Union also 
reflected the extent of the psychological grip of the Greeks on the West. In many 
influential quarters, the Soviet Union was either depicted as the new Sparta or the new 
Persia, and correspondingly the western alliance was perceived as the Delian League 
or the New Greek alliance respectively. An important focus of this chapter is to draw 
attention to the fact that many Western examples, including their notion of 
punishment and forgiveness reflect Athenian roots. 
It is not only some contemporary quarters that have engaged in a mythologized and 
romantic representation of the ancient Greeks. The ancient Greeks, in particular the 
Athenians, were the first to view themselves as the "chosen people" or the "shining 
city" on the hill. Throughout Homer's epics, the king is regularly spoken of as "Zeus- 
born" or "Zeus-nurtured"; and the kings whom Homer mentions, trace their descent to 
a god either immediately, as in the case of Achilles, or more remotely, as in the case 
of Agamemnon. 132 According to Solon, one of the best-known Athenian lawmakers, 
131 Quoted by R. W. Livingston, in The Legacy of Greece, Livingston, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1921), p. 251. 
132 Robert J. Bonner & Gertrude Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 2. 
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gods not only built Athens, they also have insured its invincibility. 133 Legend held that 
the Athenians were "autochthonous": that is, that their ancestors had never been 
invading settlers, but had literally been "born of the soil". 134 Autochthony myths are 
central to the founding of Thebes of Laius, Oedipus, Creon, Eteocles, Polyneices, 
Antigone and Ismene, and Athens. 135 
As with any "chosen people", the purported transcendent origin of Athens also 
influenced the Athenians' boastful view of their social and political institutions. In the 
case of Athens, they prided themselves upon the mildness and excellence of their 
administration of justice. Such admiration is evident in the works of Lysias, Aristotle 
and Demosthenes. '36 
This chapter aims to examine to what extent the Athenians' boastful view of their 
administration of justice was justified. By availing the extant original sources and also 
the secondary literature, this chapter identifies the presence of a hierarchical order, 
which comprised (from top to bottom) gods, the Athenian elite, Athenian male 
citizens, metics (alien residents), female citizens, slaves, and beasts. This chapter will 
contend that many provisions in and aspects of the institution of punishment in 
Athens reflected and simultaneously reinforced the above hierarchical order. By 
recalling Marxist and. Michel Foucault's perspectives on punishment, the chapter will 
argue that punishment is not only about punishing wrongdoing but it is also about 
creating and exercising authority. This later aspect of punishment was not unique to 
the ancient Greek. The chapter on the Islamic institution of punishment will also draw 
133 Erik A. Havelock, The Greek Concept of Justice: Form Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in 
Plato (Cambridge MC: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 259. 
134 S. C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 170. 
'35 Arlen W. Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity: The Birth of Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 51. 
136 Margaretha Debrunner Hall, "Even Dogs Have Erinyes: Sanctions in Athenian Practice and 
Thinking" in Greek Law in Its Political Setting: Justifications not Justice edited by L Foxhall and 
A. D. E. Lewis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 74. 
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attention to a growing number of Muslim clergy and Islamic parties who use the 
partial implementation of Islamic penal code as a platform for their personal and 
political ends. The chapter on the International Criminal Court will. also discuss how 
power politics have influenced developments of international criminal justice, both 
conceptually and also in enforcing international norms. The chapter on "forgiveness" 
will argue that the dominant position of the above hierarchy primarily accounts for the 
near-absence of provision for forgiveness/mercy in the institution of punishment in 
Athens, and also in similar social arrangements. 
In the concluding chapter of the thesis, the epilogue, amid discussing the perils of 
proceduralism, the procedural aspects and provisions of the Athenian institution of 
punishment will be shown to be able to help us identify why mere elaborate and 
sophisticated procedures cannot satisfy all the requirements of justice. The 
manipulation of the institution of punishment by the Athenian elite should warn us 
how the subordination of substantive justice to procedural justice can enable certain 
groups to take full advantage of administration of justice. 
In order to locate the hierarchical order described above within the life of 
Athenians, this chapter is organised into seven parts. The first part will lay down the 
main argument of the chapter. It will try to examine to what extent the Marxist and 
Foucault's perspectives on punishment can shed light on the Athenians' practices. The 
second part highlights some of the constraints and shortcomings of existing sources in 
providing an adequate and satisfactory insight into many aspects of Ancient Greece, 
including its institutions of punishment. The absence of adequate and corresponding 
materials on other parts of ancient Greece is the main reason that the primary focus of 
91 
this chapter is Athens. The third part will provide an overview of the procedural 
components of Athens' criminal justice system. The next part, the fourth, will discuss 
the substantive provisions of Athenian law and the types of acts that were punishable. 
Particular attention will be given to capital punishment. The fifth part will provide a 
brief review of methods of punishment, followed by the sixth part, which examines 
the cases of collective punishment and punishing collectivities in Ancient Greece. The 
seventh part will explore the religious components of the institution of punishment. 
The concluding part will return to the issues of procedural and substantive justice and 
why, in democratic systems such as classical Athens, there is a great danger of the 
sacrificing the latter. 
At the outset, two considerations should be borne in mind. First of all the main 
focus of the chapter is on the actual practices, rather than the Greek philosophers' 
discussion of punishment. Although the Greek philosophers have significantly 
widened our understanding of the actual practices of punishment in Athens, their 
philosophical views differed on many occasions from the Athenians' practices. 
Socrates' trial and subsequent execution was one example of the gap between the two. 
Secondly, should the occasion arise, examples of recent policies and practices of 
modern nation-states, in particular Western governments, will be explored throughout 
this chapter, if such examples demonstrate some degree of similarity with the 
Athenian cases. 
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I. The Triangle of Punishment, Power, and 
Politics 
This part discusses how "honour" as the premium commodity influenced the 
Athenian concept and practice of punishment. Examination of the main hierarchical 
order (gods, the Athenian elite, the Athenian male citizens, metics, women, slaves and 
the beast) that prevailed in Athenian society will be the focus of the second section of 
this part. It will be followed by an identification of the various places where this 
hierarchal order occurred. The concluding section of this part will also examine how 
Athens's relations with its subject cities were an extension of this hierarchical order. 
A. Honour & Punishment 
As sections on Foucault's and Marxist perspectives on punishment discussed, an 
important aspect of penal systems is their function as an apparatus of power and 
control. It is not, however, only economic profits that drive competition and cause 
conflict and struggles. There are societies and individuals that are motivated by other 
factors such as the quest for glory or their moral values. Non-economic factors can be 
as powerful and influential as material prosperity. In the case of Athens, it seems that 
the quest for "glory" and "honour" was more influential than that for mere economic 
profit. 
One's honour was determined by one's place in the hierarchical order. The 
motivating force, which made a man seek public honour, was called philotimia, "love 
93 
of honour"(adjective philotimos, verb philotimeisthai). 137 In the words of 
Demosthenes, the great Athenian statesman and orator (circa 385-322 BC), "... the 
Athenian people has never exerted itself to acquire money, but more than anything to 
acquire reputation. The proof of this is that although it once had more money than any 
other Greek state, it spent it all for the sake of philotimia and it never yet refused any 
danger when reputation was at stake, but contributed from the wealth of individuals to 
the common pool. "138 Elsewhere he shows us the extent of importance and 
significance of honour. Demosthenes claimed that in his own political career he had 
been primarily concerned with the honour of Athens-not with her security or 
prosperity. 139 
The etymological meaning of "punishment" in the Greek language reveals the 
centrality of honour to the centrality of the process of punishing. The most common 
word for "punishment" was timoria, honour, and for "to punish, " timoreisthai, which 
we might translate as "to assess and to distribute honour". '40 This reveals the 
centrality of honour in the process of punishing. The hierarchal order not only 
determined the components' legal and financial benefits, it also provided a centre 
stage for acquiring the premium asset for the Athenians, which was "honour". Life for 
the Greeks appeared to be a choice between dominating and being dominated. 141 in 
imaginative literature, in real life, and in the courts there was gain and glory in 
137 K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality In the time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
19774), p. 230. 
138 Quoted in ibid.. p. 236. 
139 Quoted in ibid., p. 228. 
140 Danielle S. Allen, The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishment In Democratic Athens 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 61. 
141 Barry Strauss, "Of Balances, Bandwagons, and Ancient Greeks. " In Hegemonic Rivalry: From 
Thucydides to the Nuclear Age, edited by R. N. Lebow and B. S. Strauss, (Colo: Westview Press, 1991), 
p. 202. 
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triumphing over an opponent. 142 Second to military battlefields, judicial contests were 
the most important places and occasions where male Athenian citizens projected and 
defended their honour. The Athenians called judicial trials competitions (agones) and 
called the prosecutor and defendant "competitors" (agonistai). 143 Punishment, like 
reward, was the outcome of a contest for honour. Punishment in Athens was designed 
neither to fit the crime nor to fit the criminal, but rather to re-order the relative 
positions of the two litigants. 144 
In many cases, it was not only the right of the offended party to seek redress but 
also it was his duty to restore his honour. To abandon one's right to seek justice for 
one's injury was equivalent to withdrawing from a contest, which was seen a 
cowardly act. Retaliation was defended not so much on grounds of justice but on 
grounds of "manliness". 145 This line of enquiry will be further examined in the 
chapter on "forgiveness", which will contend that one of the main reasons for the 
absence of "forgiveness" in Athenians' vocabulary and practices was the centrality of 
honour, which made it difficult for the injured party to grant forgiveness for the 
transgressor, since forgiveness was likely to have been interpreted as sign of 
"unmanliness" and weakness. 
The judicial equivalent of honour was the degree of one's substantive and 
procedural entitlements and liabilities in the administration of justice. In the sphere of 
law a person's status affected his or her right to appear in court as plaintiff, defendant, 
or witness, or to perform certain acts with legal consequences, such as contracting, 
142 Trevor J. Saunders, Plato's Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 121. 
143 Allen, op. cit., p. 60. 
144 Todd, U. cit., p. 162. 
145 Dover, op. cit., p. 184. 
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marrying, or making a will. One's capacity in legal proceedings depended on one's 
place in this hierarchical order. Before elaborating the correlation between one's place 
in the hierarchal order and one's entitlements and liabilities, an explanation of the 
hierarchical order is necessary. The next section looks at the main components of the 
hierarchical order that prevailed in classical Athens. 
B. Athens' Principal Hierarchic Order 
The focus of this section is the human components of Athens' hierarchical order. 
The section on the religious component of the institution of punishment will discuss 
the role and place of the gods in shaping the institution of punishment in Athens. It 
will argue that the Greek gods had a dual roll and function, sacred and secular. 
However, the Athenian elite managed to fully utilise their gods' role in furthering 
their personal and also the polis' interests and welfares. Furthermore, the reason for 
the inclusion of non-human creatures is because the Athenians themselves included 
them in some aspects of their institution of punishment. For example, as will be 
shown, those animals that killed a citizen, were put on trial and were punished either 
by being killed (slaughtered) or being thrown out of Attica. On the other hand, there 
were some sacred olive trees, which were protected by the law. Anyone who 
destroyed them would have faced the death penalty. 
The following section further elaborates the components of Athens' principal 
hierarchical order. 
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1. Male Citizens (Elite & Ordinary) 
The best estimate for the population of Attica as a whole in 431 BC is 300,000 to 
350,000, including 50,000 adult male citizens, 25,000 metics, and 100,000 slaves. By 
317 BC war and disease had reduced the total population of Attica to between 
150,000 and 200,000, with only 21,000 male citizens. 146 Citizens' status in Athens 
was determined according to a personal rather than a territorial principle. A citizen of 
Athens was, thus, somebody whose parents had been citizens. 147 It was possible for a 
foreigner to become an Athenian by naturalisation, but this was a special privilege 
granted to a few individuals thorough an elaborate legislative procedure, similar to the 
practice of some of the Swiss cantons. The attested grants of citizenship between 480 
BC and the abolition of democracy in 322 BC are known to be 134 cases. The most 
common form of naturalisation was purely honorific: in no fewer than 52 of these 
cases, the beneficiary did not reside in Athens and there was no expectation that he 
would ever do so; the ideal recipient here was a foreign head of state. 148 The few 
naturalised citizens could not enjoy the full entitlement of the "natural" citizens. The 
former could not hold the office of priesthood or any of the nine archonships. '49 
Within the body of male citizens there were further hierarchical orders. Another 
division that was always maintained, depended on age. A male Athenian citizen came 
of age at eighteen, and was received into his deme and his name inscribed on the 
deme's population register. From the 370s BC at least, perhaps already in 403/2 
BC., the Athenian rulers introduced a two-year military service for all eighteen-and 
146 Ferguson, pp. cit. , p. 
120. 
147 Todd, op. Cit. , pp. 
171-72. 
148 Ibid., p. 174-75. 
149 Ibid. , p. 175, fn. 13 
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nineteen-year-olds. So it may be conjectured that a young Athenian was only 
inscribed on the Assembly register of his deme at the age of twenty. The right to be a 
juror in the People's Court or a legislator or a magistrate was reserved to citizens over 
thirty. For certain magistracies the lower age-limit was forty. 'so 
However, this does not necessarily mean that all male Athenian citizens fully 
exercised their political rights. Judged by their political activity, the citizens of Athens 
can be divided into three groups. First there were the passive ones, who took no part 
in the Assembly and did not volunteer for the Heliastic Oath that members of the jury 
had to take or the selection of magistrates. Secondly, there was a very large group 
who did participate in the Assembly and serve as legislators and as jurors in the 
courts, but whose participation was limited to listening and voting and who did not 
raise their voices in discussion. And, thirdly, there was the much smaller group of 
initiative-takers, who spoke and proposed motions. They are the people whom the 
history books tend to call the "politicians" of Athens. '51 
On economic criteria the citizen body was divided into two, the `have-plenty' and 
`have-nots'. Out of 20,000 or so citizens in the late fourth century BC. 9,000 owned 
property valued at about 2,000 drachmas. It also could be plausibly stated that 5,000 
citizens owned no land at all. 152 The "upper class" in fourth- century Athens was a 
group of some 1000-1200 rich citizens with, at their core, a smaller group of the 300 
150 H. M. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and 
Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 88-9 151 Ibid., pp. 267-68. 
152 Dover, op. cit. , p. 
37. 
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very rich who would have had to have property of at least 3 or 4 talents. One talent 
equalled what an ordinary Athenian could earn in the course of more than ten years. '53 
In addition to full political and social rights, the citizens enjoyed certain exclusive 
legal protections. As in Nazi Germany where torture of "normal" defendants was 
considered to be unlawful154, the torture of citizens was banned in the fifth century 
BC. 155 The citizens could not be sold into slavery for debt. 
The political leaders in Athens were the group of Assembly speakers, generals and 
financial officers who did not just from time to time exercise their citizen's "duty" to 
submit to election or propose decrees or laws, but also took regular initiatives in the 
political assemblies. They came to form something of an elite. 156 It was a very small 
group of Athenians who were the political professionals, recruited either from the 
well-off or from the ambitious who became well-off as a result of their political 
careers. The dissonance between the ideal and reality can be summarized under four 
catch-phrases, relating to the four things that have always represented a peril for 
democracy: concentration of power, elite recruitment, political profit and 
professionalism. Concentration of power can be seen in respect of the general who 
kept being re-elected, and the rhetores who were constantly proposing motions. The 
most popular general of all in the fourth century was Phokion, who held the post no 
fewer than forty-five times. 157 
153 Hansen, op. cit., p. 115. 
154 Robert S. Rivkin, "Torture and Gonzales: An Exchange" in The New York Review of Books 
Review, Feb. I Oth, (2005), p. 43. 
iss Allen, pp. cit. , p. 
213. 
56 Hansen, op. cit., p. 271. 
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In respect of elite recruitment, it suffices to say that from the beginning of 
democracy under Kleisthenes, 507 BC, until the death of Perikles in 429 BC, most of 
the political leaders of Athens were recruited from the aristocracy and belonged to the 
very clans who had held power in the days before Kleisthenes. The constitution was 
changed but the faces were the same; only now the aristocrats had to lead instead of 
rule. '58 
As with political profit, in principle it was not possible to make a living out of 
political activity. Yet we often hear of the orators of rhetores and strategoi making 
fortunes. One of these sources alleged that Demosthenes and Demades made more 
than 50 talents each from their decrees made at home and from acting as proxenoi, 
(honorary ambassadors of another city in Athens). 159 Many public prosecutions were 
prompted by financial gains that a successful prosecution could bring to the 
prosecutor. It was these financial gains that gave birth to a powerful but despised 
group of sycophants, who often handed down their profession to their sons. 160 
Sycophants also formed a type of legal clubs, which assisted their associates in 
lawsuits by taking advantage of the opportunities, which the Athenian court system 
afforded. 161 
As will be shown in the following parts, there were plenty of opportunities for any 
experienced, full-time sycophant to secure a successful and lucrative conviction with 
the assistance of his club members. Blackmailing was another method that many 
I581bid., pp. 272-73 
159Ibid., p. 274. 
160 John Oscar Lofberg and Irving Barkan, Sycophancy in Athens And Capital Punishment in Ancient 
Athens (New York: Arno Press, 1979), p. 24. 
161 Ibid., p. 59. 
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sycophants resorted to it. Their victims would have been better off accepting a pre- 
court settlement with their accusers rather than running the risk of a public trial. 
Coupled with the financial gains and the privileges of club membership, sycophants 
and other rhetores benefited from their rhetorical schooling and skills. Since the juries 
determined the verdict of the guilt or innocence and also the penalty in the former 
case, rhetorical schooling was an essential prerequisite for both the prosecutor and the 
defendant. An Athenian court was a public theatre in which the actors competed for 
the approval of the audiences. Plato compares the hooting and clapping of the hands 
in the courts to the behaviour of an audience in a theatre. 162 In practice it meant that 
the Athenian justice system, which legally barred crippled citizens from holding the 
office of priesthood and archonships, 163 also excluded ineloquent citizens from 
playing any role in the political affairs of the polis. In sum, as Aristophanes put into 
the mouth one of his characters: in Athens, power was in the hands of the cunning 
demagogues who manipulated the jurors by using their rhetorical skill. 164 
2. Metics 
A metic was a free foreigner either of Greek origin or non-Greek, who lived and 
worked in Attica. Freed slaves became metics but not citizens. The freeborn metics, as 
their gravestones show, were mostly Greeks, indeed mostly from Greece proper, and 
only to a lesser degree from the distant Greek overseas communities. 165 Every metic 
had to choose an Athenian citizen as his sponsor. Failure to do so resulted in 
'62 Ii., p. 12. 
'63 Todd, op. cit., p. 183. 
164 Hansen, op. cit. , p. 179. 165 Ibid., p. 119. 
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condemnation which led to the confiscation of the metic's property and his being sold 
into slavery by public auction. 166 Apart from the right to appear in court, metics had 
few rights and many burdens. They had no political rights and no share in the 
distributions and other economic advantages available to citizens. Marriage between a 
metic and an Athenian was null and void, and a metic who lived with an Athenian 
woman was punished more severely than an Athenian who lived with a metic woman. 
Similarly, intentional homicide was less severely punished if the victim was a metic. 
In some cases and similar to the case slaves, metics could only give evidence under 
torture. They were obliged to perform military service and pay taxes. 167 
One of the few "privileges" that metics could be entitled to was the privilege of 
serving alongside citizens, instead of in the separate metics' division, during their 
obligatory military service. 168 
3. Female Citizen 
Most female citizen had to have male legal guardians who were responsible for 
representing them in financial and legal matters. Citizen women had two options 
when they wished to take punitive action against other free members of the city. They 
could (possibly) act for themselves by initiating divorce proceedings, despite the tight 
rein that the Kurioi (head of household) had on the affairs of women in their 
household. Secondly, women could also initiate and participate in arbitrations. But 
women who wished to have grievances heard in court had to have a male citizen to 
66 Ibid., pp. 117-18. 
167 Ibid., p. 118. 
168 Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, (Plymouth: Thames and Hudson, 1978), p. 
78. 
102 
prosecute on their behalf. 169 Women seem to have had their greatest punitive freedom 
with respect to slaves. Nonetheless, the power of women to punish slaves in the 
household is usually figured as resulting from a transfer of power from husband to 
wife. 170 
Since the citizenship of Athens was the privilege of male citizens, the law drew a far 
sharper distinction between male and female citizens than it did between male and 
female metics. Similarly, Athenian social practice permitted female as well as male 
slaves equally to enter certain civic arenas, such as shopping or trading in the agora, 
where citizen men could play a part, but not citizen women, at least without losing 
their respectability. 17 1 Female citizens could not be witnesses in court, but could be 
sued in those cases in which the penalty was death, such as homicide or impiety. 172 
Another discrepancy between their legal status and the subsequent procedural and 
substantive rights and liabilities arose with respect to their marriage. The law treated 
them as perpetual minors and as such an Athenian woman did not marry; she was 
given in marriage, as one commentator observed. 173 The law expected wives to be 
sexually faithful to their husband, 174 but in the case of the rape of a woman, the 
subsequent financial penalty went to her husband or other male member of the 
household and the state. 175 
169 Allen, op. cit., pp. 111-12. 
170 Ibid., p111. 
' 71 Todd, op. cit., p. 201. 
172 Ibid., p. 208. 
13 Ibid., p. 213. 
174 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 88. 
175 Ibid., p. 124. 
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4. Slaves 
Slaves constituted the nearest equivalent to Athens' permanent civil service. 176 
While private individuals owned most slaves, the state itself owned a sizable number 
of slaves, not fewer than a thousand and maybe distinctly more. They assisted the 
magistrates in the performance of their duties or worked as labours. Another group 
was the force of Scythian slaves, around 300, who were stationed on the hill of 
Arepagos, and their duties included keeping order in the Assembly and the courts; 
they were at the disposal of several boards of magistrates. 177 They also served in the 
army as batmen and in the navy as oarsmen. The streets of Athens were mainly built 
and maintained by public slaves under the Board of Roads. 
A slave was regarded as a piece of property just like animals, tools, money, land, 
and so on. In book 1 of Politics, Aristotle neatly defines a slave as an "animal tool". 178 
As such, slaves were not regarded as having a moral and intellectual capacity and 
agency and, therefore, lacked any independent procedural or substantive rights. The 
killing of a slave by his owner prompted only an atonement offering. In the case of 
being killed by someone else, the penalty for murder was financial compensation 
payable to his owner. 179 People and their bodies, and not texts, were regularly viewed 
as being the most trustworthy depositaries of knowledge about the past. The practice 
of torturing slaves for evidence was justified by the belief that truth about the past 
176 Stephen Todd, "Lysias against Nikomachos: The Fate of the Expert in Athenian Law", in Foxhall, 
o. cit., p. 131 
"Hansen, op. cit., pp. 121-22. 
17$ Quoted in ibid., p. 120. 
179 Ibid., p. 121. 
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resided in the body of a witness. 180 As a result of the perceived non-existence of moral 
and intellectual agency of slaves, they could be expected to take the line of least 
resistance, siding with the winner in any conflict between their betters. 181 Even a 
symbolic association of a citizen with a slave was prohibited. One of the grounds on 
which one might accuse someone of committing Hybris was when a citizen treated a 
fellow-citizen as if he were dealing with a slave or a foreigner. ' 82 
The perceived absence of moral and intellectual abilities of slaves determined only 
their procedural and substantive rights; it did not mitigate their liabilities. Not only 
were slaves held responsible for any wrongdoing, the subsequent punishment of 
slaves was far more severe than of citizens. Furthermore, the method of punishment 
of slaves corresponded to their financial circumstance. Due to their financial 
dependency on their owner, they could not be punished financially. Only the 
whipping of slaves, for offences for which free men paid fines, is known to exist. For 
example, a late-fourth-century BC. law protecting the tress around the sanctuary of 
Apollo Erithaseus, provided a fifty-drachmas fine for free trespassers and fifty strokes 
with the lash for slaves. '83 
The above line of enquiry will be further examined in the following section. 
180 Allen, W. cit., p. 67. $1 Dover, pp. cit., p. 113. 
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C. The Correlation between One's Place in the Hierarchal Order 
and Legal Entitlements and Liabilities 
In this section the correlation between one's position in the hierarchical order and 
one's legal entitlement and liability will be discussed. The focus of this section is on 
the five components of this order: the Athenian elite, male citizens, metics, female 
citizen and slaves. The section on the religious components of the institution will 
discuss the place of gods in this hierarchal order. 
One's place in this hierarchical order determined the burden of proof required to 
determine one's liability. The standard proof of liability varied from "beyond 
reasonable doubt", "balance of probability", "reasonable suspicion", to "mere 
suspicion". Although the Greeks did not employ these modern juridical concepts, one 
can discern their presence in their practices as revealed by our sources. Criminals 
liable to execution without trial were called kakougoi; they included kidnappers (of 
slaves), cutpurses, thieves, muggers, housebreakers, temple-robbers, pirates, 
adulterers, and certain classes of murderers. 184 As a rule, in Athens and indeed in 
many societies, such perpetrators of many of the above offences belonged to the 
lowest section of society. And the standard of proof needed to justify their punishment 
was not determined by a disinterested party but by the angry injured party or by any 
onlooker. An angry injured party is more likely to be satisfied with the lowest degree 
of standard of proof. 
184 Hansen, op. cit., p. 191. 
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On the other hand, crimes that the upper classes were more likely to commit were 
dealt by one of the elaborate judicial procedures of Athens. Those who were accused 
of treason, embezzlement, or offences associated with the public services, were tried 
by a jury. Trial by jury enabled the defendant to prepare for the trial in terms of 
gathering evidence and witnesses. 
Furthermore, punishments for the latter category of crimes were also far more 
lenient and bearable than the punishments for the former offences. The words atimia 
and atimos ("dishonour" and "dishonoured") referred to the specific penalty of 
political disenfranchisement that citizens received as their punishment for committing 
certain offences. Financial penalty was another method of punishment that was 
imposed on citizens and in some cases on metics. A citizen who was convicted of 
murder was allowed to leave the city after his first speech of his trial. Even in the case 
of capital punishment, citizens were treated differently. Hemlock was the preferred 
method of punishment for those who could afford to pay for it. At the end of the 
fourth century BC hemlock cost twelve drachma a dose, or roughly one-fourth of the 
cost of an average man's sustenance for a year, 185 a sum that the majority of slaves, 
metics or destitute citizens could not afford. 
The amount of compensation paid to the victim and also the severity of punishment 
were also dependent on the recipient's place in the hierarchical order. Victims of 
crime committed by a member of a lower class were treated more sympathetically. 
Equally, to wrong a member of the upper class by a member of the lower classes was 
treated more harshly than committing a similar offence against a member of the same 
185 Allen, op. cit., p. 234. 
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class. A citizen who was convicted of murdering another citizen was subjected to the 
death penalty, whereas the murder of a slave by a citizen incurred either financial 
compensation payable to the slain slave's owner or some ritual purification. The 
murder of a slave by another slave resulted in the death penalty for the killer. 
Some components of Plato's penology also reflected this hierarchical order that 
prevailed in Athens. He proposed that if a slave killed his master he must be handed 
over to the relatives of the victim to be treated as they wished, provided that they 
killed him; and for such killing they would incur no pollution. A slave who kills a 
slave in self-defence is free of pollution; but a slave who kills a free man in such 
circumstances is to be executed. '86 
Further examples of such a correlation include the removal of any of the designated 
sacred olive trees in Attica, which was punished by death, whereas killing of a slave 
by his master incurred only a symbolic ritual purification. From an egalitarian 
perspective such disparate treatment would be morally unacceptable, however, it was 
fully consistent with the underlying rationale behind this hierarchical order. The 
superior position of gods was so overwhelming that it enveloped even an animate 
object such as an olive tree that happened to have some sort of connection with the 
goddess of Athena. In other words, a dead slave was a damaged property, incapable of 
any retributive action, whereas gods had the power to punish those who damaged the 
sacred trees. 
The correlation between the offender's status and the resultant punishment can also 
be seen in the practices of many contemporary states. For example, western 
186 Saunders, op. cit., pp. 228-30. 
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governments' reactions and also the media coverage of detention or killing of western 
citizens in other parts of the world, mainly depend on the status of the detaining or 
offending authority/body. If the offending party/state happens to be a friendly 
government or a lucrative client it would receive the benefit of the doubt. However, if 
the offending party/state is a hostile or "rough" state, the victims' government will 
resort to any means at its disposal in order to hold accountable the offending 
party/state and to punish the offending individuals. The US and UK's response to the 
bombing of the US civilian aeroplane in the sky over Lockerbie, Scotland, 
demonstrated the extent of their determination to bring to justice the perpetrators of 
the attack. The US' response to its navy's bombing of an Iranian civilian aeroplane in 
1988 demonstrated the extent of the difference between the two incidents. In July 
1988, the US navy ship, Vincennes, fired a missile at the Iranian aeroplane, resulting 
in the death of nearly three hundred passengers and the crew. 
In contrast to the Lockerbie bombing, which resulted in the UN sanctions against 
Lybia and the subsequent trial of the two Libyan citizens in the Netherlands, the US 
not only refused to offer an apology or order an independent investigation, it rewarded 
the captain of the US Navy ship, Vincennes. 187 
Another contemporary example that shows how the victim's or the perpetrator's 
status determines the governmental response, rather than the actual crime, was the 
markedly different US' reaction to the killing of a young pro-Palestinian American 
187 The US reasoned that the US navy ship mistook the civilian aeroplane for a military one. Iran has 
rejected such a assertion, arguing that the US navy ship the USS Vincennes was equipped with the 
latest technologies, which could easily enable it to differentiate an Airbus 312 from F14 fighter. Even if 
one can give the US the benefit of the doubt, rewarding the ship's captain was a demonstration of utter 
insensitivity to the victims and their family. The US government never admitted responsibility or 
apologised for the tragedy. For a concise account of the shooting, 
seehttp: //news. bbc. co. uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/July/3/newsid 4678000/4678707. stm 
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student by the Israeli Army in occupied Palestine, and the killing of US military 
personnel by a group of Palestinian Authority police. The latter killing not only 
received widespread media coverage in the US media, but it also resulted in an 
extensive enquiry conducted by the FBI officers. 188 In the case of the former, as of 
September 2005, there has not been any official demand by the US for the Israeli 
government to provide its account of the killing. The little US media coverage of the 
killing of the young American student either gave the Israelis the benefit of the doubt 
or implicitly depicted her as a sympathiser of the terrorist cause. '89 
The concluding section of this part looks briefly at how Athens' judicial relations with 
its subject cities resembled its domestic hierarchical order. 
D. Athens' Manipulation of Its Judicial Arrangements with Its 
Subject Cities 
Athens' relations and judicial arrangements with its subject cities were extensions 
and reflections of its internal hierarchical order. One of the chief means of control of 
the subordinate cities was through the administration of justice. On one hand, Athens 
desired to give her allies a general feeling of security and equality in commercial 
matters. Hence, in commercial suits Athens provided reciprocity in litigation. 
Arrangements for the settlement of commercial suits also gave the allies virtual 
188 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/middleeast/3509910. stm 189 For the full account of the incident see this website, http: //www. pngo. net/GIPP/rachel_corrie. htm 
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equality with Athens. The liberality of Athens in commercial cases was obviously due 
to its desire to encourage trade, which was essential to its economic welfare. 
On the other hand, there was a tendency on the part of Athens to exercise force and 
to transfer all real power to Athens in many of the non-commercial cases, such as 
criminal cases. Here Athens exercised a close surveillance and, as far as possible, kept 
the means of judicial control in its own hands. 190 In the acts of settlement defining the 
future relations between Athens and the conquered states, the jurisdiction of the local 
courts was always materially restricted. The local courts were not permitted to inflict 
the penalties of death, exile, or disenfranchisement. All such cases were tried in 
Athens. 191 
The US' policies with respect to international trade and international criminal 
justice show some similarities to the Athenian record. The US, as one of the 
proponents of free trade, has consistently shown its support for the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the WTO, in case 
of trade disputes with other members of the WTO. However, as the chapter on the 
ICC will show, the US has become one of the main opponents of the World Court and 
the institutionalisation of international criminal justice. 
The Mytilenian debate and the Melian dialogue, as reported by Thucydides, also 
shed light on the Athenians' view and record of their judicial policies with outsiders. 
Thucydides' reports are also valuable sources in providing us with an account of the 
prevailing notion of justice among the Greeks. 
º90 Bonner & Smith, op. cit., p. 310. 
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The Melian debate narrates the negotiation between the representative of the 
Athenian army and the people of Melos. As a result of the Melians' refusal to join the 
Athenian empire, the Athenians mounted an expedition to the island of Melos. They 
first sent a representative to speak to the people and convince them to surrender. The 
Athenian representative argued: 
... The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that 
in fact 
the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept... our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men led us to conclude that it 
is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whenever one can... 192 
In the Mytilenian debate Cleon proposed the killing of the entire male population of 
rebellious Mytilene, putting his argument to the Assembly as follows: 
"... When you give way to your own feelings of compassion you are being guilty of a 
kind weakness which is dangerous to you... your leadership depends on superior 
strength not on any goodwill of theirs... " 
On the other hand his opponent, Diodotus, called for a milder treatment of Mytilene 
and reasoned that: 
... the question is how Mytilene can be most useful to Athens,..: to take over a city 
that is in ruins, so that we lose the future revenue from it. And it is just on this 
revenue that our strength in war depends... . We should 
be looking for a method by 
which, employing moderation in our punishment, we can in future secure for 
ourselves the full use of those cities which bring us important contributions... '93 
192 Quoted from the Melian dialogue as cited in International Relations In Political Thought, edited by 
Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, Nicholas Rengger, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 54 
&57. 
193Ibid., pp. 44-53. 
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Cleon's reasoning is reflected by the contemporary advocates of "hard power", 
whereas Diodotus' followers are among those who call for the utilisation of "soft 
power". A plausible comparison is made by the observation that the Islamic world is 
now the new Mytilene, whereas Cleon is represented by the hawks on both sides of 
the Atlantic in countries, which belong to "the Coalition of the Willing", those who 
have joined the US-led war on terrorism. Today's Diodotus can be found in "Old 
Europe". The growing pressure by the west on Iran to abandon its nuclear programme 
is a vivid example of the replaying of the Mytilenian debate. The United States, 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and Israel are calling for more aggressive, tough 
policies including economic sanctions and targeted air strikes to stop Iran becoming a 
nuclear power. The European Union, on the other hand, is pursuing diplomatic venues 
and economic incentives to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear ambition. In other 
words, despite different tactics, the US, Israel and western Europe share the same 
goal, which is maintaining the status quo in the balance of power in the Middle-East. 
The foregoing sections shed light on some general aspects of Athenians' conception 
and institution of punishment. The following parts seek to provide a detailed account 
of the Athenian institution of punishment. However, before a "guided tour" of 
administration of justice in Athens, it is worth mentioning the insufficient original 
sources regarding Ancient Athens. The next part will show that as a result of our 
limited knowledge of all aspects of the Greek world, any claims or a "guided tour" 
should be seen as partial undertakings and in some respects speculative rather than 
authoritative. 
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II. Sources of Ancient Greek Laws 
This section will begin by looking at the range of sources that can shed light on the 
institution of punishment in Athens and will explore the limitations of these sources. 
It then proceeds to examine the sources that Athenians resorted to in formulating and 
justifying their institution of punishment. 
A. Our Sources: Tapestry out of Shreds and Patchwork 
Ancient Greek law is a fragmented and elusive subject for study. 194 This is due to 
the lack of adequate sources that can provide a satisfactory account of any aspect of 
Greek society including their social, political and legal institutions. The most useful 
and important sources at our disposal are 150 of the so-called Attic speeches, written 
by ten well-known orators, whose careers spanned the century roughly from 420 BC 
to 320 BC. 195 The bulk of the surviving speeches are attributed to Demosthenes (59, 
but seventeen of them are assembly speeches), Isokrates (21, often substantial, but 
five of them are display pamphlets), and Lysias (34, mostly short, mostly forensic). 196 
Forensic speeches by definition cannot be treated as reliable and objective sources 
of information about the laws. The speakers were arguing on one side of a case, 
seeking the sympathy of the jury for their case and the jury's indignation against their 
opponent. These speeches have prompted six preliminary questions, which scholars 
X94 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 8. 
195 Todd, op. cit., p. 7. 
196 Ibid., p. 7, fn8. 
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traditionally ask. Three of these questions concern the personalities of the trial: who 
wrote the speech? Who was the speaker, and who was the opponent?, The other three 
questions are about issues: what was the date of the trial? Under what legal procedure 
did it take place? And what was the result? 197 We lack conclusive answers to many of 
these questions in the majority of the extant speeches. 
Furthermore, these ten masters of oratory were either Athenian citizens (Antiphon, 
Andokides, Isokrates, Demosthenes, Aischines, Lykourgos and Hypereides) or 
Athenian metics (Lysias, Isaios and Deinarchos). 198 We lack other accounts, which 
may cast doubt on the credibility and accuracy of facts or issues that these speeches 
discussed. Another inhibitory factor is the absence of any reliable material for the 
period prior to the Attic speeches. Not a single speech survived from the period of the 
growth of Athenian imperial power from the Persian Wars to the Peloponnesian 
War. '99 Our acquaintance with the pre-classical period even is more restricted. 
Discussions of pre-classical law rest heavily on one passage in Homer, the shield of 
200 Achilles (Iliad 18). 
Another informative source on Athenian law is Aristotle's Constitution of Athens, 
which may or may not have been written by Aristotle himself. The text falls into two 
parts, the first of which (1-41) comprises a narrative history of constitutional changes 
to 403/2 BC, and the rest of the book (42-69) offers a structural analysis of the 
Athenian constitution at the time of writing (probably between 332 and 322 BC). As 
with all Athenian political theory, the `constitution' here includes the courts. 01 
197 Todd, `Lysias against Nikomachos', pp. cit., p. 101. 
198Hansen, op. cit., p. 13. 
'99 Ibid. , p. 20. 200 Todd, W. cit., p. 32. 
201 Ibid., op. cit., pp. 38-9. 
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Plato's Laws is another illuminating source, which covers two areas: first, it 
contains much material on substantive private law; secondly, it contains the text of a 
wide range of proposed laws-and direct evidence for the text of Athenian statutes is 
otherwise sadly lacking. The, difficulty with it is that we do not know how in each 
case Plato's regulation relates to that of Athens. Is he inventing a law? Is he copying 
an Athenian law? Or is he modifying Athenian practice, and if so, how? 202 
Old and New comedy also can be helpful in shedding light on some aspects of 
Athenian law. In particular Aristophanes' Wasps is important because it is in a very 
literal sense a courtroom drama in which one Bdelykleon attempts to cure his father 
Philokleon of a morbid craving to be a dikastas (member of the jury). As with the 
previous sources, Athenian comedies focused on a particular period of Athens and as 
such they cannot inform us about either the preceding or subsequent periods. 
When it comes to sources related to other Greek poleis outside Athens, our 
limitations become more acute. We do not have any corresponding forensic speech, 
philosophical exposition, or comic play that enables us to examine the law of an 
individual Greek polis outside Athens for any given period. Although we may be able 
to say that every city-state had its own laws, 203 the extent of their differences or the 
possibility of their commonality remain largely unknown to us. 
The only extant extensive documentation related to a polis outside Athens is the so- 
called the Gortyn code which is generally held to have been inscribed around the mid- 
fifth century BC. Many scholars, however, maintain that older regulations are 
202Ibid. p. 40 
203 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 8. 
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embedded within it. 204 The code presents us with a hypothesis: that the legal material 
from Grotyn is real and shows two contradictory processes, that of codification or 
systematisation, and that of continuous amendment or decodification via generalized 
case-law, in operation at the same time. Legal historians familiar with English 
common law should find no difficulty therein: all it need do is to warn us against 
using the word `code' too easily. 205 Thus, this contested "code" raises more questions 
about the city of Gortyn's laws than providing any informative answers to questions 
over Crete's institution of punishment. 
The fact that we are much better informed about the period of 428-322 BC than 
about any previous or subsequent period of Greek history206, primarily in Athens, 
raises a agonistic scepticism on the question of "Greek Law". It appears "Classical 
Athens" is a more appropriate title for any exposition derived from the existing 
sources at our, disposal. The tendency to use "ancient Greece" and "classical Athens" 
interchangeably is not an accurate representation of each of them and, thus, must be 
avoided. For this reason this chapter will try to differentiate between "ancient Greece" 
and "classical Athens" in those cases where an interchangeable use of "ancient 
Greece" and "classical Athens" appears to be implausible. 
Another source on ancient Greece are commentaries written by subsequent 
generations of commentators, covering the period from the incorporation of Greece 
into the Roman Empire to our present, consisting of Christians, Muslim scholars, 
Byzantines, and critics and writer during the Enlightenment, modern period and the 
post-modern periods, each with his or her own particular philosophical, political and 
psychological inclination and prejudice. 
204 Todd, pp t" , p. 35. 205 John K. Davies, "Deconstructing God; When is a Code a Code? ", in Foxhall, op. cit.. p. 56. 206 Dover, op" Clt. , p. 4. 
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B. Sources of Law 
The second part of this section looks. at the sources that the Greeks themselves used 
in the administration of justice, according to available sources at our disposal. From 
the outset it should be stressed that the Greeks' understanding and application of 
"law" was different from ours. The Greek word nomos actually has a wider meaning 
than English word "law". It also included "custom" or way of life. In Athens, the 
issues of facts and issues of law were in practice inseparable, because the dikastai 
were competent in both, and they were the immediate source of law. As a result, no 
litigant could dare to confine his plea to the issue of law and to ignore the facts. 207 
Although Homer was neither a jurist nor a legislator, Greek penology starts with 
Homer. 208 The only relevant jurisprudential issue that can be found in the Homeric 
society is the dispute over the shield of Achilles. Nonetheless, Homeric epics gave 
birth to the myth of the Hellas, in which subsequent generations of the Greeks 
perfected it. Homer became the reference point for the subsequent generations who 
deemed him valuable in legitimising their perspective. Solon, one of the important 
Athenian lawmakers, cited a couplet from Homer to prove his case, in representing 
Athens in the adjudication by Spartan arbitrators of the dispute between Athens and 
Megara regarding the ownership of Salamis. 209 Socrates also used one of the 
quotations from Homer (Iliad. ix. 363) in stating his reasons to refuse his friend's 
offer to help him escape from prison, as Plato reported in the Crito dialogue. 210 
207 Todd, op. cit. p. 135. 
208 Saunders, op. cit. . p. 32. 209 Bonner and Smith, W. cit., p. 149. 210 For the full translation of the Crito's dialogue including this quotation (44b), and comments, see 
A. D. Woozley, Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito (London: Duckworth, 1979), pp. 
141-56 
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Homeric poetry and to a lesser extent Hesoid's works marked a boundary line for the 
Pan Hellenic culture. Anything that arrived after the era of their flowering in the 
eighth century BC was never fully assimilated and always retained an aura of 
foreignness. 211 
Drakon, who was a special thesmothete is generally believed to have codified 
Athens's first code of laws in year 621 BC. 212 The severity of Drakon's laws became 
proverbial even amongst the Athenians themselves. The orator Demades declared that 
Drakon's laws were written, not in ink, but in blood. 213 However, Drakon to a large 
measure was simply putting into writing the practices that prevailed in Athens in his 
own times, 214 rather than articulating them. 
However, Solon is believed to be responsible for the most important judicial 
reforms and initiatives in Athens. But as with many similar cases, few details are 
found in the sources. The best remaining source at the disposal of the subsequent 
generations of Athenians was the poetry of Solon, as shown by Aristotle and 
Plutarch's quotations of Solon's poem. 215 According to Aristotle, the most democratic 
parts of Solon's constitution were the following three: first and most important, 
stopping loans on the persons; secondly, enabling the volunteer to avenge the 
wronged; and thirdly, right of appeal to the law-court. 216 His second innovation 
proposed that henceforth "whoever wished" among the male citizenry could use a 
211 Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, translated by John Raffan (Cambridge MC: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), p176. 
212 Bonner & Smith, op. cit. p. 71. 
213 Ibid., p. 77. 
214 Ibid., p. 111. 
215 Ibid., p. 149. 
2)6 Quoted in MacDowell, op. cit., p. 29. 
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procedure called a graphe to prosecute certain specific types of wrongdoing. 217 It was 
also assumed that Solon retained Drakon's homicide laws. 
As with other founding figures, subsequent generations made Solon a mythologized 
figure and a legitimising tool. He was a malleable idea; his importance lay in the 
power of his name, the name of an absent author, to confirm that a given rule was 
acceptable to the whole people. The Athenians regularly changed their norms and 
laws but always called them Solonian to confirm that the laws were the possession of 
the community as a whole. 218 
However, male citizenry remained the most important source of law in democratic 
Athens. As the following sections will argue, citizens held the view that democratic 
principles entitled them to be the lawgiver, the jury, the judge and the executioner. It 
was hard to persuade an Athenian jury to give more weight to the rules of law than to 
the personalities involved in a case. 219 Even the laws of gods took their authority from 
the community's valorisation of religious belief. 220 
Following the Oligarchs' trick in 411 BC, which led the Assembly to vote against 
itself, the Athenians' attitude changed significantly. In 410 BC, officials were 
appointed with the title "anagrapheis" (meaning `inscriber'). Their duty was to collect 
copies of all the laws of Solon and have them inscribed afresh on stone. In 409/8 BC 
they were also given the task of inscribing `the law of Drakon on homicide' on stone 





219 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 52 
220 Allen, op. cit., p. 90. 
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and setting it up in front of the Stoa Basileios. The anagrapheis seemed to have 
completed their new inscription of `the laws of Solon and Drakon' in 404 BC. 2' 
After the oligarchic regime of the Thirty in 403 BC, and the subsequent civil war 
which led to the restoration of democracy, a decree was passed, laying down a 
procedure by which `the laws of Solon and Drakon' were reviewed to see which of 
them needed supplementation, and any additions thought necessary were prepared and 
scrutinised by two boards of men called `nomothetai' (meaning `law-makers'), 
together with the boule. These additions, if approved, were then inscribed on a 
stonewall with the existing laws. When this had been done, the Athenians declared 
this year, 403/2, to be the start of a new era, as far as the legal code was concerned. 
No law passed before this year was valid henceforth unless it was included in the new 
inscriptions made in the years from 410 to 403; no uninscribed law was to be. 
enforced; no decree could override a law. 222 One of the important unintended 
consequences of these changes was, however, the extent to which the control of 
legislation was handed over by the Assembly to nomothetai. The next part looks at 
the procedures that Athenians followed in prosecuting and punishing their 
wrongdoers. 
221 MacDowell, op. cit., pp. 46-7. 
222 Ibid., p. 47. 
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III. The Procedures and Organs of Administration 
of Justice 
Unlike the situation in modern states, Athenian democracy cannot be neatly divided 
into distinct categories of legislative, executive, or judicial. It is more accurate to 
distinguish them according to how citizens took part in them-either gathered en 
masse (as in the Assembly or on a popular jury) or as an individual holding one of the 
magistrates and taking their properly allotted turn at ruling or being ruled. As to the 
first mode of participation, the quorum in the Assembly was 6,000 and juries could be 
empanelled with anywhere from 200 to 6,000 citizens on them. 223 
Another difference between modern states and Athens was in the organisation of 
laws. Laws in a modern society are organised according to content; in Athens they 
were organised according to procedure, i. e. according to which magistrate was 
responsible for their administration. The first section, in this part will briefly discuss 
the areas of jurisdiction of the numerous magistrates who lived in Athens. This will be 
followed by looking at the types of court that these magistrates presided over. 
A. Magistrates 
A citizen's ability to participate as a magistrate was more limited than his ability to 
participate in the assembly-even the office of councillor could not be held more than 
twice-but magistracy allowed him a greater direct exercise of power. There were 
223 Allen, pp. cit., p. 40. 
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probably between 700 and 800 magistrates in the city. These included the 500 
members of the council 500 (boule) that set the agenda for the assembly. 224 
Other magistrates included: 
1. The nine archons 
There was first of all the eponymous archon. At one stage the archon was 
responsible for all cases dealing with property, but by the fourth century this sphere 
had been narrowed to cases concerning the family, e. g. maltreatment of orphans' 
estates, and suits against guardians. Another was the basileus who took over most of 
the religious functions of the old kings. His jurisdiction also included the homicide 
cases. The Polemarch had jurisdiction over military affairs. The Polemarch also had 
jurisdiction over cases in which metics (alien residents) were involved. The remaining 
six archons, the thesmothetait, were responsible for convening the dikasterion 
(People's court) for all lawsuits, and for presiding over most prosecutions. 
2. The Eleven 
The Eleven were primarily executive officers,, elected by lot. They were charged 
with the conviction and punishment of common criminals, and with the care of the 
city prison. 
224 Ibid., P. 40. 
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3. The Forty 
The Board of Forty magistrates worked in groups of four, one group for each Phyle. 
Each group instituted proceedings and presided over the People's court. The Forty 
presided over most private suits. The Forty on their own authority decided cases with 
a penalty of less than 10 drachmas, without appointing an arbiter or convening the 
People's court. 
4. The Eisagoeis 
On the most probable view these were instituted between 346 and 322 BC to relieve 
other magistrates of a number of suits in what was then a fairly new, but growing, 
class of cases in which litigants were guaranteed as a privilege, a decision within 
thirty days. Some of the cases that were dealt with by this group of magistrate, 
according to Aristotle, were for a dowry, where a man who owed it did not return it; 
for money lent at 12 per cent interest; for capital lent for the setting up of a business in 
the market place. 225 
5. The Nautodikai (judges of seafarers) and the Xenodikai (judges 
of foreigners) 
We are less well-informed about these magistrates. They seem to have been 
abolished around the middle of the fourth century. Surviving fragments of earlier 
225 A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens. [Vol. 2.1 Procedure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 22. 
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evidence, however, suggest that in addition to cases involving merchants, they also 
dealt with a range of other matters. 226 
6. Street and Market Officials 
The more important of these were the astynomi, the agoranomoi, the metronomoi, 
the sistophylakes, and the overseers of the market. Each of these boards , consisted of 
ten members elected by lot. Some of their responsibilities included: cleanliness and 
order in the streets, settling disputes arising out of the encroachment of private 
buildings on the highway, particularly projecting first-floor buildings; laying down 
certain prices; and ensuring that sellers used correct weights and measures. 227 
7. The Apodektai 
This was a financial magistrates composed of one man from each of the ten tribes 
and selected by lot. Their function was to receive public revenues from various 
sources and pay them over to the appropriate chests. 228 
8. Accounting Officers 
These fell into two groups: one concerned with accountability in the strict financial 
sense, the other with accountability in a much more general sense. All magistrates, 
together with members of the boule, ambassadors, and priests, if they had any 
226 Todd, op. cit., pp. 386 & 401-02 
227 Harrison, W. cit., pp. 25-6. 
228 Ibid., p. 27. 
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dealings in public funds or property, were required on laying down office to present 
their account to these officers. 229 
9. Military Officers 
By far the most important of these were the ten strategoi, replacing the nine archons 
as the most powerful executive organs of the state. The office had two attributes 
which were part cause, part effect, of its encroachment on the power of the 
archonship: first, the lot played no part in their election, and second, there was no rule 
against holding the office in succeeding years; Perikles for example held it for fifteen 
years in unbroken succession from the year 443/2 BC. The jurisdiction of the 
strategoi, as of other executive officers of state, arose out of their executive functions. 
These fell into two broad categories, command in the field and matters of defence in 
peacetime. 230 
10. Extraordinary Officers 
For a short time after the restoration of democracy in Athens at the end of the fifth 
century, a board of commissioners were concerned with the many property cases 
arising out confiscations, exiles, and so forth during the recent political upheavals. 231 
229 Ibid. p. 29. 
230 Ibid., p. 31. 
231 Ibid., p. 34. 
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11. Demarchs 
They were the chief magistrate of a deme, or mayor, appointed from the members of 
the deme by election or lot for one year. Demarchs had no jurisdiction. They were 
important however in connection with the execution of judgements. 232 
The next section looks at the different types of court in Athens. 
B. Courts 
When a magistrate had received a charge, it was posted on a notice board in the 
Agora, followed by details of the magistrate's preliminary inquiry. The main part of 
the inquiry was interrogation: the magistrate put questions to the disputants or 
claimants, and they could also put questions to each other. When the inquiry was 
finished and the issues in dispute were clear, a date for the trial would be fixed. 
Depending on the nature of the charge, the trial was conducted in one of the following 
courts: 
1. Homicide Courts 
The Athenians of the classical period believed that for religious reasons their 
forebears had been extremely conservative with regard to the law of homicide, and 
that the substance of it went back to the codification of Drakon. Solon also retained 
Drakon's homicide laws. When the basilous received a charge of homicide from the 
232 Ibid. , p. 36. 
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victim's family and a proclamation against the alleged killer had been made, his next 
duty was to hold three pre-trials in three separate months, and the trial itself in a 
fourth month. The status of murderer or victim determined the type of court in which 
the trial would be held. There were five different homicide courts: 
1. The Areipagos heard cases of the intentional killing of a citizen. 
2. The Palladion dealt with unintentional killing or killing by means of an agent 
or the killing of a non-citizen. 
3. The Delphinion heard cases when the defendant admitted killing but pleaded 
justifiable homicide. 
4. The court in Phreatto met at the seaside for cases where the accused was' a 
previously convicted and exiled killer who could not be permitted to pollute 
Attica by his presence, but had instead to deliver his defence from a boat 
moored off shore. 
5. The final court, the Prutaneion, heard cases in which the killer was unknown 
or death had been caused by an animal or an inanimate object. 233 
233 Todd, op. cit., p. 274. 
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2. Dikasteries (The People's Court) 
Aristotle asserted that the only share in the constitution granted by Solon to the 
lowest class, the thetes, was membership of the ekklesia (Assembly) and of the 
dikasteries. 234 Male citizens over the age of thirty were eligible to sit in the 
dikasteries, provided that they were not disqualified. Most private suits and public 
prosecutions were heard by sections of several hundred jurors (dikastai): 201 or 401 
jurors in private suits, 501 in most public prosecutions. Furthermore the People's 
Court examined the magistrates, passed judgements in political trials and sometimes 
reviewed decrees passed in the Assembly and laws passed by the nomothetai. It met 
200 times a year under the presidency of the magistrates, most frequently the nine 
archons. 235 
3. The Ekklesia (the Assembly) and the Boule (the Five 
Hundred Council) 
The Ekklesia was the People's Assembly, in which all adult male citizens had the 
right to speak and vote. In the age of Demosthenes it was held 40 times a year and 
was generally attended by at least 6000 citizens. The Boule, or the Council of Five 
Hundred, consisted of 50 citizens from each of the ten tribes, selected by lot for one 
year. The Council met every working day (about 250 times in a year). It prepared all 
business for the Assembly. 236 There were procedures under which the Assembly and 
the Council might act in a judicial capacity: 
234 Harrison, pp. Cit., p. 43. 
235 Hansen, op. cit., p. 352. 2361bid., 
pp. 351 & 353. 
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1) When the act charged was deemed a particularly serious threat to public order, 
even though in some cases it had only affected a private individual, and it called for 
speedy redress. It was available against those who wronged orphans or heiresses; 
against official misconduct of arbitrators; and against those guilty of acts threatening 
the stability of the state. This procedure corresponds to the case of impeachment in 
modern democracies when the Parliament exercises a judicial function. 
2) There was also a vote taken on all magistrates to determine whether they were 
governing rightly, and if the vote was adverse the magistrate concerned had to appear 
before a dikastery, which could either condemn him and fix the penalty, or acquit 
him, in which case he took up his office again. 
3) The perpetrator of certain public wrongs could be reported to the Assembly by 
means of a written complaint addressed to the Presiding officers, who then had to 
bring up the matter at a meeting of the Assembly, at which both sides were heard and 
the people then voted by show of hands. The acts which qualified for this procedure 
were quite specific: sycophancy and deceiving the people by making unfulfilled 
promises. 237 
4. Private Arbitrators 
Although private arbitrators were by definition not officers of the state, they were in 
a sense converted into a kind of officer by the fact that the state laid down certain 
rules governing the decisions they arrived at. Under certain conditions the decision of 
237 Harrison, op. cit., pp. 49-64. 
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an arbitrator or joint arbitrators agreed upon by two possible litigants was equally 
binding with the decision of a court, in the sense that the losing party was liable, if he 
did not conform to the decision, and that both parties were barred from raising the 
same issue before a court. 238 
5. Public arbitrators 
All male citizens had to serve as public arbitrators during the official year following 
that in which they reached the age of fifty-nine. Their names were recorded on the 
register of their demes. Service was compulsory, excused by the holding of office or 
absence from the country; failure to serve was a punishable offence. 
239 
The following part looks at some cases that were regarded as wrongdoing and came 
under the jurisdiction of the relevant magistrate in the appropriate court. 
IV. The Substantive Provisions of Law 
A. Private & Public Suits 
In Athens there was no public prosecutor: the system was "accusatorial" i. e. based 
on accusations by private individuals. Prior to Solon's reform only the injured party 
had the right to initiate a case, except for homicide, where it was the deceased's 
238 Ibid., pp. 64-5 
239 Ibid., p. 67. 
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family who exercised such a right. Subsequent to Solon's reform, there was a twofold 
division of legal cases: private suits (dikai idiai or just dikai) and public prosecutions 
(dikai demosiai or graphai). 
The differences between a dikai and a graphe can be summed up in eight points, as 
follows: 
1) Dikai could be brought only by the injured party, graphai by any citizen. 
2) A private suit could always be terminated by a settlement, whereas withdrawal 
of the accuser from a public prosecution was punishable by a fine of 1000 
drachmas and loss of the right ever again to prosecute in the same kind of trial. 
3) Correspondingly, there was usually no risk for a private plaintiff if he lost his 
case, but the prosecutor in a graphe suffered a fine of 1000 drachmas and 
partial atimia (disenfranchisement) if he got less than a fifth of the jury's 
votes. 
4) Arbitrators dealt with most private suits, whereas magistrates, by means of a 
preliminary investigation, took public prosecutions. 
5) Dikai were judged by 201 or 401 jurors, graphai by 501 or more. 
6) In dikai the parties had a time-limit for their speeches, and a jury dealt with 
several cases in a day; graphai lasted all day. 
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7) The plaintiff in a private suit always gained a personal advantage from 
winning his case, since he got either damages or the value of his suit. A public 
prosecution, on the hand, brought no personal advantage to the accuser, 
because the punishment was death, exile, loss of rights, confiscation to the 
state or a fine, which, with a few exceptions, also went to the state. 
8) In private suits execution was left to the winning party; in public prosecutions 
it devolved on the magistrates. 240 
Another idiosyncrasy of the Athenian system was that the types of procedure often 
overlapped, so that a plaintiff or accuser could choose from a range of different 
procedures, often with different consequences for both pursuer and pursued. 
As shown by the above different types of magistrates, courts, and procedures, it 
would not be an overstatement to describe Athenians as a litigious community. This. 
assertion is confirmed by Strepsiades, in Aristophanes' comedy, where he refused to 
believe it when Athens was pointed out to him on a map of Greece, because he could 
not see the courts in session. 241 Elsewhere the playwright suggest the reason for 
founding a new polis in the heavens, which is to escape from the Athenians' 
obsession with litigation. 242 However, this obsession had some adverse side effects on 
the citizens. In the extant homicide cases, the desire to dispose of a man who had 
begun or threatened litigation is constantly cited as one of the possible motives of 
homicide. For example in the First Tetralogy of Antiphon, the man whom the 
24° Hansen, op. cit., pp. 192-3. 
241 Todd, op. cit., p. 149. 
242Ibid., p. 149. 
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defendant is accused of having murdered had secured several convictions against him, 
and had but recently entered a new suit 243 
B Private Wrongs & Public Wrongs 
In the following section, the attested procedures for each category: private suit, or 
dikai and public prosecution, or graphe, will be examined, which will shed light on 
the types of acts that Athenians regarded as unlawful/wrongdoing. 
1. Attested Dikai (private suits) 
1) Aikeias (assault) 
2) Andropodon (the dispute over ownership of slaves or in terms of damage done 
by slaves or animals) 
3) Aphorme (for repayment of money used to fund a trade) 
4) Apostasiou (desertion of a patron by an ex-slave) 
5) Arguriou (to recover a sum of money) 
6) Bebaioseos (to force an opponent to guarantee something) 
7) Biaion (against actions involving sexual violence) 
8) Blabes (for damage) 
9) Eis dateton hairesin (to force division of an inheritance) 
10) Eis emphanon Katastasin (to force disclosure of an item) 
11) Enoikiou (something to do with property) 
12) Epitropes (against a former guardian for corruption) 
13) Exoules (a form of possession order) 
243Lofberg & Barkan, op. cit., p. 33. 
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14) Kakegoria (for slander) 
15) Kakotekhnion (against a litigant for subordination of perjury) 
16) Kheors (for debt) 
17) Klopes (for theft) 
18) Lipomarturou (against a recalcitrant witness) . 
19) Parakatathekes (refusal to restore something entrusted) 
20) Phonou (murder or more generally, homicide) 
21) Proikos (for recovery of a dowry) 
22) Pseudomarturion (against a witness for perjury) 
23) Sitou (to recover maintenance from a dowry) 
24) Sunthekon parabaseos (breach of contract) 
25) Traumatos ek pronoias (attempted murder)244 
2. Attested Graphai (public prosecutions) 
1) Adikos heikhthenai (for false arrest) 
2) Agraphiou (to force the registration of a debtor to the state) 
3) Alogiou (against an official who refuses to submit accounts) 
4) Aprostasiou (against a metic for failing to choose a patron) 
5) Argias (for idleness) 
6) Asebeias (for impiety) 
7) Astrateias (for military desertion) 
8) Bouleuseos (against an official for malicious behaviour) 
9) Doron (against an official for accepting bribes) 
244 Todd, M. cit., pp. 102-05. 
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10 )Doroxenia (against someone acquitted through bribery in a graphe xenias (see 22 
below) 
11) Hetaireseos (for male prostitution) 
12) Hierosulias (for temple robbery) 
13) Hubreos (a form of insulting assault) 
14) Kakoseos (for maltreatment of parents or orphans) 
15) Klopes (for cases of embezzlement or theft of public funds) 
16) Moikheias(for adultery) 
17) Paranoias (literally for insanity) 
18) Paranomon (against the proposer of an illegal decree) 
19) Pseudengraphes (for falsely registering someone as a state debtor) 
20) Pseudokleteias (against a summons witness for perjury) 
21) Sukophantias (for sycophancy) 
22) Xenias (against a foreigner pretending to be a citizen)245 
The above two lists are not exhaustive and in some cases there were further sub- 
divisions. For instance, the grounds for impeachment included: attempt to overthrow 
the constitution; treason, taking of bribes by an orator; or making deceptive promises 
to the people. 246 In addition to these fairly clear procedures, another important aspect 
of the Athenian laws was the extent of their "open texture". Modem scholars have 
often been at a loss as to how to deal with the vagueness of Athenian laws, famous for 
failing to define their terms. 247 It was the detailed categorisations of substances of 
law, coupled with the vagueness of legal terms, that prompted the Old Oligarch to 
observe that `the Athenians are notorious for having more litigations than all the other 
245Ibid., pp. 105-09. 246 Harrison, op. cit., pp. 53-4. 
247 Allen, op. cit., p. 186. 
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Greeks put together'. 248 Aristotle also estimated that the Athenians "had to decide 
more private and public law-suits and official scrutiny than all the rest of the world 
together. "249 
The next part looks at the ranges of penalties that Athenians inflicted on those who 
were convicted of any of these wrongs. 
V. Types of Penalties 
A. Penalties for Different Categories of Offences 
For some offences the penalty was fixed by law, but otherwise there seem to have 
been no limits; a litigant was free to propose any penalty he thought suitable, however 
unusual. But in practice only certain kinds of penalty were regularly imposed, 
including financial, corporal and disenfranchisement. The following section will look 
at the penalties that certain wrongdoings would have attracted. The second part will 
examine the methods of capital punishment. A brief discussion of the issue of 
imprisonment will conclude this section. 
248 Hansen, op. cit., p. 178. 
249 Aristotle, The Politics., iii2. 
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1. Penalties For Homicide 
Homicide was treated as a private matter and as such it was the responsibility of the 
deceased's family as to how to deal with the killer. However, through the institution 
of purification, the society became involved in homicide cases. Purification was 
required because killing was believed to cause pollution, a kind of supernatural 
infection, which was liable to spread from the killer to others who consorted with him, 
and to the whole community, unless they took steps to bring him to justice. The 
necessity for purification, thus, incorporated a religious element into the homicide 
cases. Depending on the status of killer or murdered, one of the five courts assumed 
competence to entertain the case. 
The status of the parties also determined the penalties for homicide as follows: the 
penalty of intentional killing of a citizen, upon conviction, was death with 
confiscation of property and denial of burial in Athens; penalty for an unintentional 
killing or killing by means of an agent (i. e. plotting) of a citizen or the killing of a 
non-citizen was exile, until and unless all the relatives of the deceased agreed to grant 
pardon to the killer; the failure to convince the jury of the justification of killing 
entailed conviction for deliberate murder; an animal or an inanimate object that 
caused someone's death, would be declared guilty and cast out beyond the boundaries 
of Attica250 or killed. 
If a convicted murderer decided to leave Athens or managed to escape from Athens 
at any stage before the execution, the matter was closed and no further action was 
250 Todd, op. cit. . pp. 
274-5. 
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required from the deceased's family or from the community. On the other hand, if 
such a person entered Athens at any stage after his conviction and subsequent escape, 
he was treated as an outlaw and was liable to be killed on the spot by any male 
citizen. 51 The killing of a slave by his master only incurred the need for a ritual 
purification by the latter and did not result in any legal action by a third party. 
2. Penalties For Sexual Offences 
The most authoritative available source on the treatment of sexual offences in 
Athens is the dictum of Euphiletos, which stated that adultery was in law a more 
serious matter than rape. It was generally held that adultery was not an offence against 
the marriage-bond but against the Oikos (household), and that it was his residual 
jurisdiction as head of the household that gave a man the right to execute summarily 
anybody found sleeping not only with his wife but also with a range of other female 
dependents, some of them unmarried. 252 Another available option for the "offended" 
party, (male member of the household) was the option of using vegetable 
suppositories as a way of humiliating an adulterer. 253 
The penalty for the rape of a free woman was only financial. Solon's law fixed it at 
100 drachmas. By the beginning of the fourth century the amount was assessed by the 
jury for each case; the offender had to pay this amount to the woman's husband or 
other "offended" parties, and the same amount again to the state. 254 
251 MacDowell, op. cit., pp. 119-20. 
252 Todd, op. cit., pp. 276-77. 
253Ibid., p. 278. 
254 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 124. 
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Af least from the sixth century onward, the Greeks tolerated homosexual desire in a 
man or youth for a boy. However, if a citizen man was proved to have prostituted 
himself for money, as a boy or at any subsequent stage of his life, he lost his citizen's 
rights in perpetuity, to the same degree as a man who was unable to pay off a financial 
debt to the state. There was no penalty for any non-citizen who openly advertised 
himself as a prostitute. 255 
3. Penalties for Religious Offences 
The next part of this chapter will examine in detail the religious components of the 
Athenian institution of punishment. In this section, it suffices to mention the type of 
penalties that some religious offences would have attracted. 
Asebia (broadly, `impiety') was a very flexible concept, with a wide variety of 
manifestations. However, the most visible manifestation of this concept was its direct 
association with politics. Nonetheless, we come across some unusual cases of impious 
acts such as the maltreatment of a sacred olive tree. All cultivated olive trees were 
subject to some form of legal restriction, in that no landowner was allowed to fell 
more than two per year for his own use. A number of such trees, however, were 
sacred to the goddess Athena, because they were believed to be scions of the tree, 
which she had originally planted on the Acropolis. Their fruit belonged in principle to 
the state, and the trees themselves could not be removed under any circumstances: 
even when dead, they had to be left intact in perpetuity. 256 Death was the penalty for 
255 Dover, op. cit., pp. 213-16. 
256 Todd, op. cit., p. 307, fn. 20. 
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anyone who was convicted of grubbing up the stump of such a tree, and removing the 
hurdles, which serve to distinguish sacred trees from profane tree stumps. 257 
4. Penalties For Political Offences 
The polis was not only the principal political and social institution of the community 
and the state; its welfare was also one of the main priorities of the administration of 
justice. Definition of many offences was articulated in their perceived or actual 
connection with the polis. As such many wrongdoings automatically were treated as 
political offences. Consequently, anyone, irrespective of his status, would have been 
harshly treated upon conviction for any politically-oriented offence, including 25 per 
cent of known politicians who were executed or exiled during the fourth century in 
Athens. 258 
Posthumous trial was also a regular feature of Athenian practice in cases of political 
wrongdoing. They were also willing to suspend the normal procedures of law in order 
to prosecute any politically-motivated offence, as demonstrated in the following two 
cases. Slaves who could provide information about their owner's anti-state activities 
were formally emancipated by the state. 259 In non-political cases, testimony and 
evidences of slaves were only accepted if they were extracted under torture. But 
torture could be waived in the case of a slave's testimony for any anti-state 
activities. 260 Such relaxation of the rules was coupled with a harsh punishment of 
politically-motivated offences, which was often death and confiscation of their 
property. 
251 Ibid., p. 308 
258 Ibid., p. 306. 259 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 181. 
260 Allen, op. cit., p. 105. 
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5. Penalties For Trade-related Offences 
In addition to the existence of the magistrates who were in charge of regulating 
activities of the agora, there were regulations concerning the import of grain. These 
included a law punishing by death any resident of Athens who shipped grain to 
anywhere except the Athenian port of Peiraieus. Another rule forbade residents of 
Athens from lending money for voyages, which did not carry grain there. The third 
law banned any ship which docked at Peiraieus from re-exporting more than one-third 
of its grain cargo. 261 
The next section looks at the methods of capital punishment for the capital crimes. 
B. Methods of Capital Punishment 
Stoning, barathron, apotympanismos, and hemlock represent the four recognised 
forms of capital punishment from early times down through the historical period of 
ancient Athens. Each was superseded by the following one, in the development of the 
machinery of state execution 
1. * Stoning 
Stones as the most natural and the most readily obtainable means of defence or 
attack were gradually transformed from a means of self-help to a regular mode of 
261 Todd, op. cit., p. 321. 
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community punishment among the ancients. The underlying principle of stoning was 
that it had to be executed not by a few individual members but by the entire 
community as such. It thus represented more vividly the general feeling and brought a 
smaller share of guilt to the individual participant. Plato proposed that stoning as a 
result homicide should take place in the name of the entire community through their 
official representatives. 262 In Homeric society, stoning was a recognised form of 
community punishment. In the tragedies stoning is frequently mentioned as a 
deliberate form of punishment. This mythic-poetic example reflects the historical 
truth and offers indisputable evidence that in the early period of Greek history stoning 
was a legally recognised form of execution. 263 Stoning seems to have continued as a 
mode of punishment in various parts of Greece even during the historical period. In 
Athens, however, stoning was not considered a legal means of execution, during the 
historical period. It took place only as the result of popular excitement but had no 
legal sanction. 264 
2. Barathron 
Precipitation from a high rock as a means of execution was practiced among many 
communities from very early times. It was a law of Elis to cast from Mount Typaeum 
any women who were caught present at the Olympic games, or even on the other side 
of the Alpheus on the days prohibited to women. 265 The earliest historical reference to 
barathron is found in Herodotus who reported how the Athenians had thrown the 
messengers of Darius into it. There seems to be divided opinion among scholars as to 
262 Plato, Laws. 73B 
263 Todd, op. cit., pp. 43-4. 
264 Ibid., p. 44-5 
265Ibid., p. 53 
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whether or not criminals were thrown into the barathron alive. In view of the extant 
evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that from very early times until the end of the 
fifth century BC criminals were thrown into the barathron alive, and that constituted 
their execution. The fact that no references to the barathron are found after the famous 
trial of the Generals (406 BC. ) leads to the assumption that at this date or soon 
thereafter the practice of hurling criminals alive into the barathron was 
discontinued. 266 
3. Apotumpanismos 
The condemned man was fastened to an upright wooden board by five iron bands 
around his neck, wrists, and ankles secured by nails. He either died from exposure and 
starvation or perhaps was strangled by the iron collar. This method was used for 
persons condemned to death for homicide, and also for traitors and thieves. 267 No one 
was allowed to approach and bring the man help or brief of any kind whatsoever. The 
procedure in some way resembles crucifixion, except that in the latter the hands and 
feet are nailed, and the consequent loss of blood tends to cut short the punishment. 
What is more, one of the essential elements of the tumpanon is the iron collar, which 
because of the body's weight puts pressure on the lower jaw and thus adds 
significantly to the suffering. It is possible to imagine that the agony of the victim 
could last for several days. That such a savage form of capital punishment was 
266 Lofberg & Barkan, op. cit., p. 62. 
267 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 55. 
144 
regularly practiced in Athens alongside their elaborate cultural activities should 
somewhat modify our ideas concerning Athenian society. 268 
4. Hemlock 
The ancient sources describe at some length the nature of the plant and the method 
of preparing the poison. The noxious element especially resided in the seed. The 
poisonous juice issued upon pounding the venomous parts, in the form of a milky 
liquid, which coagulated in the sun. The hemlock that grew in Attica was very 
virulent but rare. It was frequently used as a therapeutic, particularly for external 
applications. It passed as a cure for numerous ills from inflammation of the eyes to 
gout. 269 It was also employed in the preparation of the poison, which was 
administered in Athens to convicts who were sentenced to death. To ensure death one 
had to drink of that preparation an amount to the value of twelve drachmas. 270 There 
are several cases of poisoning by hemlock but the most famous, and the lengthiest 
account, is that of the death of Socrates. Political criminals were given the choice of 
dying a mild death on the payment of the price of the poison, or else of being 
subjected to a more cruel death. 271 
268 Louise Gernet, The Anthropology of Ancient Greece. translated by John Hamilton and Blaise Nagy 
(Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 254. 269 Lofberg & Barkan, 2p-. cit., pp. 73-4. 
270 Ibid. 
, p. 74. 271 Ibid., pp. 77-8. 
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5. Imprisonment 
The Athenians developed penal imprisonment. They used imprisonment in the 
military context for wrongs less serious than treason. We also have textual evidence 
about actual prison buildings that suggests that the prison(s) in Athens probably 
would have been large enough to hold more people than would have been on remand 
at any given time. 272 Statements in the orators and elsewhere definitely imply that 
imprisonment was recognised as a normal penalty, and there is evidence that this went 
back to the original code of Solon. 273 When Plato makes Socrates contemplate the 
possibility of estimating his penalty as imprisonment, he shows that the normal 
process of estimation could arrive at this penalty. 274 
The next section will discuss cases of collective punishment and punishment of 
collectivity according to available sources at our disposal. 
VI: The Cases of Collective Punishment and 
Punishment of Collectivity 
The following part will examine what our extant sources can reveal about the 
Greeks' view and practice of collective punishment and punishing collectivities. The 
chapter on the institution of punishment discussed the theoretical and jurisprudential 
aspects of the discourse of collective punishment and punishing collectivities. The 
272 Allen, op. cit., pp. 226-27. 
273 Harrison, op. cit., p. 177. 
274 Plato, Apology., 37b. 
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focus of this section is to draw attention to some of the recorded cases that meet the 
criteria of collective punishment, which are the extension of liability/accountability to 
those individuals who happen to share some natural attribute with the principal 
perpetrator, such as the children of the perpetrators. It is also assumed that the 
associated individuals did not play any role in the wrongdoing/crimes. 
A. Cases of Collective Punishment In Ancient Greece 
The following part will list some of the cases at our disposal that demonstrate in one 
way or another some characteristics of collective punishment. These cases are either 
individual cases or related to the procedures within the law that resulted in extending 
responsibility and liability to a third person, which is a necessary and sufficient 
prerequisite for an act to be regarded as collective punishment. In other words, 
collective punishment is not necessarily about numbers, but is concerned with the 
principle of extending responsibility/liability to a third person, who did not play any 
role in the offence. 
1) Myth of creation of the first woman: in Greek mythology, the struggle between 
Zeus and Prometheus has an important place. Prometheus stole fire from Olympus 
and gave it to mankind; Zeus punished him by chaining him to a rock where an eagle 
gnawed at his liver until Hercules rescued him. Furthermore, Zeus contrived that 
Pandora, the first woman, be given to men, and she of course released upon them 
further "grievous cares", which include "hard work". 275 
273 Quoted from Hesiod' Works and Days, cited in Saunders, op. cit. p. 42. 
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As with Christianity's notion of "original sin", Zeus extended the punishment of 
Prometheus to include Prometheus' beneficiaries, the race of men. Although men 
initially benefited from the stolen fire, they did not ask for it and certainly did not 
conspire with Prometheus. Furthermore, one can partially attribute the misogynist 
elements of Greek culture to the representation of women in Greek mythology as 
symbolised by Pandora. Equally, one can characterise as collective punishment the 
Greeks' mistreatment of women on the grounds of Zeus's decision to punish men by 
creating the first woman, Pandora. 
2) The myth of the five ages: Hesoid describes the successively more degenerate races 
of men; the sequence culminates in the present day, in which men's life is described 
in the same terms as before: it is full of labour and sorrow, and the gods will give 
them grievous cares, mingled with some good. Eventually Zeus will destroy this race 
for its violence and injustice. 276 
3) At the beginning of the Iliad, Homer narrates that Apollo sends a plague on the 
whole Greek army for the offence of its commander. 
4) Also in the Iliad, Homer quotes Agamemnon telling Peisander and Hippolochus 
that he will kill them in revenge for the offence of their father, Antimachus. 277 
5) In another section, which shows Homer's awareness of and ability to differentiate 
between individualised punishment and collective punishment, he mentions Poseidon 
276 Ibid. , p. 42. 277 Ibid. , p. 13. 
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who argued before the gods on Aeneas ' behalf that he was innocent and pious, and 
did not deserve to die for the grief of others. 278 
6) Poliscide: Thucydides' account of the Mytilenian debate reported two different 
proposals put by Cleon and Diodotus to the Assembly as to how Athens should 
respond to the Mytilene's rebellion. They initially agreed to Cleon's proposal to put to 
death not only those prisoners at their hands but also the entire male population of 
Mytilene, and to enslave their women and children. However, after fierce debate 
between the two, in a tight vote, they agreed to follow Diodotus's advice and, 
therefore, killed all captured prisoners. Richard N. Lebow and Robert Kelly have 
termed the Cleon's proposal, "poliscide" 279 A proposal, which was first approved by 
the majority of voters and subsequently by nearly half of them. Even Diodotus' 
proposal is not immune from the charge of collective punishment. Although the 
captured prisoners did have a role in the revolt, their collective execution was 
rationalised and used as a means to send a message to the rest of Mytilene and other 
colonies, rather than simply punishing them for their involvement in the revolt against 
Athens. 
7) Further actual cases of "poliscide" involved Skione, committed by the Athenians in 
422 BC; Hysiai by the Spartans in 417; Plataitai by the Thebans in 373; and Thebes 
by Alexander. 280 
278 Ibid. , p. 13. 2'9 Richard N. Lebow and Robert Kelly in (2001) "Thucydides and Hegemony: Athens and the United 
States", in Review of International Studies, Vol. 27 (2001), p. 51. 
280 Dover, op. cit., p. 161. 
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8) Scapegoats: the Athenians employed one form of "remedy" that was meant to 
benefit the whole community. As a city, they drove scapegoats out of Athens once a 
year. In a ritual that resembled a stoning, the Athenians "cleansed" the city by driving 
out two of the city's least significant citizens after decking them with dried figs, 281 the 
two being chosen on the account of their ugliness. 282 We neither know the cause (s) of 
the perceived un-cleanliness of the city, nor the reason(s) why the annual expulsion of 
two "ugly" or crippled citizens could cleanse the city. We can infer, however, that the 
two candidates were not convicted of any wrongdoing in a court of law, and as such 
they were innocent. 
9) Ostracism: Kleisthenes is credited to have also introduced a procedure by which a 
leader could be banished ten years. Each year the people voted in an Assembly 
meeting, by ordinary show of hands, whether they wanted an ostracism, and if they 
voted in favour, the ostracism took place some two months later in the Agora. The 
person whose name appeared most times had automatically, within ten days, to go 
into banishment for ten years. 283 Recalling the multitude of procedures that were 
available at the disposal of Athenians to hold accountable any wrongdoers, the 
persons who were chosen for ostracism could not conceivably be guilty of any 
wrongdoing. Their banishment was probably prompted by the Athenians' distrust of 
politicians and their continuous attempt to contain the power of their political leaders. 
In other words, the ostracised officials were punished for the perceived unwarranted 
power and behaviours of their fellow politicians. 
281 Allen, M. cit., p. 85. 
282 Burker, op. cit., p. 80. 
283 Hansen, op. cit., p. 35. 
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10) Confiscation of Property: in Athens the property of convicted killers and some 
other group of convicts was automatically confiscated. 284 This would have left their 
households utterly destitute. In the absence of a functioning Social Service, the family 
members of the killer would have endured unbearable pain. The collective 
punishment of the killer's family was recognised by Plato. He proposed that in his 
ideal city, Magnesia, the property of the killer would pass to his heir, and estates 
should remain in the same family in perpetuity. 285 
11) Debt to State: anyone who failed to pay his taxes or other financial obligations to 
the state lost all his political rights and was declared disenfranchised, atimia. In the 
event of his death or banishment, his obligations were automatically transferred to his 
children. So long as they failed to honour their father's obligation, they were also 
disenfranchised. 286 
12) Three for One: there was a rule that allowed the relatives of a murdered Athenian 
murdered to seize any three citizens of a state that failed to punish the murderer. 287 
13) All for One: there seems to have been another rule penalising any allied 
community which failed to demonstrate that the unaccountable death of an Athenian 
within their territory was not carried out as a form of protest against Athenian 
imperialism. 288 Such a rule resembles Nazi Germany's practice in the occupied 
284 Saunders, op. cit., p. 235. 
285Ibid., p. 235. 
286 Todd, op. cit., p. 143. 
287 Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Customs of Greece and Rome. vol. I (London: 
Macmillan, 1911), p. 349. 
288 Ibid., p. 331. 
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territories in which for any assassinated member of the Gestapo, ten or more local 
people were randomly executed. 
The concluding section examines the cases that can demonstrate the Athenians' 
records of punishing certain collectivities. 
B. Punishment of Collectivities 
Constructing a given collectivity can be manifested in different types, shapes, and 
orientation. Collectivities can be territorial, political, societal, cultural or religious. 
A collectivity by definition is an exclusive and demarcated construction, though the 
extent and degree of exclusivity varies across different collectivities. The demarcated 
lines do not necessarily have to be fixed and can be subject to alteration. For instance, 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, blacks were represented as an 
effeminate group, whereas later representations portrayed them as masculine. 
The nature of a collectivity also determines its relationships with other collectivities, 
and, thus, its susceptibility to cooperation or conflict. The collectivity of the city-state 
is one of the most important and influential collectivities that have been constructed. 
It has also contributed to the formation of further collectivities and changes such as 
international systems. The point at which an inside/outside political construction 
takes hold is the point at which true international systems come into being. 289 The 
formation of city-states gave rise to international systems, which resulted in the 
289 Buzan & Little, op. cit., p. 163. 
152 
institutionalisation. of differential morality. Differential morality then becomes a tool 
and a justification that the collectivity of the nation-state could punish with impunity 
those who are not within its demarcated space. As was earlier argued, judicial 
punishment is only one form of the multifaceted institution of punishment. Situations 
of punishment are susceptible to multiple narrative determinations. 290 Constructing a 
given collectivity, and the underpinning normative principles of such a construction, 
are some of these narrative determinations. To exclude one entity from the entitlement 
of the moral values or the protection of the legal system are also forms of punishment. 
In sum, punishing collectivities does not necessarily entail the punishing of each and 
every member of some collectivity: rather, it is the punishment of the collectivity 
itself. 
The following part will examine the correlation between the Greeks' construction of 
different collectivities and the process of punishing these collectivities. As the 
foregoing sections occasionally highlighted, the relationships between different 
components of Athens, principal hierarchical order (gods, the Athenian elite, male 
citizens, metics, female citizens, slaves, barbarians and the beast), was conflictive and 
competitive. It appears that the Athenian elite were responsible for determining the 
place and also ascribing the rights and liabilities of each component of this 
hierarchical order. The Athenian elites had also an important role in constructing the 
social, legal, political, and moral worth and agency of each component of Athens' 
principal hierarchical order. The issue of correlation between the institution of 
punishment and this hierarchical order was examined in the first part of the chapter. 
The focus of this section is on the Athenians' view of the two specific "inferior" 
290 Allen, op. cit., p. 29. 
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collectivities, barbarians and slaves, and how such views were then utilised in the 
subsequent punishment of the members of these perceived inferior collectivities. 
1. Barbaros 
The word barbaros was onomatopoetic in origin, describing the jabber of those who 
did not speak Greek. 291 But the subsequent events transformed it into a highly 
charged political and cultural multifaceted label, enveloping many aspects of non- 
Greek speakers. Barbaros as a multifaceted construction, then, paved the way for the 
multifaceted construction of its antithesis, "civilised". Each aspect of the two 
collectivities was viewed as being oppositional. 
In many extant artefacts we come across objects that show a healthy, fit, masculine, 
often naked- Greek in contrast to an aged, frightened, cloaked enfeebled non- 
Greek, 292 often Persian. Xenophon described Persians' bodies as flabby and 
physically enfeebled. 293 Isokrast glorified physical beauty as the most venerated and 
precious and divine of all things, exemplified by Helen 
294 and by implication by 
Helen's beneficiaries, the Athenians. The perceived physical inferiority of Persians 
made it easier for those Greeks "to sacrifice captive Persians before the battle of 
Salamis, in place of animals. " 295 On another occasion that demonstrated the Greeks' 
view of Persian bodies, following the expulsion of Persians from Greece, the oracle of 
291 Martin Wight, Systems of States, edited by Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1977), p. 84. 
292 E. Hall, `Asia Unmanned: Images of Victory in Classical Athens' in War and Society in the Greek 
World, edited by J. Rich and G. Shipley (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 115. 
293 Harrison, op. cit., p. 203. 
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Delphi ordered erection of an altar to Zeus and prohibited sacrifice upon it until they 
had first extinguished all fires throughout the country, since it had been defiled by the 
presence of the barbarians. 296 
2. Slavery 
Athenians regarded a man's habituation and style of life as having a profound effect 
on his moral character and the pressures to which he was subjected as limiting his 
moral capacity. 297 The presence of a large number of slaves - between 100,000 and 
150,000 - and their occupations made it easier to view the collectivity of slavery as a 
subhuman but a natural collectivity. Aristotle was convinced that nature would like to 
distinguish the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labour, 
the other upright. 298 The equation of slavery and beastliness was also reflected in the 
judicial treatment of members of both collectivities. Animals who caused a citizen's 
death were tried by one of the five homicides courts, and received the corresponding 
penalty, which was capital punishment. 299 Slaves who killed a free man irrespective of 
the circumstances, including legitimate self-defence, were also received capital 
punishment, whereas the murder of a slave by a freeman incurred ritual purification if 
his owner was the killer, otherwise financial compensation payable to his owner was 
the penalty for the murder of a slave. Therefore, in Athens punishment and slavery 
were not utterly distinguishable experiences. 300 
The following section looks at the religious component of the institution of 
punishment in classical Athens. 
296 Clemon, op. cit., p. 123. 297 Dover, pp. cit., p. 40. 298 Quoted in Brown, et al., op. cit. , p. 
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VII. Religious Component of the Institution of Punishment 
This section will begin with a concise look at the nature of Greek religion. It then 
proceeds to elaborate the cases of sacred offences. The place of post-mortem 
punishment in the Athenian institution will be examined in the last section of this part. 
A. The Nature of Greek Religion 
Unlike the monotheistic religions, Greek religion was not a systematic one. There 
was not a hierarchical priesthood, nor a sacred text, nor a single authoritative figure. 
Greek religion was not closed, in the sense of accepting only a finite number of 
supernatural beings, nor did it have any developed notion of orthodoxy. 
301 The 
poetries of Hesiod and Homer were the first and most influential sources that 
introduced gods into the Greek world. Most sacred laws had no remembered origin 
and were just ancestral traditions. 302 Three important differences between early Greek 
religion and other contemporaries religions can be identified: 1) it (Greek religion) is 
neither monotheistic nor polytheistic 2) it is not anthropocentric 3) its gods are not 
transcendent but are immanent. 303 
The Greeks' relations with their gods were significantly different from the situation 
in their monotheistic counterparts. In the case of the latter, the relationship is one of 
unconditional subordination of fallible and sinful men to the Almighty, whereas the 
301 Dover, o o_- 302 MacDowell , p. 3 1, fn. 8. 
303 Hugh Llyod, Jones, 
Thel Justice of Zeus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 60. 
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Greeks' relations with their gods were far from unconditional obedience. There was 
an inherent enmity between the two from the very beginning. According to myth, 
Zeus severely punished Prometheus, man's patron, for his attempt to empower men 
by giving them fire. Men were also punished by the creation of the first woman, 
Pandora, through whose folly all kinds of plague were let loose upon earth. 
Furthermore, unlike the transcendent god of monotheistic religions, Greek gods 
were far more "down-to-earth". The epics tell us of gods' love, suffering, grievance, 
sense of humour, sadness, murder and rape. For instance Zeus is believed to have had 
sex with one hundred and fifteen women, 304 including raping his own mother. 
305 The 
Greeks were at liberty to examine their gods' behaviour and characteristics. Homer 
complained that despite the gods' constant claim to be attentive to justice among 
humans, and their occasional actions that would seem to effect a "rough justice", the 
gods are fundamentally inconstant in their enforcement of justice among humans. 306 
Solon was also critical of the envious and trouble-making nature of the gods. 307 
Euripides found it absurd if someone were to say that he loves Zeus. He also saw the 
love for mankind to be beneath the dignity of Zeus. 
308 Plato's attempt to cleanse gods 
from any anthropomorphic foibles remained isolated and was not incorporated into 
the mainstream sections of the Greek world. 
However, religion was an important institution in ancient Greece. Religion provided 
city polities with the ideological glue that we associate with contemporary 
304 Burkert, op. cit., p. 128. 
305 Ibid. p. 297. 
306 Patrick J. Deneen, "The Odyssey of Political Theory", in Justice v. Law in Greek Political Thought, 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1997), p. 99. 30' Llyod-Jones, op. cit., p. 108. 
308 Burkert, op. cit., p. 274. 
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"nationalism". 309 The Greek polis articulated religion and was itself articulated by it; 
religion became the polis' central ideology, structuring and giving meaning to all the 
elements that made up the identity of the polis: its past, its physical landscape, and the 
relationship between its constituent parts. 310 The extent of importance of religion in 
the Greek world can be seen in the number of religious festivals of the Greeks that 
would put to shame even the most devout monotheistic religions: there was only one 
day left without a festival in the Greek calendar, 311 and the majority of these festivals , 
had a religious component and connection. 
The next part of this section explores the issue of sacred offences, which shed light 
on the extent of importance of religion in influencing and shaping the procedural and 
substantive aspects of the Greek institution of punishment, in particular in Athens. As 
with the other sections of this chapter, the focus will be on Athens due to the 
scarceness of sources for other parts of ancient Greece. 
B. Sacred Offences Or Polis' Needs? 
The absence of a priestly caste and of an authoritative sacred text, coupled with 
democratic inclinations, resulted in the politicisation of religion by many apparatus of 
the state including the judiciary, in Athens. Religion was subordinate to the needs of 
the polis. More accurately, religion became one of the tools that the Athenian elite 
manipulated for their own personal and the group's ends. 
One. of the nine archons, Basileus presided over religious matters, including 
sacrilege and homicide. Unlike modern court procedures, witnesses in Athenian trials 
309 Ferguson, op. cit., p., 141. 
310 Ibid. p. 142. 
311 Burkert, op. cit., p. 259. 
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were not sworn in as a matter of course, but they might take an oath either as the 
result of a challenge by one of the litigants or voluntarily to render their statements 
more persuasive. 312 
There were three distinctive offences that Athenians viewed as religion-related 
offences. They included those offences that might provoke gods' wrath; offences 
related to festivals; and impious acts. Each of these three offences will be briefly 
examined below. Gods' anger was the most important and visible religious aspect of 
the Athenian institution of punishment. Since acts such as uprooting sacred trees or 
hosting a convicted murderer of a citizen would attract gods' wrath, Athenians were 
keen to punish such wrongdoers. However, if such a killer voluntarily left Athens, 
Athenians assumed that the matter was closed. In other words, protecting the 
community from the gods' wrath was the main consideration in homicide cases, rather 
than seeking justice for the victim or punishing the murderer. 
Some offences in connection with certain festivals were another group of 
supposedly religious offences. For instance, a law stated that at certain festivals no 
one might seize money or other property from another person, even if it was 
something (such as an overdue debt), which he was otherwise legally entitled to 
seize. 313 As this example illustrates, the offences related to festivals were acts that 
threatened the enjoyment of participants at festivals and the smooth conduct of 
festivals, rather than acts that were offensive to the gods. 
The impious acts were far less well defined than the two categories above. The 
procedure of asebeias graphe, could be used for any act that the prosecutor deemed to 
3: 2 Harrison, pp. -cit., p. 150. 
3i3 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 195. 
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be impious. Socrates is the most famous Athenian whose accusers used the charge of 
asebia, impiety, to prosecute him. The charge was: 
The following graphe was brought and the oath taken by Meletos son of Meletos of 
Pithos against Socrates son of Sophroniskos of Alopeke: Socrates is guilty of not 
recognising the gods whom the state recognises and introducing other new divinities; 
he is also guilty of corrupting the young. 314 
The charges against Socrates show what the concept of impiety normally meant in 
Athenian law. Two of the three charges appear to be more of a secular nature than a 
purely religious one: undermining the state's gods; and corrupting the young who are 
the backbone of the state. Furthermore, there were undoubtedly many Athenians who 
thought that Socrates' influence on Alkibiades, Kritias, and others had been indirectly 
responsible for the political troubles of the period and especially the oligarchic 
regimes in 404.315 The political nature of Socrates' trial was not an isolated case. The 
Athenian religious trials were all about politics. Offences against gods were merely a 
way of encoding offences against the state. The Thirty Tyrants' oligarchic revolution 
that led to the suspension of democracy in 404/3, justified the execution of their 
political opponents on the grounds of purification. 316 
The subordinate position of religion compared to the interests of the polis was not 
confined to the designation of supposedly religious offences. It can be seen in the 
functions of the Pan-Hellenic institutions. The two most famous Pan-Hellenic 
institutions were the quadrennial festival of the Olympian Zeus whose chief features 
314 Quoted in ibid. 
, p. 201. 35 Ibid., p. 202. 
316 Burkert, op. cit., p. 83. 
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were games, and the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi. The festival had political importance 
as a forum and a sounding board. The texts of important treaties were inscribed on 
pillars set up at Olympia as well as at Delphi. The Oracle at Delphi had greater 
political importance than the Olympian festival: it was the nearest equivalent in Hellas 
to the papacy in parts of Christendom. 317 
In general, the oracles leaned to conservatism and had aristocratic sympathies. The 
oracle usually gave its support to the power that was on the upgrade, like The Times 
newspaper in British politics, 318or the Washington Post in the US. Any advice that 
was given against the interest of the stronger party could provoke his anger and 
backlash. For example, a dispute had arisen as to whether two of the Athenian tribes 
should be allowed to retain possession of a hill at Oropos (on the borders of Attica 
and Boiotia), which had formerly been sacred to the god Amphiararos. The Athenians 
instructed three citizens, one of whom was an elderly citizen named Euxenippos, to 
sleep overnight in the god's temple to ascertain the god's will. Our sources report that 
Euxenippos proposed that the two tribes should keep the piece of land. However, this 
proposal was not reviewed as favourable by the Athenians, and Euxenippos was 
subsequently prosecuted. The charge was that he had said what was not best for the 
Athenian people. The law for this offence required the death penalty. But we do not 
know about the outcome of the case. 319 
3' Wight, `The States-System', op. cit. , p. 48. 31' Ibid. , p. 49. 319 MacDowell, op. cit., p. 180. 
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C. Greeks' View of Post-Mortem Punishment 
One of the fundamental differences between a secular institution of punishment and 
a religious one is the belief in post-mortem punishment by the latter, and its rejection 
by the former. The belief that one survives after death and will be held accountable 
for one' s deeds during earthly life is an essential component of many religions, 
particularly the monotheistic religions. Belief in supernatural surrogates can be 
effective at three stages: (a) it can deter a potential offender; (b) it can give powerful 
satisfaction to an injured party; (c) it can deter in the future an actual offender who 
supposes that he has in fact been punished by some surrogate. 320 
The extent and the depth of belief in the existence and power of the supernatural 
surrogate(s) determine the effectiveness of each of these three stages. In other words, 
a devout believer is fully convinced of the certainty of the post-mortem accountability 
and punishment and he would take account of such punishment in pursuing any act in 
this world, whereas a half-hearted believer would resort to post-mortem 
accountability and punishment if they complemented his other considerations; or 
when he has no choice but to believe in post-mortem punishment. In Greek literature, 
and conjecturally in life, the belief in supernatural surrogates was commonly 
restricted to (b). 321 The epics reported Zeus' "spy service": 30,000 immortal watchers 
roaming the earth to take note of unjust deeds. However these "persons" enforce 
justice not out of zeal for moral virtue but because they are themselves personally 
involved. 322 
320 Saunders, op. cit., p. 75. 
321 Ibid., p. 75. 
322 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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Overall the Greeks were sceptical about their gods' powers in the next world. 
Although Greek mythology is rich in describing the fate of man after his death, the 
Greeks themselves did not appear to delegate their right in punishing wrongdoers to 
their gods. Athenian litigants looked for tangible and visible recompense and 
satisfaction, not the unseen or future comforts of the religious faith that gods or other 
supernatural beings will bring offenders to book. 323 They were more interested in 
visible gains than the prospect of punishment in the next world. The Greeks' 
impatience can be seen in the posthumous trials that they regularly set. The Assembly 
assumed its right to hold accountable anyone, including the dead, who were alleged to 
have committed any wrong against the community. For example the corpse of 
Phyrinicus, who was alleged to have disclosed the Athenians' secret negotiations with 
the Persians, was disinterred and put on trial, and following his conviction it was 
thrown out of the Attica. 324 
Another important difference between the religious components of the Greek 
institution of punishment and the monotheistic religions is the absence of the notion 
of sin in the Greek world. Sinful acts are mainly acts that are transgressions of a god's 
will or violation of the moral codes. The presence of a god as an offended party is a 
necessary prerequisite for an act or a thought to be seen as a sinful act or thought. The 
nearest notion of "sin" in the Greek world was probably asebia, impiety. However, in 
Athenian eyes, impiety was essentially a matter of harmful actions against the 
community rather than sinful thoughts. 325 And as argued above, in the majority of 
impious acts, the offended party was the polis rather than the Greek gods. 
323 Ibid., p. 121. 
324 Lofberg & Barkan, pp. cit., p. 68. 
325 Todd, op. cit., p. 364. 
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Conclusion: 
The preceding sections looked at the procedural and substantive aspects and 
provisions of the administration of justice in Athens, though within the limitation of 
available sources at our disposal. It also sought to examine to what extent the 
institution of punishment in Athens reflected and also was reinforced by its 
hierarchical order (Athenian elite, ordinary male citizens, metics, female citizen, slave 
and beast). 
John Rawls's informative discussion of the anatomy of the relationship between 
procedural and substantive justice can also be utilised to learn more about the 
Athenian institution of punishment. With respect to procedural justice, Rawls outlines 
the features of three kind of procedural justice: perfect procedural, imperfect 
procedural, and pure procedural justice. Perfect procedural justice has two elements: 
(i) there is a criterion for a substantively just outcome, which exists independently of 
the procedure itself; and (ii) the procedure is guaranteed to achieve that just outcome. 
Imperfect procedural justice also has two elements: (i) there is a criterion for a 
substantively just outcome which exists independently of the procedure itself; and (ii) 
there is no procedure which is guaranteed to lead to this outcome. Finally, there is 
pure procedural justice, which according to Rawls is "where there is no independent 
criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the 
outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has 
been properly followed. "326 
326 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 85-85. 
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In applying Rawls' criteria of different types of justice to Athens, it becomes clear 
that the agent's place in the hierarchical order mainly determined the type of 
procedural justice that he was entitled to. For example, slaves, who constituted the 
largest group in Athens' hierarchical order, hardly enjoyed even the protections of 
"pure procedural justice", whereas the Athenian elite, who were the smallest group of 
Athens' hierarchal order, enjoyed many forms of protection of "perfect procedural 
justice". 
With respect to Rawls' "criterion for a substantively just outcome which exists 
independently of the procedure itself', Glaucon's definition of justice seems to have 
captured the prevailing Athenian understanding of substantive justice. At the 
beginning of Book Two of Plato's Republic, Glaucon begins his speech with his 
definition of justice. As Katherine Philippakis interprets, "He [Galucon] says that 
injustice is natural and justice artificial, for it is good to practise injustice but bad to 
suffer it, and so men get together and contract for their protection. Injustice is 
overreaching, or taking more than one's share, and justice is the granting advantage to 
the weaker. The weak set down a compact to enforce justice against the strong who 
practice injustice. s327 In the words of Glaucon, himself, justice is "a mean between 
what is best- doing injustice without paying the penalty- and what is worst- suffering 
injustice without being able to avenge oneself. "328 
However, as a result of the mythologized and romantic representation of ancient 
Greeks, in particular of classical Athens, in many quarters in the west, few are aware 
of the many unjust, elitist and cruel aspects of Athenians' concept and institution of 
327 Katherine Philippakis, "See No Evil: The Story of Gyges in Herodotus and Plato" in `Justice v. 
Law', op. cit., p. 33-4. 
328 Plato, The Republic. translated by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 359a. 
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punishment. Such a lack of awareness is, however, consistent with any mythologized 
entity, where a significant gap exists between the reality and the perception. Rumi's 
invitation to look beyond the form and look for the substance is the best advice in 
dealing with any mythologized entity, and will conclude this chapter: Rumi329 says, 
"I look not at the tongue and the speech; I look at the inward (spirit) and the state (of 
feeling). 
I gaze into the heart (to see) whether it be lowly, though the words uttered be not 
lowly, 
Because the heart is substance, speech (only) the accident; so the accident is 
subservient, the substance is the (real) object. " 330 
329 For a concise introduction to Rumi, see part III of the chapter on "forgiveness" of this thesis. 
330 Jalaluddin Rumi The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi, ed. & trans. Reynold A. Nicholson, Six Books 
(Tehran: So'ad Publisher, 2003), Book II: 1760-1765 (for further explanation on the format or 
referencing to Rumi, see, fn 725. 
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Chapter 4 
If you punish, let your punishment be commensurate with the wrongs that have been done you. But it 
shall be best for you to endure your wrongs with patience331 
The Islamic Institution of Punishment: A Mosaic of Eternal 
and Temporal Forms and Values 
Preface: The previous chapter showed how the institution of punishment in classical 
Athens demonstrated some contrasting features. On one hand, it was one of the most 
elaborate and sophisticated in terms of the procedural aspects of the administration of 
justice. On the other hand, its content protected the interests of a very small numbers 
of its residents and suppressed large sections of society. The chapter on forgiveness in 
this thesis will examine the place of forgiveness in the vocabulary and practices of the 
Athenians of ancient Greece. The second case study of the thesis is the Islamic 
institution of punishment. It will try to draw attention to some common and also 
contrasting features of the two traditions, Islam as a monotheistic religion and Athens 
as a democratic city-state. The following chapter will examine the third case study of 
the thesis, the ICC, which will complete the second section of the thesis. 
The examination of the Islamic institution of punishment commences by recalling 
the widely-publicised verdict of a Sharia court in Nigeria. When the then mayor of 
33'Koran, 16: 127. 
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Rome conferred upon Safiya Husseini the honorary citizenship of Rome, he probably 
reflected the worldwide anger against and condemnation of the verdict of a Sharia 
court in Nigeria, which sentenced her to death by stoning for adultery. 332 Her case not 
only demonstrated global public opinion on the perceived cruelty of the Islamic penal 
code, it has also intensified the debate within the Islamic world on implementation of 
Islamic penal code in their respective societies. The perceived cruelty of the Islamic 
penal code, coupled with the events of September 11,2001, have reinforced the early 
prevailing views of Islam and Muslims in the west as violent, irrational, and as a 
merciless doctrine and community. The live broadcast of the collapsing twin towers in 
New York, beheading of foreign hostages in Iraq or recent hostage -taking of school 
children in Russia will have a significant impact on how the public in the west will 
view the Islamic world in forthcoming years. 
. i" 
One of the principal charges and assertions of generations of orientalists has been 
their conviction regarding the inherent clash of Islamic norms with the contemporary 
international norms. Strawson has called it the "orientalists' problematigue" by which 
"Islamic law is represented within Anglo-American scholarship as an essentially 
defective legal system especially with regards to international law". 333 The Penguin 
Dictionary of Politics, also mentions aspects of the Islamic penal code in introducing 
Islam. According to its author, "... some punishments under this system [the Koranic 
law], including amputations and stonings, are regarded as barbaric in the West... "334 
Such a view of Islamic law has also informed many of related western policies, as was 
recently demonstrated by the veiled threat made by the German former EU 
332 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/africa/2246838. stm 333 Quoted in Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), P. 11. 
334 David Robertson, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics (London: the Penguin Group, 2003), p. 251. 
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enlargement commissioner, against Turkey. In his recent visit to Turkey Gunter 
Verheugen remarked "Turkey should not give the impression ... that 
it is introducing 
Islamic elements into its legal system while engaged in a great project such as the 
EU. " 335 More recently, the question of compatibility of Islamic law with 
international human rights and norms has also resurfaced in the discussion on the 
adoption of a new constitution for Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The growing fear of western countries of the prospect of a nuclear and biological 
attack by an Islamic militant group or a hostile Islamic state also raises some 
questions pertinent to the Islamic institution of punishment. The use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) by any group is a manifestation of the group's belief, or 
tolerance of the permissibility of collective punishment, which is a necessary 
consequence of the use of WMD. If one could establish that Islamic law condones 
collective punishment/responsibility, the possibility of a nuclear or a biological attack 
äI. 
by an Islamic state would be seen to be more plausible. 
äii 
Three general discourses and perspectives, "Orientalism", the "Clash of 
Civilisations", and "Talibanism" have mainly informed western criticism and 
questions about the Islamic world, including the Islamic penal code. As a result of 
partial, subjective, and politicised interpretation and representation of Islam by the 
above three groups, many aspects of the Islamic world, including its penal code have 
been inaccurately understood in the west and also by those Muslims who have 
submitted themselves uncritically to one of the three groups. 
335 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/europe/3641026. stm 
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This chapter aims to pursue two overall objectives. First, to bring to the surface 
many aspects of Islamic law which challenge those who view Islamic law as 
incompatible with international human rights and norms; and secondly, it will argue 
that the Islamic institution of punishment can contribute positively to international 
criminal justice. Areas where international criminal justice - as at the national level - 
can engage with the Islamic institution of punishment include: Islam's unqualified 
rejection of collective criminal responsibility/punishment, Islamic retributive justice's 
derivation and dependence on distributive justice, the institutionalisation of 
forgiveness within the Islamic institution of punishment, and its victim-oriented 
foundations and inclinations. 
In order to pursue the above two objectives this chapter is divided into six parts. The 
first part will provide a concise account of Islam's fundamental concerns, which are 
the nature of God, its theory of humankind, and the nature of mutual relationships 
between the two, God and man. The second section will explore Islam's main sources 
of legislation. The third part examines Islam's main schools of law and the categories 
of crimes which these schools have articulated. The third part also draws attention to 
some less well-known provisions of Islamic jurisprudence in relation to the rights of 
the accused. As with any legal system, Islam's main schools of law constitute and 
represent the letter of Islamic law. An understanding of the Islamic institution of 
punishment entails examining the spirit of Islamic law and its normative 
underpinnings. 
To this end, the fourth part will focus on the four themes of the interplay of law and 
morality, the Day of Judgement, justice, and forgiveness from, the Koran's 
perspective, and their ensuing incorporation into Islam's major schools of law, and 
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will also consider Islamic Sufism. The fifth part will discuss the extent of 
implementation of various aspects of the Islamic institution of punishment. Particular 
attention will be given to the contemporary debate on the implementing of the Islamic 
penal code, which has attracted diverse and often fierce debates. The concluding part 
will discuss how the Islamic institution of punishment can contribute to the debates on 
international criminal justice. 
From the outset, five issues should be borne in mind. First, it must be stressed that 
from the rise of Islam in 610 CE to the present day, diverse political, tribal, 
nationalistic, economic and international factors and players have influenced the 
interpretation, representation and implementation of Islamic norms and values. As 
such, some Muslim interpretations and practices should not necessarily be seen as 
Islamic, in terms of strictly conforming to the principal injunctions of the Koran. An I 
illustrative example of the localisation of Islamic norms is the case of the Saudi banj 
on women driving, on an alleged Islamic basis. Not only do Muslim women drive in 
the rest of the Islamic world, but also the Saudi case seems to be incompatible with 
the teaching of the Koran and the practice of the Prophet Mohammed. It is universally 
accepted among Muslims that the first wife of the Prophet was a businesswoman, who 
financially supported the Prophet and his missions and was the first person to covert 
to Islam. In other words, all Muslims have been blessed by the financial contributions 
of a businesswoman. Also, it is accepted that the second wife of the Prophet was 
politically and militarily active, as she led a battalion of the Muslim army after the 
Prophet's death. Comparing these examples with case in Saudi Arabia illustrates the 
gulf between the teaching of the Koran and some Muslims' interpretation on certain 
issues such as the rights and status of women. In the words of Abdulwahb Boubida, 
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"Islamic civilisation is essentially feminist336 . there is not a single text of the Koran 
can be given misgynist interpretation.. . misogyny is really no more than a sociological 
conditioning"337 
Secondly, due to the indisputable place and the authority of the Koran among all 
Muslims, the Koran will be the main source of reference throughout this chapter, in 
order to help differentiate between Islam and Muslims' diverse interpretations, and 
local practices. Thirdly, the chapter on "forgiveness" and also the concluding chapter 
will return to the Islamic institution of punishment, where they further elaborate and 
clarify some issues that are raised in this chapter. Fourthly, unless stated explicitly, 
throughout this chapter, referring to "man" or "men" includes both genders: men and 
women. Last point that needs to be explained is the imbalance between focus on 
Islamic documents and Muslims' practices throughout the thesis. Such an imbalance 
is partly intentional and partly unavoidable. A great deal of westerns' views of Islam 
and Muslims have been shaped by Muslims' practices and as such there is an 
insufficient knowledge about Islamic texts and thoughts. By giving primacy to Islamic 
texts, in particular its prime source the Koran, it is hoped to address the imbalance 
between too much exposure to Muslims' practice and too little knowledge about 
Islamic texts and thoughts. Also Muslims' practices covers range of different 
historical, political and social groups. It would be difficult, if not impossible to 
provide a fair representative account of Muslims' practices throughout fourteen 
centuries Muslims' history across the globe. It is also worth recalling that it is not the 
336 A misogynist interpretation and representation of Islam, mainly by male Muslim clergies have 
sidelined many "women friendly" provisions of Islam. A Muslim-feminist approach to Islam can 
discredit the misogynist representation of Islam. There are growing , 
if small, number of women 
organisation in some Muslim nations that are beginning to challenge the patriarchally-oriented Islamic 
discourses, such as "Sisters in Islam" a Malaysia-based advocacy group. For information about this 
organisation, see its website at www. sistersinislam. org. my 
337 Abelwahab Bouhdiba, Sexuality in Islam, translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 116. 
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intention of this thesis to idealise one tradition, including Islam and dismissing other 
traditions. It aims to draw attention to unrecognised humane and progressive 
provisions of non-western traditions, in particular Islam. 
I: The Principle of Unity 
As with other Islamic institutions and norms, the Islamic institution of punishment 
has been informed by Islam's main normative and ideological principles. An informed 
study of a derived and secondary institution such as the concept and institution of 
punishment, depends upon a prior acquaintance with the primary principles and 
framework. To this end, the first part of this chapter provides a concise account of 
some components of Islam's main principle, which is the principle of unity. The 
principle of unity provides a fertile soil for Islamic soil and spirituality. Unity is 
essential to Islam. "Islam underscores the unity of God, the unity of the many streams 
of revelation, the unity of humanity, and ultimately the unity of existence. Unity 
embraces and sustains diversity; the Whole is reflected in the parts. "338 From the 
principle of unity come many other Islamic principles, including Islam's account of 
God, its theory of mankind and the nature of the relationships between the Divine and 
mankind, which will be briefly examined in this part. 
A. God's Sovereignty 
338 Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk, "Peace in the Sufi Tradition: An Ecology of the Spirit", in 
Peace and Conflict resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice , edited 
by Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. 
Funk and Ayse S. Kadayifci (Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 2001), p. 247. 
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Among many attributes associated with God, the extent and nature of his 
sovereignty is one that has an immanent presence in Islam. God's sovereignty is 
recognised to be all-encompassing, absolute, inerrant, omnipotent, unaccountable, 
and uninfringeable. The Koran provides ample examples to demonstrate the nature 
and the degree of God's sovereignty in his kingdom, including the following verses: 
"To God belongs all that the heavens and the earth contain. "339 
"We created man. We know the promptings of his soul, and are closer to him than his 
jugular vein. "340 
"Do you not see how God is praised by those in the heavens and those on earth? The 
very birds praise Him as they wing their way. "341 
These unambiguous verses not only show the Koran's account of God's omnipotent 
sovereignty, they also shed light on the reasons why Muslim jurists have been careful 
to avoid an anthropocentric construction of any aspect of Islamic jurisprudence. 
More importantly, the principle of Unity and the extent and the nature of God's 
sovereignty as indicated in the Koran explain why secularisation of the Islamic world 
remains a peripheral exercise. An ontological separation between human beings and 
the Divine or granting absolute independence to the former is a fruitless labour within 
Islamic experience. But as the following sections seek to demonstrate, in some 
respects, the Koran informs us that the Divine has delegated his sovereignty to men, 
empowering them to strive towards discovering God's intents, and to implement them 
in his kingdom. 
339 Koran: 4: 126. 
340Ibid, 50: 116. 
341 1bid, 24: 41. 
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It is due to the principle of unity that Islamic jurisprudence has claimed to be all- 
encompassing and inclusive. The nature of Islamic jurisprudence will be discussed in 
the following parts. For the present part it suffices to draw attention to animal rights in 
Islamic law. Not only does the Koran mention that "The very birds praise Him [God]" 
(K, 24: 41), leading Muslim jurists have been obliged to elaborate and codify animal 
rights. One of the leading Muslim jurist-scholars, Taghi Jafarri has compiled a treatise 
on animal rights in Islamic law, containing 30 articles. These include: 
1. Animals' owners are obliged to provide all necessary provisions for their 
decent treatment and welfare; 
2. In cases where the owner fails to discharge his responsibility, it is incumbent 
on the state to look after the animal 
3. Cattle, sheep, goats, camels, etc should be allowed to feed their own young 
before milking them for human consumption. It is forbidden to milk such 
animals if it results in starving the animal's offspring; 
4. Anyone who milks mammals, must make sure to do it with trimmed nails, in 
order not to hurt the animals. 
5. It is forbidden to hunt animals for the sake of entertainment or unnecessary 
reasons. 
342 
342 This treatise has yet to be translated into English. However, for an introduction to this author see 
this website: http: //www. almizan. org/intro. asp 
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In addition to articulating, animals' rights, Islamic law includes provisions for 
punishing those who mistreat animals. It is the duty of the Islamic state to punish the 
abusers of animals. Furthermore, Muslims have been warned that they will be held 
accountable on the Day of Judgement if they mistreat animals. Equally, Muslims can 
expect to be rewarded for humane treatment of animals. In addition to animals, other 
creatures also enjoy certain rights and protection in Islamic law. This line of enquiry, 
the effect of the principle of Unity in informing Islamic discourse, will be further 
elaborated in the proceeding sections. 
B. The Islamic Account of the Nature of Mankind 
For Islam "man exceeds in dignity the whole creation and contains within himself 
the wonders that bear witness to the divine majesty. Second in creation to God, he is 
first in relation to every other creature. He is the link between natura naturata and ens 
naturans". 343 The source of this unique and privileged position is his origin - the 
way that man was created, according to the Koran: 
"... Your Lord said to the angels: `I am creating man from dry clay, from black 
moulded loam. When I have fashioned him and breathed of My spirit into him, kneel 
down and prostrate yourselves before him. "344 
The Koran also defines man's constitutional position in God's kingdom, which is 
that of God's vicegerent, as the following verse shows: 
"... I am placing on the earth one that shall rule as My deputy. "345 
343Bouhdiba, op. cit., p. 58. 
344 Koran, 15: 27-29. 
345Ibid., 2: 30. 
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The provisions and means that God has conferred upon man further reflect his 
privileged status as God's deputy: 
"He has subjected to you what the Heavens and the earth contains.., 046 
"It is He who has made the earth subservient to you. Walk about its regions and eat of 
"347 His provisions... 
However, as Cherif Bassiouni has noted, "The viceregency of man should not be 
thought of as a de facto sovereignty versus God's de jure sovereignty, nor should it be 
linked to the " divine right of kings" or papal authority. It is a concordat between free 
men, choosing to believe, accept and submit for the privilege of trusteeship or 
viceregency ". 348 
On a number of occasions God has admonished men for their violation of this 
concordat. The Koran refers to many cases to demonstrate the ungrateful, conflict- 
prone nature of many men and women.. Beginning with the prophets, whom one 
could expect to be immune from any temptation to fall, the Koran recalls the 
condemnable behaviour of many of God's prophets: from Adam whom God found 
lacking in steadfastness (K, 20: 115), Moses who slew a man in a row (K, 20: 40), to 
Jonah (K, 37: 147), and David (K, 38: 25) who both committed sins. 
If the Prophets were susceptible to falling from grace, ordinary men are more likely 
to follow suit. In the Koran, God has characterised men as niggardly (K, 17: 99), 
346 Ibid, 45: 13. 
347 Ibid, 67: 14. 
aas Cherif Bassiouni, "Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights", in The Islamic 
Criminal Justice System, edited by Cherif Bassiouni (New York: Oceana Publications, 1982), p. 11. 
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exceedingly contentious (K, 18: 54), unmindful (K, 21: 42), ungrateful (K, 22: 68), and 
as dividing themselves into factions each rejoicing in its own doctrines (K, 23: 52). 
The Koran's reflection on men's ungrateful and unacceptable behaviour is the main 
reason that Islam treats man as a free agent, responsible for his course of actions and 
choices. The Koran has stressed men's residual freedom and personal responsibility 
by recalling those individuals who have upheld their promise and concord with God. 
It has also identified the way in which man could reclaim his privileged status. The 
following section will focus on the Koran's prescription for man's salvation, which is 
total submission to the Divine. 
C. Total Submission 
The notion of total submission has been reflected on many occasions and in many 
contexts, beginning with the linguistic meaning of Islam and Muslim. Unlike many 
other religions that have been named after their founders, such as Christianity, 
Buddhism, or Zoroastrianism, Islam is based on a concept. The word Islam in Arabic 
means submission or surrender to God. Its derivation is from the word Selm or peace; 
wherefore the traditional Islamic greeting of As Salam Aleikum - "May peace be on 
you" 
Submission can be physical, intellectual or emotional/esoteric. In conformance 
with the all-encompassing sovereignty of the Divine, God's required means of 
submission is utter submission (K, 19: 93), as the Koran puts it. This entails 
submission of body, intellect, and heart. The Koran has identified three groups of 
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individuals: believers, hypocrites, and non-believers, representing the degree of their 
submission to the Divine. The believers are those who have submitted in their entirety 
to the Divine. The Koran quotes the Prophet Mohammed as an example of such 
submission: 
"My prayers and my devotions, my life and my death, are all for God, Lord of the 
Universe... "349 
Ritual praying is the physical manifestation of this submission and would be 
considered valid if it is derived from an intellectual and esoteric submission and 
conviction. The Koran characterises hypocrites as those who partially submit to God: 
"The Arabs of the desert declare: `We are true believers. ', 
Say (0 Mohammed): ' Believers you are not. Rather say: " We profess Islam, " for 
faith has not yet found its way into your hearts. "350 
Mere physical and intellectual submissions to the Divine still remain inadequate 
and must be perfected by an esoteric submission. Muslims believe that prior to the 
creation of man, Satan was a devout Muslim and worshipped God. However, in the 
words of the Koran, Satan's arrogance inhibited him from submitting to God 
esoterically, which led to his subsequent expulsion from God's inner circle of 
worshippers: 
"Why did you not prostrate yourself when I commanded you? He asked. 
349 Koran, 16: 162. 
350 Ibid, 49: 14. 
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`I am nobler than he [Adam] he [Satan] replied. `You created me from fire, but You 
created him from clay. ' He [God] said: `Get you down hence! This is no place for 
your contemptuous pride. "35' 
It is worth comparing the Koran's tri-dimensional conception of submission 
with Martin Wight's notion of the triple standard of morality. In his discussion of the 
three traditions of international theory, he points to the existence of three degrees of 
morality according to the realism perspective : personal morality, which is moral; 
civic morality, which is quasi-moral; and international morality which is immoral. 352 
However, and in spite of apparent differences between the three facets of submission, 
the Koran is absolutely clear about their common normative foundation, which is also 
consistent with the principle of Unity. The issue of relation between law and morality 
in Islamic tradition will be further examined in Part Four of this chapter. 
Informing men of their final destination has complemented the Koran's story of the 
creation of man, his constitutional position and the means of salvation. If men 
begin to pursue the path towards total submission, their reward and salvation 
would be to reunite with the Divine. The Koran quotes a group of them, saying: 
"We belong to God, and to Him we shall return. 053 
The Koran also tells us that God would honour his promise to the true submitters and 
will greet them by saying: 
35' Ibid., 7: 12-13. 
352 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian 
Porter (London: Leicester University Press, 1996), p. 247. 353 Koran, 2: 156. 
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"0 serene soul! Return to your Lord, joyful, and pleasing in His sight. Join My 
servants and enter My Paradise. "354 
Rumi's account of spiritual evolution is also helpful in understanding the notion of 
"total submission", which will be discussed in the chapter on "forgiveness". 
The next part looks at Islamic jurisprudence and its sources. 
II: Islamic Jurisprudence and Its Sources 
This part is divided into two sections. The first part is a brief introduction to the 
concept of "Sharia". It then proceeds to introduce the main sources of legislation in 
Islam. 
Regulating the affairs of a community that believes in God's absolute sovereignty, 
on one hand and in man's viceregency on the other hand is not an enviable task. This 
has been further complicated by the jurists' duty to reconcile worldly affairs 
with eternal ones. In Islam the enjoyment of worldly privileges is celebrated, as is 
demonstrated in many verses of the Koran including the following : 
"... when the prayers are ended, disperse and go your ways in quest of God's 
bounty. 3355 
One of the reported sayings of the Prophet Mohammed has elaborated the great 
harmony between worldly values and heavenly ones in Islam. He has encouraged 
Muslims "to seek worldly life as if he is to live forever, and salvation as if he is to 
354 Ibid. , 89: 27-30. 355 Ibid. , 62: 10. 
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die tomorrow. " 356 In another saying, the Prophet has described marriage as 
discharging half of a believer's religious duties. 357 
The quest to reconcile the temporal and eternal values and needs has been the main 
preoccupation of Muslim jurists, as the following sections show. 
A. Sharia 
Islamic jurisprudence consists of two main branches, Figh and Usul-Al-Figh. 
Figh is the discipline concerned with the articulation of actual rules of law. Usul-Al 
Figh deals with the theory of law and the methodological principles governing the 
formulation of the rules of law. Usul-Al-Figh embraces a number of salient features of 
Muslim juristic thought: 
... espousal of divine sovereignty (the basis of everything else); a 
fixation upon sacred 
texts that are the repositories of divine revelation; an uncompromisingly intentionalist 
approach to the interpretation of these texts; a frank acknowledgement of the 
uncertainty and fallibility of all individual human endeavour to capture the divine 
intent and a consequent acceptance of probabilism as the foundation of valid 
interpretation; a tolerance of legal diversity and a willingness to disseminate juristic 
authority among multiple schools; a moralistic bent grounded in a particular social 
vision; and, last, a preoccupation with the affairs of private individuals, and especially 
with family relations and contracts, coupled with a concern to define the limits of the 
power of government. 358 
Sharia has often been equated with Islamic law, whereas law constitutes only one 
356 Quoted in Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1984), p. 129. 
357 Quoted in Bouhdiba, op. cit. , p. 11. 358 Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), pp. xii- 
xii. 
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important aspect of Sharia. In archaic Arabic the term Sharia means " path to the 
water hole. " In its Islamic usage, Sharia is the totality of divine categorisations of 
human acts. These categories comprise several sets. Legal injunctions are one of these 
sets. Muslim jurists unanimously hold the view that Sharia's main objective is to 
protect five paramount and universal aspects of Muslims' lives. They include: 
religion, life, offspring (linage), property, and rationality. All Sharia's injunctions, 
commandments, and prohibitions consciously focus upon safeguarding and promoting 
these five paramount and universal interests. Identifying the objects of Sharia was 
complemented by the categorisation of believers' acts. Muslim jurists divided all 
fields of human activity into five different categories: obligatory, recommended, 
indifferent, disapproved of, and forbidden. Of these five categories, two quite 
naturally lend themselves to being subsumed under the heading of law, namely the 
obligatory and the forbidden; it is in the nature of Law to prescribe and to impose 
obligation - and to forbid. 359 
Muslim jurists have extensively addressed both the five paramount interests of man 
and also the five categories of his acts. For a contemporary case, one could refer to 
Muslim jurists' approval of all organ transplants on the basis of the preservation of 
life, one of the five purported objectives of Sharia. 360 
In line with the encompassing spirit of Sharia, the jurists felt obliged not to ignore 
any issue that would arise in an Islamic community, such as the status of 
hermaphrodites. The Islamic legal system is the first to have recognised 
359 Ibid., p. 18. 360 Birgit Krawietz, "Darura [necessity] in Modern Islamic Law: The Case of Organ Transplantations", 
in Islamic Law: Theory and Practices, edited by R. Gleave & E. Kermeli (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), 
p. 187. 
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hermaphrodites as a distinct category. All Islamic schools of law have devoted a 
section of their books to the legal status of this group, with particular in regard to 
personal status and inheritance. Since a male's share of inheritance or compensatory 
payment is more than that of a female claimant, the classical jurists reasoned that as a 
hermaphrodite is neither male nor female, his/her share of inheritance or payment 
should be less than a man but more than a woman. 361 
The Koranic basis of the recognition of hermaphrodites as a recognised minority 
group is this verse of the Koran, which advises women on how to conduct their affairs 
with the different categories of men. In addition to the close relatives, women have 
been advised to treat as women: 
"... Male attendants lacking in natural vigour [towards women] , 362 
Based on this recognition, a Kuwaiti court ruled that a 25-year-old man who 
underwent sex-change surgery can be officially regarded as a woman. The plaintiffs 
lawyer presented the court with an edict from Sunni Islam's top religious institution, 
al-Azhar, in Egypt. 363 Ayatollah Khomeini was among the first religious scholars who 
in 1955, approved sex-change operations. Since the Islamic revolution, transsexuals 
can apply to be legally recognised in their acquired gender and to receive a new birth 
certificate and passport, a right that transsexuals are denied in many parts of the 
world, including western countries. 364 
The multifaceted nature and objectives of Sharia compelled Muslim jurists to 
seek the means and sources that would enable them to meet the expectations of their 
361 Habedin Moemini, Islamic Penal Code (Tehran: Khate Sevoum, 2003), p. 455. 
362 Koran, 24: 30. 
363 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/middleeast/3657727. stm 364 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/programmes/newsnight/4115535. stm. 
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constituents and, more importantly, to discharge their religious duties. All Muslim 
jurists acknowledge God's absolute right and prerogative in law making. However, 
they also accept the permissibility and in some case the necessity of man's 
interpretive and declarative power in discovering the divine intent. Muslim 
jurists enjoy a derivative rule-making power, not an absolute law-creating prerogative. 
Furthermore, man, as God's viceregent, has been empowered to make 
complementary laws, but their validity will depend upon their compliance with 
Sharia. Therefore, Sharia consists of God's laws and jurists' interpretations of God's 
laws and intents. The widely-held assertion, particularly among Muslims, that regards 
Sharia as being the direct, sole, and invariable will and words of God ignores the 
significant role and contribution of jurists' interpretative inputs to it. 
B. Sources of Legislation 
The sources to which Muslim jurists have recourse to discover the divine intent and 
also to make complementary laws, consist of chief sources and complementary ones. 
The chief sources are the Koran, the Sunnah, Ijma, and Qiyas. 
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1. The Koran 
The Koran is universally accepted by Muslims to be the infallible word of God as 
first revealed to the Prophet Mohammed by the Angel Gabriel. It consists of one 
hundred and fourteen chapters and more than six thousand and six hundred verses. 
Nearly two thirds of the Koran was revealed to the Prophet Mohammed in his 
hometown, Mecca, where he spent the first ten years of his mission. The remaining 
verses appeared in Medina, where the Prophet Mohammed lived after his forced flight 
from Mecca. It was in the Medina where the first Islamic polity emerged. According 
to the majority of commentators, the Medina verses mainly deal with the practical 
principles, whereas the Meccan verses focus on theological and philosophical issues. 
There is no agreement among scholars about the exact number of the verses in the 
Koran, which deal with the legal issues. Different numbers have been suggested. They 
include eighty, 365 two hundred, 366 five hundred367, or, 10 % of all the Koran verses. 368 
2. The Sunna (Tradition) 
The Surma primarily consists of Ahadith, (singular Hadith) the Prophet's sayings 
and his purported practices. The Sunni Muslims include the transmitted words and 
practices of the four Caliphs that succeeded the Prophet to the category of the Surma. 
365Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nä im, Toward and Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and 
International Law (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 20. . 366 Sayyed Mostafa Mohagg Damad, "Comparison between Islam's Humanitarian laws and 
Contemporary International Law", in Human Rights from the Islamic Perspective: Iranian Scholars' 
Opinions, edited by Hussain Salimi Hussain (Tehran: AL HUDA, 2002), p. 320. 
36 Bassioni. `Islamic Criminal Justice', op. cit. , p. 129. 368 David Bonderman, " Modernisation and Changing Perceptions of Islamic Law", in Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 81 (April 1968), p. 1172. 
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For the Shia Muslims, in addition to those of the Prophet Mohammed, the words and 
practices of their twelve Imams are included in the Surma, as well those reports that 
have been verified by one of their 12 Imams. 
The compilations of six scholars have come to be accepted by the majority of Sunni 
Muslims as containing sound and genuine Sunna. 369 As for the Shia Muslims there 
are four books that contain the purported words and practices of the Prophet 
Mohammed and the Shia's twelve Imams. 370 
The question of the reliability of the Sunna: its definition, content, relevance, and 
applicability, has been the most controversial issue in the Islamic world. This 
controversy was given birth by the Prophet himself, who is reported to have instructed 
his companions not to write down his words, in order to prevent its confusion with the 
Koran. 371 Even after his death, the second Caliph prohibited the transmission of any 
Hadith from the Prophet. 372 
The earliest Islamic reasoning seems to have been virtually Hadith free. 
Furthermore, the Khawaraj movement, a militant group that arose in the early stages 
of Islam, was strongly critical of the rising tendency to sideline the Koran in favour of 
Hadith and other forms of human interference in divine affairs as they perceived. Ahl 
-AI - Koran, who viewed the Koran as being sufficient to discover the divine intent, 
put the most coherent argument and doctrine against reliance on Hadith. The Ahl -Al 
369 These scholars are: al - Bukhari (d. 870), Muslim. (d. 857) Abu Da'ud (d. 888), Tirmidhi (d. 892) 
and Ibn Maja. (d. 886) 
370 These were complied by, Kafi by mohammed Kulaini, Man Lah Yahzel- AL Fagih by Sodugh, 
Isibsar & Tahzib by Sheikh Tuisi. 4&5 century Islamic 371 Daniel. W Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 54. 
372 Ibid., p. 96 . 
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- Koran held sway till the end of the third century of the Islamic era, when their 
opponents, Ahl- Hadith, gained prominence and prevailed in the Islamic world for 
almost one millennium. In spite of the valid criticism against the content and 
particularly the methodology of inferring authentic Hadith, its proponents 
unfortunately succeeded in elevating Hadith to nearly equal status with the Koran, to 
the extent that Ahl - Al- Hadith developed a maxim that "the Koran has greater need 
of the Sunna than the Sunna of the Koran. , 373 
The debate over the Sunna re-emerged in the nineteenth century. A leading Indian 
Muslim reformist, Sayyed Ahmad Khan (1817- 1898) rejected almost all Hadith as 
unreliable, and believed that only the traditions dealing with spiritual matters were of 
relevance and those dealing with worldly matters were not binding. However, he did 
not reject the authority of Sunna, he severely curtailed its scope, and called for new 
methods of evaluating it, and insisted on its subordinate position vis- a-vis the Koran. 
374 
The opponents of equal footing of Hadith with the Koran have identified three 
weaknesses in the Sunna. 375 
1. Unlike the Koran, the Sunna has not been recorded in a way that can be trusted to 
represent the exact word of God. Ahadith recorded only the words of the Prophet, not 
of God. 
2. Divine injunction must be externally and verbally communicated, whereas the 
Sunna bears the marks of Mohammed's personality; and 
37 Ibid., p. 17. 374 Ibid., p. 33. 
375 Ibid., p. 53. 
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3. The late registration of the Surma in writing and its flawed transmission 
The following section examines the third source of legislation. 
3. Ijma (Consensus) 
The third source of Islamic legislation is Ijma, or consensus. It can be said Ijma is 
closer to the modem notion of Doctrine in Law. For the early jurists, the consensus of 
Muslim scholars on a given issue, or their silence, would count as a legally binding 
and acceptable for the rest of the community. However, as of the Sunna, this source 
also generated fierce debate among jurists. Questions were raised about its definition: 
does it require complete unanimity or can it be formed despite some disagreement or 
minority dissent? Whose Ijma is binding and upon whom? Is it the consensus of the 
n: Y Prophet's companions and their community of Median, that of Muslim scholars and 
jurists in general, or that of the totality of Muslims? Is it the Ijma of a single 
wlll 
generation or that of several generations? Is the Ijma of an earlier generation(s) 
necessarily binding on all subsequent generations? 376 
These questions have been explored both by the proponents and critics of Ijma 
throughout the Islamic world for generations, with no prospect of immediate - 
resolution. 
4. Qiyas (Analogy) 
In applying Qiyas (analogy) a jurist is "concluding from a given principle 
embodied in a precedent that a new case falls under this principle or is similar to this 
376 An-Nä im, op. cit. ' p. 24. 
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precedent on the strength of a common essential feature called the `reason'. "377 The 
main opponents of Qiyas can be found among Ahl-Al-Hadith. who have 
argued that to have recourse to Qiyas, is tantamount to basing Sharia on human reason 
rather than divine revelation. 378 
The above sources are common to the four surviving Sunni schools of law. But 
the three Shia schools of law do not recognise the fourth analogy as a separate source 
of law. The fourth source, according to the Shia, is rational intuition. 
The supplementary sources or subsidiary techniques are: 
1. Istishan: is the deviation from certain rules based on precedents 
derived from other rules based on relevant legal reasoning. According 
to An-Na'im, "the best English translation for Istihsan is `favourable 
construction' or `juristic preference'. "379 
2. Istislah (public good): is an unprecedented judgement explicitly 
covered by the Koran or the Sunna and necessitated by public interest. 
3. Istishab: a principle of evidence whereby an existing state of affairs 
may be presumed to have had a lawful origin and to continue in 
existence until the contrary is shown. 380 
377Majid Khadduri, "Nature and Sources of Islamic Law", in George Washington Law Review Vol. 22, 
W53), P. 14 
Ibid. , p. 25. 379 An-Na'im, op. cit., p. 25. 
380 Noel Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), p. 92. 
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4. Darura (necessity): necessity may cause the impermissible to become 
permissible. For example, in the Koran, necessity permits a Muslim to 
eat forbidden food such as pork or do impermissible things if that is the 
only way to preserve his or her life. 
5. Al-Urf, or the custom and usage. 
The Islamic sources of law seem to conform to the categories defined by 
modem jurists and the statute of the International Court of Justice, namely agreement, 
custom, reason, and authority. The first two sources, the Koran and the Prophet's 
words and practices, represent authority; Mohammed's companions-and 
succeeding Muslim generations embodying the Arab-Muslimjus gentium is 
equivalent to custom; jurists' decrees and juristic commentaries of text-writers, as 
well as utterances from authoritative sources, may be said to form reason. 
The next part looks at major Islam schools of law and the categories of crimes. 
III: Islamic Criminal Justice 
This part comprises three sections. The first section is an introduction to Islam's 
major schools of law. It is followed by an examination of the categories of offences 
according to Islamic law. The concluding section focuses on some of the rights of the 
accused in Islamic law. 
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A. The Schools of Law & Jurisprudence 
The Sunni and Shia traditions are the major branches of Islam. In addition to 
these groups, there have been other branches throughout the Islamic world. The major 
difference between the Sunni and Shia traditions is the issue of succession of the 
Prophet Mohammed. The Sunni regard the four Caliphs that succeeded the Prophet 
Mohammed to be his legitimate successors. These four were, Abu- Baker, Omar, 
Othman, and Ali; whereas according to the Shia, Ali alone should have succeeded the 
Prophet, to be followed by Ali' s descendents. According to them the reason for Ali's 
and his descendents' eligibility is the divine sanction and the Prophet's blessing, 
rather than their blood connection with the Prophet. 
The Shia tradition of Islam is also sub - divided into further sub-groups. The largest 
group within this tradition are Al - Ithna-`ashriyyah (the Twelvers), who believe in 
the infallibility of their 12 imams, the first one being Ali and the twelfth is Al - Mahdi "'" ' 
who was forced to occult in the year 1016. The Shia Twelvers believe that Al - Mahdi 
would reappear as a messiah to be accompanied by Christ to fulfil God's promise, 
which is the establishment of a universal just state on earth. 
Apart from the question of the Prophet' s successors, there are no major differences 
or disputes about the major tenets and pillars of Islam between the two main traditions 
of Islam. However in some parts of the Islamic world, the jurisprudential differences 
have been translated into sectarian differences and sometime into conflicts, similar to 
the growing tension between the Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq. 
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There are four surviving schools of law in the Sunni tradition, and the Shia have 
their own School. The four Sunni schools are: 
1. Hanafi: its founding jurist was Abu Hanifa who died in 767. This school 
spread in the Islamic countries more widely than all the others. Its adherents 
constitute more than one-third of all the Muslims in the world. 
2. Maliki: its founding jurist was Malik, who died in 795. This school is still 
predominant amongst the people of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. 
3. Shafie: its founding jurist was Shafie who died in 819. Egypt was the 
stronghold of this school. It has many adherents in Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Yemen, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
4. Hanbali: its founding jurist was Hanbal who died in 855. This school has 
spread less than all together schools, but it has become the official school of ;;: 
Saudi Arabia. 381 
As noted above for both the Shia and Sunni, the Koran, the Sunna and consensus are 
the sources of jurisprudence. But Shias do not recognise analogy as an independent 
source of legislation. For them, rational intuition is the fourth source. 
The next section looks at categories of crimes according to the main schools of 
jurisprudence. 
38! Safia M. Safwat, "Offences and Penalties in Islamic Law", in Islamic Quarterly, Vol. 26 (1982), p. 
152. 
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B. Categories of Crimes 
Muslim jurists have categorised offences in two groups, those offences that violate 
God's rights and offences related to violation of men's rights. Subject to the 
procedural requirements, the former cannot be suspended, mitigated or aggravated, 
whereas in case of the latter, the victim or his family (in the case of intentional 
homicide) are empowered to seek redress from the perpetrator or to grant him 
forgiveness. 
Another category that Muslim jurists have developed is more specific and also 
related to the first general category. According to this specific category, the offences 
comprise three groups: Hudud, Quesas, and Tazir. Hudud are the offences for which 
the Koran and/or the Sunna have provided specific penalties. The Quesas 
category deals with offences inflicted by one individual upon another, such as 
homicide or injury. Tazir offences are those that are not included in either of the 
former two categories. The following section discusses each of these offences. 
1. Hudud Offences 
There is no unanimous agreement among jurists about the exact number of offences 
of Hudud: seven, six or four have been suggested. The seven offences named as 
Hudud offences are: theft, highway robbery, unlawful sexual intercourse, unproven 
accusation of adultery, intoxication, apostasy, and rebellion against the Muslim state. 
194 
There has been disagreement among some jurists about the merits of inclusion of 
the three offences of intoxication, apostasy and rebellion against the Muslim state as 
Hudud offences, because of the lack of any specific and fixed penalty for these three 
offences either in the Koran or in the Sunna. But there is no disagreement about 
the existence of specific penalties for the four remaining offences; theft, highway 
robbery, unlawful sexual intercourse, and unproven accusation of unlawful sexual 
intercourse. 
i. Theft 
Recalling the purported objective of Sharia in preserving and protecting religion, 
life, offspring (linage), property, and rationality, the offence of theft is the violation of 
man's property, and as such, the Koran has stipulated punishment for theft as 
following: 
"... as for the man or woman who is guilty of theft, cut off their hands to punish them 
for their crimes"382 
Although the above Koranic verse is straightforward regarding the penalty for theft, 
there are nineteen conditions that need to be met before the execution of punishment. 
Among these safeguards are, the maturity, sanity, intention of the culpable, and the 
value of the stolen goods, which is determined by the enforcing authority. 383 In 
addition to these specific factors , "the establishment of the true Islamic society is a 
condition precedent to the infliction of Hudud penalties". 384 No school of law 
allows amputation of a thief's hand amid widespread poverty, or famine. Islam's 
382 Koran, 5: 38. 
383 Moumini, op. cit., p. 242. 
384 Safwat, op. cit., p. 162. 
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retributive justice is an application and an extension of its distributive justice, which 
explains why there have been few cases of amputations in those Islamic states that 
implement Islamic penal code. For example the number of amputations between 1955 
and 1980 in Saudi Arabia was only sixteen. 385 
ii. Armed Highway Robbery 
The punishment for the offence of armed highway robbery aimed to protect the 
individual's life and property against any threats when they are most vulnerable, such 
as when travelling. The Koran has laid down the punishment for this offence as 
follows: "... those who spread disorder in the land shall be slain or crucified or have 
their hands and feet cut off on alternate sides, or be banished from the land. "386 
The severity of this penalty should be viewed in the context of medieval social 
order, when banditry was widespread and trade was an important part of the 
economic and social fabric of the medieval societies of the greater Middle East. 
The prospect of such a dreadful penalty aimed not. only to protect the life and property 
of individual travellers, but also the economic structure of society. As with other 
Hudud offences, there were requirements and safeguards to be met prior to the 
infliction of this penalty. The Koran gives the enforcing body the right to choose one 
of the four courses of punishment: execution, crucifixion, amputation of his hands and 
feet or banishment. Throughout fourteen centuries of Islamic history, including the 
contemporary era, execution or banishment have been the main methods of 
punishment in relation to this offence. There is no credible report that suggests 
ass Bassiouni, `Islamic Criminal Justice', op. cit., p. 201. 
386 Koran, 5: 33. 
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crucifixion has been used as a method of punishment in the Islamic world, probably 
due to the association of crucifixion with Christians' account of the crucifixion of 
Christ. 
W. Unproven Accusation of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse 
Due to the sensitivity of the allegation of sexual misconducts the penalty of an 
unsubstantiated accusation of sexual misconduct would earn the accuser the 
following punishment, as laid down by the Koran: "Those that defame honourable 
women and cannot produce their four witnesses shall be given eighty lashes. "387 
iv. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse 
One of the common concerns of all societies has been the regulation of the sexual 
affairs of their members. No matter how liberal, conservative, traditional or modern a 
society claims to be, there is a universal consensus about the need to regulate the 
sexual freedom of its members. No known moral, legal or religious system has a 
laissez faire attitude towards the sex life of its members. Islam's attitude toward sex 
has been one of the main issues that has been disapprovingly questioned by different 
groups in the west. For the pre-1960s generation of orientalists, Islam's liberal 
attitude towards sex and the Prophet Mohammed's sex life were examples of 
Islam's decadent and permissive nature. Muslims' relaxed attitude towards sexual 
issues were also present in Muslim states' treatment of prostitution. In Andalusia 
prostitutes were Kharajiyyat, those who pay the Kharaj, or property tax. Also in the 
tenth century, under Sayf-al-dawla and under the Fatimids in Egypt prostitution was 
387 Ibid., p. 24: 4. 
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officially taxed. It was only in 1949 that a law was passed to close the houses of 
prostitution throughout the Kingdom of Egypt. 388 Despite states' legal intervention to 
close the brothels, in the Arab-Muslim town the red-light district is part of the familiar 
landscape of the town, 389 but is less publicised than those of Amsterdam and 
Hamburg. 
The new generation of orientalists are the offspring of the post-i 960s sexual 
liberation revolution in the west who came to view Islam's attitude towards sex as 
biblical and repressive. 
Islam's attitude toward sex has been informed by two considerations, recognising 
and embracing the sexual needs of both men and women, and secondly protection of 
the institution of the family. The first consideration was the focus of the attack of the 
pre-1960s critics, whereas the second one prompts the post-1960s' criticism. Islamic 
sexual laws and ethics seek to achieve a balanced sexuality both for the individuals 
and also for society. Unlike medieval Christianity, which embedded guilt with sex, 
Islam has been far more accommodating and embracing of the sexual needs of human 
beings. Not only is marriage regarded as fulfilling half of a believer's religious duties, 
there are sayings from the Prophet Mohammed promising heavenly rewards for 
lawful sexual intercourse! Islam's early affirmation of the institution of divorce aimed 
to end unresolved marital difficulties and thus enabled the couple to seek other 
avenues for their sexual and spiritual satisfaction. Shia jurisprudence sanctions 
temporary marriage for those who are unable to commit to a permanent relationship. 
388 Bouhdiba, op. cit., pp. 189-93. 
389 Ibid., p. 193. 
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Conjugal rights are among the rights that Islamic law offers to prisoners. In 
accordance with this requirement, prisoners in Saudi Arabia are allowed to have 
regular visits from their partner for conjugal privileges. 390 
Within these privileges and entitlements, Islam has placed certain restrictions on 
unregulated sexual activities and proposes punishment for those who violate 
these boundaries. The Sharia's stated penalty for unlawful sexual affairs between two 
consenting adults is one hundred lashes: "The adulterer and the adulteress shall each 
be given a hundred lashes. "391 
However the most controversial issue concerning the penalty for unlawful sexual 
intercourse is the punishment for married persons. All Muslim jurists agree that the 
penalty for unlawful sexual intercourse between two unmarried persons is one 
hundred lashes, as the Koran stipulates. But they disagree on the penalty of stoning 
for such a crime, committed by married persons. The proponents of stoning 
substantiate their claim, referring not to the Koran but to some supposed sayings of 
the Prophet and his immediate successors, the four Caliphs. The opponents of stoning 
have challenged the methodology of verifying the authenticity of these sayings and 
also their contents. The first group that rejected stoning to death was the Khawaraj 
who held differing views from the majority in the early stages of the rise of Islam. 392 
There is not a single verse in the Koran prescribing or condoning this method of 
punishment for adultery or any other offences. 
390 Ibid., p. 235. 
391 Koran, 24: 2. 
392 Mohammed S., El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study . 
(Indianapolis: 
American Trust Publications, 1982), p. 15. 
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Furthermore, those jurists who support stoning have put in place tough safeguards 
to prevent any miscarriage of justice. These safeguards are applicable irrespective of 
the marital status of the accused, and are also applicable to both man and woman. The 
following requirements are examples of these safeguards: 
1. Unlawful sexual intercourse can be proven either by self-confession or by 
testimony of four male witnesses. Other circumstantial evidence such as the 
pregnancy of a single woman cannot be used as a proof. 
2. The four witnesses should be male, sane, sound, reliable and just. 
3. The four witnesses should be unanimous in their testimony. Any discrepancy on 
the part of any one of them would automatically discredit all of them, and would 
result in their being punished for the offence of accusation of unproven sexual 
intercourse. 
4. The witnesses' testimony can only be accepted if they are able to testify to 
having observed the actual coitus, the man's penetration of a woman according 
to this formula "like a brush in a pot of glue". 393 It is for this specific 
requirement that this offence should be described as unlawful sexual 
"intercourse", rather than in vague terms such as sexual misconduct. 
393Weiss, OD. Cit., p. 156. 
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5. Self-confession: according to Islamic law, unlawful sexual intercourse is a 
violation of God's command, which would earn the offender severe punishment 
in the world to come. However, repentance, and self-confession and the ensuing 
worldly punishment would spare him/her the dreadful punishment on the Day of 
Judgement. Therefore, the offenders can willingly and voluntarily confess to 
having committed this offence. Confessions should be repeated four times. 
6. The presiding judges are required to encourage confessors to change their 
testimony to avoid punishment. Since very few people are willing to endure the 
severe punishment of stoning or flogging, self-confession as a method of 
proving the offence of fornication is impractical. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for 
more than fifty years, only one case of unlawful sexual intercourse is known to 
have been proved by self-confession. 394 Self-confession can be withdrawn at any 
Y 
stage including during the enforcing of the penalty, which would automatically 
terminate the procedure and the confessor could walk free. As a result of these 
safeguards, the Nigerian lady whom we mentioned earlier won her appeal 
against the initial verdict and was set free by the Appellate Sharia Court. 395 
Therefore, the rules of evidence, which apply in the case of the offence of unlawful 
sexual intercourse for both man and woman, render it almost impossible to prove the 
occurrence of this offence. Furthermore, the offence of unproven accusation of 
unlawful sexual intercourse is a further safeguard to protect women from malicious 
charges. 
The following part examines the second category of crimes according to Islamic law. 
394 Al- Awa, W. cit., p. 129. 
395 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/africa/1891395. stm 
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2. Quesas Offences 
The word Quesas means " equality" or " equivalence". It denotes that a person who 
has inflicted harm on an individual should be punished in equivalence with the harm 
that he has caused. There are five Quesas offences: 
1. - Murder 
2. Voluntary killing (similar to intentional killing or voluntary manslaughter) 
3. Involuntary killing 
4. Intentional physical injury or maiming 
5. Unintentional physical injury or maiming. 396 
These offences fall into the category of people's rights and thus the victim or 
his/her family are empowered to redress the harm either by retaliation, monetary 
compensation, or forgiveness. The Koran stipulate these penalties: 
"We have decreed for them [Jews] a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a 
nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and a wound for a wound. But if a man 
charitably forbears from retaliation, his remission shall atone for him. Transgressors 
"397 are those that do not judge according to God's revelation. 
To properly understand the significance of punishment for the Quesas offences, 
they have to be viewed in the context of the social order of the tribal community 
in which Islam was born. Although for our contemporary sensibilities "an eye for an 
eye" justice seems to be too cruel and inhumane, it helped significantly to restore 
396 Bassiouni, `International Criminal Justice)', pp. cit., p. 203 
397 Koran, 5: 45. 
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proportionality between crime and punishment in a culture where collective 
punishment was widely accepted. In addition to the above limitation on excessive 
retaliation, the Koran has provided one of the most celebrated decrees on the value of 
human life in this verse of the Koran: 
"... whoever killed a human being, except as punishment for murder or other villainy 
in the land, shall be regarded as having killed all mankind; and that whoever saved a 
human life shall be regarded as having saved all mankind. "398 
The Koran and the Islamic penal code aim to pursue a balanced approach to the 
issue of retaliation and violence. As the above verses show, the Koran vehemently 
condemns excessive retaliation and calls for equality between the injury and the 
penalty. On the other hand, it does not ask the victims to forgive unconditionally and 
unwillingly those who have wronged them. The balanced approach of the 
Koran can be further inferred by comparing Matthew's famous saying in the New 
Testament with two verses from the Koran: 
The biblical version: 
"You have heard that that it was said, ' An eye for and an eye and a tooth for a tooth. ' 
But I say to you, do not resist the one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the 
right cheek, turn to him the other also. "(Matt. 5: 38-39) 
Whereas the Koran states: 
398 Ibid. , 5: 32. 
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"God does not love harsh words, except by a man who is truly wronged. "399 
"If you punish, let your punishment be commensurate with the wrongs that have been 
aoo done to you. But it shall be best for you to endure your wrongs with patience. " 
This balanced approach can also be seen in Islam's attitude towards capital 
punishment. There is no offence in Islam which automatically prompts capital 
punishment in the first instance. The procedural safeguards and also ethical 
recommendations aim to discourage resorting to the death penalty as a preferred 
method of punishment. On the totality of procedural and substantial components of 
the Islamic institution of punishment, it is a reasonable and warranted assertion to 
characterise Islamic law as the first de-facto abolitionist legal system, while 
respecting the needs and legitimate sensibility of the victim and the community. 
The abolitionist inclinations of Islamic law can be compared with western 
traditions. It is true that many western nations have now joined the family of 
abolitionist states, prior to the movement to abolish the death penalty; there were far 
too many capital offences in western law. For example, in England, for many 
centuries, death was the penalty for almost every felony. By 1819 there were 220 
capital offences. 40' 
The section is concluded by examination of the third category of offences in Islamic 
law. 
399 Ibid. , 4: 148. 400 Ibid. , 16: 127. 401 Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 17. 
204 
3. Tazir Offences 
Tazir offences encompass all offences for which Sharia does not prescribe a 
fixed penalty. Punishment of these crimes is derived from the discretionary authority 
of the sovereign as delegated to the judge. Tazir offences can be: simple robbery, 
larceny, cruelty to animals, attempted adultery, the breach of trust by the public 
treasurer or testamentary guardian, false testimony, usury slander, corruption, bribery, 
tampering with weights and measures, spying for the enemy or rape. Although Sharia 
has not specified the penalty for Tazir offences, judges cannot override the overall 
objectives of Sharia. The punishment of Tazir offences can be verbal admonition 
uttered by the judge mainly in case of juvenile offenders, corporal punishment, 
deprivation of liberty or pecuniary penalties. 
The next section reviews some of the rights that the accused and offenders are entitled 
to in Islamic criminal law. 
C. The Rights of the Accused & Offenders 
The penal code of Sharia includes many provisions that few are aware of. The 
following section will look briefly at some of these provisions. 
1. Prohibition of Torture 
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The Islamic legal system was among the first to systematically curb the use of 
coercive measures to discover the truth. Anti-torture elements in the Islamic legal 
system can be inferred from the rules of evidence and also the religious and moral 
condemnation of torture by the Prophet and his companions. As noted in the offences 
of Hudud, confession is a voluntary act and could be withdrawn at any stage. As in 
the offence of Quesas, the crime can be proven either by self-confession by the 
accused or by the oath taken by the victim or his relatives in the case of murder. In the 
third category of crime, Tazir, many rules of evidence that are applied in cases of 
Hudud and Quesas crimes are also applicable here. 
In the absence of clear guidelines, the truth should be sought within the general 
framework and the spirit of the law, which explicitly prohibit torture. The expressed 
prohibition of torture is inspired by the clear instructions of the Prophet and his 
companions. The Prophet is purported to have said: "God shall torture on the Day of 
Recompense those who inflict torture on people in life". 402 The Koran associates 
torture with unbelievers and recalls God's condemnation of a group who 
tortured a group of the faithful: 
"Cursed be the diggers of the trench, who lighted the consuming fire and sat around it 
to watch the faithful being put to the torture! Nor did they torture them for any reason 
save that they believed in God...,, 403 
The events of post-September 11,2001, have demonstrated the extent and the 
degree of observance of the 1984 UN Convention against torture in the international 
community, in particular by many western nations such as the US and UK. In the 
402 Quoted in Osman Abd-el-Malek al-Saleh "The Rights of the Individual to Procedural Security", in 
Islam" in, Bassiouni, `Islam Criminal Justice', op. cit., p. 72. 




case of the latter, one could refer to a recent ruling by the UK's Appeal Court, the 
second highest court in the land, on the admissibility in the UK courts of evidence 
obtained by torture. According to this ruling, evidence produced by torture would be 
admissible in such cases as long as Britain had not " procured or connived" at the 
torture. 404 The practices of torture committed by the US and its Middle-Eastern allies 
have now become a matter of public record and perception, in particular in the Islamic 
world, where places such as Guantanamo Bay, Abu-Ghraib prison in Baghdad, and 
Baghram airport in Kabul, are known as torture camps. There are also some members 
of the Organisation of Islamic Countries where torture has become a regular practice 
as part of their security apparatus, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Pakistan, Iran, 
Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. In other words, such states not only violate relevant 
international human rights law, but also are ignoring the teaching of the Koran. 
2. The Principle of Equality 
The issues of equality before the law on one hand, and the immunity of certain 
categories of individuals from the reign of law, on the other, have posed challenges to 
many legal systems. However, Islam began tackling them in its early stages of 
development. Islamic jurisprudence does not recognise any person as being 
immune from the reign of law. The Koran's account of the Prophet Mohammed 
reveals a lack of any notion of special privileges of immunity and accountability, 
even in case of the Prophet Mohammed: 
404 "Tortured Logic", in The Guardian Weekly, (12/08/04) 
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"If they disbelieve you, (Mohammed), say: `My deeds are mine and your deeds are 
yours. You are not accountable for my actions, nor am I accountable for what you 
do'... "aos 
The Prophet himself submitted to Islamic law to highlight the principle of equality 
before the law. The Prophet-cum-head of state spoke clearly about this in his last 
sermon: 
O people! If I have flogged anyone [wrongly], let him retaliate here and now. If I have 
insulted anyone, let him reciprocate. If I have taken anyone's property, let him claim 
it and take it from me. Let no one fear any rancour on my part, for that would not be 
becoming to me. Be aware that one who takes back his right from is most dear to me, 
for I wish to meet my Lord with a clear conscience. 406 
On the issue of discrimination and exclusion of a given group from the protection 
of the law, Islam's legal system also introduced egalitarian provisions and was far 
ahead of many contemporary legal systems in granting procedural and substantive 
rights to minority groups. The Koran is unequivocal about the equality of all men 
and women regarding the essence of human dignity, reward and accountability in 
their personal conduct, the unity of origin, and equality in creation, of the entire 
human race, as this verse shows: 
"You people! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into 
nations and tribes, that you might get to know one another. The noblest of you in 
God's sight is he who is most righteous. God is all knowing and wise. "407 
405 Koran, 10: 41. 
406 Quoted in Mohammed Hashim Karnali, Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam (Cambridge: Islamic 
Texts Society, 2002), p. 55. 
4D7 Koran, 49: 13 
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However, in some respects, such as the amount of compensatory money paid, there 
are differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, and men and women. The former 
case is similar to the differences between citizens and non-citizens in a secular state, 
whereas in the case of the latter, the differences have been justified on the principle of 
equity, and due to the different roles and responsibilities of men and women. 
There is no obstacle in the Koran that could inhibit Muslims from granting full 
procedural equality to women, and also to non-Muslims, in those areas where 
medieval jurists failed to do so. For example, in Iran the different rate of 
compensatory money or blood money paid to Muslims and non-Muslims has now 
been abolished and there is equality between the two with respect to blood money. 408 
The section on the contemporary debate on Sharia returns to this subject. 
3. The Principle of Presumption of Innocence 
The presumption of innocence requires the accuser to prove his accusation. The 
defendant is not required to produce negative evidence. The rules of evidence in all 
Islamic schools of law require the accuser, either the individual or the prosecutor, to 
prove their accusation. Conviction must be founded upon assurance and certainty of 
guilt and not on mere probability. In case of Hudud crimes, any doubt about the 
408 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/middle_east/2395867. stm 
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reliability of evidence or witnesses would automatically lead to dismissing the case. 
The Prophet, inter alia has provided the religious underpinning of the principle of 
presumption of innocence, proclaiming, `had men been believed only according to 
their allegations, some persons would have claimed the blood and properties 
belonging to others, but the accuser is bound to present proof. Furthermore, the 
absence of the concept of " original sin" in Islam places emphasis on the original 
soundness and integrity of the human moral constitution. 
4. The Principle of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility, which was introduced in the 
west in the aftermath of the French Revolution, was fully incorporated into the 
Islamic legal system in the seventh century, as is reflected in many verses of the 
Koran, including the following: 
"No soul shall bear another's burden. If a laden soul cries out for help, not even a near 
relation shall share its burden. "409 
The application of the principle of individualisation of punishment would result in 
dismissing the notion of collective responsibility and hence collective punishment. 
Targeting innocent civilians for politically motivated goals or for any other ends are 
explicitly in violation of individual criminal responsibility, as such, is prohibited in 
Islamic law. Almost every Muslim jurist and scholar has condemned all acts of 
violence against civilians that have been perpetuated since the 9/11 attacks on the US 
and elsewhere. 
409 Koran, 35: 18. 
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However, many of them have been reluctant to include the case of Occupied 
Palestine in unlawful acts of violence, on the grounds of the Palestinians' legitimate 
right for self-defence, and also doubt the non-combatant status of those Jewish settlers 
who immigrated from the rest of the world into Occupied Palestine. But, as will be 
argued shortly, some attacks by the Palestinians cannot be justified on Islamic 
grounds. 
It is true that those Jews that immigrated to Occupied Palestine cannot expect to be 
treated as non-combatants, since they voluntarily chose to occupy and settle on 
others' lands and properties. Also, it is true that all mature and able men and women 
Jewish citizens in Occupied Palestine are active or reserve members of the Occupying 
army and apparatus, which excludes them from the conventional category of civilians. 
However, there are also some non-combatants who live in Occupied Palestine, who 
are protected by the Islamic law of warfare. The non-combatant and thus innocent 
groups include: children under the age of military service, the elderly, medical 
personnel, priests and rabbis, the sick, those of Palestinian of Arab origin, Muslim 
Palestinians, Christian Muslims, the Jews of Palestinian origin, and also foreign 
visitors. Any military attack that may harm one of the protected groups is prohibited 
under Islamic law, as this verse of the Koran clearly shows: 
"... whoever killed a human being, except as punishment for murder or other villainy 
in the land, shall be regarded as having killed all mankind... "aio 
As to the use of weapons of mass destruction, it is explicitly prohibited on the 
grounds of Islam's unequivocal rejection of collective criminal responsibility and also 
410Ibid., 5: 32. 
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the sanctity of human life. One of Iran's main defences to refute the western assertion 
and fear about Iran's nuclear programme has been the Islamic prohibition on the 
acquisition and the use of nuclear bombs. In his speech to the UN General Assembly 
in September 2005, Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated that, "Islam prohibits Iran 
to acquire nuclear weapons"41I 
Another hypocrisy of countries such as the US, UK and France who press Iran to 
allay western fear by abandoning altogether its nuclear enrichment programme, is that 
not only do they possess hundreds of nuclear weapons and have used two of them (in 
the case of the US) and have openly declared their readiness to use them, they 
(western nuclear powers) failed to articulate any legal doctrine that explicitly 
prohibits the use of nuclear weapons. Not only there is no municipal law that prohibits 
the use of nuclear weapons in western countries, but there is no explicit provision in 
international law on the use of nuclear weapons, thanks to the concerted efforts of 
nuclear powers to prevent the development of any legal prohibition on the use of 
nuclear weapons. The most recent attempt was demonstrated during the negotiations 
to adopt the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in which nuclear 
powers, including the US and France succeeded in removing nuclear weapons from 
the list of banned weapons in the Rome Statute 
412 
5. The Principle of Legality of Crimes and Punishment 
The principle of legality of crimes and punishment stipulates that no person can be 
411 For the full text of Iranian Pres. Ahmadinejad' s speech to the UN can be found on his official 
website at: http: //www. president. it/ahmadinejad/cronicnews/1384/06/26/indix-f. htm (26 September 
2005) 
412 For a further elaboration of the Rome Statute of the ICC, see the next chapter, the ICC. 
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accused of a crime or suffer punishment except as specified by law. The full 
recognition of this principle in the West did not occur till the end of the eighteenth 
century. Islam established this principle some fourteen centuries ago, as the following 
verse of the Koran testifies: 
"... Apostles who brought good news to mankind and admonish them, so that they 
might have no plea against God after their coming.., "413 
6. The Principle of Non-Retroactivity 
While the principle of non-retroactivity has its origin in the west with Article eight 
of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, it has been an integral part of 
Islamic law for fourteen centuries. The only exception to this principle in Islamic 
jurisprudence is that criminal law has retroactive effect if it favours the accused 414 
Islam prohibited certain practices such as usury, marriage of one man to two sisters or 
drinking wine. However, the Koran has stipulated that men would not be held 
accountable if these acts were committed before Islam pertained. 
7. The Principle of Legitimacy 
The principle of legitimacy is the principle of the supremacy of law. This principle 
governs the interactions of all the authorities of the state and individuals. The absence 
of the notion of the absolute power of any human being, including the Prophet 
Mohammed, coupled with the omnipotent sovereignty of God in Islam, resulted in the 
413 Koran, 4: 164. 
414 Bassiouni, `Islamic Criminal Justice', op. cit., p. 63. 
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subsequent supremacy of law in Islam, as demonstrated in this verse of the Koran 
demonstrates in which God commanded Prophet Mohammed to: 
"Pronounce judgement among them according to God's revelations and 
do not lead by their desires. "als 
Furthermore, the duty to obey the ruler is not absolute under Islamic law. It is 
subject to the observance of Islamic law by the ruler. Otherwise subordinates would 
be held accountable for their actions, as quoted by a group in this verse of the Koran: 
"... Lord, we obeyed our masters and our great ones, but they led us away from the 
right path... 5416 
They then would be asked: 
"... Was not the earth of God spacious enough for you to fly for refuge? "417 
These verses imply that the Koran does not recognise the defence of " Obedience to 
Superior Order" as a mitigating factor, which is often used in cases of war crimes. 
The Prophet also warned Muslims about the danger of divided loyalty between God's 
commands and unjust rules: "there is no obedience to the created in disobedience of 
the Creator"418. 
8. Prisoners' Rights 
415 Koran, 5: 49. 
416 Ibid, 33: 67. 
417 Ibid 4: 97. 
418 Quoted in Karnali, op. cit., p. 24. 
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The gradual reduction of corporal and capital punishment has been accompanied by 
growing numbers of prisoners, as imprisonment has become the only method of 
punishment for many criminal acts. However, the rise of prisoners' numbers has 
prompted the question of the suitability of imprisonment as an effective means to 
dispense justice. It is now universally accepted that prisons have become training 
environments for the less experienced inmates. This unintended consequence 
would undermine an important objective of imprisonment, which is the rehabilitation 
of this group of offenders. 
More importantly, it is not only the prisoner that is affected by his imprisonment, 
but his family also are forced to share to some extent his fate. The imprisonment of a 
husband, a father, or a mother is bound to put under severe psychological and 
financial strains his/her family members. Therefore, one could argue that 
imprisonment is not compatible with the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility and individualised punishment. It is because of these ensuing 
consequences of imprisonment that Muslim jurists have been reluctant to consider 
imprisonment as a method of punishment. There is no place for imprisonment in cases 
of Hudud, Quesas and the majority of the Tazir crimes. The reluctant acceptance of 
imprisonment has been accompanied by strict conditions to minimise the adverse 
effects of imprisonment. According to all Islamic schools of law, the state must 
provide prisoners with the basic necessities of life, and the prison environment should 
be within the objectives of Sharia, which is to protect the principal welfare of 
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prisoners. It is also incumbent on the public treasury to support the family of prisoners 
during their internment. 419 
The next part examines the four normative principles that have underpinned the 
Islamic institution of punishment. 
IV. Normative Principles of the Islamic Institution of 
Punishment 
The foregoing sections provided an insight into Islam's principal tenets, its main 
sources of legislation, its major schools of law, the categories of offences and some of 
the rights to which the accused and offenders are entitled in Islamic law. The 
following section will discuss four important issues pertaining to the Islamic 
institution of punishment. These are: the interplay of morality and law, the Day of 
Judgement, justice, and forgiveness. 
A: Interplay of Law and Morality 
The principle of Unity has also enveloped Islamic law and the Islamic institution of 
punishment. Unlike many other legal systems that allow either implicitly or explicitly, 
a distinction between morality and legality, or the separation of temporal values from 
heavenly ones, Muslims do not recognise such a division. According to the principle 
of unity, no aspect of Islamic jurisprudence, including Islamic law, can be devoid of 
morality or condone or facilitate any act that is considered immoral. As Bassiouni 
noted, "When orientalists speak of Islamic morality to indicate a similarity to 
419 Bassiouni, `Islamic Criminal Justice', on. cit., p. 235. 
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Christian morality, the parallel may be misleading, because the entire fabric of Islam 
is moral and not merely an aspect thereof. This belief eliminates the need for a 
distinction between practical and theoretical morality and transcends distinguishing 
theories of absolutism and relationism of moral judgement. " 420 The requirement for 
compatibility of Islamic law and morality does not necessarily mean that all moral 
injunctions should be translated into legal ones to be enforced judicially. In fact, there 
is no judicial mechanism to monitor the implementation and enforcement of the five 
pillars of Islam: confession of faith, ritual praying, alms-giving, fasting, and 
pilgrimage to Mecca. The unconditional submission of Islamic law to its moral codes 
means that there cannot be any law in the Islamic jurisprudence that contravenes 
Islamic values. 
The systematic persecution of Jews and other minorities during the Nazi regime was 
prompted by Hitler's sponsored " Enabling Act", which was then passed by the 
German Parliament. For a more recent example of the clash of morality and legality, 
one could refer to a recent decision by Israel's High Court to lift restrictions on the 
Israeli Army's policy of demolishing the Palestinian homes in the Occupied West 
bank and the Gaza strip. 421 The driver of a bulldozer who proceeds to demolish 
Palestinian's homes would have legal justification and protection, but he would have 
grave difficulty in providing a moral justification to many of us. 
B: The Day of Judgement 
The most distinctive difference between the monotheistic legal systems and the 
420 Ibid., p. 8. 421 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/middle_east/3723375. stm 
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secular/positive systems is the central place of the Day of Judgement in the legal 
systems that purport to be divinely inspired. Secular legal systems do not recognise 
any metaphysical issue to lie within their jurisdiction. Although Islam has embraced 
in entirety all worldly provisions and privileges, it nonetheless regards the privileges 
of the temporal world as ornament(K, 18: 46) and transitory (K, 16: 95). 
An important aspect of the confession of faith, the first pillar of Islam, is belief in 
the Day of Judgement. The five paramount interests of Sharia are meant to enable 
believers to go through the transitory stage and prepare them for the final stage, which 
is reuniting with the Divine. The difference between Islam, with its philosophical 
underpinning, and the positive legal systems has influenced the understanding, and 
application, of certain concepts such as life. In a positive legal system life primarily 
is a biological concept and death is what stops the biological clock and thus 
terminates life. However, "life" in Islam embraces a host of meanings including 
" self', "psyche", " soul", " animus, " and "living being, ". 422 It is not life in an 
abstract biological sense. This differing understanding explains why the Koran 
considers martyrs to be alive: 
"Do not say that those slain in the cause of God are dead. They are alive, but you are 
not aware of them. "423 
An important aspect of the Islamic concept of punishment is its relation to the 
Day of Judgement. There is not any worldly punishment for committing many 
prohibited acts, such as mistreatment of animals. However, as the following shows, 
422 Weiss, op. cit., p. 151. 
423 Koran, 2: 154. 
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the Prophet forewarned that the perpetrators of such acts would be held accountable 
on that Day. The Prophet has been reported to have warned Muslims that "a woman 
went to hell because she kept a cat closed up until it died. , 424 The stark warning 
about punishment in the afterlife has compensated for the absence of worldly 
punishment. To ensure internalisation of the Day of Judgement in Muslims' minds, 
the Koran has informed Muslims that there are angels who record all their actions, 
which would then be presented on the Day of Judgement: 
"Surely there are guardians watching over you, noble recorders who know of all your 
actions. '5425 
A large section of the Koran deals with the Day of Judgement and illustrates many 
details of that Day, describing the Day of Judgement as a court, when people are put 
on trial and are questioned by God: 
"We will assemble you all, together with past generations. "426 
"We shall set up just scales on the Day of judgement. "427 
The real values and standards of behaviour by which a society lives are not always 
and not merely those that the courts will enforce, and there are often more powerful 
forces to compel the observance of standards of behaviour than legal coercion. 28 The 
backdrop of the Day of Judgement is the most powerful incentive to observe 
the law in Islam. The prospect of justice on that Day also helps victims to be patient 
and hopeful of redressing their injuries, and minimises the thirst for revenge in this 
world when they feel helpless, or for other grounds. The utilitarian benefit of the 
prospect of justice on the Day of Judgement was recently demonstrated by one of the 
424 Quoted in Bassiouni, `Islamic Criminal Justice', op. cit., p. 196. 
425Koran, 82: 9. 
426 Ibid., 77: 38. 
427 Ibid. 21: 47. 
428 Noel. J Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1969), p. 84. 
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leading Shia clerics, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Said al-Hakim, who invited Iraqis 
to be calm in the wake of a wave of car bombings against the holiest places of the 
Shia, and advised them that "God would avenge and compensate the victims. "429 
Furthermore, and unlike many circumstances, when the parties are forced to make a 
choice between justice and peace, those who believe in the justice of the afterlife 
are not required to do so. If they cannot achieve justice in this world, they are 
confident that justice shall prevail, maybe not in this world but certainly in the 
afterlife. Therefore their decision to opt for peace is more meaningful and sustainable. 
In other words, those who believe in the Day of Judgement have the best of both 
worlds, peace in this world and justice in the world to come! The background of the 
Day of Judgement should be one of the factors that need to be considered in the post- 
conflict settlements in Islamic societies such as Afghanistan, where there is less thirst 
for retributive measures. The chapter on "forgiveness" and also the section on 
"restorative justice" in the concluding chapter will further elaborate the non- 
retributive aspects of Islamic institution of punishment. 
C. Justice 
Another issue that is correlated with the Islamic institution of punishment is that of 
justice. Literally adl (Justice) means placing something in its rightful place; it also 
means according equal treatment to others or reaching a state of equilibrium in 
transactions with them. Adl thus signifies moral rectitude and fairness since it means 
that things should be where they belong. 430 In the Arabic language, for every aspect 
429 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/europe/3641026. stm> 
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of justice there are several words. The most common in usage is the word " adl". 
Literally, the word adl is an abstract noun, derived from the verb Adala, which means: 
to straighten; to run away; to be equal; to be balanced; and also denotes example or 
alike. 43' 
The Koran, as the principal source of authority and reference, in Islam, has 
addressed the virtue of justice in different contexts. These verses then inspired 
Muslim thinkers' views on the virtue of justice. Their access to the Greek 
philosophers' books also deepened their interest in and understanding of the 
various aspects of justice. Considered along with the virtue of justice, is the vice of 
injustice. There are over two hundred admonitions against injustice in the Koran. 432 
Justice is an attribute that is present at any stage of God's kingdom, beginning with 
God himself and the creation of the Universe: "He raised the heaven on high and set 
the balance of all things. "433; "I am not unjust to My servants. "; 434"God loves those 
who exercise justice. "435"We have made you (believers) a just community. "436 
God's apostles have also been enjoined to do justice: "We have sent Our apostles with 
veritable signs, and through them have brought down scriptures and the scales of 
justice, so that men might conduct themselves with fairness. "437 
430 Kamali, op. Cit., p. 103. 
43' Khadduri, op. cit., p. 6. 
432 Ibid., p. 6 
433 Koran, 55: 7. 




436 Ibid., 2: 144. 
437 Ibid., 57: 25. 
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The Koran is identified as a scale of Justice: "We have revealed to you the Book 
(Koran) so that you may resolve their difference for them: a guide and a blessing to 
true believers. "438 
Justice is also an incumbency upon all believers: "... Speak for justice. "43966 Deal 
justly. "440c4. Fight for justice. "441 
More importantly, the Koran commends a deontological dispensation of justice: 
"Woe betide the unjust who, when others measure for them, exact in full, but when 
they measure or weigh for others, defraud them. "aal 
"Believers conduct yourselves with justice and bear true witness before God, even 
though it be against yourselves, your parents, or your kinsfolk. Be they rich or 
poor... "443 
As noted in the foregoing sections, Islamic retributive justice is an extension of 
Islamic distributive justice. Furthermore, as the above verses of the Koran show Islam 
requires justice to envelop every aspect of Muslims, including the Islamic institution 
438 Ibid., 16: 64. 
439 Ibid., 7: 199. 
440 Ibid., 5: 8. 
441 Ibid., 8: 5. 
442 Ibid., 83: 1. 
443 Ibid., 4: 135. 
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of punishment. Therefore, the Islamic institution of punishment aims to satisfy the 
requirements of both procedural and substantive justice. 
D. Institutionalised Forgiveness 
Although forgiveness is regarded as a commendable virtue in many cultures, Islam 
is among the few systems that have made forgiveness an important component of 
their penal codes, as well as regarding it as a moral and religious incumbency oh 
believers. Similar to the giving of alms to the needy, which is a moral virtue in other 
systems, in Islam it is an obligatory act and is one of its five pillars. Forgiveness in the 
context of the Islamic concept of punishment has been tailored to complement the 
retributive aspect of the penal code. Forgiveness is not a substitute for punishment or 
a means to escape from it. Only those who genuinely repent will be entitled to it. 
Forgiveness is both applicable to worldly punishment and on the Day of Judgement. 
In enforcing any of the three categories of offences, the guilty are given the option of 
repentance, or seeking forgiveness from God or the victim. In Hudud offences, the 
offender who seeks forgiveness from God, before his arrest, has been promised 
forgiveness. However, after his arrest, he cannot escape the relevant worldly 
punishment. In the case of Quesas offences, although the victim or his relatives have 
been empowered to seek retribution, they are strongly encouraged to opt for 
forgiveness as this verse of the Koran indicates: 
"Let evil be rewarded with evil. But he that forgives and seeks reconciliation shall be 
recompensed by God. "444 
444 Ibid., 42: 40. 
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Forgiveness can be sought by genuine repentance and by contributing to the welfare 
of society: "To be charitable in public is good, but to give alms to the poor in private 
is better and will atone for some of your sins. "445 
The recommended ways of seeking forgiveness is another indication of the nature of 
"Islamic criminal justice which is essentially a policy-oriented system. " 446 
Forgiveness not only is an important aspect of the Islamic institution of punishment, 
it also has a central position in other aspects of Islam. The most widely used 
characteristic that the Koran associates with God is his forgiveness. The Koran speaks 
of God's forgiveness on more than 240 occasions. Unlike the clear equivalence 
between crime and punishment, God's forgiveness is said to be unlimited: "God 
gives without measure to whom He will. "447 
The Koran identifies God's forgiveness as the only reason for the survival of 
mankind: "If God punished men for their sins, not one creature would be left 
alive.., "448 
Forgiveness and imploring for it not only is one of the central attributes of God, it is 
also a duty and a privilege for man, in particular for the believers: "They (believers) 
implore forgiveness for the faithful, saying: ` Lord, You embrace all things with Your 
"449 mercy and Your knowledge. Forgive those who repent and follow Your path... 
445 Ibid., 2; 271. 
446 Bassiouni, `Islamic Criminal Justice', pp. cit., p. 5. 
447 Koran, 3: 37. 
449 Ibid., 16: 61. 
449 Ibid., 40: 7. 
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Seeking forgiveness has been identified as a part of God's apostles' missiom"... when 
they (men) wronged themselves, they had to come to you imploring God's pardon, 
and if the Apostle had sought of God forgiveness for them, they would have found 
God forgiving and merciful. , 450 
In another verse, the Koran considers forgiveness not only a moral virtue but as an 
incumbency upon men: "To endure with fortitude and to forgive is a duty incumbent 
on all... "451 
Another area that shows the place of forgiveness in Islam is Islamic Sufism. The 
goal of the Sufi is said to be: 
... the apprehension of truth, " but the intent lies deeper in the inner desire to achieve 
perfection by spiritual exercises in search of the Divine. The culmination of the 
process is the threshold where the soul becomes isolated from everything foreign to 
itself, from all that is not Divine. When the. soul is finally united with the Divine, the 
Sufi is transformed from the state of " Al-fana" [literally: extinction], the reality of 
existence to the state of " Al -hagq, "[truth] the ultimate reality or the reality of union 
with the Divine. Divine Justice in the eyes of the Sufi is not the reward in the 
hereafter, but the possession of the light, beauty, and love of God. 452 
The Sufi's measure of justice is forgiveness and mercy. A well-known Sufi, Abu 
Sa'id B. All al-Khayr (d. 1049), has provided an example of the Sufi degree of 
forgiveness: 
450 Ibid., 4: 53. 
asi Ibid. 4243. 
452 Khadurri 
, op. cit., p. 72. 
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I have prayed God to forgive my neighbours on the left, on the right, in front, and 
behind, and He has forgiven them for my sake .... I need not say a word on 
behalf of 
those around me. If anyone has mounted an ass and passed by the end of this street, or 
has passed my house, or will pass it, or if the light of my candle falls on him, the least 
thing that God will do with him is that he will have mercy upon him. 453 
As such, the Koran aims to make Muslim societies as a forgiving one, by 
institutionalising it and cultivating a culture of forgiveness. The chapter on 
"forgiveness" will further elaborate the Islamic conception of forgiveness. 
The focus of the next part is the extent of the implementation of Islamic law in the 
criminal justice systems of Muslim states and societies. 
V: Extent of Implementation of Sharia In Muslim States 
From the year 610 CE. to the present era Islam has been an important and influential 
force not only in Muslim societies but also on the international stage in various 
capacities and degrees. Today's Muslims constitute more than one fifth of the world's 
population, encapsulating different cultures, traditions, and political arrangements. 
Although throughout this thesis, including this chapter, some of the practical aspects 
of the Islamic institution of punishment have been highlighted, it is not practically 
possible to provide a systematic and an adequate treatment of the practical aspects and 
453 Cited in ibid., p. 109. 
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the extent of the implementation of the Islamic institution of punishment in one single 
section in this chapter. This part will try to provide a concise account of the extent of 
implementation of the institution of punishment prior to the Islamic revolution in Iran 
in 1979. The second part will examine in more detail the issue of implementation of 
the Sharia penal code in contemporary Muslim societies. 
As with any set of rules, the extent of implementation Islamic law, including its 
penal provisions, depends on various factors and players. The most important factor 
has been Muslims' conviction and their decision to implement Islamic law. Islamic 
law has provided only one set of rules and regulations that have been operating in 
Muslim societies. Local traditions and rulers' decrees have competed with or 
complemented Islamic law. Which set of rules/laws prevails over the competing ones 
depends on the balance of power between the competing forces. For example, in the 
early years of the twentieth century, the nationalists took control of modern Turkey. 
"The Young Turk officers" then engaged in mass killing and the deportation of 
Armenians from Turkey. But in the early years of the twenty - first century, the 
Islamic run Turkish government is one the leading pro-European forces. Furthermore, 
at the same time as the Turks were busy slaughtering Armenians, other Muslim 
societies such as Syria and Iran provided safe havens for the fleeing Armenian 
refugees 
Another factor in understanding the extent of implementation of Islamic law, in 
particular regarding the Koran's teaching, is the awareness of the difference between 
an idealistic set of rules and the empirical realties. The Koran's teachings are 
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idealistic and moral teachings, whereas Muslims' practices reflect the empirical 
realities of Muslim societies. 
Another factor which needs to be appreciated is the nature of Islamic law, including 
its penal codes. As the above sections showed, a great deal of Islamic law such as the 
offences of Tazir, are dependent on local contexts and traditions. Compared with 
many other traditions and systems, Islamic law is not centralised or institutionally 
hierarchical. Furthermore the implementation of some aspects of Islamic law, such as 
its distributive justice and the importance of forgiveness, depends on individual 
Muslims' adherence to the Koranic teachings. 454 The individualistic natures of such 
provisions make it difficult for an external observer and researcher to quantify them. 
The above factors are also relevant in the current discussion on implementation of the 
Sharia penal code in Muslim states. The next section focuses on the line of enquiry. 
Of fifty-six members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), four 
Countries: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan and Iran, have incorporated parts of the 
Sharia penal code into their legal system. In other parts of the Islamic world, 
increasing numbers of Islamic groups demand the immediate application of Sharia 
as the sole, or at least primary, legal system of the land. This resurgence of interest in 
the Islamic penal code can be viewed from different angles. As the introductory 
chapter on the institution of punishment showed, the modern institutions of 
punishment are confronted by the crises of legitimacy and effectiveness. This is more 
454 The most recent book on the Islamic institution of punishment can help readers to learn more about 
the extent of implementation of Islamic penal code throughout from the rise of Islam to the present era. 
Unfortunately, I have not been able to read it by the time of submitting this thesis. However, the 
background of its author and also its title seem to be promising for such an endeavour. Peters, Rudolph 
Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixth Century to the 
Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
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vivid in the Islamic countries, where many secular institutions, particularly the crime- 
control initiatives, have failed to deliver. The revival of interest in the Islamic penal 
code is part of a universal resurgence, seeking more effective means of crime control. 
An important aspect of the resurgence of political Islam is the issue of the 
Islamisation of Muslims' penal code. Those groups that purport to advocate Islamic 
values and Islamic solutions for many problems of Muslim societies tend to use the 
Sharia penal code as a first step towards their goal, which is creating a true Islamic 
polity. However, some of these groups tend to disguise their real intention behind 
Sharia and use it as a means to further their personal and political objectives. For 
example, for some political parties in Nigeria or Pakistan partial enforcing of the 
Sharia penal code has become their premier political card against their secular rivals. 
Chief among the proponents of the full implementation of the Sharia penal code are »»,. 
the growing numbers of Muslim clerics who have often monopolised understanding 
}ýi; 
and representation of Islam in recent centuries. Bishop Hoadly succinctly described 
the role of the interpretive medium in (mis)representing the original message. 
According to him, 
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he 
who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first 
spoke or wrote them". 455 
The Koran also warns against misguided and abusive clerics: "Believers, many are the 
clerics and the monks who defraud men of their possessions and debar them from the 
path of God, "456 
ass Quoted in W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar, and J. Chopper (eds. ), Constitutional Law, Cases Comments, 
Questions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970), p. 1. 
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The growing domination of the conservative segments of the Muslim clergy over 
the judiciary was vividly present in Iran, and Afghanistan has now joined Iran in 
allowing the clergy to take charge of the judiciary. In the case of Iran, the judiciary 
has become one of the main arenas, in which the conservatives have confronted the 
reformist movement. In Afghanistan, with the blessing of the US, the clergy managed 
to insert favourable articles into Afghanistan's new constitution, which would enable 
them to control the Afghanistan Supreme Court. The background of the newly - 
appointed Afghan Supreme Courtjudges proved that the clerics' early efforts bore 
fruition. All nine judges of Afghanistan's interim Supreme Court belong to the 
conservative wing of Afghanistan's clergy. 457 
Any discussion of the plausibility of implementation of any aspect of Islam's penal 
code and also of other Islamic institutions should recognise the vested interests 
of powerful forces in the Muslim world, in particular the male/cleric-dominated 
traditional and political institutions. A fruitful debate on the implementation of 
Islamic penal code should be conducted in a democratic environment, where 
representatives of every group of Muslims could participate. The active participation 
and contribution of criminologists, international and constitutional lawyers, Muslim 
women, Sufis, as well as the clergy, would ensure a balanced understanding, 
interpretation and also implementation of Islam's legal system. 
456 Koran, 9: 34. 
457According to Article 121 of Afghanistan's new Constitution, the Supreme would have jurisdiction to 
assess the compatibility of any legislation with the "foundations" and "provisions" of Islam. The early 
draft did not mention "provisions" but the clerics managed to insert it into the final version of the 
Constitution on the last days of constitutional Loyeh Jergah in Dec. 2003. This would enable the 
Supreme Court justices to exercise an unprecedented power to impose their interpretation of Sharia's 
diverse laws and provisions on the rest of the country, similar to the Council of Guardians in Iran, 
which has similar constitutional prerogative and political power. According to many Afghanistan 
observers, the US was instrumental in facilitating the clerics in inserting the aforementioned article into 
the constitution and the US also supported recent appointments to the Supreme Court, in return for the 
clergy's support of the new government. 
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The Islamic legal system, as a policy-oriented system, coupled with Sharia' s five 
paramount and universal interests - religion, life, property, offspring and rationality - 
is fully capable of meeting the needs of contemporary Muslim societies and is in 
full harmony with the majority of contemporary international human rights laws and 
norms. The successful fruition of this endeavour would depend on the democratisation 
of the understanding and representation of Islam, and also upon de-politicisation of 
the debate on the Sharia penal code. 
The concluding part of this chapter is a brief introduction to how the Islamic 
institution of punishment could contribute to further developments of international 
criminal justice. It should also be mentioned that the concluding chapter will expand 
this line of enquiry. 
VI: Islamic Institution of Punishment and International Criminal 
Justice 
It is not only the understanding and implementation of Islamic penal code that are in 
need of the full participation of all walks of Muslims. Development and 
implementation of global norms and institutions are also in need of democratisation, , 
and the contributions, involvement and active participation of all members of the 
international community. The monopoly of any one single group or voice in an 
international endeavour such as international criminal justice is doomed to fail. 
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Islamic laws and norms are fully equipped to contribute to such endeavour. The 
uncompromising insistence of Islam on the compatibility of legal norms with morality 
demonstrates that any system of law in the national or international sphere would be 
rendered ineffective and unpopular if it were divorced from moral principles. Islamic 
laws and norms can contribute positively to addressing the moral deficiencies of many 
aspects of international law and affairs. 
Islam purports to reject compartmentalisation of any aspect of human existence and 
attempts to address all human beings' tendencies and needs, and aims to create 
equilibrium amongst their multifaceted needs. It warns us that any attempt to satisfy a 
given human need should take note of the complexity of the human being and his 
needs. Treating a human being as a mere consumer, or as a competitive agent in the 
Hobbessian sense, a sexual object in the Freudian tradition, or a joyless believer from 
the Taliban's perspective would do injustice to human beings, who also possess many 
other needs and qualities. Islam wants man to be at peace with himself, with his fellow 
human beings, and with the world. 
The Koran's view of justice as a deontological virtue is one of the most egalitarian 
notions of justice. There have been few selfless voices in dispensing justice. The 
Islamic conception of justice and its subtext of just punishment aim to make 
dispensing justice obligatory act, benefiting not only "us" but also "them". If 
dispensing justice becomes an obligatory even at the expense of one's own unjust 
interests, addressing many of the contemporary global challenges would be less 
complicated than today. Islam refuses to see justice as an impediment to peace. 
"Peace vs. justice" has often been used by powerful players to evade their 
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responsibilities. As Sohail Hashmi has noted, "The Koran does not stop at mutual 
toleration or an uneasy coexistence of different communities, a religious cold war. 
Rather it envisions a dynamic moral-political cooperation of the righteous, whereby 
all human beings are challenged to contribute positively and according to their own 
moral traditions to the building of a just and equitable human community on this 
planet". 458 
Islam's commandment of forgiveness as an incumbency and its attempt to 
institutionalise forgiveness aim not only to displace violence, but also to suppress it 
and pave the way for its ultimate disappearance. Forgiveness is not only required of 
the poor, weak and the dispossessed; it is also incumbent on the rich, the powerful, 
and the exalted. 
tut 4J 
if", 
The following story attributed to a Muslim Sufi reflects succinctly the spirit of the 
Islamic institution of punishment, which is wilful forgiveness: , ý, A 
One night, Bayazid (d. circa 788 C. E. ) was returning from the cemetery 
when a young nobleman approached, playing a lute. " God save us" Bayazid 
exclaimed. The youth lifted the lute and dashed it against Bayazid's head, breaking 
both his head and the lute. Bayazid returned to his convent and waited till morning. 
Then he summoned one of his companions. He wrapped a sum equal of the price of 
the lute in a cloth, added a piece of sweetmeat, and sent these to the youth. "Tell the 
young gentleman, " he said to his companion, "that Bayazid asks his pardon. Say to 
him, `Last night you struck me with that lute and it broke. Accept this money in 
458 Sohail H. Hashmi "Is There an Islamic Ethic of Humanitarian Intervention? ", in Just Intervention, 
edited by Anthony F. Lang, (Washington D. C : George Town University Press, 2003), p. 77. 
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compensation, and buy another. The sweetmeat is to remove from your heart the 
sorrow over the lute being broken. ' " When the young nobleman realised what he had 
done, he came to Bayazid and apologised. He fell at the Shaykh's feet and repented. 459 
459 Quoted in Leonard Lewisohn, The Heritage of Sufism, Vol. I., (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
1993), pp. xxix-xxx. 
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Chapter 5 
It is a very tough call whether to point the finger or try to negotiate with people. Asa lawyer, of course, I would 
like to prosecute everybody who is guilty of these heinous things [war crimes]. As a diplomat or a politician or as a 
statesmen, I also would like to stop the slaughter, bring it to a halt. You have two things that are in real conflict 
here ... I don't know the proper mix. 
Morris Abrams, former US Ambassador to the UN. Commission on Human Rights46o 
The International Criminal Court: A Grotian Moment or A 
Legless Giant ? 
Preface: The first case study, the institution of punishment in classical Athens, 
provided an account of the administration of justice in an ancient city-state. The 
second case, the Islamic institution of punishment discussed the concept of 
punishment in one of the world's monotheistic religions. The scope of both cases was 
limited to specific audiences and constituents. The third case study, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), differs significantly from the previous cases. The Rome Statute 
of the ICC has been signed and ratified by a large number of countries with diverse 
political and social backgrounds. Secondly, the Court is a three-year old entity and as 
such there are many unanswered questions surrounding many aspects of the Court. 
Unlike the abundant cases of the first two studies, as of October 2005, there has not 
been one single trial, conviction, and imprisonment by the ICC. However, the Rome 
460 Quoted in Michael P. Scharf and Nigel Rodley "International Law Principles on Accountability", in 
Post-Conflict Justice, edited by M. Cherif Bassiouni (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002), p. 
89. 
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Statute and also the ad hoc international criminal tribunals can help us to make some 
observations on the possible roles of the ICC in years to come. 
If one looks at number of casualties of the conflicts of the twentieth century and the 
number of judicial cases at the international level that dealt with some of the 
perpetrators of these conflicts, one can identify the extent of the role and influence of 
the lawyers and the diplomats/statesmen of that century in dealing with war crimes, 
and the nature of the dilemma that Morris Abrams identified (above). 
In the twentieth century there have been 33 million military deaths, 205 million 
victimisation deaths, 461 and an unknown number of people who have survived 
enslavement, torture, and rape, because of their political, racial, ethnic, or religious 
affiliation. Yet, violence and death on this massive scale was rarely tackled by any 
judicial response. As former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala 
Lasso, stated, "a person stands a better chance of being tried and judged for killing 
one human being than for killing 100,00. " 
During the last century, four international tribunals tried some of the perpetrators: 
the International Military Tribunals for the Far East, the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg International Tribunal, the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The 
first two tribunals tried some 6022 German and Japanese war criminals. As of June 
461 M. Cherif Bassiouni, " Searching for Peace and Achieving, Justice: The Need for Accountability", in 
Law & Contemporary Problems. Vol. 9 (1996), p. 59. 
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2005, the ICTY has indicted 73 accused. 462 The ICTR has commenced investigation 
against 63 individuals 463 
Another striking aspect of these conflicts is not only the high number of victims but 
also the number of perpetrators of some of these conflicts. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen 
calculates that there were at least 100,000 perpetrators of the Holocaust, perhaps as 
many as 500,000.464 Gerard Prunier estimates there were between 80,000 and 100,000 
murders in the Rwandan genocide. 465 
A number of reasons have been articulated to explain the reasons for the 
astronomical gulf between the mass atrocities and the judicial response to them. 
Richard Falk'. s view on the nature of the international legal order can be helpful in 
identifying the competing forces in it. According to him, five distinct, but not . *1 4 
necessarily allied, conceptions have shaped the international legal order: 
1) The Westphalia conception; 2) the Charter conception; 3) geo-political conceptions 
(sphere of influence, deterrence); 4) rules of the game; (5); and decentralised modes 
of implementation. 466 He describes the Westphalia conception as the classical 
framework of legal constraint postulated to regulate a highly decentralised world of 
sovereign states; this conception yields a permissive, voluntaristic system of law 
stressing matters of the allocation of competence among sovereign states. The Charter 
462 www. un. org/icty/cases/indictindex-e. htm 
463 www. ictr. org/ENGLISH/cases/Index. htm 
464 Quoted in Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hands of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes 
Tribunals. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 300. 
465 I bid. 
466 Richard A. Falk, "The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal 
Order" in The Future of the International Legal Order: Trends and Patterns Vol. 1., edited by Richard 
A. Falk and Cyril E. Black (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 42-3. 
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conception takes its name from the United Nations Charter, and constitutes a major 
modification of the Westphalia system in a number of critical respects bearing on the 
status of war, the role of national sovereignty, and the degree to which authority 
structures are centralised. 467 
Demosthenes (circa 385-322BC) the great Athenian orator and statesman, also made 
an observation about the nature of international politics, which remains valid and 
applicable to the contemporary world. He said, "... for I observe that any nation is 
accorded its rights in proportion to its strength at the time... The rights of individuals 
within a state are impartially guaranteed by the law to weak and strong alike; but on 
the international plane the strong lay down what rights the weak are to enjoy. "468 
Dorothy Jones has provided another angle that underpins the main characteristics of ý4 ,1 
the international legal order. She identifies three pairings that tie justice to basic 
international concerns. They are: 1) justice and peace; 2) justice and rights; and 3) and 
justice and law. 469 However, as a result of the competing forces on the international 
stage and also the domination of power politics, it has not always been possible to tie 
justice to any of these three concepts. More importantly, on many occasions we have 
been compelled to see them as oppositional, in particular with respect to justice and 
peace. But the ferocity and frequency of the conflicts of the past century have shown 
us that in the competition between justice and peace, there is no winner. 
467 Ibid., p. 32. 
468 Quoted in Dover, W. cit., p. 311. 
469 Dorothy V. Jones, Towards A Just World: The Critical Years In The Search For International 
Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. xi. 
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This chapter aims to examine the issue of international criminal responsibility 
within an international legal order that has been shaped by conflicting forces and 
players, by examining the developments in the articulation and codification of 
international criminal law and also by reviewing the handful of international criminal 
tribunals that have enforced international criminal law. Particular attention will be 
given to the International Criminal Court. The chapter ends with two propositions: A) 
that Demosthenes' assertion about international politics remains applicable to our 
international legal order, since predominantly western-generated theories and western 
power have shaped international criminal law's vocabulary, modality, rules, 
methodologies, structure, and assumptions. In other words, the international legal 
order is as extension and reflection of the distribution of power on the global stage. B) 
a mere legalistic approach to deal effectively and legitimately with mass atrocities is 
inadequate and should be complemented by other factors such as victim reintegration, 
reconciliation, and addressing the structural and economic causes of conflicts on the 
global stage. 
To this end, the chapter is divided into five parts. Part One draws attention to 
theoretical and conceptual deficiencies of the concept of punishment applicable to 
international crimes. Part Two examines existing provisions and developments in 
international of law with respect to the notion of accountability, including the notion 
of impunity, the concept of international crime, the concept of international crime of 
states and the notion of individual accountability/responsibility. 
The thirds part reviews major developments and initiatives at the global level to try 
war criminals and other violators of international criminal law prior to the 
establishment of the ICC on 1St July 2002 The fourth part will be devoted to the ICC. 
0 ti 
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It will begin by looking at the steps that resulted in the signing of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC on July 17,1998. It will then proceed to discuss some of the main contentious 
issues that the delegates had to deal with. The third section of this part will look at 
some of the provisions of the Statues, in particular those through which ICC 
supporters hope to become the gentle civilisers of nations in relation to challenging 
the culture of impunity at the global level. This part will conclude by arguing that the 
"euphoria" surrounding the ICC is not justified as the Court has been weakened by 
some in-built features such as the principle of complementarity to the national bodies 
or its weak enforcement regime. The concluding part of this chapter, the fifth part, 
will argue that the task of dealing effectively with gross violations of human rights by 
states or the non-state actors requires a multifaceted approach. It will be argued that 
the current legalistic approach to response to violation of international norms should 
be complemented by the two equally important principles and approaches: the o ji 
expansion of the moral community and the scope of justice; and the recognition of 
aj 
distributive justice both as a preventive measure and also as a component of any 
reconciliation efforts in the post-conflict justice. 
I. International Criminal Justice: A System Without Penology 
This part seeks to draw attention to the conceptualdifficulties and shortcomings in 
extending the theories and modalities of the institution of punishment from the 
domestic arena to international crimes. As we saw in the introductory chapter on the 
institution of punishment, there is no theory or modality that can satisfy both 
retributivism and consequentialism at the national level. This is because each theory 
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and modality lacks one or more essential component in terms of the requirements of 
justice and effective methods of deterrence. The existing theories and modalities of 
the institution of punishment face further challenges when they are transplanted to 
international criminal law. Applying Michael Davis' definition of punishment to 
international crimes highlights the extent of the conceptual and practical difficulties of 
transplanting national modalities and theories of punishment to international crime. 
According to Davis, punishment is an evil satisfying six conditions: 
1. There is a body of rules capable of guiding action ('primary rules"); 
2. There are beings ("persons") capable of following these rules or not as they 
choose, capable of choosing on the basis of reasons, and capable of treating 
the prospect of suffering a special evil as a reason against doing an act (to be 
weighed with other reasons for and against); 
3. There is a procedure ("authority") for inflicting types of evil ("penalty") upon 
a person if he does not follow the rules; 
4. There are ("secondary")'rules connecting failure to follow primary rules 
("crimes" or "offences") with certain penalties; 
5. Both the primary and secondary rules are supposed to be known to the persons 
subject to them (in general, at least); and 
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6. Imposition of the penalty is (in general, at least) justified by the person's not 
having followed the appropriate rule when he could have. 470 
A number of difficulties arise when one applies the above definition of punishment 
to international criminal law. 
A. Within municipal law, there exist bodies that legislate, adjudicate and enforce 
rules related to the matters of law and order. But international criminal law is 
far more complex. International law is a body of rules, which regulate the 
conduct of sovereign states in their intercourse with one another. Unlike 
municipal laws, in international law there exist no centralised bodies 
competent to legislate, adjudicate and enforce the normative values of the 
system. In fact among its nearly two hundred members, there is no consensus 
about the normative values of international law. 
B. "Persons" in municipal law are easily identifiable and can be held accountable. 
But in international law, there are two distinct groups of persons, natural and 
"legal" persons. Legal persons are states, corporations and international 
organisations. As we saw in the introductory remarks, international law does 
not recognise the concept of punishing states. As such, states cannot be 
punitively punished. Even the natural persons in international law cannot be 
easily apprehended. Some of them enjoy state immunity, which protects them 
from any legal infringement by another state. Also, some of the natural 
persons who have committed international crimes are often protected by their 
470 Michael Davis, "How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime", in Ethics. Vol. 93, (1993), p. 728. 
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fellow community, such as Radvan Karadich or Osama Bin Laden, thus they 
cannot easily be detained. The third difficulty in apprehending guilty 
"persons" on the international stage is the sheer number of them. In some 
cases, there are far too many natural persons who are implicated in violating 
international criminal law. Their sheer numbers make it impossible to arrest, 
try and punish all of them. Some of the egregious international crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleanings are sadly committed 
by a large number of offenders as in the case of the Rwanda genocide, where 
hundreds of thousands of Hutu took part. 
C. "Persons" in municipal law are often "deviants" compared with the majority 
of the law-abiding citizens. Also, the lawbreakers often have the option and 
freedom of choosing their course of action. But in some international crimes all 
such as genocide, and ethnic cleansing it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
delineate the deviants from the majority, since such crimes are committed or 
condoned by the majority of the guilty ethnic or religious group. Furthermore, 
the presence of powerful and coercive elements and forces make it difficult to 
treat the guilty as fully free to choose their course of action. The terror 
machines of the totalitarian regimes, groups or ideology do not allow the 
citizens to remain neutral. 
D. "Authority" in municipal law enjoys some degree of legitimacy. Few exist 
who would deny the social utility and necessity of "law" and "order", even in 
undemocratic societies. But "authority" "law" and "order" in international law 
are contested phenomena. One of the main challenges for international 
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criminal justice initiatives has been to overcome their actual or perceived 
democratic deficiencies, particularly among many non-western nations. As 
David Chuter has observed, "international criminal law's vocabulary and 
concepts are not neutral. They are culturally specific, constructed and 
manipulated by a very small number of countries ... "471. The 
democratic 
deficiencies of international criminal law, therefore, cast profound doubt on 
the legitimacy and acceptability of many components of punishment, 
including the authority to punish, the primary rules and also the penalties for 
violating the primary rules in the context of international criminal justice. If 
offenders refuse to accept the legitimacy of the punishing authority, then they 
do not feel obliged to respect the primary rules or to accept the legitimacy of 
penalties for violating the primary rules. 
E. In municipal law, there is a fair degree of compatibility between the crime 
and punishment. But in international criminal law, such compatibility is 
difficult to achieve. Some of the violators of international criminal law commit 
acts beyond basic human decency, such as genocide or crimes against 
humanity. It is impossible to find a corresponding penalty that can match the 
ferocity of such crimes. The lack of compatibility between international 
crimes and punishment has been compounded by international law's 
prohibition of capital punishment. The severest permissible penalty in 
international law is up to thirty years' imprisonment, with a possibility of "life 
imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and 
471 David Chuter, War Crimes: Confronting Atrocities in the Modern World (Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), p. 94. 
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individual circumstances of the convicted person"472 according to the Rome 
Statute. Few would argue that life imprisonment can match the degree of evil 
of acts of genocide and many other horrendous crimes committed by 
individuals in inter-state or civil wars. 
F. In municipal law, the concerned parties, victim, offender, judge, prosecutor, 
lawyer, police, and prison officer normally share certain common traits such 
as language, nationality, ethnicity, and religion. But in international criminal 
institutions, there exist few such common traits among and between the 
participants. There seems to be a division of labour and specialities in the 
international criminal institutions such as the ICTY and ICRT. The victims 
and interpreters are from non-western nations, whereas judges, prosecuting 
personnel, lawyers, forensic experts, and even prison officers are mainly from 
western nations. Not only are there cultural and linguistic barriers between the 
victim/offender and the personnel of the international criminal institutions, 
there also are experiential gulfs. Many of the epistemic community of 
international lawyers, judges, policy-makers and advocates may be isolated 
from "real life as. it is lived in countries where these abuses take place. "473 
The above differences between municipal law and international criminal law are not 
exhaustive, but they are helpful in identifying some of the challenges that 
international criminal law faces. However, and despite the shortcoming of every 
single theory of punishment at the domestic level that deals with ordinary crime, as 
472 For the full text of the Rome Statute and also related documents, see this website: www. iccnow. org 
Article 77 of the Rome Statute. 
473 Chuter, op. Cit., p. 49. 
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will be argued shortly, they have been transplanted to international criminal justice on 
a large scale. In the words of Mark A. Drumbl, "despite the extraordinary nature of 
this criminality [mass atrocities] its modality of punishment, theory of sentencing, and 
process of determining guilt or innocence each remain disappointingly ordinary. "474 
International criminal law, as an extraordinary field, has been conceptualised and 
operated by the inadequate theories and rationales of domestic criminal law. In sum, 
international criminal law lacks its own penology, forcing it to arbitrarily borrow the 
penological rationales of domestic criminal law. 475 
The following two examples further highlight some aspects of the current status of 
the world's functioning international criminal tribunals. Following a plea bargain, 
Biljana Plavsic, a top Bosnian Serb leader (known as the Serbian Iron Lady) was 
sentenced to eleven years by the ICTY. This was despite the fact that she was 
responsible for planning some of the gravest atrocities in Bosnia, including the forced 
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of non-Serbs, destruction of 850 non-Serb 
villages, killings of many thousands of individuals, widespread sexual assault, and 
inhumane destruction. 476 
The alarming cost of international criminal institutions is another factor that attracts 
criticism. For example, in the case of the ICTRY, thus far it has cost roughly $25 
474 Mark A. Drumbl, "Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: the Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity", in Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Winter 2005) p541. 
475 Ibid., p. 549. 
476 Ibid., pp. 583-84. 
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million dollars to secure a single conviction, 477 while hundreds of thousands of the 
victims are struggling to rebuild their shattered lives. 
It is hoped that the above sections to provide a brief introduction to some of the 
difficulties facing international criminal justice. The following parts will further 
elaborate some of the issues that this part raised. The next part looks at the main 
theoretical developments in international law, with respect to individual 
accountability. 
II. The Principles of Individual Accountability in 
International Law 
This part will begin by looking at the concepts of impunity, and international crime 
and will briefly examine the concept of international crimes of state. It will conclude 
by examining the concept of individual accountability from the perspective of 
contending theories of international law. 
A. The Notion of Impunity 
The term impunity suggests that a wrongdoer is allowed to remain free from 
"punishment, harm, or loss. "478 Impunity is the antithesis of accountability: the 
exemption from accountability, penalty, or punishment for perpetrators of illegal acts. 
Patrice McSherry and Raul Molina Meja have proposed a typology with three aspects 
47 Ibid. , p. 601. 478 Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 228. 
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of impunity: structural, strategic, and psychological. Structural impunity is the 
mobilisation of official, institutional structures to foster impunity. Strategic impunity 
is the utilisation of procedures to prevent criminal investigation and prosecution. 
Psychological/political impunity is the manipulation of fear, distrust, and isolation 
among citizens to crush hopes of freedom, social equality, or justice. 479 
Different actors and agents resort to one or more than one of the above methods to 
maintain their impunity. For example, one of the main reasons that there was no 
consensus in the Rome Conference on the legal definition of the crime of 
"aggression" was resistance by some powerful states not to limit their military 
freedom by criminalizing acts that might be constitutes as aggression. The US' refusal 
to support the ICC was also partly promoted by the US' desire to maintain its freedom 
of action, and thus its impunity from any legal scrutiny. 
Accountability measures fall into three categories: truth, justice, and redress. The 
accountability options include: (a) international prosecution; (b) international and ,,; 
national investigatory commissions; (c) truth commissions; (d) national prosecutions; 
(e) national lustration mechanisms; (f) civil remedies; and (g) mechanism for the 
reparation of victims 480 
The focus of this chapter will be on the first option, international prosecution, through 
the codification and the institutionalisation of accountability. The concluding chapter 
of the thesis examines the hybrid-courts, which are another method of promoting 
accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. 
479 Patrice McSherry and Raul Molina Meja, "Confronting the Question of Justice in Guatemala", in 
Social Justice , Vol. 1 (1992), p. 19. 480 M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other 
Serious Violations of Human Rights" in `Post-Conflict Justice', Bassiouni, op. cit., p. 27. 
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B. The Concept of International Crime 
The notion of international crime is an ambiguous and contested concept. It can 
refer to crimes that states will enforce domestically as a result of treaty obligations 
that those states have incurred. Or it can refer to what is customarily deemed as 
criminal by the community of nations. Or it can refer to the acts that are clearly 
proscribed by so-called jus cogens norms, norms of such transparent bindingness that 
no individual can fail to understand that he or she is bound to them, and no state can 
fail to see that it should either prosecute such acts or turn the perpetrator over to 
another institution that will prosecute. 481 Notwithstanding such definitions, M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, a prominent authority on international criminal law, points out that the 
"term `international crime' or its equivalent had never been specifically used in 
"482 international conventions. 
However, one can infer from the international conventions evidences for 28 crime 
categories in international criminal law. These 28 categories are evidenced by 281 
conventions concluded between 1815 and 2000. These international crimes are: 
aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, unlawful possession 
and/or use of weapons, theft of nuclear materials, mercenarism, apartheid, slavery and 
slave-related practices, torture and other forms of cruel or degrading treatment, 
unlawful human experimentation, piracy, aircraft jacking, unlawful acts against civil 
maritime navigation, unlawful acts against internationally protected persons, crimes 
against UN and associated personnel, taking of civilian hostages, unlawful use of the 
481 May, op. cit., p. 64. 
482 M. Cherif Bassiouni, "The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical 
Framework", in International Criminal Law 
, Vol. 1, Crimes, 2d ed., edited 
by M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
(NY: Transaction Press, 1999), p. 55. 
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mail, attacks with explosives, financing of terrorism, unlawful traffic in drugs and 
dangerous substances, organised crime, destruction and/or theft of national treasures 
and cultural heritage, unlawful acts against the environment, international traffic in 
obscene materials, falsification and counterfeiting of currency, unlawful interference 
with submarine cables, and bribery of foreign public officials. 483 
As appears from the above list, the use of nuclear weapons has not been explicitly 
declared illegal in international law, whereas theft of nuclear materials is illegal. The 
absence of the former and the presence of the latter offence in the list of international 
crime is a vivid example of the politically-oriented nature of the international legal 
order. This order is inclined towards legitimating and maintaining the interests of the 
powerful nations. As Mark Drumbl has observed, "these international institutions 
[related to international criminal justice] therefore drift into what Michel Foucault 
called the "political economy" of punishment. This political economy bureaucratises 
, bs 
and normalises punishment, thereby inserting it deeply into the now-globalized social ,:; 
body... the, new and additional layers of bureaucratisation contemplated by the 
emerging punitive are of the super-state of international organisation. "484 
Larry May has suggested another category, political crimes, that embodies some of 
the above crimes. According to him, a political crime is a crime that is committed by 
people, the bulk of whom do not have to do anything directly harmful themselves. So, 
to call something a political crime is to say that it is a crime committed by a 
collectivity, typically by a state or by an organised group of people in some way 
483 M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice" in `Post-Conflict Justice' Bassiouni, op. cit. , pp. 
963-64. 
484 Drumbl, op. cit. , p. 541. 
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acting systematically. 485 The "Harm" of some of political crimes is politically 
contingent: for example, the crime of "terrorism", which mainly focuses on the harm 
caused by non-state actors. 
The core crimes of international criminal law are often cited as part ofjus cogens, or 
peremptory norms of international law. The authoritative formulation of the concept 
of jus cogens is in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates: 
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law aus cogens) 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purpose of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character. 486 
According to Bassiouni, there are seven jus cogens international crimes, which have 
been recognised as such. There are, in the order of their emergence in international 
criminal law as follows: (1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes against 
humanity; (5) genocide; (6) apartheid; and (7) torture. 487 
Several rationales and justifications have been proposed to justify the prosecution of 
international crimes. Cherif Bassiouni identifies two positions as the basis for 
transcending the concept of sovereignty. The first is the Universalist position that 
stems from an idealistic weltanschauung. This position recognises certain values and 
485 May, op. cit., p. 171. 
486 Cited in Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between 
Sovereignty And the Rule of Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 41., fn. 68. 
487 Cherif Bassiouni, ' Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes', pp. cit. , p. 
964. 
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the existence of overriding international interests as being commonly shared and 
accepted by the international community and thus transcending the singularity of 
national interests. The second position is a pragmatic policy-oriented one that 
recognises that occasionally certain commonly shared interests of the international 
community require an enforcement mechanism that transcends the interests. of 
singular sovereignty. 488 
Larry May suggests that there are three bases for prosecuting international crimes: 
(1) Crimes that will not be prosecuted domestically because of a weak state; 
(2) Crimes that are committed by the State or with significant state complicity; 
(3) Crimes that target a whole group, not merely a solitary human person. 489 
Concurrently, he develops another thesis, consisting of the two principles of security 
and international harm that call for the prosecuting of international crimes. He 
describes the security principle as follows: 
If a state deprives its subjects of physical security or subsistence, or is unable or 
unwilling to protect its subjects from harm to security or subsistence, 
a) then that state has no right to prevent international bodies from "crossing its 
borders" in order to protect those subjects or remedy their harms; 
488 bid., p. 956. 
489 May, op. cit., p. 7. 
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b) and then international bodies may be justified in "crossing the borders" of a 
sovereign State when genuinely acting to protect those subjects. 490 
The principle of International Harm, May argues, should be the rationale for the trial 
of those who cause the harm and should be determined by the nature of the harm: 
either the group-based status of the victim or the group-based harm violates a strong 
interest of the international community, and can even be said to harm humanity. He 
elaborates this principle as follows: 
To determine if harm to humanity has occurred, there will have to be one of two (and 
ideally two) of the following conditions met: either the individual is harmed because 
of that person's group membership or other non-individualised characteristic, or the 
harm occurs due to the involvement of a group such as the State. 491 
However, the concept of international crimes and May's focus are both myopic. il 
This is because they place blame squarely on the final stage of the continuum of 
violence: those who were most evidently responsible. Many of the world's mass 
atrocities and violence are multifaceted and comprise a continuum, including political, 
economic, historical, and colonial factors that facilitate the violence. This line of 
enquiry will be further elaborated in the next section. In the remaining sections of this 
part, the concepts of "international crimes of state" and "individual accountability" 
will be examined. 
490 Ibid., p. 68. 
491 Ibid. , p. 83. 
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C. The Concept of International Crimes of State 
The notion of the palatability of punishing states under international law was 
discussed in the introductory chapter on the institution of punishment. This section 
will be a short examination of this issue. As we saw it, the 2001 International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility deleted the concept of 
"international crimes of state" and replaced it with a neutral and less controversial 
concept. Article 40 now speaks of "Serious Breaches of Obligations Under 
Peremptory Norms of General International Law". 
The rejection of the concept of "international crimes of State", which renders 
obsolete the concept of "punishing states" is an indication of the evolution of 
international law from collective criminal responsibility to individual criminal 
responsibility. In addition to the issues that were raised in the introductory chapter, 
there are three deeply - rooted difficulties in the concept of "international crimes of 
State" and "punishing states". First, not all the acts that would give rise to this 
criminal responsibility can be said to be stipulated under international law with the 
uniform clarity needed to satisfy the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, and thus to 
win the support of states. The threshold for agreement would certainly be very high, 
and negotiations arduous. Secondly, since there are very few states who are willing to 
attempt to create such a body to try states, there is no institution with the possibility of 
trying to convict States accused of such crimes. Thirdly, identifying the appropriate 
consequences of such acts has been contentious, to the extent that there has been no 
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development of penal consequences for states with respect to breaches of peremptory 
norms, not even an attempt to the extent of providing for punitive damages 492 
However, and despite the reluctance of the ILC to speak of "punishing states" the 
fact that the institution of war- though with different labels such as self-defence, and 
reprisal- has not been declared illegal and is authorised by the Kellogg-Briand pact, 
the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the UN Charter show the permissibility 
and availability of means of punishing aggressive states under public international law 
in the cases of self-defence or humanitarian intervention. 
In addition to permissibility of self-defence/reprisal in international law, there are 
other legally acceptable means and measures of punishing states, short of war. They 
include: economic sanctions; declaratory judgement by a court as to the illegality of 
the defendant state; satisfaction, any measure which the author of a breach of duty is 
bound to take under customary law or under an agreement by the parties to a dispute; 
formal apologies; payment of an indemnity; taking measures to prevent a recurrence 
of the harm, etc. 493 
Furthermore, the 2001 ICL Draft Articles on State responsibilities have retained 
reference to wrongful acts and the possibility of countermeasures, which are punitive 
and judgemental measures. However, many of the above punitive measures are not 
compatible with many of the crimes that are committed on behalf of states, in 
particular in terms of proportionality. For example, economic sanctions against states 
492 Broomhall, op. Lit., pp. 16-7. 
493Brownlie, op. cit., pp. 462-65. 
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often result in inflicting undue pain or worse upon ordinary citizens who did not have 
any role in the policies or actions that promoted the sanctions. 
In sum, as noted in the first part, international law is underdeveloped with respect to 
finding appropriate methods to punish many violators of international criminal law, in 
particular, when crimes are committed by the states' apparatus or on behalf of states. 
D. The Principle of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
Examining the issue of individual responsibility/accountability within municipal 
laws is a relatively straightforward undertaking. Law creates social order and brings 
about certain reciprocal behaviour in men and women, by inducing men and women 
to refrain from certain acts which for one reason or another are deemed detrimental to 
society, and to perform others which are useful to society. It can be attained in two 
fundamentally different ways with or without the threat and use of force. The conduct, 
which is the specific condition of sanction, is called an illegal act, tort, or delict. The 
individual who commits a delict is called delinquent. 494 
However, in a system such as international law, whose primary actors, states, are 
legal entities, the recognition of the rights and responsibilities of the natural entities, 
individuals, has to overcome considerable theoretical and practical difficulties. The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 were the first systematic attempts to recognise the rights 
of individuals during military conflicts. And the Nuremberg trials recognised the 
494 Hans Kelsen Principles of International Law (New York: The LawBookExchange, 2003), p. 5. 
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individual as assuming responsibility in international law. The following section looks 
at how the two contending theories of international law have addressed the issue of 
individual criminal responsibility. 
1. The Positivists' Account of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
Positivists affirmed that there is no international law except what is found in custom 
and treaties, that is, what is based on common consent. Some denied the existence of a 
law of nature, and seem to be the "antipodes of the naturalists". But the extremes 
meet, and the positivists seem to be inductive realists. When positivists consider the 
relationship of international law to municipal law, they do so upon the basis of the 
supremacy of the state, and the existence of wide differences between the two 
functioning orders. The theory is known as dualism (or sometimes as pluralism) and 
stresses that the rules of the systems of international law and municipal law exist 
separately and each cannot purport to have an effect on, or overrule, the other. Those 
writers who disagree with this theory and who adopt the "monist" approach tend to 
fall into two distinct categories: those who uphold a strong ethical position with a 
deep concern for human rights, and others who maintain a monist position on 
formalistic logical grounds. The monists are united in accepting a unitary view of law 
as a whole and are opposed to the strict division posited by the positivists 495 
The positivists/dualists not only privilege municipal laws over international law, but 
they also view sovereign states as the primary subjects and components of 
international law. They strongly support the principle of sovereign equality, which is 
495 Malcolm N. Shaw International Law, 4t' edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
pp. 100-01. 
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manifested in the maxim par in parem non habet imerium, (meaning literally "an 
equal has no power over an equal". ) This maxim had a prominent credibility in the 
classic period of international laws, when the state was generally conceived of as a 
juristic entity having a distinctive personality and entitled to specific fundamental 
rights, such as the rights of absolute sovereignty, complete and exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction, absolute independence and legal equality within the family of nations. 
Consequently, it appeared logical to deduce from such attributes that as all sovereign 
states were equal in law, no single state should be subjected to the jurisdiction of 
another state. 496 
The principle of sovereign equality gave birth to the doctrine of foreign state 
immunity, which is another important principle of international law. The person of a 
diplomatic agent, in his/her official capacity, is inviolable under Article 29 of the 
Vienna Convention and he may not be detained or arrested. Article 30(1) also 
provides for the inviolability of the private residence of a diplomatic agent, while 
article 30(2) provides that his papers, correspondence and property are inviolable. 
The positivists have recognised the permissibility of individual criminal 
accountability. Individuals can be held accountable either by the express consent of 
sovereign states through conventional treaties or by the binding force of peremptory 
norms of international law, jus cogens. In case of the former, under Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention, the sending state may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of 
diplomatic agents and others possessing immunity under the Convention. 
496 Lee M. Caplan "State Immunity, Human rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative 
Hierarchy Theory", in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No 4(Oct., 2003), p. 748. 
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The positivists also concede that under the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
individuals can be held accountable. Under this principle, each and every state has 
jurisdiction to try particular offences. The basis for this is that the crimes involved are 
regarded as particularly offensive to the international community as a whole. 
However, the principle of universal jurisdiction confers rights on states to prosecute 
the offenders but not an obligation upon them. There is no rule of customary 
international law imposing a duty on states to prosecute violators of international 
crimes. With regard to states' treaty obligations, the positivists give sovereigns states 
a discretionary power to discharge their treaty obligations. If discharging any treaty 
obligation threatens states' vital interests, then the states are entitled to suspend the 
previous undertakings. Since sovereign states are the ultimate arbitrator of their vital 
interests, the perceived national interests of states will determine whether to take any 
steps to exercise their rights under the principle of universal jurisdiction, or to 
discharge their treaty-obligation to prosecute an individual who may have committed 
an international crime. 
It is not only the positivists that confer upon states discretionary power as to how to 
deal with the individuals who have committed a proscribed act. The realists' account 
of the nature of mankind and international relations also reveals their uneasiness with 
an issue such as individual accountability within an international penal process. 
Thomas Hobbes' account of the state of nature continues to be the best illustration and 
articulation of the realist paradigm. His "right of nature" is the unrestricted liberty of 
appetitive creatures competing for life and power. Human beings are rational 
creatures, but their rationality is the ends/means type of prudence of creatures 
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concerned with self-preservation. For Hobbes, within civil society, law rules; between 
civil societies, "policy" (expediency) rules. Outside civil society, is the "state of 
nature, " where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law exists, there 
can be no injustice. 497 
Realists argue, therefore, that the bitter realities of international politics, which is 
governed by the rules of the "state of nature, " provide little space, if any, for the issue 
of individual accountability at the global level. In the words of Kenneth Waltz, 
"National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. 
International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodating. The 
international realm is pre-eminently a political one. "498 
Despite the legal permissibility of individual accountability in the positivists, the 
realists have long been sceptical of the ability of law to play a productive role in 
international relations. The realist-oriented critics of war crimes trials argue that such 
efforts would either perpetuate the conflict or destabilise post-war efforts to build a 
secure peace. The nexus of "Justice VS. Peace" enjoys a considerable credibility 
among realists. Realists see justice as dangerous to a durable peace. 499 
The next section will briefly review the tradition of "natural law" perspective on the 
question of individual criminal responsibility. 
497 For a concise account of Hobbes' view see "The emergence of international law", the essay 
introducing selections from Grotius and others in Brown et al., op. cit , pp-316-318 498 Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Addison- Wesley, 1979), pp. 
112-13. 
499 Jonathan Bass, M. cit., p286. 
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2. The Natural Law Tradition And the Principle of Individual 
Accountability At the Global Level 
If recognition of the "state of nature" is a distinct characteristic of realists, "natural 
law" is of monists' perspective. The idea of natural law can be traced back to the 
Stoics who believed that there is a divine and natural law governing everything in the 
universe, including human conduct. In the Christian version of this view, the law is 
divine in being promulgated by God and natural in being knowable by reason without 
the aid of revelation. Because human beings are free, rational beings, they can choose 
to disobey this law. And natural law, understood as a morality binding on all human 
soo beings, must be distinguished from the laws observed in particular communities. 
The proponents of natural law, which advocate the unitary nature of law as a whole, 
take a further step in declaring the supremacy of international law over national laws. 
Hans Kelsen argues that international law as a normative order does not contain 
norms that limit its spheres of validity, and is not under any other legal order. No legal 
norms exist which claim to exclude the validity of international law anywhere. 50' He 
refers to the UN Charter, which claims to be applicable both to member states and 
non-members, and also the suspension of neutrality under the provisions of the 
Charter to support his claim about the supremacy of international law. The suspension 
of neutrality under the provision of the Charter, can be inferred from the requirement 
of states to avoid taking any steps which might contravene the Security Council's 
S00Brown, et al., op. Cit., p. 312. 
501 Kelsen, pp. cit., p. 95. 
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resolutions, in particular those that are issued under the Chapter Seven of the 
Charter. 502 
In contrast with Hobbessians who believe that there can be rights without 
correlative duties, monism emphasises the need for a correlation between rights and 
responsibilities, as was demonstrated by Judge Hurber's observation: "responsibility 
is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character involve 
international responsibility. If the obligation in question is not met, responsibility 
entails the duty to make reparation. "503 
References to the natural law tradition have gradually disappeared in the texts of 
international law, and the Grotian tradition has now become the antithesis of 
positivism /realism. The proponents of the Grotian tradition are among the most 
committed supporters and advocates of institutionalisation of the rule of the law at the 
international level. As such, for them, the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility is an essential component of the institutionalised rule of law. The 
establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration following the Hague Peace 
Conference in 1899, was declared to be a Grotian tradition. 504 Also the establishment 
of the ICC was characterised as a "Grotian Moment" by Lleila Sadat. 505 
The above two parts sought to provide an introduction to the main theoretical 
developments in international law with respect to the principles of international 
criminal justice and individual criminal responsibility. The following sections 
examine the practical steps that were taken to implement and enforce international 
criminal justice. 
502 Ibid., p. 87. 
503 Cited in Brownlie, op. cit., p. 437. 
504 Jones, op. cit., p. 3. 
505 Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and Transformation of International Law: 
Justice for the New Millennium (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002), p. 13., fn. 37. 
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III: The Arduous Road to Rome: Ad Hoc Attempts to Try 
War Criminals Prior to the Establishment of the ICC 
This section will begin by looking at the realised initiatives and bodies that 
exercised jurisdiction with respect to war crimes prior to the establishment of the ICC 
at the global level. As such the cases of transitional justice-the emerging 
democracies' attempts to deal with past human rights abuses perpetuated or permitted 
by former authoritarian regimes506 - will not be explored in this part. The chapter also 
does not include the cases where the states have chosen their right under universal 
jurisdiction to try the nationals of other states for violation of war crimes, torture or 
crimes against humanity. The case of the "hybrid-courts" will be examined in the 
concluding chapter. 
This part tries to highlight that many of the questions and issues, such as the tension 
between the sovereignty of states and the rule of law at the global level; the selectivity 
of prosecution and accountability; and the undesirability of impunity, are not unique 
to the twenty - first century. These have been shared and raised by many communities 
and traditions across different historical periods. The Pre-ICC developments in the 
field of international justice do not direct us to characterise the contemporary era as 
another advanced stage in the "process of history". But such attempts, the previous 
successes and failures, should strengthen the view that there are some fundamental 
questions that remain central to all mankind, and that will have to be confronted. 
soe There have been nearly 30 countries that in one way or another have attempted to deal with the past 
abuse of human rights they include: El Salvador, Argentine, Honduras, Uruguay, Guatemala, Chile, 
Brazil, Bolivia, Haiti, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Albania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Lithuania, South Africa, The Philippines, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. 
The transitional government of Iraq is also in the process of establishing a tribunal to try the former 
officials of the Iraqi regime, including Saddam Hussein. 
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Questions such as what do human beings owe one another? What is justice? What are 
the ends of politics, and what are its limits? Who are insiders? Who are outsiders? 
What is the correlation between justice and peace? And so on and so forth. 
A. Pre-1919 Developments 
Xenophon reported the only recorded case from ancient Greece, which shows an 
attempt to try individuals for violation of customs of war. During the Peloponnesian 
War, after a battle at Aegospotami, the Spartan commander Lysander organised an 
informal tribunal of Sparta and its allies, and condemned Athenian prisoners for 
violations of the laws of war. 507 Herodotus also reported that Xerxes refused to 
retaliate by killing Spartan heralds after Athens and Sparta slew Persian envoys 
because "he would not act like the Lacedamonians, who, by killing the heralds, had 
broken the laws which all men hold in common". 508 
Islamic law is the first juridical system that systematically addressed and codified 
Islamic laws of war, which is shown in a speech uttered by the first Caliph, Abu Bakr 
(d. 642) when he sent his army on an expedition to the Syrian borders: 
Stop, 0 people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do 
not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead 
bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the 
trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the 
507 Xenophon, A History of My times, translated by Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) p. 103. 
508 Herodotus, The Histories, translated by George Rawlinson (New York: everyman's Library, 1997), 
p. 562. 
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enemy's flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted 
their lives to monastic services, leave them alone. 509 
As the laws of chivalry developed during the Middle - Ages in western Europe, so 
did rules limiting the means and manner of conducting war. Heraldic courts 
developed a code of chivalry that regulated a knight's conduct in battle; Christian 
princes enforced these in their own courts. The goal of these principles, norms, and 
rules was to protect non-combatants, innocent civilians, and those who were hors de 
combat from unnecessary harm. 510 These ideas and values later were incorporated into 
The Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907, and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
The first international criminal tribunal to bring to justice someone responsible for 
crimes against humanity was convened in 1474. An ad hoc criminal tribunal of 
twenty-eight judges from different states allied to the Roman Empire tried and 
convicted Peter Von Hagenbach on behalf Charles, Duke of Burgundy, for murder, 
rape, perjury, and other crimes in violation of "the laws of God and man" during the 
sll occupation of the town of Breisach, at a time where there were no hostilities. 
However, the laws of chivalry were accompanied by an ancient political principle of 
European history: the principle that faith need not be'kept with heretics. This was first 
enunciated at the time of the Aligensian Crusade, by Innocent III, the greatest of the 
medieval papal legislators, in his Bull of 1208 deposing the Count of Toulouse: Cum 
sog Quoted in Abdul Aziz Said, "The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent 
Actions" in `Peace and Conflict resolution In Islam', op. cit. , p. 199. 510 Jackson Nyamuya Maogota, War crimes and Realpolitic: International Justice From World Warl to 
the 21" Century (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004), p. 21. 
511 Ibid., p. 21. 
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baereticisfides non servanda(`faith need not be kept with those who do not keep faith 
with God'). The Bull released subjects from their allegiance to the heretical prince. 512 
Moreover, this principle was also applied to non-Christians, which became one of the 
contributing factors to savage behaviours on the part of the Crusading armies during 
the Middle Ages. 
Samuel Rachel was the first modern international lawyer who recognised the 
problem of selectivity of enforcement of international law. Rachel proposed that states 
should agree to establish a new "college of fecials" to decide disputes under 
international law. For Rachel, the idea of international law implies the need for a 
world courts 13 
The failure of the informal and weak international enforcement mechanism led 
Moynier, on 3`d January 1872, to present a proposal to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross calling for the establishment of an international tribunal to enforce laws 
of war and other humanitarian norms. Until Moynier suggested a permanent court, 
almost all trials for such violations were conducted by ad hoc tribunals constituted by 
one of the belligerent- usually the victor - rather than ordinary courts, or by 
international criminal court. However, no government took up his proposal. 514 
In 1907 the Second Hague Conference was convened to revise the Conventions of 
1899. During the deliberations to adopt the 1907 Hague Convention Regarding the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, there was little willingness by the twenty-six 
states to "submit to the jurisdiction of an international court" to try alleged war 
512 Wight, `International Theory', op. cit., p. 240. 
53 Brown, et al., op. cit., p. 321. 
514 Nyamuya Maogoto, op. cit., p. 24. 
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criminals. The suggestion at the conference of a permanent international criminal 
court "with compulsory jurisdiction that would transcend national boundaries" met 
strong opposition, led by the United States. 515 
B. The First World War 
The unprecedented devastation of the First World War resulted in an estimate of 21 
million casualties and 8.5 million combatants dead. The devastation provided a 
catalyst for the first serious attempt in modern times at international justice. This new 
attitude included extending criminal jurisdiction over sovereign states (Germany and 
Turkey) for the apprehension, trial, and punishment of individuals guilty of 
committing atrocities under the rubrics of "war crimes" and "crimes against 
humanity". The Peace treaties of Versailles and Sevres envisaged liability for 
individuals even if crimes were committed in the name of states. Article 227 of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty provided for the creation of an ad hoc international criminal 
tribunal to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II for initiating the war. It further provided in 
articles 228 and 229 for the prosecution of German military personnel accused of 
violating the laws and customs of war before inter-allied military tribunals or before 
the military courts of any of the western Allies. By 1920, the western allies had 
compiled a list of approximately 20,000 Germans who were to be investigated for war 
crimes. 
The Dutch government, whose sitting monarch was the Kaiser's cousin, refused to 
extradite him on the ground that the Kaiser' s offence was "political" and hence 
515 Ibid. , p. 26. 
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6-1 
exempt from extraditions 16, an explanation that was easily accepted by the allies, 
which led to the subsequent practical invalidation of article 227. 
As for the prosecutions intended by articles 228 and 229, political tussles caused 
delay, in particular the rise of the Bolshevik revolution, which sent waves of concern 
and anxiety across Europe. An alternative solution was proposed: instead of setting up 
an international tribunal, Germany would conduct the prosecutions. The initial list of 
20,000 was reduced to 896 by the Western Allies; of these only forty-five were 
submitted for prosecution. The German Supreme Court prosecuted only twelve 
military officers: half resulted in acquittals and half in conviction with light sentences. 
Many of the convicted managed to escape with the assistance of prison guards! 517 
The fate of the Peace Treaty of Sevres was no better than that of the Versailles 
treaty. The treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920 between Turkey and the 
Western allies. Besides the matter of mandates for the territories of the Ottoman 
Empire, the treaty provided for Turkey's surrender of accused persons to be tried for 
"crimes against the laws of humanity. " Charges were to be brought before an 
international tribunal against Turkish officials for the large-scale killing of Armenians 
in Turkey. On 28 May 1919, sixty-seven detainees were seized by surprise by the 
British and removed from the military prisons; among them twelve former ministers 
who were eventually transferred to Malta, where the numbers of prisoners rose to 118 
by August 1920. 
516 Ibid. , p. 53. 517 Ibid., p. 56. 
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Rising political tensions within the Western allies and nationalistic passions in 
Turkey eventually led to the scrapping of the Peace Treaty of Sevres and its 
subsequent replacement in 1923 by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, which wiped out 
the provisions in the Sevres treaty relating the international penal process, and also led 
the subsequent release of the Turkish prisoners detained by the British. 518 
C. The International Military Tribunal At Nuremberg 
In view of the lukewarm reception of the military tribunal and their disappointing 
outcomes at the end of the First World War, the Western allies were determined to 
avoid the mistakes of their predecessors. The atrocities of World War II provided 
further urgency to establish an effective judicial tribunal to try the alleged war 
criminals. As early as 1942, the allied powers had signed an agreement at the Palace 
of St. James, establishing the United Nations War Crimes Commission. Three years 
later the London International Conference519 gave birth to the Nuremberg Charter, 
which provided for the prosecution of the following substantive crimes: (a) crimes 
against peace; (b) war crimes; and (c) crimes against humanity. Prosecution for 
crimes against peace was without legal precedent, save for the failed attempt after 
World War Ito prosecute the Kaiser under Article 227 of the Peace Treaty of 
Versailles. 
Critics of the formulation of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter also 
argued that it violated the principle of legality; namely the prohibition against ex post 
518 Ibid., p. 62. 
519 On the very day the London Charter was signed, the US dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese 
city of Nagasaki, immediately killing at least 70,000 individuals. Such a coincidence is a prime 
example of the tension between the desire for the rule of law and pure self-interest of the US, and 
indeed many states. 
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facto laws and the maxims nullum crimen sine lege (penal law cannot be enacted 
retroactively) and nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without law). The Soviet Union 
wanted to include the phrase by the European Axis in crime against peace, in order to 
make the initiation of a war of aggression a crime limited to the leaders of the 
European Axis and to avoid the application of that same norm to any Soviet conduct, 
notwithstanding their own aggression against Poland and Finland. 520 
More importantly many crimes laid down in the Charter were equally applicable to 
the Allied and Axis powers, a factor that continue to taint the Nuremberg tribunal as 
the victors' justice. The tribunal tried twenty-two Nazi leaders and convicted nineteen 
of them. Sixteen were convicted for crimes against humanity. 521 
The Nuremberg trials later prompted the recognition and codification of a cluster of 
principles that became known as the Nuremberg principles. They include: (1) the 
responsibility of the individual (for crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against peace); (2) criminal responsibility attaches regardless of the 
official position the individual; (3) responsibility reaches the individual regardless of 
whether national law is silent, condones, or actually requires the behaviour in question 
(through superior orders or otherwise); (4) this form of criminal responsibility gives 
rise to the potential for enforcement through international (including Security 
Council) tribunals as well as through national courts exercising universal jurisdiction;. 
and (5), and of key importance, there are close historical, practical, and doctrinal links 
between the core prohibitions of this law and the foundations of the post-War 
international order. 522 
520 Ibid., p. 94. 
521 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (London: Penguin 
Books, 2000), p. 239. 
522 Broomhall, op. cit., p. 30. 
270 
D. The International Military Tribunal of the Far East 
In parallel with the Nuremberg Tribunal, General Macarthur established the Tokyo 
Tribunal on 19 January 1946 in his capacity as the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers through a military order. Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo 
Tribunal was similar to a military commission or court-martial. Unlike the limited 
number of prosecutable crimes under the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo indictment 
was more extensive, encompassing fifty-five counts. Unlike the fairly regular 
procedures of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the proceedings at Tokyo were fraught with 
procedural irregularities and marred by abuses of judicial discretion. The defendants 
were chosen on the basis of political discretion, and their trials were generally unfair. 
The ambiguity and injustice of the judicial process forced one of the sitting judges to 
express loudly his objection to the procedures, 523 and he refused to attend many trial 
sessions. 524 Unlike the limited number of convicted Nazi leaders, the Far-East military 
Tribunals tried some 6000 war criminals, imposing 900 death sentences. 525 
Such a significant degree of discrepancy between the two tribunals was, however, 
consistent with the Western attitude towards Japan. During the inter-war period many 
restaurants in California carried the warning: "Dogs and Japs prohibited". It was the 
same period in which Japan's request to insert racial equality into the Covenant of the 
League of Nations was refused. 526 As the Dutch member of the Tokyo Tribunal 
observed: " They [Americans] were more or less indoctrinated to look on the Japanese 
as a sub-human race. The bombing of the Japanese cities, followed by the atomic 
523 Nyamuya Maogo, U. cit., p. 105 
524 Robertson, op. cit., p. 224. 
525 Ibid. 
, p. 224. 526 Cassese, `The Tokyo Trials and Beyond', op. cit., p. 25. 
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bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was made possible by precisely that feeling that 
it was not human beings they were cremating by the hundreds of thousands. "527 
One of the few common features of the both tribunals was, however, the fate of 
German and Japanese scientists, who were treated favourably. The US flew out the 
Japanese scientists who experimented with biological weapons, and tried them out on 
Chinese prisoners of war. 528 German scientists became the bounties for the US and 
the USSR, and were later employed by the US and the Red Army to work on their 
military projects. In addition to scientists, all the major German industrialists at the 
end of the occupation and the trials retained their links with their industries, and even 
those tried in the US were handed light sentences, which in time enabled them to go 
back to Germany and assume control of their industries. 529 It is only in recent years 
that as a result of legal actions by some of the US-based survivors of the Nazi 
atrocities against some German companies and the Swiss banks, the latter have been 
forced to pay compensation to the Holocaust survivors, including a US$1.25 billion 
pay-out by a Swiss banking and political establishment. Also as a result of the threat 
of legal action in the US courts and pressures from the US, the Germany government 
and some German companies paid a massive US $6 billion to the victims of wartime 
slave labour programmes. This payment was in addition to US $60 billion over the 
last half-century that Germany has paid to the Holocaust victims. 530 The support that 
Israel continues to receive from the western nations since its creation is also related to 








', p 100 
531Robertson pp. 
°" cit. 100. 
cit., pp, 122-32, & 362. An important issue related to the reparations to the Holocaust survivors has been the Western states' treatment of Israel. As Martha Minow observes, "The creation of Israel could be viewed as a 
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E. The International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia 
Following the partial success of the Nuremberg trials, the Cold War rivalry between 
the two Super Powers stalemated any meaningful efforts in the field of enforcement 
of individual criminal responsibility at the global level. However, significant steps 
were taken in the field of codification of international criminal law. The end of the 
Cold War provided ample opportunities to begin enforcing some of these codified 
norms, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
The death of Tito precipitated the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, beginning 
with the declaration of independence by Slovenia on 8 May 1991, followed by similar 
moves by Croatia on 16 March 1991. On 3 March 1992, Bosnia also declared 
independence. Each of these moves promoted military action by the Serbian- 
dominated Yugoslavia National Army who wanted to reverse the processes. 
The Yugoslav-Slovenian war was short, even negligible compared with the other 
wars to come. Also, and in spite of the intensity of the war between the Serbs and the 
kind of international reparation effort; the prosecutions of Nuremberg, and later, the Eichmann trial in 
Israel itself, became both memorials to the dead and justifications for the reparation of new 
nationhood. " Between Vengeance and forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), p. 133 
However, the reparation of new nationhood has led to another collective violent wrong against another 
community that had no role whosoever in the suffering of the European Jewry. The guilt ridden post- 
War Germany and many Western governments have contributed to another widespread and systematic 
wrong, which was the displacement of millions of Palestinians from their lands, and the 60 years 
occupation and humiliation of Palestinians by the Zionist settlers. The manipulation of the suffering of 
Holocaust victims by the Zionists and also the guilty conscience of Post-war Germany and other 
Western governments who failed to assist the Jewish victims of the Nazis do not allow an explicit 
recognition of such a connection. But many in the Islamic world hold the view that it was morally 
repugnant that the Palestinians should suffer for the wrongs of the Nazi Germany and the anti-Semitics 
of the West. The continuing suffering of the Palestinians shows that one cannot and should not right a 
wrong by creating another wrong. 
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Croats, there was a degree of proportionality and symmetry in the methods of warfare, 
damages and sufferings, whereas the Serbs' treatment of Muslims had all the 
trademark of an unequal conflict in many respects: 
In the summer of 1992 ... the world 
learned of mass forced population transfers of 
Muslims in convoys of cattle trucks; of organised massacres and the physical 
destruction of whole towns, including more than one thousand major historical, 
religious and cultural monuments throughout Bosnia and Croatia; of the systematic 
and repeated rape of as many as 20,000 Muslim women and young girls; and of the 
existence of four hundred Serb-run detention centres where tens of thousands of , 
Bosnian Muslims were being tortured and killed in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi- 
Run concentration camps of World War II. 532 
The execution of in July 1995 of 8,000 Muslim men and boys in the supposed UN 
haven, Srebrenica, by the Serb forces was the darkest page of the Balkan conflict. 
The ability of the two masterminds of the genocide, Mladic and Kardzic, to remain 
free and well-protected by the Serbs even after the 10th anniversary of the genocide is 
another testimony of the weakness of the enforcement mechanism of international 
criminal justice. Although the US-brokered Dayton Accord ceased hostilities in 
Bosnia, it largely ratified the gains of the Serbs, leaving the Bosnian Muslims with 
only 51 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Muslim-Croat federation; the rest became 
Republika Srpska, a separate and autonomous Serb republic. 533 
On May 25 `h 1993, the Security Council opted to invoke Chapter VII and adopted 
Resolution 827 to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). The turn of the century witnessed a fully functioning ICTY, holding trials 
and appellate proceedings on a regular basis. More than 1,000 people from seventy- 
532 V. Morris and M. P. Scharf, (eds. ) An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (NY: Transnational, 1995), p. 22. 
533 Nyamuya Maogoto, op. cit., p. 157. 
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five countries are involved in prosecuting and trying crimes committed across the 
region, including the former president of Serbia and Montenegro, Slobodan 
Milosevic, who was arrested by the new government of Serbia and transferred to The 
Hague in 2001. 
The ICTY was born out of a political desire to redeem the international 
community's conscience rather than the primary commitment of the international 
community to guarantee international justice, 534 and it remains to be seen to what 
extent it will be able to achieve its goals in dispensing justice and contributing to 
political and ethnic reconciliation in the Balkans. Comparing the results of two 
opinion polls show the continuing difficulties of the ICTY in establishing its 
legitimacy in the region, in particular among the Serbs. By January 1997, almost two- 
thirds of Bosnian Serbs had a very favourable opinion of Mladic and among over half 
of Bosnian Serbs had a very favourable image of Karadzic, the two masterminds of 
the Srebrenica massacre. 535 Mladic and Karadzic' s ability to remain at large, despite 
the heavy presence of NATO forces, is another indication that the tribunal has failed 
to gain the trust of the ordinary Serbs. Such a lack of trust was further demonstrated 
by the result of the latest opinion poll, in which two-thirds of the Serbs still believe 
that Mladic and Kardzik are innocent of the charges that have been levelled against 
them by the ICTY. 536 
The most positive contribution that the ICTY made was providing momentum for 
the establishment of the ICC. Payam Akhavan, formerly legal advisor in the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the ICTY, also argues that the tribunal helped to marginalize 
534 Ibid., p. 145 
535 Jonathan Bass, op. cit. , p. 288. 536 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/go/em/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/4602949. stm 
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nationalist political leaders and other forces associated with ethnic war and genocide, 
to discourage vengeance by victims' groups, and to transform criminal justice into an 
important element of the contemporary international agenda, and that it has 
significantly contributed to peace-building in the region. 537 The arrest of the former 
Yugoslavian President Milosevic was another important and a precedent-setting 
achievement by the ICTY. 
F. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The friction between the Hutu and the Tutsi peaked after the assassination of 
President Habyarimana of Rwanda and of President Cyprien Ntariyaira of Burundi on 
6th April, 1994, resulting in the most efficient killing since the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 538 During the remaining three weeks of April, 
approximately 100,00 died. The killing continued until 18 July 1994; final estimates 
of the total number of victims range from 500,000 to 1,000,000.539 The events 
between April and July 1994 were anything but a surprise. Rather, they were the 
culmination of many years of cynical indifference and wilful blindness to the plight of 
the Rwandan people. In the words of the Rwandan representative to the Security 
Council: 
Since 1959 Rwanda has repeatedly experienced collective massacres, which, as 
early as 1964, were described by Pope Paul VI and two Nobel Prize winners - 
537 Payam Akhavan, "Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal justice Prevent Future Atrocities? " 
in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, Non. 1. (Jan. 2001), p 9. 
539 P. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We will Be Killed with Our Families: 
Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998), p. 4. 
539 "Development in the Law: International Criminal Law" in Harvard Law Review , Vol. 114, (2001), 
p2013. 
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Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre- as the most atrocious acts of genocide this 
century after that of the Jews during the Second World War. But whenever such 
tragedies occurred the world kept silent and acted as though it did not understand that 
there was a grave problem of the violation of human rights. 540 
Prior to the genocide, the population of Rwanda consisted of an estimated 85 per 
cent Hutu, fourteen per cent Tutsi, and one per cent Twa and others. The ethnic 
compartmentalisation and instrumentalisation had its roots in colonial Rwanda, with 
the colonial powers (first Germany, then Belgium) favouring the minority Tutsi 
people as the ruling class through a system of patron-client control. Although the 
names Hutu, and Twa existed prior to colonisation, the Rwandans did not distinguish 
themselves based on their ethnicity before the Belgian implementation of the identity 
card system. The ID cards became the most important tool in differentiating victims 
from the perpetrators during the killings. Within thirty to forty minutes of the 
aeroplane crash, roadblocks were set up in Kigali by Hutu militia, at which identity 
cards were checked; Tutsi were singled out and murdered on the spot. 541 
The fact that the language and culture of the Hutu and the Tutsi were essentially the 
same, presented a potential problem for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in considering whether to extend the protection of the 
Genocide Convention to the Tutsi, since the Genocide Convention recognises only the 
four protected groups: national, ethnic, racial, and religious. 542 The absence of any 
objective criteria that could differentiate between the Hutu and the Tutsi compelled 
540 Quoted in Nyamuya Maogoto, op. cit., p. 179. 
sal I bid. 
542 ' Developments: International Criminal Law', op. cit., p. 2014. 
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the tribunal to interpret the Convention as protecting "stable groups, constituted in a 
permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth. "543 
Unlike other genocides that took place in history in secrecy, that in Rwanda 
happened before the eyes and the ears of the world. There was a UN peacekeeping 
force on the ground. Its members stood by and watched as killings took place. The 
rest of the world watched it on television. Once the killing had begun, US and 
European policymakers insisted on withdrawing peacekeepers, refused to jam radio 
broadcasts inciting murder, and issued tepid, belated condemnation. To defuse any 
pressure to act, they also refrained from labelling the slaughter "genocide". 
On 9 April 1994, three days into the genocide, European troops descended upon the 
Kigali airport to evacuate their own citizens, which recalls Jonathan Bass's 
observation: "What is striking is not just that even liberal states value the lives of 
their own more than those of foreigners, but how radically [original emphasis] the 
lives of foreigners are discounted. " 544 On 2lst April, two weeks after the bloodbath 
began, with reports of some 100,000 Rwandans dead, the Security Council, in perhaps 
its most shameful hour, slashed the flimsy peacekeeping force further, leaving 450 
troops to tackle tens of thousands of killers. 545 
Shortly after the Hutu extremists launched the genocide, the Tutsi paramilitary 
forces, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) undertook a major military offensive, 
moving from Uganda into Northern Rwanda. By mid-July the RPF was able to assert 
effective control over the country. 
543 Ibid., p. 2015. 
544 Jonathan Bass, op. cit., p. 28. 
5a5 Nyamuya Maogoto, op. cit., p. 183. 
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On 8 November 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 955, creating the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). However, the ICTR immediately 
became a sideshow. According to Article 15 of the ICTR Statute, Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda have a common prosecutor. Article 12 (2) also provides that the five 
members of the appeal chamber of the ICTY shall also serve as members of the same 
chamber of the ICTR. Both the prosecutor and the members of the Appeal Chamber 
are residents in The Hague, whereas the ICTR is based in Arusha, Tanzania. 
In the words of Samantha Powers, "a vast array of international decisions, non- 
decisions and decisions not to decide ensured that the Rwandan people and the 
peacekeepers would be abandoned to their fates. "546 To add salt to the injury, Rwanda 
has not been the recipient of international peacekeepers or significant economic 
assistance, unlike Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 547 
One wonders, had the Rwandans been of different colour, or possessed natural 
resources, would not they have had different fates and treatment by the international 
community? The world's lukewarm response to the Darfur and Congo crises further 
demonstrated how one's colour of skin determines one's treatment by the 
international criminal justice apparatus. 
As a partial result, the Rwanda tribunal, for all its administrative chaos and friction 
with the Rwandan government, has been able to prosecute an impressive roster of the 
major figures in the 1994 genocide: the former Rwandan prime minister; the minister 
of information; the former foreign minister; the director of cabinet at the defence 
546 S. Power, "Accessory to Murder? " in The New York Times: 11 February (2001). 
547 Payam Akhavan, 'Beyond Impunity'. op. cit., p. 23. 
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ministry; the former interior minister; the president of the National Assembly; the 
mayor of Taba; the director general of the foreign ministry. In 1998 the Arusha 
tribunal convicted the former prime minister, Kambanda, for genocide and crimes 
against humanity - an achievement comparable to a Milosevic conviction. 
548 
The Statutes of ICTY and ICRT limit penalties to imprisonment for a term up to 
life. Together the ICTY and ICTR have issued nearly seventy sentences. Some of 
these remain subject to appeal. At the ICTR, of the twenty individuals who have been 
convicted as of March 2005, eleven have been sentenced to life imprisonment (in 
certain cases, to multiple life sentences), one to thirty-five years, one to thirty years, 
one to twenty years, three to twenty-five years, and the remainder to terms ranging 
from ten to fifteen years. 
The ICTY has issued one life sentence, which is currently under appeal. Its thirty 
final sentences range from terms of imprisonment of forty years to three years. The 
mean sentence is 13.9 years and the median sentence is twelve years. 549 All ICTY and 
ICTR convicts serve their sentences in facilities in those states that have expressed a 
willingness to accept them. These states include Mali, Germany, Spain, Austria and 
Norway. The ICTR and ICTY budgets for 2002-2003 were US$ 178 million and US$ 
223 million respectively. 550 
Another issue related to the international criminal tribunals is the place of the victim 
and also restitution. In cases of the ICTY and ICTR restitution has never been 
548 Jonathan Bass, op. Cit., p. 325. 
549 Drumbl, op. Cit., p. 557. 
550 Ibid., p. 597., n. 308. 
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awarded in any of the sentences handed down by these tribunals, 551 due to the absence 
of any provisions in their respective Statutes. The absence of victims in international 
tribunals corresponds to the relative absence of victims in the criminal justice systems 
of many western systems. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the prevailing 
theories and modalities of punishment in western tradition have given little space, if 
any, to the victims, due to their retributive and deterrence assumptions and priorities. 
The absence of any role for the victims in the international tribunals is another 
example of the imposition of the western assumptions and modalities on the 
international criminal tribunals. 
In sum, despite the massive financial resources, the active involvement of the 
international community and employment of the most talented lawyers, prosecutors 
and judges, the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR have been disappointing. Both 
have failed to contribute significantly to the process of national and ethnic 
reconciliation. They failed to deter later conflicts as those conflicts in Kosovo, Sudan, 
and Congo demonstrated. More importantly they failed a large number of victims by 
the inadequate length of many of the sentences, and also by the absence of any 
restorative measures. 
The next part examines the case of the International Criminal Court, and seeks to 
establish whether the ICC be viewed as window-dressing or a pinnacle. 
551 Ibid, p. 556. 
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IV. The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court 
The first section of this part will look at the main steps that paved the way for the 
convening of the UN Diplomatic Conference for the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court from June 15 to July 17,1998, in Rome. The second part will discuss 
some of the contentious issues that the delegates had to overcome during the 
conference. The third part will highlight some aspects of the thirteen parts of the 
Rome Statute. The concluding sections will provide a detailed examination of the 
potential promises and also of the in-built weak provisions of the Statute. 
A. The Appian Way: Diplomatic Negotiations and Attempts to 
Establish an International Criminal Court Prior to the Rome 
Conference 
The Rome Statute was a product of the culmination of diverse processes and steps. 
The focus of this section is on the continuum of initiatives that directly addressed the 
establishment of an international criminal court. 
1) Following the fiasco of the war crimes tribunals of the Versailles and Sevres peace 
treaties, the Advisory Committee of Jurists of the League of Nations submitted a 
Resolution to establish a High Court of International Justice, composed of one 
member from each state, which would be "competent to try crimes constituting a 
breach of international public order or against the universal law of nations, referred to 
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it the Assembly of the Council of the League of Nations. " The Resolution was 
ultimately ignored. 552 
2) The idea was revived after the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 
1934, and in 1937 a convention was opened for signature on the creation of an 
international criminal court that would try persons accused of offences established in 
the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The convention was 
signed by only thirteen nations and never came into force. 553 
3) The London International Assembly established in 1941 under the auspices of the 
League of Nations, produced a proposal for an international criminal court, competent 
only to hear cases in which "no domestic court of any of the United Nations has 
jurisdiction to try the accused and ... 
[is] in a position and willing to exercise such 
jurisdiction. " The proposal also contained the provision for an international 
constabulary charged with "execution of the orders of the Court and of the Procurator 
General [of the Court]. " Although the statute failed to be realised, it lent support for 
the subsequent establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military 
Tribunals. 554 
4) Immediately after the Second World War, the question of the establishment of an 
international criminal court was raised in the United Nations. In a resolution 
accompanying the Genocide Convention, the General Assembly invited the newly- 
established International Law Commission (ILC), along with its work on the 
codification of international criminal law, to "study the desirability and possibility of 
552 Nadya Sadat, p. cit., p. 24. 
553 Ibid. , p. 25. 554 Ibid., p. 27. 
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establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with 
genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by 
international conventions. " The ILC voted at its Second Session in 1950 to support 
the desirability and feasibility of creating an international criminal court. 555 
5) The General Assembly of the UN established a committee composed of the 
representatives of seventeen member states to further examine the question of the 
establishment of an international criminal court. The Committee on International 
Criminal Jurisdiction met in Geneva in August 1951 and agreed to a draft statute for 
an international criminal court, and submitted it to the General Assembly. 556 
6) The General Assembly requested the formation of another seventeen member 
state committee to re-examine several of the issues and prepare another report. The 
second Committee met in New York during the summer of 1953 and issued its report 
with an amended version of the Statute annexed thereto. The 1951 and 1953 
_ 
Committee Reports were never implemented for lack of a political consensus on the 
desirability of creating an international criminal court. The idea stalled in the UN for 
more than thirty-five years. 557 
7) In 1989 a resolution was introduced by a coalition of sixteen Caribbean and Latin 
American nations led by Trinidad and Tobago, which requested the ILC to address the 
crime of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs across national frontiers, and presumably 
to discuss the international criminal court (or other trial mechanism) in that context. 
The ILC, in its forty-fourth session in 1992, created a working group on an 
555 Ibid., p. 33. 
556 Ibid., p. 34. 
557 Ibid., p. 36. 
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international criminal court, which produced an extensive report outlining the general 
bases upon which, in its opinion, the establishment of the ICC could proceed. 558 
8) In 1992 and following the Commission's report, the General Assembly granted 
the ILC a mandate to elaborate a draft statute "as a matter of priority". The ILC 
559 
considered two draft statutes before finally adopting a 60-article version in 1994. 
9) The ILC' s Draft Statute was returned to the General Assembly for consideration, 
which then established an Ad Hoc Committee, which met twice in 1995 to review the 
Commission's report. 560 
10) The Ad Hoc Committee rendered its report in 1995, which became the basis for 
the work of the Preparatory Committee established by the General Assembly to 
consider the Statute. In 1996 and 1997, the Preparatory Committee held six official 
sessions, each lasting approximately two weeks, and several inter-sessional sessions. 
Finally, in April 1998 it issued a consolidated text of a draft Statute for the 
consideration of the Diplomatic Conference later that summer. 561 
The next section will look at the composition of the Conference and some issues that 
divided the delegates. 




560 Ibid., p. 41. 
561 Ibid., p. 42. 
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B. The Rome Conference 
Following an invitation from the Secretary General of the UN, 160 countries sent 
their representative to Rome to discuss the Preparatory Draft Statute for the 
establishment of an international criminal court. In addition to member states' 
delegations, thirty-three intergovernmental organisations and a coalition of 236 NGOs 
took part at the conference. 562 
The Preparatory Draft Statute was riddled with some fourteen hundred square 
brackets, i. e., points of disagreement, surrounding partial and complete provisions 
with any number of alternative texts. 563 Through the Conference three distinctive 
groups were formed: the Like-Minded Group (LMG); the Permanent Members of the 
Security Council; and some members of the Non-Aligned Movement who had 
different positions vis-ä-vis the other two groups on certain issues. 
The Like-Minded Group had been formed during the Ad Hoc Committee's work by 
a handful of Western European and Latin American states that were frustrated by the 
opposition of the major powers to the establishment of the ICC. It originated. with 42 
states and grew considerably thereafter to more than sixty members. 564 The LMG 
group favoured a strong and independent court. 
The second group, the permanent members of the Security Council were united on 
two points: a strong role for the Security Council vis-ä-vis the Court, and the 
562 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", in The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 93., No. 1 (Jan., 1999), p. 22. 563 Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, "The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process", in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), p. 3. 
564 Nadya Sadat, op. cit., p. 7. n. 23. 
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exclusion of nuclear weapons from the weapons prohibited by the Statute. With the 
exception of the United Kingdom, which had joined the LMG shortly before the 
conference following the victory of the Labour party at the UK general election, the 
permanent members of the SC also wanted the jurisdiction and exercise of the Court 
to be carefully circumscribed. 565 
The third group were those states that were extremely suspicious of the Security 
Council and insisted on the inclusion of nuclear weapons among weapons prohibited 
by the Statute (e. g., India, Mexico and Egypt). In general, however, those same states 
espoused positions that were similar to those of the permanent members of the SC, in 
566 
advocating a court whose powers would be relatively restricted. 
With the exception of these trends, the conference was characterised by a mosaic of 
positions that transcended political and regional groupings. For example, many states 
believed that the Security Council could not be relied upon to administer justice in an 
impartial manner. Most developing states advocated the inclusion of aggression 
among the core crimes covered by the statute, and many favoured prohibiting nuclear 
weapons. Some wanted terrorism or regional drug trafficking to be covered as well 
(e. g., Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, Sri Lanka and some Caribbean states. 567) 
The Arab states, in particular, were among those countries that were advocating the 
inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Statute, and called for an independent and 
powerful prosecutor. 568 
565 Kirsch, op. cit. , p. 4. 566 Ibid., p. 4. 
567 Ibid., p. 4. 
568 Steven C. Roach, "Arab States and the Role of Islam in the International Criminal Court", in 
Political Studies, Vol. 53, (2005), p. 143. 
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NGOs also played an important role during the conference. They not only lobbied 
for certain positions, but also made available the expertise they had built up over 
years of focusing on this subject. Amnesty International set up a tent for information 
and publicity purposes a few hundred yards away from the Conference centre, and the 
Italian-based Transnational Radical Party, in addition to papering the city with posters 
("We expect concrete results"), supplied each delegation with a small plastic briefcase 
containing literature and a transistor radio so that the conference could be followed 
live on Radio Radicale2.569 The NGOs' influence was felt on a variety of issues, 
particularly the protection of children, sexual violence, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation and an independent role for the prosecutor. 570 
At the end of five weeks of gruelling negotiations, the conference adopted the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court in an emotional vote of 120 to 7, with 21 
countries abstaining. The United States requested the vote. Because it was 
unrecorded, it is unclear which states voted no, but in addition to the US which 
publicly stated its position, it is believed that China, India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, 
and Yemen also voted against the Statute. 571 In addition to adoption of the Statute, the 
conference mandated the Preparatory Commission to complete draft texts of Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, the Elements of Crimes, the relationship agreement between 
the Court and the United Nations, basic principles of the headquarters agreement, 
financial regulations and rules, an agreement on the privileges and immunities of the 
Court, a budget for the first financial year, and the rules of procedure of the Assembly 
of States Parties. After the ratification of the Statute by 60 states, the Court came into 
existence in July 2002, with the subsequent appointment of its eighteen judges, the 
569 Nadya Sadat, 2p. cit., p. 3. 
570 Arsanjani, op. cit., p. 23. 
57 1 Nadya Sadat, Op. Cit. , p. 4. n. 9. 
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Prosecutor, and the Deputy Prosecutor, and the rest of the administrative personnel of 
the Court. As of May 2005, out of 135 that signed the Rome Statute, 98 states have 
ratified it. 572 
The next section of this part will briefly examine some aspects of the thirteen parts of 
the Rome Statute. 
C. The Structure and the Provisions of the Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute is composed of a preamble and thirteen parts, including 128 
articles. The Preamble addresses the main normative aspects and the foundations of 
the ICC. 
Part One, the establishment of the Court, comprises four articles dealing with the 
creation of the Court: the Court as a standing institution; its complementarity to 
national criminal jurisdictions; its intention to adjudicate the most serious crimes of 
international concern; its jurisdiction over persons and not legal entities. 
Part Two is composed of seventeen articles and is the heart of the Statute, and was 
the most difficult part to negotiate. 573 This part deals with the list and the definition of 
crimes, the trigger mechanism, admissibility and applicable law. Its text was not 
negotiated until the penultimate day of the conference. The final text provides that the 
court may exercise jurisdiction with respect to the crimes listed in the statute, if it has 
the consent of the state of the territory where the crime was committed or the consent 
572 For a complete insight into the existing arrangement of the Court, see its official website at: 
httP: //www. icc-cpi. int/home. html&l=en 
573 Arsanjani, op. cit., p. 25. 
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of the state of nationality of the accused. But this requirement does not apply if a 
situation is referred to the court by the Security Council; the court will have 
jurisdiction regarding the crimes concerned even if committed in non-states parties by 
nationals of non-states parties and in the absence of consent by the territorial state or 
the state of nationality of the accused. 
According to Article five of the Statute, the Court will have jurisdiction over the 
following crimes: (a) the crimes of genocide; (b) crimes against humanity; (c) war 
crimes (d) the crime of aggression. Due to the absence of a universally accepted 
definition of the crime of aggression, the Statute provided that the court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over this crime once a provision is adopted with respect to the definition 
of the crime, and setting out the conditions under which the court shall exercise 
jurisdiction. 
Article 17 identifies four grounds of inadmissibility: (1) the case is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it; (2) the case has been 
investigated by a state that has jurisdiction over it and the state has decided not to 
prosecute the person concerned; (3) the person concerned has already been tried for 
the conduct in question; and (4) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify action by 
the Court. 
Part Three, General Principles of Criminal Law, composed of twelve articles, sets 
out the Statute's substantive criminal law, including the basis for individual criminal 
responsibility and grounds for excluding criminal responsibility. 
Part Four, Composition and Administration of the Court, comprises nineteen 
articles. The Court will be composed of four organs: the Presidency; an Appeal, a Pre- 
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Trial and a Trial Division; the Office of the Prosecutor; and the Registry. The court is 
to have eighteen judges, nominated and elected by states parties. 
Part Five, Investigation and Prosecution, consists of nine articles. It addresses the 
steps to be taken to initiate investigation, the rights of the person under investigation, 
and other requirements to be complied with before trial. 
Part Six, The Trial, contains of fifteen articles. It addresses the conduct of the trial, 
rights of the accused, protection of victims and witnesses, and admissibility of 
evidence. 
Part Seven, Penalties, is composed of four articles. The-question of the death 
penalty was difficult to negotiate because its supporters could not agree to its 
exclusion from the Statute, lest it undermine their own national laws permitting 
capital punishment. Under the leadership of Norway, a compromise formula was 
reached. The death penalty was excluded from the Statute, but the President of the 
Rome Conference read a statement in the plenary to the effect that there was no 
international consensus on the inclusion of the death penalty. 574 One may note that a 
person convicted of a crime under the Statute may receive the death penalty in a 
national court, but not under the Statute if such a person is convicted for the same 
crime by the ICC. In other words, the top officials who organised, directed and 
facilitated the commission of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court will 
receive lenient penalties from the ICC, whereas the junior officials and foot soldiers 
will be subject to harsher penalties, as the national courts will likely try them. 
574 Ibid., p. 39. 
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The primary punishment envisioned by the Statute is imprisonment for a term of up 
to thirty years. No minimum sentences are suggested by the text, nor are specific 
sentences proposed for particular crimes. Rather, the length of a given sentence is left 
to the discretion of the judges, subject to two qualifications: first, the maximum 
sentence of thirty years may only be extended to life imprisonment in cases of 
"extreme gravity". Second, because many delegations felt that life imprisonment was 
excessively severe, and indeed, the constitutions of many countries prohibit it, Article 
10 of the Statute imposed a mandatory review (but not a mandatory reduction) of the 
sentence after twenty-five years to determine if the sentence should be reduced. 575 
Other sentences are to be reviewed by the court after the person had served two-thirds 
of his or her time. In addition to imprisonment, the Court has the power to impose 
fines, or to order the forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or 
indirectly from the crime, payable to the victims through the Victim Trust Fund. 
Compared with the ad hoc tribunals, this provision for the victims is an important 
development. 
The Statute and the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence list aggravating and 
mitigating factors, which mirror the factors that animate sentencing for ordinary 
domestic crimes. The ICC' s positive laws lack significant guidance regarding the 
purposes of sentencing, 576 which would leave judges with a discretionary power. 
Part Eight, Appeal and Revision, consisting of five articles, allows for the decision 
of the trial chamber to be appealed by either the prosecutor or the convicted person. 
Other decisions that may be appealed include those regarding jurisdiction and 
admissibility, the granting or denial of release of the person investigated or accused, 
575 Nadya Sadat, op. cit., p. 167. 
576 Drumbl, op. cit. ' p. 554. 
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the fair and expeditious conduct of proceedings, and functions and powers of the pre- 
trial chamber. 
Part Nine, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, contains seventeen 
articles. States party to the statute are obliged to cooperate with the Court and they 
must ensure that their domestic laws provide for the forms of cooperation specified 
under the Statute (Articles 86 and 88). A state party may postpone execution of a 
request from the Court, if it decides that it would interfere with an ongoing 
investigation or prosecution or the admissibility of the case is being challenged before 
the Court (Articles 94 and 95). The Court is to report non-cooperation by state parties 
to the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council, if the Council referred the 
matter to the Court. 
Part Ten, Enforcement, includes nine articles. A sentence of imprisonment shall be 
served in a state chosen by the court from a list of states that have indicated their 
wiliness to accept sentenced persons. The Court shall supervise the enforcement of 
conditions of imprisonment. 
Part Eleven consists of a single article establishing the Assembly of States Parties, 
which will provide oversight for the Court and its operation. 
Part Twelve consists of six articles, which deal with the financing of the Court. 
Expenses shall be paid from assessed contributions made by states parties and funds 
provided by the United Nations subject to the approval of the General Assembly. The 
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court may also receive funds from governments and non-governmental entities and 
individuals. 
The last part, Part Thirteen consists of ten articles, which constitute the final 
clauses. According to Article 119, the court has competence to decide on any dispute 
regarding its "judicial functions". Article 121 stipulates that seven years after the 
entry into force of the statute, the Secretary General of the United Nations shall 
convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to the statute. 
The next section will look at some of the provisions of the Statute and the anticipated 
effect of the Court in challenging the culture of impunity at the global level. This part 
is about the "quarter full" nature of the Court, as its proponents have advocated. The 
next section will proceed to examine the "three quarter empty" aspects of the Statute. 
D. A Grotian Moment: the Promise of the ICC 
As the foregoing sections showed, the road to Rome was long and arduous. The 
establishment of the Court amid the divergent and often conflicting views of the 
sovereign states on the role and rules of international law in inter-states affairs was in 
itself a remarkable achievement. The successful establishment of the Court was 
another step towards institutionalising the rule of law in global affairs. The 
Nuremberg tribunal and the subsequent developments in the codification of 
international criminal law put an end to the conceptual constraints in holding 
individuals accountable for violating international criminal law. The establishment of 
the ICC complemented the normative and conceptual progression by creating a 
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permanent institution to enforce these norms. Should the international community 
desire to hold to account the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights, the 
absence of an institutional framework and mechanism would no longer be a 
constraining factor. The experiences of the two ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, 
showed the great difficulties encountered in establishing such tribunals even in those 
cases where there was political consensus in the international community. For 
instance, the process for selection and appointment of the prosecutor for the ICTY 
took more than fourteen months. 577 
The rationalist perspective on international institutions is also helpful in better 
understanding the benefits of a permanent institution such as the ICC. According to 
this perspective, which is first known under the label of "regime theory", states as 
rational, unitary actors create international institutions in order to alleviate strategic 
cooperation problems that arise in the anarchical international system. 578 According to 
the neo - liberal argument, international institutions can alleviate cooperation 
problems in different ways - by centralising monitoring, or by centralising 
enforcement - which include the central provision of a public good, as a forum for 
strategies of issue linkage and by reducing the transaction costs of repeated 
international negotiations. 579 
57 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, (Review Author) "Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International 
War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg", in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 92, No. 3 
(Jul., 1998), pp. 590-593 
5" Duncan Sindal, "International Political Economy Approaches to International Institutions" in 
Economic Dimensions in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, edited by 
Jagodeep S. Bhandari and Alan 0. Sykes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 480. 
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Two rationalist explanations can be given for the establishment of the ICC as a new 
element in the regime of international criminal justice - one argument refers to 
enforcement problems arising with prosecution in national courts, the other one to 
high transaction costs incurred in the more recently created system of `ad hoc 
tribunals'. 
With respect to the former argument, Kenneth Abbott argues that the ICC solves an 
enforcement problem in international criminal justice. According to him, the 
worldwide punishment and deterrence of atrocities is in the interest of all states in 
order to avoid costly interventions. But punishment and deterrence constitute public 
goods, which are undersupplied in a regime that relies exclusively on decentralised 
prosecution in national courts. 580 The ICC can supply the worldwide community with 
deterrence and punishment. 
The second rationalist argument, the transaction cost, focuses on deficits not in the 
prosecution of perpetrators at the national level, but in the system of more recently- 
established ad hoc tribunals. Observers of these bodies diagnosed an acute `tribunal 
fatigue', and indicate that the ICC was meant as an instrument to reduce the 
transactions costs of international criminal justice. 581 
The normative features of the ICC are another argument that complement its 
utilitarian benefits. The Rome Statue has incorporated all the relevant international 
treaties concerning human rights of the defendants, such as due process, presumption 
of innocence, and legal representation. The work of the Court is not limited to the 
prosecution and punishment of individuals, but is intended to contribute to a 
580 Kenneth Abbott, "International Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in 
Internal Conflicts", in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93., No. 2. (Apr., 1999), p. 374 581 Fehl, op. cit., pp 370-71. 
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normative framework to combat impunity, maintain international peace and security 
and assist in national reconciliation and truth finding. 582 
Another important provision of the Rome Statute is the significant attention to the 
needs of the victims. The Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR overlooked victims in 
two respects: victims could not take part in a personal capacity in the criminal 
proceedings and are not entitled to obtain compensation for the harm they suffered. 
The Rome Statute appears to mark a new step forward to fill these gaps: victims are 
accorded the double status. They are able to take part in the criminal process and to 
present their `views and concerns' where their `personal interests' are affected. 583 
Secondly, they are entitled to seek from the Court reparations for the harm suffered by 
them. 584 
These provisions of the Statute reflect the latest trend in contemporary criminal law, 
in particular the contributions made by scientific tenets such as the concept of defense 
sociale, which are unanimous in their conclusion that social harmony cannot be 
restored merely by convicting and sentencing the guilty. 585 However, such a 
consideration of the victim has not been universally approved. Larry May complains 
that the concerns of the victims are simply being given far too much weight, 586 
apparently ignoring the fact that victims have paid the highest price for the crimes, 
which entitle them to be treated as the main stakeholder in any response as how to 
deal with the perpetrator(s). 
582 Nadya Sadat, op. cit., p. 249. 
583 Art. 68 (3) 
584 Art. 75. 
585 Claude Jorda and Jerome de Hemtinne, "The Status and Role of The Victim", in The Rome Statute 
of The International Criminal Court: A Commentary Vol. II, edited by Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta 
and John R. W. D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 1388. 586 May, op. it., p. 92. 
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The constructivist perspective can also shed light on the normative features of the 
ICC. A branch of this paradigm, tends to understand institutions as (sets of) norms, a 
`norm' being defined as a `standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given 
identity". The general argument is that some institutions are so widely accepted 
within a group of states that they have come to be constitutive of its identity -a state, 
which wants to define itself as a member of the community, must act in accordance 
with the standard of appropriate behaviour in the community. With regard to the 
creation of international norms, scholars emphasis the role of `norm entrepreneurs', 
such as transnational networks of NGOs, that lobby states to redefine their interests so 
as to support the respective norm. 587 According to a constructivist perspective the 
universally recognised human rights norms are more than just formal institutional 
rules - they have come to define the identity of the `community of liberal states' and 
of its members. Human rights are one standard of appropriate behaviour for any state 
which seeks to view itself, and be viewed by others, as a respected member of the 
international community. The growing normative consensus on human rights norms 
have paved the way to view impunity for the perpetrators of human rights violations 
as a collective problem of just that international community. 588 
The purposes of criminal law sanctions have been suggested to be: just punishment, 
deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous and rehabilitation. The Rome Statute has 
virtually nothing to say about the purpose of sentencing. The only real reference is in 
the preamble, which declares that putting an end to impunity for serious international 
587 Fehl, pp. cit., pp. 365-66. 
588 Ibid., p. 372. 
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crimes will `contribute to the prevention of such crimes', which suggests that the 
deterrent effect is one of the main aims of the Court. 
Since the jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole, 589 this would imply, that the Court 
will likely focus on the "big fish", so there is a great deal of hope that the existence of 
the Court become one of the factors that the would-be perpetrators of the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court would take into account, prior to executing their 
decisions. Contrary to the simplistic myths of primordial `tribal' hatred, the conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were not expressions of spontaneous blood lust 
or inevitable historical cataclysms. Both conflicts resulted from the deliberate 
incitement of ethnic hatred and violence by which ruthless demagogues and warlords 
elevated themselves to positions of absolute power. 590 Such leaders may be desperate, 
erratic, or even psychotic, but incitement to ethnic violence is usually aimed at the 
acquisition and sustained exercise of power. 591 
The prospect of facing an international tribunal will, undoubtedly, contribute to their 
calculation of the cost and the benefit of their plans. Such a deterrent effect of the ICC 
was recently demonstrated by the revelation that the UK Chief of Staff required an 
explicit legal guarantee from the UK Prime Minister about the legality of the invasion 
of Iraq. According to the leaked letter, he explicitly expressed his fear that the absence 
589 Art. 5 
590 Payam Akhavan 
, 
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of a clear legal justification for the war might prompt the prospect of appearing before 
the ICC. 592 
The above provisions of the Rome Statute and the Court's potential to contribute to 
strengthening the rule of law at the global level prompted the UN Secretary General, 
Kofi Annan to describe the ICC as "a gift of hope for future generations". 593 A gift 
that Nadya Sadat characterised as a "Grotian Moment". 594 Justice, once there is a 
procedure for its delivery, is prone to have its own momentum. 595 
However, in the words of Nadya Sadat, a great deal of what the Rome Statute 
"giveth" in its first few parts is "taken away" by other parts. 596There are less 
optimistic voices who are sceptical about the Rome Statute and the likely impact of 
the ICC. The following section reviews the main arguments that have been made by 
such sceptical voices. 
E. The ICC: A Giant Without Arms and Legs 
As discussed in the foregoing parts, the Like-Minded Group (LMG) were the most 
vocal supporters of an effective and powerful Court. Their cornerstone principles that 
were adopted during the preparatory negotiations included a commitment to a 
successful Diplomatic Conference in 1998; the prompt creation of an independent and 
592http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/news/main. jhtml? xml=/news/2002/ 11 /06/nirgO6. xml&sSheet=/news/200 
2/11/06/ixnewstop. html 
593 Quoted in Broomhall, op. cit., p. 1. 
59" Nadya Sadat, op. cit., p. 13. fn., 37. 
s9s Robertson, op. cit., p. 449. 
596 Nadya Sadat, op. cit. , p. 202. 
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effective ICC; the absence of a Security Council `filter' role; automatic jurisdiction; a 
definition of war crimes including internal armed conflict; an independent prosecutor 
with an ex officio role; an obligation on States Parties to cooperate with the ICC; and a 
provision that questions of jurisdiction and admissibility should ultimately be decided 
597 by the Court. 
Although there were many states that raised their objection to some of the LMG' s 
principles, the US presented the most systematic and widespread opposition to many 
of these principles, in particular to an independent prosecutor, the weakened power of 
the Security Council, the universal jurisdiction of the Court, and the trigger 
mechanism of the Court. The President of the Rome Conference, Philip Kirsch, 
admitted that the US delegation was in fact exceptionally effective in advancing US 
views and having them reflected in the Statute. According to him, the US had a 
greater impact on the Statute than any other State, since countless provisions and 
aspects of the Statute were developed to reflect or accommodate its concerns and 
priorities. 598 The effective work of the US diplomats at the Rome Conference was 
later complemented by the US legislators who passed the `American 
Servicemembers' Protection Act' (ASPA) in August 2002, which threatened states 
supporting the ICC with cuts in'military aid and authorised the President to `use all 
means necessary' to free US personnel from the ICC' s custody. With reference to the 
latter provision, the ASPA is known colloquially as the `Hague Invasion Act'. 599 
597 Philip Kirsch and Darryl Robinson, "Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference", in, `The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court', Anonio Cassese et al., op. cit., p. 71.. 11. 598 Ibid., p. 99. 
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In the words of Geoffrey Robertson, "the Rome delegates felt the need to make 
concessions to Washington in the naive hope that the Clinton administration would at 
least tolerate the Court. Instead, they got the worst of both worlds: the Court has been 
considerably weakened and the US government is still determined to destroy a 
historically important new institution. 400 
The uneasiness of the US with regard to international law has been examined from 
different angles. The most critical one is provided by Geoffrey Robertson who 
describes the traditional Washington stance that the US is "above international 
law". 601 Jason Ralph, who uses the English School approach to assess the impact of 
the ICC on international society gives a more subtle explanation. According to him, 
the US could get through the institutions of international society what it could not get 
through the institutions of world society. Keeping major decisions, including those on 
international criminal justice, within the confines of the society of states is clearly part 
of a strategy to maintain hegemony. 602 
Shirley Scott uses the US' treatment of the ICC, inter alia, to argue that that the 
twentieth century was not only the era of United States' dominance of the 
international legal system but also of the contribution of international law to US 
national power, understood in the sense of influence over the policies and actions of 
other states. According to her, treaty negotiations can be viewed as an opportunity to 
improve a state's relative power in a given issue. The US has on occasion influenced 
the policies of other states, while at the same time, limiting the influence of those 
600 Robertson, op. cit., p. 347. 
601 Robertson, op. cit., p. 327. 
602 Jason Ralph, "International Society, the International Criminal Court and American Foreign 
Policy", in Review of International Studies Vol. 31 (2005), p. 42 
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states over the relevant policies of the US by participating actively in negotiations for 
a multilateral treaty and then not signing the ensuing treaty, which exactly was the 
fate of the Rome Statute. 603 The US did a triple flip as it evaluated and re-evaluated 
the repercussions of its involvement or lack thereof: participating in negotiating, not 
signing, signing just before the deadline for doing so, and then `unsigning'. 604 It 
seems the US' book of guidance with respect to international criminal justice is 
Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish, as it has fully utilized its power on the 
international stage to influence the developments in international criminal justice to 
its perceived national interests. 
In the following sections the limited scope of the jurisdiction of the Court, the 
principle of complementarity, and the enforcement regime of the Court will be 
examined. 
1. The Constrained Jurisdiction of the Court 
According to Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction 
over the commission of any crimes within its competence, if they have been 
committed by the national of any state party (nationality state) or on the territory of 
the state party (territorial state). The Court will also be able to exercise its jurisdiction 
over the non-member state if it is referred to it by the Security Council or on the ad 
603 Shirley V. Scott, "Is there room fir international law in realpolitik?: accounting the US `attitude' 
towards international law" in Review of International Studies , Vol. 
30 (2004), p. 88. 
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hoc agreement with a non-member, which consents to the exercise of the Court 
jurisdiction. 
The Statute stops short of permitting custodial States to consent to jurisdiction. That 
is if a defendant of a State not party to the Statute travels to a State party, the State to 
which the potential defendant has travelled may not serve as a jurisdictional nexus to 
the ICC, even though it could, under well-accepted principles of universal 
jurisdiction, try the defendant itself. The human rights community desperately fought, 
albeit unsuccessfully, to include the custodial State as a jurisdictional nexus to prevent 
the phenomenon of "travelling tyrants, " able to travel to any State (other than the 
territorial State) so long as they avoid States that have joined the ICC. Furthermore, 
under the State consent regime, the State withholding its consent need not make any 
effort to try the defendants (s) involved itself. So, with the exception of a Security 
Council referral, many of the most egregious cases will not be prosecuted by 
anyone. 605 
2. The Principle of Complementarity or Subordination 
With the exception of the cases referred by the Security Council, the Court will act 
to complement national courts and procedures. The Preamble to the Rome Statute 
emphasises that the ICC jurisdiction shall be "complementarity" to that of nation 
states. But the provisions of the Statute itself suggest that `subordinate' would be a 
605 Nadya Sadat, pp. -cit., p., 118. 
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6. 
more accurate description of the legal relationship, 606 which is similar to the function 
of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Pursuant to Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the Court may exercise jurisdiction only 
if. (1) national jurisdictions are "unwilling or unable" to; (2) the crime is of sufficient 
gravity; and (3) the person has not already been tried for the conduct on which the 
complaint is based. This article, 17, kow-tows to state sovereignty: the ICC will not 
be permitted to put anyone on trial who has been "under investigation" by a national 
prosecutor and has had charges dropped or the investigation stopped. 607 
The principle of complementarity has been complemented by an extremely complex 
procedure for challenging jurisdiction and admissibility. Essentially, at every stage of 
the proceeding up to trial, including the vetting of the case by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
if the Prosecutor is investigating proprio motu, challenges to admissibility and 
jurisdiction are permitted, and, for the most part, are subject to intelocutory appeal. 
Given that at most stages of the proceeding, there are several parties (including the 
Court) with a right of challenge, it is likely that the Court will be spending a great deal 
of time on motions relating to admissibility and jurisdiction. 08 These provisions will 
enable the states to have numerous legal opportunities to derail a prosecution, or to 
delay it for years through appellate manoeuvres, especially in cases that are not 
referred by the Security Council. 
Although the Court has the jurisdictional power to review the domestic procedures 
to assess if they are genuine or not, the limited resources of the ICC would constrain 
606 Geoffrey Robertson, op. cit., p. 349. 
607 Ibid., p. 350. 
608 Nadya Sadat, op. Cit., p. 122. 
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the Court to allocate its limited personnel to challenge the domestic procedures of the 
states, in particular of the powerful countries. As Chuter has observed, "in order for 
the ICC as an institution to maintain resource support, it is incentivized to investigate 
wrongdoers in politically powerless places. "609 This limitation, as Drumbl has 
warned, risks reducing the permanent ICC to an ad hoc institution contingent on 
international political consensus. 610 
3. Weakened Enforcement Regime 
Even if the Court managed to overcome the many procedural and substantive 
obstacles and successfully commence a trial, the enforcement of the Court's decision 
will remain hostage to the goodwill of the states. The enforcement regime of the 
Court is premised on three principles. First, the ICC will not be permitted to sanction 
states directly for-non-compliance with its orders. Rather, the ICC will be required to 
make findings of non-compliance and direct those to the Assembly of States Parties 
and the Security Council, in the case of a Security Council referral to the ICC. 
Second, the ICC may not compel state compliance with its orders. That is, it may not 
compel the appearance of witness; it may not compel execution of arrest warrants; it 
may not seize bank accounts or government documents of its own accord. There is no 
power of subpoena; there is no mandamus. Third, the personnel of the ICC will have 
no right, in most cases, to proceed directly to the execution of their duties on the 
territories of states but must work through the authorities present in the requested state 
and be subject to national law. 611 
609 Chuter, op. cit. , p. 
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When it comes to the co-operation of other states in facilitating the missions of the 
Court, it would be more difficult for the Court to achieve a substantial and predictable 
degree of cooperation. Based on the precedent of the two ad hoc tribunals and also 
other similar cases, for many states their co-operation with the Court will be primarily 
dependent on their political interest and calculation. 
States have been amazingly consistent in their refusal to pay for international justice 
with the lives of their own soldiers. As early as 1815, the British squadron that finally 
captured Napoleon was instructed that the king valued the life of a single British 
sailor as much as Napoleon's. 612 Such a trend continued to date. Even liberal states 
have mostly pursued international justice when their citizens had been the victims of 
war crimes, which explains why even in the Kosovo war, NATO insisted on 
humanitarianism on the cheap, refusing to send in ground troops even as Milosevic's 
ethnic cleansing killed thousands of Kosovars and put a million of them out of their 
homes. 613 
The latest example of the submission of international justice to the realpolitik was 
demonstrated by the recent visit to Washington of General Gosh, Sudan's intelligence 
chief, who has been implicated in human rights abuses by the ICC. The General's 
visit was to consolidate the growing working relationship between the two countries 
in the US-led war on terrorism. 614 So, it is no wonder that Antonio Cassese, former 
612 Gary Bass, op. cit., p. 277. 
61 Ibid., p. 277. 
614 Suzanne Goldenberg, "Ostracised Sudan emerges as Key American Ally in `war on terror", in The 
Guardian weekly, May 6-12 (2005), p. 6. 
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President of the ICTY, compared the ICC to a "giant without arms and legs who 
needs artificial limbs to walk and work. "615 
The concluding part of this chapter argues that international criminal justice should 
be construed as part of a multifaceted continuum, than as an independent variable. 
Blaming and focusing on selected evildoers is a myopic exercise as it disguises the 
role of other factors and players. 
V. The Way Forward: The Triangle of Legalism, Moral 
Inclusion, and Distributive Justice 
The establishment of the two ad hoc tribunals, the ICC and the growing number of 
national initiatives to deal with perpetrators of gross violations of human rights 
indicate that a legalistic approach to the punishment of such crimes has become one of 
the main responses to gross violations of human rights. However, as the foregoing 
sections tried to demonstrate, the recognition of a legalistic approach at the global 
level is to a large degree dependent upon the political interests of nations, in particular 
the powerful countries. And as such there are many significant residual weaknesses 
within the apparatus of international criminal justice. More importantly, even when 
such shortcomings are overcome, as Judith Shklar once wrote, "the idea that all 
international problems will dissolve with the establishment of an international court 
with compulsory jurisdiction is an invitation to political indolence. "616 
The shortcoming of a mere legalistic approach is illustrated in Robert Penn Warren's 
fictional demagogue Willie Spark: 
615 A. Cassese, "On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law" in The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, (1998), 
p. 13. 
616 Quoted in Gary Bass, op. cit., p. 282. 
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I know a lot of law... But I am not a lawyer. That's why I can see what the law is like. 
It's like a single bed-blanket on a double bed and three folks in the bed and a cold 
night. There ain't ever enough blanket to cover the case, no matter how much pulling 
and hauling, and someone is always going to nigh catch pneumonia. Hell, the law is 
like the pants you bought last year and the seams are popped and the shank bone's to 
the breeze. The law is always too short and too tight for growing humankind. 617 
The case of slavery shows the extent of deficiencies of a mere legalistic approach. 
From 1815 to 1982, there were 72 conventions on the subject of slavery and slave- 
related practices. There were also 47 other conventions elaborated between 1874 and 
1996 applicable to this category of crime, which is deemed part ofjus cogens. 618 
The recent report by the International Labour Organisation, in May 2005, showed 
despite the many elaborate legal treaties and conventions on the issue of slavery, there 
are still 12.3 million people who are one way or another can be defined as slaves. 619 
A legalistic approach, while it is necessary for the institutionalisation of the 
accountability at the global level, should be complemented by the two equally 
important principles: the expansion of our moral inclusion circle; and the importance 
of distributive justice. Also, the chapters on "forgiveness" and the "epilogue" will 
further expand this line of enquiry, non-legalistic approaches and normative 
principles. The following section will examine each of these two principles 
A. An Inclusive Moral Circle and Community 
617 Robert Penn Warren, All the King's Men (New York: Harvest, 1996), p. 136 
618 Cherif Bassiouni, `Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes', op. cit., pp. 969-70. 
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Three lines of research that examine the notion of justice often focus on what, how, 
and how. Distributive justice addresses the contingency, what, and concerns the 
distribution of such social goods and resources as love/caring, services, goods, 
money, information, status. Procedural justice addresses the contingency, how, and 
concerns the procedures and processes deemed fair and appropriate. Procedural 
justice research has focused on six tenets connected with perceptions of procedural 
fairness: consistency (applications of procedures across people across time); 
impartiality (ability to suppress bias); decision quality (information gathering and 
accuracy); correctability (process monitoring and correction of errors); voice (process 
control); and ethicality (polite, respectful, dignified). 
Inclusion in the scope ofjustice, addresses the contingency, who, and concerns who 
is inside or outside our psychological boundary for justice, called the "scope of 
justice" or "moral community". For those inside, concerns about fairness, rights, 
entitlements, and well-being govern conduct. For those outside, concern about 
fairness, rights, entitlements, and well-being are deemed irrelevant; instead, people 
who are morally excluded from our scope of justice are seen as undeserving, 
expendable nonentities, or as hated enemies deserving extermination. 620 
Polemarchus' s definition of justice in Plato's Republic also sheds light on how 
one's place in the moral community determines the type of justice which is invoked. 
According to him, justice is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies. 62' 
620 Susan Opotow, "Psychology of Impunity and Injustice: Implications for Social Reconciliation" in 
`Post Conflict Justice', op. cit., pp. 207-08. 
621 Katherine Philippakis, "See No Evil: The Story of Gyges in Herodotus and Plato" in `Justice v. Law 
In Greek Political Thought', op. cit., pp. 33-4. 
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As noted in the chapter on Islamic institutions of punishment, the Islamic 
conception of justice is deontological and applicable to all members of humanity as 
the following two verses of the Koran show: 
"... Woe betide the unjust who, when others measure for them, exact in full, but when 
they measure or weight for others, defraud them. "622 
"Believers conduct yourselves with justice and bear true witness before God, even 
thought it be against yourselves, your parents, or your kinsfolk. Be they rich or 
poor... " 
623 
One common feature of almost all genocides, massive violations of human rights, 
and crimes against humanity, has been the exclusion of the victims from the moral 
scope by the perpetrators. And in many cases such exclusion has been followed by 
physical extermination, as the cases of Nazi Germany and Rwanda demonstrated. 
Jews and Communists were the first to be officially excluded from the circle of those 
who counted in society, and from that time it became dangerous for any German to 
show concern for them. As the months and years of the National Socialist rule went 
on, the list of exclusions grew: Social Democrats, pacifists, homosexuals, beggars, the 
crippled, the senile, the retarded, the mentally ill, Gypsies, Poles, Russian Slavs of 
any nationality and, of course, anyone who opposed the regime. 624 
The Rwanda conflict was not a spontaneous outburst of savagery. Radio, television 
and other media organised the extermination of the Tutsi and Hutu moderates through 
622 Koran, 83: 1. 
623 Ibid, 4: 135. 
624 Jones, op. cit. , p. 174. 
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the systematic incitement of the public, targeting a largely illiterate population with 
no access to other sources of information. They reviled the Tutsi as "cockroaches" 
that had infested the country, and the ensuing rage was sustained by the careful 
political-military organisation of Hutu extremists. 625 
The US' decision to exclude the terrorist suspects and Taliban fighters from the 
Geneva Conventions, and also the UK's decision to provide a different legal regime 
for foreigners suspected of terrorist links are also indications that such legal exclusion 
and differentiation are closely correlated to the benign moral exclusion that many 
Muslims in the US and many Western countries have been subjected to since the 
events of the September 11,2001. 
Just as moral exclusion is entwined with and can foster impunity and violence, 
moral inclusion can be characterised as the process of social reconciliation. Moral 
inclusion is defined as: (1) believing that considerations of fairness apply to the other, 
(2) willingness to allocate a share of community resources to the other, and (3) 
willingness to make sacrifices to foster the other's well-being. 626 
Larry May's account of moral sensitivity is also relevant in highlighting the 
importance of the moral scope. According to him, moral sensitivity involves: (1) 
perceptiveness of the needs or feelings of others, (2) caring about the effects of one's 
actions, (3) critical appreciation of what is morally relevant about the situation of 
625 Payam Akhavan, `Beyond Impunity', pp. cit., p. 11. 626 Optow, pp. cit., p. 214. 
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those who are affected by one's behaviour, and (4) motivation to act so as to minimise 
the harms and offences that might result from one's behaviour. 627 
Recalling the continuum of violence and the active contribution of different factors 
and players. in creating the environment that facilitates much violence, the expansion 
of the moral community is a universal undertaking, not only of conflict-ridden 
societies. In the words of the 12 `h century Persian poet, Saa'di: 
"The Children of Adam are limbs of one another, created from a single substance. 
When one limb suffers misfortune, the others cannot be at rest. 
You who do not suffer the pain of others do not deserved to be called human. , 628 
B. Distributive Justice 
The model of domestic municipal law has often been cited as the way forward for 
international criminal justice. Based on the analogy of domestic laws, it is argued that 
the recent trend to move beyond norm articulation towards enforcement in 
international criminal law should consist of substantive prohibitions as well as 
procedures and institutions for their enforcement. However, one of the most important 
lessons that one should draw from the domestic criminal law is the recognition of 
prevention of crimes. In other words, the important role of distributive justice. is 
627 May, oop" cit., p. 186. 
628 For a sample of Sa'adi' s poetries in English see, Coleman Barks and Inayat Khan, The Hand of 
Poetry: Five Mystic Poets of Persia, Translations from the Poems of Sanai, Attar Rumi, Saadi and 
Hafiz (New York: Omega Publication, 1993) 
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universally accepted. Distributive justice not only should complement retributive 
justice, but it should precede it, similar to the Islamic notion of punishment. As the 
chapter on the Islamic institution of punishment showed, the enforcement of the 
punishment for many proscribed depends on the socio-economic status of the offender 
and also of society. For example, the prescribed punishment for theft, which is cutting 
of the thief s hands, is legally prohibited amid widespread famine or poverty. 
Rama Mani proposes that in place of current approaches, a two-stage response to 
claims for distributive justice should be adopted in post-conflict societies. The initial 
response would be a backward-looking one, and the second and subsequent response 
should be forward-looking. In the initial backward-looking stage, the demand for 
distributive justice in post-conflict societies has a distinctly rectificatory flavour -a 
demand for rectification for a pattern of past injustices and inequities in distribution. 
This stage must start by first looking back: at the country's history and the particular 
structure and impact of inequalities that directly or indirectly instigated its conflict. 
Once the deepest and potentially conflict-producing inequalities underlying conflict 
have been addressed, the second and subsequent forward - looking stage would 
concern itself with the traditional priorities of distributive or social justice. 629 
The essential place of distributive justice within an integrated and multifaceted 
response to post-conflict justice can be pursued by different means and approaches, 
including the preventative measures that are paramount importance. These preventive 
measures include an adequate and sustained developmental aid and assistance to the 
global South. The common denominator for the global North is the honouring of the 
629 Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of Wars(Cambridge: Polity, 
2002), pp. 179-80. 
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pledge to contribute 0.7% of their GDP to the developing countries. This pledge was 
inspired 30 years ago, via the UN's Millennium goals. In June 2005, the European 
Union governments pledged to meet the target by 2015. However, judging from their 
past records it remains to be seen whether the EU will be able to meet its target after 
45 years after it was first set. 630 
The necessity for and the positive contribution of economic and reconstruction of 
assistance and investment, as part of an integrated and multifaceted response to post- 
conflict justice, were demonstrated in the post-war - Germany, Yugoslavia, and 
Indonesia. The Allies' successful efforts to establish the Nuremberg tribunal was 
complemented by the generous economic assistance to Germany through the Marshall 
Plan. The successful incorporation of Germany into the international community 
could not have been possible in the absence of the Marshal Plan. 
In the case of Croatia' s recent proactive cooperation with the ICTY, the promise of 
joining the EU has been a determining factor, as was confirmed by the newly - elected 
Croatian President, Mesis. When asked to name the determining factor in his victory, 
he asserted, "The opening of Croatia towards Europe was crucial". His gamble on 
international cooperation and transparent government, including support of the ICTY, 
paid off. 631 
The promise of international economic assistance was also an important factor that 
prompted the Indonesian government to put on trial some of the military officials who 
were implicated in the atrocities committed in East Timor. Accountability for 
atrocities and corruption, it was noted, "is the key to obtaining the international 
630 "Great Expectations", in The Guardian Weekly, June 3-9 (2005), p. 13. 631 Payam Akhavan, `Beyond Impunity', pp. cit., p. 20. 
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investment and aid Indonesia desperately needs. Mr. Wahid is playing his aces- 
democratic legitimacy and international support - to break with the past. "632 
The reality of widespread atrocities in Africa and elsewhere leaves little room for 
judicial romanticism and even less for moral triumphalism. Achieving effective 
prevention against and entrenched culture of impunity cannot be realised through the 
efforts of a few ad hoc tribunals, national trials and even the International Criminal 
Court. Post-mortem justice without a corresponding commitment of military, political, 
and economic resources significantly dilutes the message of accountability and 
undermines its long-term viability in preventing crimes. 633 
Chapter 6 
Even God prays. What is His Prayer? May it be My will that My love of Compassion overwhelm my 
demand for strict justice. " (part of a Jewish Supplication recited on the Yum Kippur)634 
"A lot of people used to say to me, `You are not a normal victim's family member' because I did not 
want to revenge. Now, I know I am not alone. " (Anne Coleman, a mother whose daughter was murdered, 
Joined Murder Victims Families, a group opposed to capital punishment. )635 
The Lure of Punishment: The Promise of Forgiveness 
Preface: As the introductory chapter argued, there are three categories of response 
to wrongdoing: punitive measures, impunity and forgiveness. The previous chapters 
mainly focused on the first two categories, punitive measures and impunity. We saw 
632 Ibid. , p. 29. 633 Ibid., p. 30. 
634 Quoted in Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Fýgiveness and 
University Press, 1998), p. 4. 
Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
635 Quoted in Minow, Q. cit., p. 135. 
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that Athenian elites, some sections of the Muslim clergy, and powerful nations on the 
international stage granted upon themselves some degree of impunity i. e. by enacting 
legislative measures and monopolising the interpretation and administration of justice. 
Impunity includes all three dimensions, acts of impunity, structure of impunity and 
the culture of impunity. Also discussed was the fact that in the eyes of many, the 
alternative to impunity should be punitive measures. The following chapters, five and 
the epilogue, which constitute the third and the final section of the thesis, will argue 
that punitive measures and impunity are not the only possible responses to 
wrongdoing. This section focuses on the third category, non-penal responses, in 
particular forgiveness and restorative justice. This section aims to draw attention to 
the inadequacy and in some cases the danger of mere punitive responses to 
wrongdoing. 
Questions as to how to deal with the pains and legacies of past atrocities, abuses, 
and criminal acts have become some the main questions that many post-conflict 
societies have to deal with. As with every important decision, they face conflicting 
options and demands from diverse quarters such as politicians, lawyers, human rights 
advocates, and the international community. Max Weber's essay, Politics as a 
Vocation, captures the main dilemma and conflicting demands amid dealing with past 
abuses and the desire to move towards reconciliation. He distinguishes between the 
two ideal types of ethical systems to be pursued in the world of politics: the ethic of 
ultimate ends or conviction, characterised by an uncompromising commitment to a set 
of values and ideals, and the ethic of responsibility, which acknowledges the need to 
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be guided in one's political conduct by an awareness of what is practically possible 
within the world as it is and the parameters of existing conditions. 636 
The advocates of a legalistic approach to dealing with past atrocities would 
characterise their approach as following the first ideal type of ethical system, the ethic 
of ultimate ends or conviction. Their guiding principle/motto "No Peace Without 
Justice" is an indication of their commitment to the demand for justice. On the other 
hand, those societies that opt for non-legalistic approaches such as granting amnesty 
or establishing truth commissions would favour the merits of Weber' second ideal 
type of ethical system, the ethic of responsibility. But, as Max Weber himself 
conceded, neither of these two modes could act as infallible guides to action. 
Aristotle's account of equity also sheds light on the dilemma that societies face. 
Aristotle's discussion of the equitable (epieikeia) in the Nicomachean Ethics occurred 
within his account of justice, which began with an apparent dilemma. The epieikes, he 
says, is neither strictly the same as the just nor altogether different in kind. 637 On the 
one hand, it looks as if it would be strange to separate epieikeia from justice, for we 
praise both people and their judgements for the quality of epieikeia, recognising it as a 
normatively good thing. But in that case it would be odd if epieikeia turns out to be 
altogether opposed to the just. Then we would either have to say that justice is not a 
normatively good quality, or withdraw our normative claims for epieikeia. 638 
636 Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation. ", in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. edited by H. H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
637 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II 37a33-4. 
63glbid., II 37b8ff. 
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The legalistic approach or strict legal justice suffers from significant empirical and 
normative shortcomings, in particular in the context of post-conflict justice. 
Mass atrocities are often perpetrated by a large number of individuals as the cases of 
Nazi Germany and the Rwanda Genocide demonstrated. Mass atrocities are 
multifaceted occurrences and phenomena, of which criminal wrongdoing is only one 
aspect. Karl Jaspers, reflecting on the Holocaust, distinguishes between four types of 
guilt: the criminal guilt of those who actually committed the crime; the political guilt 
of those who helped such people get to power; the moral guilt of those who stood by, 
doing nothing as the crimes were being committed; and the metaphysical guilt of 
those who survived while others were killed, thereby failing in their responsibility to 
do all that they might have done to preserve the standards of civilised humanity 639 
Trials might be valid processes for determining criminal guilt, but they are not best 
suited to bring to account other facets of culpability and wrongdoing. Moreover, trials 
have their limitations when it comes to unveiling the truth about the past. They are 
combative encounters where defendant and prosecutor compete to get their version of 
the truth accepted as authoritative. It can be argued that trials can serve as morality 
plays, where good triumphs over evil and the guilty are made to pay the price for their 
misdeeds. 640 
The alternative options to a legalistic approach, impunity, amnesty, truth 
commissions and other reconciliation processes also have also their own limitations 
and shortcomings. The failure of the Allies in holding accountable the German and 
Turkish officials for their involvement in the atrocities of the First World War, 
639 Karl Jaspers, "The Question of German Guilt", in Transitional Justice. Vol. 1. edited by Neil Kritz 
(Washington: United State Institute of Peace Press, 1995). 
q"° Andrew Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation After the Violence (Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001), p. 6. 
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contributed to the subsequent events of the Second World War, as was testified by 
Hitler. In 1939, in relation to the acts of genocide and aggression committed by 
German forces, Hitler remarked, "who after all is today speaking about the destruction 
of the Armenians? "64' 
With respect to amnesty, in particular the self-granted amnesty that dictators often 
enact prior to transferring power to democratic governments, the experiences of 
Argentina and Chile show its shortcomings. In both countries the new governments 
have begun the process of repealing such amnesties and are in the process of 
commencing judicial investigation into some of the past atrocities. 642 Even if new 
democratic governments are reluctant to follow the Chilean and Argentinean 's suit, 
the families of the victims will not stop their demand for justice until their suffering 
and pains are dealt with adequately and satisfactorily. With respect to national truth 
commissions, among the 20 such commissions that have been established in recent 
years, for different reasons, the majority of them have failed to establish the basic 
truth let alone national reconciliation. In the cases of the Latin American truth 
commissions, their remit prevented them from naming and identifying the actual 
individuals responsible for the abuses, which ensured that the perpetrators continued 
to enjoy impunity. More importantly, the heart of the criticism levelled against the 
Latin American type of truth commissions is that justice is forgotten in the proclaimed 
quest for peace, and the alleged reconciliation is false. The criminals provide a 
version of the truth in return for amnesty, and the victims are then left to do the 
reconciliation. 643 
641 Quoted in Michael P. Scharf and Nigel Rodley, op. cit., p. 91. 642 Rigby, op. cit., p. 13. 
643 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Compared with the technological advancement in the fields of weaponry in recent 
years, one can see an astronomical gap between the modern world's ability and 
capability for efficient warfare, and its approach to dealing with mass murderers, 
torturers and genocidaires, as the foregoing paragraphs sought to demonstrate. 
In this chapter, I aim to argue that the virtue and the process of forgiveness could 
have great potential to close such a gap, and compensate for some of the deficiencies 
of a mere legalistic approach or utilitarian approaches such as impunity or general 
amnesty. It will argue that forgiveness not only can complement our responses to 
wrongdoing but its presence is necessary in any attempt of reconciliation either at the 
personal level or societal level. It will contend that one of the main reasons the 
modem concept and institution of punishment face crises of legitimacy and 
effectiveness is the absence of forgiveness in the theories and modalities of 
punishment, both domestically and globally. Incorporating forgiveness in the 
vocabulary of punishment not only is desirable, but more importantly it is essential. 
This chapter will seek to demonstrate that despite the perceived tension between the 
need for truth and the quest for justice, and the desire for forgiveness, such a tension 
has been disproportionally exaggerated in many circles. There are traditions that are 
proactive and successful in reconciling these ends, such as the Islamic institution of 
punishment or the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It will also 
draw attention to what steps need to be taken in order to achieve the reconciliation of 
truth and mercy, retributive justice and forgiveness. 
To these ends, the chapter is divided into five parts. The first part will begin by 
examining concepts that are often confused with forgiveness, stich as amnesty, 
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condonation, and justification. In other words, the first part will discuss what 
forgiveness is not. The first part also briefly discusses Christianity' s account of 
forgiveness, arguing that despite the popular perception that views forgiveness and 
Christianity as synonymous, there are many questions that challenge such an 
equation. 
The second part will shed light on the concept/virtue/process of forgiveness from 
different angles. The third part will examine Rumi's perspective on the virtue of 
forgiveness. It will seek to demonstrate that Rumi's account not only is a well- 
articulated representation of the Islamic notion of forgiveness, it also has overcome 
many weakness of the secular and Christianity's account of forgiveness. The fourth 
part will provide a brief examination of the place of forgiveness in classical Athens. 
The concluding part discusses some of the reasons for the insignificant presence of 
the notion of forgiveness in the contemporary moral vocabulary and private and 
public realms, and what can be done to incorporate forgiveness in our response to 
those who wrong us. 
I. What Forgiveness Is Not 
There are concepts, practices, and notions that resemble forgiveness. However, they 
do not fully correspond to the notion of forgiveness as a virtue or share all the 
characteristics of the process of forgiveness. Prior to examining the virtue/process of 
forgiveness, it will be helpful to shed light on those concepts and practices that are 
incorrectly identified with forgiveness, such as amnesty, forgetting, condonation, 
excuse, and justifying. 
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A. Amnesty 
The word "amnesty" is derived from the Greek word amnesia, which is closely 
linked with another Greek term amnestikaikeia, which means forgetting and forgiving 
legally wrongful acts. Indeed, the Athenian Greeks are famous for having declared 
one of the world's first general amnesties, in 403 BC., when all of the rebels in a 
bloody civil uprising were pardoned after they had surrendered. 644 The first recorded 
general amnesty in Islam occurred in the year 622 CE., when the Prophet Mohammed 
declared a general amnesty for all residents of Mecca, after the Muslim army 
conquered the city. 645 In recent years some countries have also resorted to general 
amnesties following transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one or at 
the end of the civil war. 
The institution of amnesty is different from forgiveness/pardon in the following 
respects: (a) it (amnesty) is general, in that it applies to categories of offenders and not 
to named individuals; (b) it removes the effects of the conviction and not merely of 
the sentence; and (c) it applies primarily to political offenders. 646 Amnesty is often 
granted either by the executive or legislative body; as such it is an extra - judicial 
institution, whereas forgiveness is a personal act prompted by the victim. 
Amnesty presupposes wrongdoing and culpability as granting amnesty to the 
innocent is not logically possible. Thus, the beneficiaries of amnesty cannot claim to 
have been absolved of their moral or legal responsibility. Amnesty is an indication of 
644 May, op. cit., p. 243. 
645 Prophet Mohammed was born in Mecca in 570 A. D and began his call in year 610. He spent the first 
13 years of his mission in Mecca, where he was subjected to persistent harassment of the Meccans, 
who forced him to flee the city in year 622. He sought asylum in the city of Yathreb, where he 
established the first Islamic polity. The relations between Mecca and Medina (former Yathreb) 
continued to be antagonistic until 630 when the Muslim army took the city. 646 Leslie Sebba, "The Pardoning Power: A World Survey", in Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, Vol. 68. No. 1, (1977), p. 118. 
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the granting authorities' decision to pursue objectives other than justice. Amnesty is 
often pursued when there are practical difficulties in opting for the path of truth and 
justice, for example, when an emergent democracy is unable to conduct fair trials for 
a large number of the accused, or when the accused are too powerful, and their 
prosecution could bring more harm than benefits. In other words, amnesty flows from 
necessity and its beneficiaries do not earn it but are lucky to be in a situation where 
their victims are weak. 
Many recent general amnesties not only are fundamentally flawed with respect to 
establishing truth and individual responsibility, they impose extra burdens on the 
victims. Amnesty programmes require victims to forget their past, without the benefit 
of clear memories and accounts of the horrors of mass violence. Save an explicit 
authorisation by the victims or their relatives, the granting bodies can pardon only 
those harms that injure the state, the normative order or the society. But they do not 
have the right to forgive on behalf of the victims. 
For example in Islamic law, the murderer can receive a pardon only from the close 
relatives of the deceased and the state is not authorised to pardon the murderer. It is 
even assumed that the murdered person's family pardon the murderer not on behalf of 
the victim, but in their capacity as his relatives, and they exercise their right as one of 
the victims of the transgression. According to Islamic jurisprudence, God's 
forgiveness of the murderer is also conditioned by the victim's forgiveness. And if the 
latter refuses to forgive the murderer on the Day of Judgement, God will respect such 
a decision. However, if the murderer happens to be a righteous person in other 
respects, God Will lobby on his behalf on that day to seek his forgiveness from his 
victim. 
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Since amnesties are often conditioned by necessity, they can be revoked when the 
victims or the new government feel confident and capable of holding. criminal 
investigations into the acts and actors previously granted amnesty. In particular, 
repealing of amnesty often occurs when the perpetrators grant it to themselves. In 
addition to moves at the national level, challenges to amnesty laws enacted in 
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Suriname, and Uruguay have been lodged with the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organisation of American 
States. 647 
B. Condonation 
The term condonation derives from the Latin donare, which means "to present or 
give". There are important-if subtle - differences between condonation and 
forgiveness. Jean Hampton defines condonation as "the acceptance, without moral 
protest (either inward or outward), of an action which ought to warrant such protest, 
made possible, first, by ridding oneself of the judgement that the action is wrong, so 
its performer cannot be a wrongdoer, and, second, by ridding oneself of any attendant 
feelings (such as those which are involved in resentment) which signify one's protest 
of the action. "648 
But condonation is not forgiveness. The central difference between the two is that 
condonation involves accepting the moral wrong whereas forgiveness does not. 
Forgiving someone presupposes that the action to be forgiven was wrong, and nothing 
in the act of forgiveness communicates to the wrongdoer that his/her action was 
ba' Scharf and Rodley, 648 Jean Hampton, "Forgiveness 
Resentment and Hatred" in `Forgiveness and Mercy', op. cit., p. 40. 
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permissible after all, or that the forgiver has decided to reject as inappropriate any 
previous resentment of it. 649 
According to Graf Haber, the essential difference between forgiveness and 
condonation is that forgiveness presupposes personal injury, which one protests 
against in the form of resentment, while condonation does not. Furthermore, when we 
condone an action, we do so immediately unlike when we forgive someone, which 
often takes place over a period of time. 650 
C. Clemency/Pardon 
An act of clemency is an official act by an executive that removes all or some of the 
actual or possible punitive consequences of a criminal conviction. 651 An executive 
who wants to exercise clemency has several options. One option, the pardon, can take 
several forms: full or conditional pardon. 
Reprieve is another form of clemency, which postpones execution of the sentence 
for a specified period of time - until a pregnant death-row inmate's child can be born, 
for example. But a reprieve does not prevent the punishment altogether. 652A 
commutation substitutes a lesser for a more severe sentence. Thus, punishment takes 
place, but in a reduced form. Presidents occasionally commute a sentence to the time 
already served or a death penalty to a life sentence. 653 All forms of clemency 
presuppose and establish individual responsibility for the wrongdoing and the 
appropriate punishment for the offence in question. 
6491=, 
p40. 650Joram Graf Haber, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Study (Boston: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, 
bsl 
Inc., 1991), p. 60. 
Dean Moore, op. cit., p. 4. 652 
653 
bid., p"5. 
L bid., p. 5. 
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The different forms of clemency are granted by public authority, whereas the 
individual enacts forgiveness. In reality, most pardon applications are processed by 
specially designed bodies such as the Office of the Pardon Attorney in the Department 
of Justice in the United States 
In many respects parole is a utilitarian institution. Social utilities such as the prison' 
population often are the main reasons when the state uses its pardoning power to 
reduce the number of prisoners. Also parole creates an important incentive to 
encourage the prisoners to reform. 
D. The Remission of Punishment 
Rather than consisting of the reversal of moral judgement, it may be thought that 
forgiveness consists of the remission of punishment where "punishment" is used 
primarily, though not exclusively. The Oxford English Dictionary, for one, 
encourages this view. One definition of the OED give it " to remit, to let off, to 
pardon. " Although sometimes punishment is remitted because of a new, more 
favourable judgement about the moral aspects of the case in the question, there are 
cases where punishment is remitted without reversing or modifying a moral 
judgement about the relevant wrongdoing. 654 
It is common to see `forgiveness, ' `mercy, ' and `pardon' used interchangeably, as 
illustrated by the following definition of pardon by Edward Coke, in which all three 
654 Grad Haber, op. cit., pp. 14-5. 
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are invoked: "A pardon is a work of mercy, whereby the king... forgive any crime, 
offence, punishment, etc" 655 
However, and despite the presence of some overlapping factors among the three 
concepts, there are also differences between them. For example, neither does 
remitting punishment always imply forgiveness, nor does inflicting punishment 
necessarily means the absence of forgiveness. This line of enquiry will be further 
examined in the section on relation between forgiveness and punishment. 
E. Excuse and Justification 
When we excuse, we say that a wrong was done, but the offending actor was not 
fully responsible. When we justify an action, we imply that the actor did perform the 
action but no wrong was involved. 656 In contrast, when we forgive, there is an injured 
party, victim, or creditor, and a perpetrator, wrongdoer, or debtor. 
F. Forgetting or Mental Hygiene 
The desire to forget a wrongdoing or a painful experience is primarily self-centred, 
and self-absorbed. Regardless of why I change my attitude toward you, I will be 
viewed as forgiving you. This is not quite right. Suppose that I do so as an act of 
mental hygiene. I am sick and tired of being so angry that my sleep is restless and my 
stomach upset. I resolve not to endure another day of it, and I manage, with 
655 Quoted in Dean Moore, op. cit., p. 183. 
656 John L Austin, "A Plea for Excuses. ", in Philosophical aper, edited by J. L. Austin (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 124. 
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professional help, to end this disruptive state of mind. 657 The act of forgiving is 
concerned with other people. To change one's attitude entirely out of self-interest 
might be (sensibly) to forget what someone did, but it is not to forgive him for having 
done it. 
G. To Pity 
To pity someone does not always amount to genuine compassion, for by pitying one 
may deliberately diminish and belittle a person, and to do this is not to forgive that 
person. In some cases, too, the pity I feel may arise from a sense of guilt or shame - 
my guilt, say, at the pleasure I take in your discomfort. For if forgiveness is a virtue, it 
should not be motivated by a desire to free oneself from guilt or shame. Forgiveness is 
not self-interested but other-regarding. 658 
H. The Reversal of Moral Judgement 
Forgiveness is not the retraction or modification of a previous moral judgement 
made of a wrongful act that one has committed. The following example by Anne 
Minas illustrates this point: 
The eloping couple might be forgiven in this way by their parents. The parents, in 
their shock and dismay when first hearing the news, censure the action harshly. Later, 
however, they realise that their judgement about the elopement was too severe and so 
they modify or abandon it, and so forgive the couple. 659 
657 Norvin Richards, "Forgiveness" in Ethics, Vol. 99, No. 1 (Oct., 1998), p. 79. 
658 David Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect", in Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), p. 308. 659 Anna Minas, "God and Forgiveness", in The Journal of Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 99 
(April 1999), pp. 138-39. 
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Once we realise that elopement is not wrong, the expression of forgiveness 
by the 
parents of this couple is incoherent. In forgiving a person we imply that what the 
person did was wrong. The expression of forgiveness in the absence of real 
wrongdoing cannot be countenanced as forgiveness at all. 
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I. The Christians' Account of Forgiveness 
This section aims to question the popular view which equates Christianity with 
unconditional forgiveness and love. From the outset, however, it should be stressed 
that forgiveness has an important place in Christianity and one cannot deny that there 
have been countless forgiving Christians, and forgiveness has a very important place 
in Christianity, both theoretically and also in practice. 
Among many normative concepts, forgiveness is the main concept that many 
associate with Christianity to the extent that many would easily equate forgiveness 
with Christianity. Malise Ruthven's comparison of Islam and Christianity illustrates 
the prevailing view of Christianity's notion of love and forgiveness: 
660 Graf Haber, pp. Lit., p. 12. 
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Whereas Christianity is primarily the religion of love, Islam is above all the religion 
of justice.... the two watchwords, love and justice661, can usefully act as a signpost to 
a wide range of differences between the two religions in terms both of their 
acknowledged practices and dogmas and of the unconscious prejudices of their 
adherents. 62 
Hannah Arendt' s account of Christ further highlights this perceived equation 
(Christianity=Forgiveness). According to her, " the discoverer of the role of 
forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth. "663 Gregory Jones 
is more explicit and elaborates the place of forgiveness in Christianity: 
For Christians, forgiveness is not a first or even a final "step"; it is rather an embodied 
way of life. Christians cannot be content with standards of justice found in a political 
constitution, much less in popular therapeutic currency; rather Christians learn the 
fullness of what justice is, and what it entails, precisely by participating in such 
Christian practices as baptism, Eucharist, and interpreting Scripture. 664 
Such a strong and powerful emphasis on forgiveness prompts many critics to 
question such a degree of humility. Friedrich Nietzsche questions Christian teaching 
about love and forgiveness as follows: 
Weakness is being lied into something meritorious, and impotence which does not 
require into "goodness of heart"; anxious lowliness into "humility"; subjection to 
those one hates into "obedience" (that is, to one whom they say he commands this 
subjection-they call him God). The inoffensiveness of the weak man, even the 
cowardice of which he has so much, his lingering at the door, his being ineluctably 
661 From only a numerical comparison, there are significant gaps between the perception and reality. 
For example, the Koran has referred to God's forgiveness more than 250 times, whereas forgiveness 
appears some thirty-eight times in the New Testament. For reference for the latter case, see, William 
Klassen, A Forgiving Community (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), p. 112 
662 Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World(London: Penguin, 1984), pp. 227-28. 
663 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 238. 
664 L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness: A Theological Analysis (Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1995), p. 89. 
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compelled to wait, here acquire flattering names, such as "patience, " and are even 
called virtue itself; his inability for revenge is called unwillingness to revenge, 
perhaps even forgiveness ("for they know not what they do-we alone know what 
they do! "). They also speak of "loving one's enemies"- and sweat as they do so. 665 
However, the biblical verses that give an impression of the unconditionality of 
forgiveness should be read in the contexts of other verses that present a different 
picture. Despite the claims about the unconditionality of love and forgiveness, there 
are some qualifications and prerequisites necessary to receive the forgiveness of 
Christians and their God. God's forgiveness is conditioned not only upon repentance, 
but also upon belief, or faith, in "Him", and in the central tenets of the Christian 
view. 666 Mark and Matthew's description of the "unforgivable sin" is another 
qualifying factor that limits the scope of Christian forgiveness: they state that whoever 
blasphemes against the Holy Spirit not only will not be forgiven but is guilty of an 
everlasting sin. 667 
Another biblical evidence that casts doubt on Christianity's notion of forgiveness is 
the discrepancy between the God of the Old Testament and the New one. The 
following verse from Exodus is an illustrative example: 
"... Who [God] by no means acquits the guilty, but brings the iniquity of parents on 
children and grandchildren to the third and the fourth generations"668 
An agent that deliberately punishes the innocents, e. g. the children of the sinning 
father, cannot justify such injustices by being merciful to others. We may not like an 
665 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by Walter Kaufman and R. J. 
Hollingdale, edited by Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1989), essay, section, p. 14. 
666 William Neblett, "The Ethics of Guilt", in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71, No. 18, Seventy-First 
Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 24,1974), p. 658. 
66' Mark : 3: 28 and Matthew: 12: 31-32. 
668 Exodus , 34: 6-7. 
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unmerciful person, but we believe in and insist on punishing the guilty i. e., the 
murderer. Therefore our sense of justice will have difficulties to reconcile a guilty 
God (presuming punishing the innocent is a crime/wrong) with a merciful God. 
Another issue is Jesus' judgement that some people may be irredeemably rotten, 
specifically Jesus' accusation of the Pharisees in Matthew, as this verse shows: 
"You snakes! You brood of vipers! How will you escape being condemned to 
hell? "669 
The account of Jesus' s worldly life is also fundamentally different from the Jesus 
of the Day of Judgement. In other words, the Jesus of this world resembles the God of 
the New Testament, whereas the Jesus of the Day of Judgment is the God of the Old 
Testament as the following verses indicate: 
"... [Christ] will convict the world of guilt ... " 
670 
"Jesus will judge the Beast, the False Prophet, and their armies. 671 
"When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and the angels with him, he will sit on his 
throne in heavenly glory. All the nations will be gathered before him.. . they will go 
away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life. "672 
"When the Lord Jesus is revealed from heaven... he will punish those who do not 
know God". 673 
The Christian account of hell further qualifies the claim of unconditional love even 
in the case of the God of the New Testament. Although Christians have varying 
669 Matthew, 23: 33. 
670 John , 16: 7-8. 671 Revelation , 20: 1-2,4. 672 Matthew, 25: 31-32,46 
673 2 Thessalonians , 1: 7-8. 
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conceptions of hell, the following biblical verses are uncontroversial representations 
of the Christian belief in the existence of hell as a literal place of suffering: 
"Then they will go away to eternal punishment"674 
"If anyone' s name was not found written in the book of life, he was thrown into the 
lake of fire"675 
"Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather be afraid 
of the one who can destroy both soul and body in hell"676 
"I [Jesus Christ] am the Living One... I hold the keys of death and Hades"677 
"Depart from me, you [Satan and his angels] who are cursed, into the eternal life fire 
prepared for the devil and his angels"678 
In addition to the above theological questions, the politicisation and abuse of the 
virtue/process of forgiveness by different circles within Christianity, in particular the 
Catholic's deployment of the language of guilt and pastoral power have also cast 
profound doubt on the equation between Christianity and forgiveness. Merold 
Wetphal explains this phenomenon as follows: 
It is the guilt potential of the ascetic ideal that the priest is able to exploit, and one 
could say that his moral authority is simply his ability to do so. To heal he first 
wounds, since a religion of forgiveness makes sense only to sinners. The priest does 
this when he "alters the direction of ressentiment. " We all seek an explanation for our 
suffering. Resentment sees "a guilty agent, " one who is evil and deserves to be 
punished (since even if I lack the power to punish, there is satisfaction in knowing 
that my enemy- deserves it). 679 
674 Matthew, 25: 46; see also Matthew, 13: 42; Mark, 9: 47-48. 
675 Revelation , 20: 15. 676 Matthew, 10: 28. 
677 John, 11: 25. 
678 Matthew, 25: 41. 
679 Merold Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1993), p. 242. 
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By redirecting the guilt to the agent him or herself, the priest gains enormous power 
to create a passive subject whose guilt produces a passive acquiescence in 
forgiveness. Nietzsche writes: 
I suffer: someone must be to blame for it'-thus thinks every sickly sheep. But his 
shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: `Quite so, my sheep! Someone must be to 
blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it you 
alone are to blame for yourselfr'-This is brazen and false enough: but one thing at 
least is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered. 6so 
Despite the above questions over Christianity's notion of forgiveness, one cannot 
deny the advance that Christianity made over what ancient Greek culture had to 
offer-even at its best. The best of pagan culture -represented by Athena in the 
Oresteia-generally rises only to the procedural control of strict retributive justice but 
rarely even considers that such justice might be transcended by higher moral 
demands. 681 However, it would be a mistake to think that such concerns are unique to 
the Christian tradition or originated in that tradition. In addition to some examples of 
the presence of the celebrated place of forgiveness in the Jewish tradition as was 
demonstrated by the prayer quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the debts owed by 
Christianity to Roman thought should also be appreciated. As Martha Nussbaum has 
argued the notion of "cosmopolitan humanity" came to Christianity from Roman 
philosophy, rather than vice versa. 682 In particular the Roman philosopher/writer and 
680 Nietzsche, pp. cit., essay 3, section 15. 
681 Murphy and Hampton, op. cit., p. 4. 
682 Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 114. 
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the author of De Clementia, Seneca, had significant influence on Christian figures 
such as Clement of Alexandria and Augustine. 683 
"Love" and "forgiveness" have also been present in the vocabulary of non-Western 
traditions that existed before Christianity, for example, the Confucian concept of Jen, 
which is the key to identifying the moral universalism in Confucian doctrine. It is 
reported that when Confucius was pressed by a disciple to explain the meaning of Jen, 
he replied "Love men. , 
684 
II. What Is Forgiveness? 
The preceding remarks shed light on some aspects of the notion of forgiveness, in 
discussing what forgiveness was not. This part will expand the examination of the 
virtue/process of forgiveness and will conclude by a discussion of the apparent 
tension between forgiveness/mercy and justice. 
As with many other moral and social concepts, there have been divergent opinions 
on the definition of forgiveness. According to Joanna North, at best forgiveness is 
"difficult to define" and, at worst, it is "paradoxical or even impossible" to define. 685 
Martin Hughes defines forgiveness as "the cancellation of deserved hostilities and the 
"6 substitution of friendlier attitudes. 86H. J. N. Horsbrugh, while essentially agreeing 
683 Ibid., p. 115. n 68. 
684 Puchala, op. cit., p. 176. 
685 Joanna North, "Wrongdoing and Forgiveness", in Philosophy, Vol. 62, No. 242 (October 1987), p. 
499. 
686 Martin Hughes, "Forgiveness, " in Analysis. Vol. 35, No. 4 (March 1975) p113. 
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that forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment, adds a refinement based on his 
belief that forgiveness is a process. 687 
Norvin Richards describes forgiveness as a two-level process: "... you are not only 
a person who will be this angry with me for having done that, you are also a person 
who will abandon such feelings in light of certain considerations (or, a person who 
will not). This second-level, self regulatory part of one's character is what is in play in 
"688 acts of forgiveness and refusal to forgive. 
According to Jeffrie Murphy, "forgiveness is not the overcoming of resentment 
simpliciter; it is rather this: foreswearing resentment on moral grounds. "689 
For Joram Graf Haber, when an agent forgives, he unilaterally forgives a wrongdoer 
for an injury received. In other words, according to him, "forgiveness is of an offender 
for an offence against the forgiver. , 690 
Peter Digeser proposes the notion of political forgiveness as an illocutionary act of 
self-disclosure and the most appropriate and relevant discourse in the public realm: 
"unlike ordinary, resentment-or sentiment-based conceptions of forgiveness, political 
forgiveness is necessarily public: an audience must receive and understand both the 
message that the debt has been forgiven and the invitation to restore a relationship. , 691 
687 H. J. N. Horsbrugh, "Forgiveness, " in The Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 4, No. 2 (December 
1974), pp. 273-74. 
688 Norvin Richards, "Forgiveness" in Ethics. Vol. 99, Nol (October 1988), pp. 77-97. 
689 Jeffrie Murphy, "Forgiveness and Resentment" In `Forgiveness and Mercy' op. cit., p. 24. 
690 Graf Haber, op. cit., p. 11. 
691 Digeser, op. cit., p. 4. 
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Mahatma Gandhi believed that non-violence and forgiveness were the supreme 
attributes of the brave, although violence was preferably to cowardice. Hence his 
explanation:. "Non-violence is not a cover for cowardice, but it is the supreme virtue 
of the brave... Non-violence, therefore, presupposes the ability to strike. It is a 
conscious deliberate restraint put upon one's desire for vengeance. But vengeance is 
any day superior to passive, effeminate and helpless submission. Forgiveness is 
higher still. "692 
A. The Typology of Forgiveness 
The following statements represent the main stages/facets of the virtue of forgiveness: 
I. X did A; 
2. A was wrong; 
3. X was responsible for doing A; 
4. S was personally injured by X's doing A; 
5. X deserves P for doing A; 
6. S resented being injured by X's doing A; 
7. Resentment is proportionate to A; 
8. S genuinely commits himself to work on eliminating his resentment on moral 
grounds; 
9" S remits whole or parts of P. 
10. X understands and receives S's message/act; 
11. S and X's mutual relations begin to be transformed. 
692 
Quoted in Rigby, op. cit., p. 192. 
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The following section will further examine each of the above statements. 
1. "X" did "A" 
The process of forgiveness entails the establishment of "who did what to whom". 
This point is succinctly illustrates by a bereaved Uruguayan woman who announced 
that, "I am ready to forgive, but I need to know whom to forgive and for what. "693 
2. "A" was wrong 
"A" needs to be a wrong in order to prompt the process of forgiveness. For 
example, a prisoner who believes that his imprisonment was just cannot claim that he 
forgives the society/state for his just imprisonment. Or someone who volunteers 
himself for mercy killing, cannot claim that he forgives the person who is due to 
administer the euthanasia. 
3. "X" was responsible for doing "A" 
The agency of "X" needs to be established. We may be injured by a falling rock but 
we do not commence the process of forgiving the rock. Also, if we come to view the 
693 Quoted in ibid., p. 8. 
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"X"'s doing of "A" as excusable or justifiable, we also cannot claim that we begin the 
process of forgiveness of "X" for doing an excusable or justifiable act. 
4. "S" was personally injured by "X"' s doing "A" 
For persons to be fit for the commencement and completion of the process of 
forgiveness, they must have standing both to forgive and be forgiven. As with 
punishment where there needs to be a victim and a perpetrator and, or the legitimate 
representative of the former (i. e. society), the forgiver "S" needs to be personally 
injured in order to claim the legitimate right to forgive "X". "S" can also delegate his 
right to his representatives i. e., family, society, state, or God to forgive "X". Save 
clear authorisation by "S", no other agency can forgive "X" for injuring "S". 
Simon Wiesenthal' s autobiographical tale The Sunflower examines some questions 
concerning third-party forgiveness. Wiesenthal, an educated Jew, was caught in the 
web of Nazi terror; as his tale begins, he is an inmate in a concentration camp in 
Poland, working in a makeshift hospital for wounded German soldiers in a building 
that was once the school that Wiesenthal attended. On arriving at the hospital, 
Wiesenthal is brought by a nurse into a room where he encounters a dying Nazi, a 
twenty one-year-old SS man named Karl. Karl tells him of his participation in an 
event that led to the murder of some 300 Jews: 
"I know that what I have told you is terrible, " says the soldier. "In the long nights that 
I have been waiting for my death, time and time again I have longed to talk about it to 
a Jew and beg forgiveness from him. Only I didn't know whether there were any Jews 
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left. "694 Wiesenthal goes on to relate how he did not forgive the SS soldier and this 
incident later challenged his heart and soul. Wiesenthal rightly did not forgive Karl 
for the murder of 300 Jews, as he did not have any right to forgive Karl on behalf of 
any of his victims. But Karl's crimes were also directed against the Jewish community 
and against the rest of humanity that sees itself as one of the victims of genocide. In 
other words, Wiesenthal as a member of the Jewish people and the community of 
mankind could forgive Karl's attack on Jewish people and universal morality. 
Peter Digeser proposes four kinds of relationships that could be reconciled through 
an act of political forgiveness: 
1. An individual forgives another individual, or one to one. 
2. An individual forgives a group, or one to many. 
3. A group forgives an individual, or many to one. 
4. A group forgives another group, or many to many. 695 
Some of the previous examples have dealt with the first relationship and the pre- 
conditions for such an occurrence. 
For the second relationship to be established, the individual needs to accept that the 
group in question is capable of doing wrong. Otherwise one cannot possibly forgive 
an entity where its agency cannot be established. For example, someone who has been 
mistreated by the immigration officer of a given country may see the officer as an 
individual agency or as the official representative of that country. Mistreatment at the 
airport may be interpreted as an act on behalf of the host country or as the 
694 Quoted in Graf Haber, op. cit., p. 45. 
695 Digeser, op. cit., p. 110. 
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discourteous attitude of the individual officer. However, the individual's 
interpretation of the mistreatment is informed by different factors, which it makes 
difficult, if not impossible, to provide a consistent statement with respect to the 
second relationship, or one to many. 
For the third relationship, many to one, the same problem remains, that is the 
necessity to establish that the group in question is capable of being wronged. The 
institution of pardon can be seen as a manifestation of this relationship. There are 
some wrongdoings that have different clusters of victims, each entitled to different 
processes of forgiveness. The institution of pardon/parole, which is granted by a 
public authority, can be justified on the basis of some of the above criteria. The 
criminal violates the normative/moral order of the society. He is subsequently held to 
account by the society's representative i. e., the state. It can be said that society has 
also given the authorisation to its representatives to pardon the deserving 
wrongdoer(s). 
The fourth relationship is more problematic and less plausible. It requires not only 
to establish agency of the both agents-this is to accept that both groups must be 
capable of doing wrong and being wronged- but also to establish the nature/amount 
of wrong, and a legitimate representative of each group, in order to communicate the 
message and commence the process of forgiveness. Group to group forgiveness is a 
component of the notion of collective responsibility/accountability, which was 
discussed in the introductory chapter. 
5. "X" deserves "P" for doing "A" 
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"P" can be a form of moral condemnation or a penal punishment proportionate to 
the degree of A. Since remittance of "P" (9) is essential to the successful completion 
of the process of forgiveness, Scott Hestevold' s notion of "disjunctive desert" can be 
insightful. He notes, " For some, if not all improper actions, there exist disjunctions of 
penalties, each disjunct of which could alone serve as the sufficient deserts may be of 
varying severity. To show mercy is to levy one of the less severe penalties of the 
appropriate disjunctive desert. , 696 This line of enquiry will be further examined in the 
sections concerning remission of punishment, and the relation between justice and 
forgiveness/mercy will be further examined shortly. 
6. "S" resented being injured by "X"'s doing "A" 
The focus of this statement is resentment. Resentment is a form of personal protest 
that expresses our regard for self, for others, and for the normative order. Closely 
associated with resentment, is the notion of indignation, which is a form of personal 
protest that expresses our respect not for the self, but rather for others and the 
normative order only. 697 Jeffrie Murphy takes the view that " resentment does indeed 
perform a useful social job - the job of reinforcing the rules of morality and provoking 
defences of those rules. "698 
696 H. Scott Hestevold, "Justice to Mercy", in Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, 
No. 2 (Dec., 1985), p. 28 1. 
697 Graf Haber, op. cit., p. 48. 
698 Jeffrie Murphy, on. cit., p. 15. 
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A person who is self-respecting and who cares about him/herself, others and the 
moral law not only is entitled to feel resentment against wrongdoing, but he/she must 
feel resentful in light of such wrongdoing. Aristotle had this to say of the failure to 
feel anger when anger is warranted: 
The deficiency -a sort of inirascibility or whatever it is - is blamed, since people who 
are not angered by the right things, or in the right way, or at the right times, or 
towards the right people, all seem to be foolish. For such a person seems to be 
insensible and to feel no pain. Since he is not angered, he does not seem to be the sort 
to defend himself; and such willingness to accept insults to oneself or to overlook 
699 indults to one's family and friends is slavish. 
Not to feel indignant towards injustice is an indication of one's lack of commitment 
to morality. The expansion of our moral scope, as was discussed in the ICC chapter, 
entails indignation towards all injustices, no matter where they are enacted and who 
are their authors. Those who subscribe to a universal and deontological conception of 
justice and humanity are more able and willing to be consistent in their condemnation 
of all kinds of injustices. Those who owe their allegiance to any manifestations of 
particularism, nation, race, religion, community, class, gender, cast, etc., would have 
difficulties in being consistent in their indignation towards injustice. More 
worryingly, a blind submission to any form of particularism may prompt the 
condoning of injustices. 
7. Resentment should be proportionate to "A" 
699 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, v. 1126a, p. 1056. 
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As with just punishment where justice requires a degree of proportionality between 
the wrong/harm and the resultant punishment, the amount of resentment should also 
be proportionate to the act (A). Once again Aristotle provides an insightful 
observation: 
I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in 
these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and 
confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure. and pain may be 
felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the 
right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right 
motive, an in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, this is characteristic 
of virtue. 700 
One's level and degree of resentment is determined and dependent upon the value 
which one's "theory of human worth" accords one. According to Jean Hampton: 
A theory of human worth involves, first, a conception of what it is for a human being 
to be valuable or of worth (e. g., is he of instrumental or of intrinsic value? ); second, a 
conception of how, by virtue of their value, human beings should be ranked relative to 
one another (e. g., must be ranked as equals, or should some be ranked higher than 
others? ) in which an individual's rank determines her "standing" relative to other 
people; third, a conception of how evidence for that value is to be ascertained so that 
rank can be determined (e. g., competitively? Non-competitively? With reference to 
what other measuring scales job performance, athletic prowess, degree of virtue? ); 
and fourth, a theory of how (if at all) human beings can gain or lose value (and 
thereby rank). 701 
A person's view of his/her value and relative rank among her fellows determines 
whether she will interpret an action as demeaning or degrading. For example, she can 
feel. demeaned by another's action if she believes she was superior to this person but 
has received treatment that accorded her mere equality. A white person who is forced 
700 Ibid., v. 1106b25, 
701 Jean Hampton, in `Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred' op. cit., pp. 48-9. 
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to sit next to a black person on a bus might believe this demeans her by making it 
appear that they are of equal rank and value, and, that they should thus be accorded 
equal treatment. Jean Hampton gives an alternative example. She quotes a rape 
counsellor as saying to her "a woman who failed to tell anyone that she had been 
raped by a man she knew because she thought this was the sort of thing women had to 
"take" from men. , 702 
Thus, excessive humility is the manifestation of too little self-respect and 
inadequate resentment, whereas unjustified anger is a consequence of having an 
inflated or distorted view of what is our real value. On the basis of this analysis, one 
can argue that the US response to the bombing of the twin towers on September 11th, 
2001, in the form of the global campaign against terrorism, and the democratisation of 
the Islamic world, is disproportionate, this disproportionality being derived from an 
inflated sense of self-worth and self-respect. 
An inflated sense of self-worth and self-respect is often coupled with the imposition 
and expectation of a deflated sense of self-worth and self-respect from others. The 
Western solidarity with the US in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th 
attacks was genuine and justified. The French Newspaper headline "We All Are 
American" was a fair representation of the views and the feelings of millions across 
the Western world. However, we have not seen similar headlines for Rwanda, Sudan, 
Bosnia or Iraq. The different valuation of one's worth and that of others recalls this 
verse of the Koran: 
702 Ibid., p. 49. 
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"Woe betide the unjust who, when others measure for them, exact in full, but when 
they measure or weigh for others, defraud them. "M3 
Equally, those Arab and Muslim media, governments and individuals that treat 
differently violence against civilians in Occupied Palestine and Iraq would have great 
difficulties in conforming with the above verse of the Koran, which requires of us a 
consistency in our moral judgment. 
8. "S" genuinely commits himself to work on eliminating his 
resentment 
The requirement of genuineness is to ensure the process's sustainability. A change 
of behaviour is insufficient for forgiveness since it will frequently do no more than 
hide bitter feelings and the desire for revenge. The absence of genuine commitment 
means commencing a process that might prove to difficult to fulfil. Or in the words of 
Novitiz, "is compatible with deceit and hypocrisy. "704 
9. "S" Remits Whole or parts of P 
The wrongness of "X" demands the enactment of "P". However, the remitting of 
"P" is not always an indication of the virtue/process of forgiveness. For example 
refusal to punish or retaliate in politics could be due to all sorts of reasons - 
703 Koran, 83: 1. 
704 Novitz, op. cit., p. 301 n. 5. 
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prosecutorial discretion, cost, unwillingness of witnesses to testify, the realisation of 
the transgressor's innocence. 705 
Nonetheless, to forgive someone requires modification of the amount of "P" or 
reinterpretation of its underlying reason(s). The definition of mercy further illustrates 
the necessity for such a change. For Jean Hampton, mercy "is the suspension or 
mitigation of a punishment that would otherwise be deserved as retribution, and 
which is granted out of pity and compassion for the wrongdoer. "706 
Cases exist where forgiveness can be pursued without a complete change of "P": for 
example, when the law prescribes punishment, despite the victim's genuine decision 
to forgive the offender. John Paul II' s assassin, who was publicly forgiven, had to 
complete his imprisonment term in Italy, because the Italian justice system did not 
provide provision for the release of offenders who are forgiven by their victims. 
Sometimes, the well-being of the offender/transgressor requires the commission of 
punishment, when the underlying philosophy of the punishment is to reform the 
offender. In other words, in such a situation the underlying reason for punishment is 
changed from one having a retributive basis to one based on rehabilitation/reform. 
However, if punishment is entirely the consequence of resentment (retributive 
justice), and there is no need for inflicting punishment on the rehabilitation/reform 
basis, completion of the process of forgiveness entails the remission of punishment. 
10. "X" understands and receives "S"'s message/act 
705 Digeser, `Political Forgiveness, op. cit., p. 124. 
706 Hampton, "Retributive Idea", in `Forgiveness and Mercy', op. cit., p. 158. 
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This entails the process of forgiveness as a unilateral act, which is initiated by the 
injured "S". It is not dependent on an active contribution from "X" in any form of 
repentance. This is the simple reason that repentance cannot be plausibly confessed by 
outsiders. Archbishop Tutu of South Africa explains why the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission did not require remorse as a condition for political 
forgiveness: 
If the applicant was effusive in his protestations about being, sorry and repentant to 
satisfy such a requirement for remorse, then he would have been condemned for being 
totally insincere and laying it on thick to impress the Amnesty Committee panel. If, 
on the other hand, he was somewhat abrupt and merely formal, he would have been 
accused of being callous and uncaring and not really repentant. It would have been a 
"no-win" situation. As it happens, most applicants have in fact expressed at least 
remorse and asked for forgiveness from their victims. Whether their requests have 
stemmed from genuine contrition is obviously a moot point. 07 
Undoubtedly if "X" tries genuinely to establish his remorse, "S" will be encouraged 
to commence, pursue and complete the process of forgiveness. In divine forgiveness 
the requirement of repentance is understandable, since the divine as an omnipresent 
and perfect being can establish the authenticity of the act of repentance. 
However, in order to achieve the aims of the process of forgiveness, which is 
reconciliation and a fruitful transformation of the dynamic of the relations between 
"S" and "X", the former must convey the message of forgiveness with the appropriate 
standing and through the appropriate signs or utterances. As Hannah Arendt observes, 
707 Mplio Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), p. 50. 
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"forgiving and promising enacted in solitude or isolation remain without reality and 
can signify no more than a role played before one's self. "708 
John Austin lists six conditions that must be satisfied for locutions in general to 
count as performative utterances: 
1. There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by 
certain persons in certain circumstances; 
2. The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate 
for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked; 
3. The procedure must be executed by all participants correctly and; 
4. Completely; 
5. Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain 
thoughts or feelings or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct 
on the part of the participant, then a person participating in and so invoking 
the procedure must in fact have these thoughts or feelings, and the participants 
must intend so to conduct themselves; and further 
6. Must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. 709 
708 Arendt, op. cit., p. 237. 
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However, there are cases where there is not any possible means of communication 
between "S" and "X", such as when either is dead. In such cases, the process of 
forgiveness cannot be pursued. 
11. Mutual relations of "S" and "X" begin to be transformed 
Forgiveness is a means of breaking apart cycles of violence, vengeance, and 
bitterness for individuals as well as for larger social groups. Forgiveness allows "S" to 
view "X" in a new light. It is acquired through habituation, example, and practice. 
As Paul Tillich has observed, the process of forgiveness cannot change the facts: what 
has happened has happened and remains so in all eternity! But the meaning of the 
facts can be changed by the eternal. 710 
The next section briefly discusses why forgiveness is seen as a virtue. 
B. Forgiveness As A Virtue 
The requirement for proportionality between wrongdoing and resentment (factor 
No. 7) raises the question as to whether forgiveness is a virtue or not. For Philippa 
Foot, virtues are characterised by the following properties: 
1) They are beneficial traits, benefiting the owner as well as others are 
concerned; 
2) They "belong to the will"; and 
709 John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things With Words(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1962), p. 121. 
710 Quoted in William Klassen, op. cit., p. 210. 
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3) They are corrective, in the sense that they stand at a point where there 
is some temptation to be resisted or some deficiency of motivation to 
be made good. 711 
With respect to the first property, the preceding remarks showed some of the 
beneficial traits of resentment, which is an important component of the process of 
forgiveness. Throughout this chapter, in particular in the concluding part, further 
beneficial traits of forgiveness will be shown. And like all Aristotelian virtues, the 
virtue of forgiveness is "concerned with feelings and action, which excess and 
deficiency are in error and incur blame, while the intermediate condition is correct 
and wins praise". 712 Therefore, subject to the requirements of Aristotle's account, the 
virtue of forgiveness does have many beneficial traits. 
With respect to the second property, Foot uses the term "will" to include not only 
what is subject to volitional control but also what is wished for, as well as what is 
sought. 713 Since a completed process of forgiveness reaffirms one's commitment to 
morality, self and others, it satisfies the second property. The following section, with 
regard to statement 8, will discuss the corrective traits of forgiveness, and will then 
establish that forgiveness will satisfy the third property of Foot's characterisation of 
virtue. R. S. Downie takes the view that readiness to forgive is a virtue, and inability to 
forgive, or at least unwillingness to try, a vice. 714 
"' See Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices", in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1-18. 
712 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics. 1106b25. 
713 Philippa Foot, op. cit., p. 5. 
74 R. S. Downie, " Forgiveness", in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, No, 59, (April., 1965), p. 
128. 
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C. The Perceived Tension Between Forgiveness and Justice 
One of the most prominent questions concerning forgiveness/mercy has been its 
apparent conflict with justice. In the case of punishment, justice involves the 
obligatory administering of deserved suffering for an agent's having performed a 
wrongful action. Mercy/forgiveness, however, involves the supererogatory tempering 
of deserved suffering. In other words, failing to give someone all that is deserved is 
both immoral and supererogatory, which is indeed puzzling. 
There have been some attempts to resolve the apparent tension between justice and 
mercy/forgiveness. Aristotle's view of the relation between two kinds of justice - 
equity and legal justice - was the first successful attempt to challenge the apparent 
tension between mercy/forgiveness and justice. Aristotle explained that: 
The equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice. The 
reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a 
universal statement which shall be correct... When a law speaks universally, then, and 
a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, 
where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the 
omission. 715 
Aristotle's distinction between general (or universal) and particular justice, and 
within the latter, his distinction between distributive and rectificatory (or corrective) 
justice reveals the way in which forgiveness/mercy conflicts with and yet may 
conform to the demands of justice. General justice includes whatever "produces and 
715 Aristotle, Nichomachea_. n Ethics v, 1,137. V, 1,137. 
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maintains happiness and its parts for a political community. , 716 If an act of political 
forgiveness also serves the greater good, then it is not obvious that (general) justice 
and forgiveness necessarily conflict. In addition, forgiveness would seem to be only 
obliquely connected to distributive justice, which establishes the authoritative 
distribution of burdens and benefits. Forgiveness seems unconnected to deciding what 
constitutes a relevant reason for distributing a good, unless a regime sought to reward 
or punish those who were forgiving or unforgiving. 
In contrast, forgiveness appears to conflict more directly with corrective or 
rectificatory forms of particular justice, which seeks to bring the parties back to the 
original conditions of a voluntary transaction. Corrections may entail punishment - or 
reform, in the case of institutions that have done wrong - as well as restitution. 
Rectificatory justice is consummated when the parties receive what is owed them. 717 
As will be shown, the conflict seems overstated in the sense that while it is true that 
forgiveness annuls what is due, such an annulment is always within the power of the 
creditor or the victim. There is no real conflict here because creditors and victims 
have a right to enjoy, and not a duty to claim, what is owed. Forgiveness, then, is 
consistent with a central feature of what it means to hold a right to a debt, namely that 
the right need not be exercised. 718 
Scott Hestevold articulated the doctrine of disjunctive desert in order to resolve the 
apparent tension between justice and mercy/forgiveness. He explains: 
716 Ibid., 1129b, 15-20. 
717 P. Digeser, op. cit., p. 37. 
718 Ibid., p. 39. 
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For some, if not all improper actions, there exist disjunctions of penalties, each 
disjunct of which alone serve as the sufficient desert for the improper act in question; 
and, the sufficient desert may be of varying severity. To show mercy is to levy one of 
the less severe penalties of the appropriate disjunctive desert. Such a solution to the 
problem implies that the merciful person is one who acts justly, since he levies a 
penalty deserved; yet, he is also praiseworthy for his supererogatory choosing of one 
of the less severe penalties. 719 
Peter Digeser proposes four assumptions that must be made to support a permission 
for overriding rectificatory justice. The first is that not all goods can be placed under 
and reconciled with the category of rectificatory justice. Receiving one's due is not 
necessarily the same as establishing peace, stability, or prosperity. Second, these other 
goods are (on occasion) more important than receiving what is due. Third, those who 
are creditors or find themselves as victims of wrongdoing have some discretion over 
how to press their claims. That is, they may choose not to pursue justice fully. Finally 
the act of forgiveness in particular at the societal level must somewhat advance these 
other values. 720 The relationship between justice and forgiveness will be further 
examined in the concluding section of this chapter. 
The following part Will examine Rumi's account of forgiveness, which is one of the 
best-articulated representations of the Islamic notion of forgiveness. 
III. Rumps Perspective On Forgiveness. 
719 H. Sott Hestevold, 
720 Di eser o cit., 
o'p, Zgl g, p. S4. 
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This part will begin by offering an insight into Islamic Sufism, of which Rumi is 
one pillar. It then proceeds to examine the Rumi's account of forgiveness. Towards 
the latter end, Rumi's notion of forgiveness will be discussed in the contexts of his 
accounts of the spiritual revolution and journey of man; his characteristics of a perfect 
man; and his reflection on "love". 
A. Islamic Sufism 
Mysticism is one of the common aspects of many religions including Islam. 
However, in many religions mystics has remained a minority sect in their 
respective religions and have not developed a distinctive identity or established 
constituents. On the other hand, Islamic mysticism or Sufism has been a leading 
feature of the Islamic world for many centuries and has cultivated different traditions 
across the Islamic world, from Africa, Turkey, and Central Asia to the sub- 
continent. 721 
Islamic Sufism has two distinctive schools: the School of Baghdad, and the School 
of Khurasan. Geographically, the latter encapsulated primarily the north-east of 
Modern Iran, Afghanistan, but as far as Sufism was concerned it included the eastern 
part of the Islamic world, including the sub-continent and Central Asia. Rumi 
belonged to the School of Khurasan. The School of Baghdad spread in the western 
part of the Islamic world. Ghazali and Ibn-Al Arabi are the leading pillars of the 
school of Baghdad. The distinctive characteristic of the School of Khurasan is its 
721 For an informative book on Islamic mysticism see: Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of 
Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975) 
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emphasis on intoxication in the context of Sufism. The Baghdad School has stressed 
sobriety. However such characterisations have been subject to dispute and 
controversy. 722 
Sufism speaks essentially of three elements: the nature of God, the nature of man, 
and the spiritual virtues. 723 Sufism's account of these three elements often clashed 
with those of orthodox schools of law. But Sufism was strong enough to challenge the 
ascendancy of the law over the minds of Muslims and often proved victorious. 724 
To understand the nature of this struggle one has to take note of the trilogy of 
science in Islam, which are: transmitted science; reason or intellectual discussion; and 
heart savour. Islamic Sufism advocates the primacy of the latter over intellectual 
discussion. 725 The struggle between the partisans of the jurisprudence of the heart 
(Sufis) and the dogmatic jurists of the letter of the law (the clergy) had become the 
vendetta of medieval Islamic history. 726 This struggle had all characteristics of the 
eternal conflict between Eros and Nomos. Sufis had to overcome preconceptions, on 
the one hand the anti-mystic al rationalist bias of a secular academic milieu and on 
the other, the fundamentalist prejudices inherited from an exoteric Islamic 
conservatism that repudiates mysticism. 727 The universal appreciation and embracing 
of Sufism has been largely prompted by the aesthetic nature and style of Sufism's 
literature. Four of the greatest literary figures of the West; Dante, St John of the 
722 For an extensive introduction to Sufism See, Leonard Lewisohn The Heritage Of Sufism , three 
volumes (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1999) 
723 Seyyed Hussein Nasr, Sufi Essays (London: George Allen & Unwind Ltd., 1972), p. 34 
724 Joseph Schacht, "Theology and Law in Islam", in Theology and Law in Islam, edited by G. E. 
Grunebaum(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), p. 4. 
725 Lewisohn, op. cit., vol. II, p. 386. 
726 Ibid., p. 21. 
727 Ibid., p. 16. 
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Cross, Goethe and indirectly, William Blake, in one way or another have been 
influenced by Persian Sufi literature, 729 in particular that of Rumi's. 729 
728 Lewisohn, op. cit., vol. II, p. 7. 
729Jalal-ud-Din Mohammad was born in Balkh, Afghanistan, on the 6th day of the Islamic lunar month 
`Rabi al Awwal' in the lunar year of 604AH, which corresponds to September 30,1207, to a family of 
well known mystics and scholars. The invading Mongol army destroyed Balkh in 1221. 
Since Mawlana was born in Balkh and lived in Balkh for a period of time before his father set out 
westward with his whole family, it gives a clear justification to view him as a `Balkhi', as did Professor 
R. A. Nicholson on the title pages of the first volume of his work in 1925 (of the Persian text) that was 
followed by his complete English translation of The Mathnawi: "Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad bin 
Muhammad bin al-Husayn al-Balkhi, thumma (then called) al- Rumi. The word of Balkhi is recorded 
on the tombstone of Mawlana's father in Konia. 
When the Mongols invaded Central Asia, his father, Baha-ud-Din Walad, a famous preacher and jurist, 
known as Sultan-al-Ulama "the Sultan of Islamic scholars", left Balkh, with the whole family for 
Baghdad and Mecca that eventually took him to Anatolia. On the way to Anatolia, Mawlana met one of 
the most famous mystic Persian poets, Attar, in the city of Nishapur. Attar immediately recognized 
Balkhi-Rumi's spiritual eminence. He saw the father walking ahead of the son and said "Hear comes a 
sea followed by an ocean. " He gave the boy his Asrarnama, a book about the entanglement of the soul 
in the material world. This meeting had a deep impact on Mawlana's thoughts, which later inspired him 
in his work. 
From Nishapur, Walad and his entourage set out for Baghdad, meeting many scholars and Sufis there. 
From Baghdad, they went to Hejaz and performed the pilgrimage at Mecca. It was after this journey 
that most likely, as a result of an invitation of Allah-ud-Din Kai Qubad, ruler of Anatolia, that Baha- 
ud-Din Walad settled in Konya, Anatolia, the westernmost territories of Seljuk Empire. 
When Bhaha-ud-Din Walad died Mawlana succeeded the father at the age of twenty-five. One of his 
father's students, Syed Burhan-ud-Din Mahaqqiq, continued to train Mawlana in the religious and 
mystical teachings of Balkhi-Rumi's father. For a number of years, Mawlana practiced Sufism as a 
disciple of Burhan-ud-Din until the latter died in 1240. It was during this period that Mawlana traveled 
to Damascus and said to have spent four years there. 
Mawlana's first teacher was his father, but he was greatly impressed by dervish Shams Tabrizi. It was 
his meeting with Shams Tabrizi in the late fall of 1244 that changed his life completely. On the night of 
December 5th, 1248, when Mawlana and Shams were talking, Shams was called to the back door. He 
went out, never to be seen again. 
Mawlana's love and his bereavement for the death of Shams found their expression in an outpouring of 
music, dance and lyric poems, Divani Shamsi Tabrizi. He himself went out searching for Shams and 
journeyed again to Damascus. There, he realized: 
Why should I seek? I am the same as 
He. His essence speaks through me 
I have been looking for myself! 
After meeting Shams, Mawlana had been spontaneously composing Ghazals that had been collected in 
the Divani-i-Kbir. Mawlana found another companion in Saladin Zarkub, the goldsmith. After Saladin 
death, Mawlana's scribe and favorite student, Husam Chelebi assumed the role. One day, when Husain 
and Mawlana were wandering through the vineyards outside Konya, Hasum described his idea to 
Mawlana and said "If you were to write a book like the Ilahinama of Snnai or Mantik'ut-Tayr'i of 
Attar, it would become the companion of many poets. They would fill their hearts from your work and 
compose music to accompany it. "Mawlana Balkhi-Rumi smiled and took out a peace of paper on 
which were already written the opening eighteen lines of his Mathnwi, beginning with: 
Listen to the reed and the tale it tells, 
How it sings, complains of separation? 
Mawlana spent twelve years of his life in Anatolia dictating the six volumes of this masterwork, the 
Mathnawi to Husam. In December 1273, Mawlana fell ill and died on December 17,1273 in Konia. 
Mawlana Balkhi-Rumi was laid to rest beside his father in a splendid shrine, the Yesil Turbe "green 
Tomb", located in the garden offered to his father by the Seljuk King Kai-Qubad I. Over his tomb, his 
epitaph reads: 
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B. Rumi's Account of Forgiveness 
To infer Rumi's perspective on forgiveness three themes, will be explored: Rumi's 
account of evolution, his characterisation of a perfect man, and Rumi's deliberation 
"When we are dead, seek not our tomb in the earth, but find it in the hearts of men" 
Mawlana left behind as the record of his extraordinarily intense and rich intellectual, moral and 
spiritual life, lived on the grandest height spirit, love and humanism, the Mathnawi, a mystical epic; 
3,500odes; 2000 quatrains; a book of table talk; and a large volume of letters. The Mevlevi order that 
he founded and that his son, Sultan Walad continued spread his vision and mystical and moral 
teachings all over Asia and Africa and now has centers all over the world. 
The Mathnawi is Mawlana's greatest poetic work, composed during the last years of his life. It is a 
compendium of ethical and social precepts as well as mystical teachings. It is deeply permeated with 
Qur'anic meanings and references. Mawlana himself called it" the roots of the roots of the roots of the 
(Islamic) Religion.... and the explainer of the Qur'an. " It is divided into six books, and Mawlana wrote 
in prose prefaces for each book. Scribes completed the earliest complete manuscript the "Konia 
manuscript" in December 1278, five years after Mawlana's death. 
There are also several prose works by Mawlana: 145 of his letters, "Maktubat", the Seven Sermons, 
"Majalis-e-Sa'ah", and 71 of his spiritual lectures or "Discourses" (Fihi Ma Fihi). 
The world of Mawlana is not exclusive; it is the highest state of a human being a fully evolved human. 
He does not offend anyone, and he includes everyone. A perfect human being who touches every one 
of us. For the Islamic readers, Mawlana remains an important commentator on the Qur'an and a 
brilliant exponent of Sufi philosophy, the strain of Islam that stresses direct and ecstatic communion 
with Allah. Mawlana, who was strictly educated in religious law and philosophy, is viewed in the 
Islamic world as a spiritual descendant of two other great Sufi writers, Sanai of Ghazna and Attar. 
This unique fusion of the highest philosophical lucidity with the greatest possible spiritual awareness 
and the most complete artistic gifts, give Mawlana unique power as what might be called a Sacred 
Initiator or Initiator into the Sacred. Born out of the fire of a vast Awakening, Mawlana's work has an 
uncanny direct force of illumination; anyone approaching it with an open heart and mind, at whatever 
stage of his or her evolution, will drive from it inspiration, excitement, and help of the highest kind. 
Everything Mawlana wrote or transmitted has the unmistakable authority of total inner experience, the 
authority of human being who has risked and given everything to the search for divine truth. " 
Mawlana's very broad appeal and highly advanced thinking, humanism, open heart and mind, may 
derive from his genuinely cosmopolitan character, because in his lifetime he enjoyed unusually good 
relations with diverse groups of social, cultural and religious background. Born in Balkh, Afghanistan 
where, in the course of history, several civilizations were born and met, where people were accustomed 
to these rich cultural diversities, traditions and religions, Mawlana apparently was familiar with all of 
them and therefore he was friendly with believers of many religions. Most of those scholars who 
studied Mawlana admit that there was no more beautiful tribute to Mawlana's universality than his 
funeral, a forty-day marathon of grieving attended by distraught, weeping Muslims, Christians, Jews, 
Hindus and Buddhists who cried and mourned in a manner that one would have thought that Mawlana 
belonged to each one of them. 
Rumi was not a poet per se. He was a thinker who chose poetry as a medium to convey his thoughts. 
With the possible exception of Lucretius, throughout history, Rumi is the only major thinker to express 
an entire system of thought in verses, which have an aesthetic merit of their own. ((Afzal Iqbal, The 
Life and Work of Jala-ud-din Rumi (London: The Octagon Press, 1983), p. xvii. )) 
As of other Muslim thinkers, Rumi's principal source of inspiration and guidance was the Koran. 
Nearly one quarter of Mathnawi, or about 6000 lines are direct translations or paragraphs of the Koran. 
Such inspiration and influence prompted Jami, a thirteenth-century Muslim scholar, to describe 




1. Rumi's Account of Evolution 
One's view of his/her place in the cosmos significantly determines his/her relations 
with the rest of the world. Rumi's account of evolution and spiritual perfection aim to 
inject confidence and hope into the men's account of the nature and themselves. As 
such, those who are subscribed to Rumi's account of evolution are more willing to 
incorporate forgiveness as part of their response to wrongdoing. 
Darwin's On the Origin of Species was the first systematic study in the West that 
addressed the biological evolution of the human species. His controversial finding 
continues to be a polarising subject in some quarters in the West, in particular in the 
religious-oriented educational sector. The biological evolution of human species has 
been less controversial in the Islamic world and was discussed well before Darwin. 
The first Muslim scholar who discussed evolution and the biological origin of the 
human species was An Maskoyah, a well-known physician and philosopher (d. circa 
1030 AD). There is no extant evidence to suggest that his finding was based on some 
scientific experimentation. But his speculative discussion to a large extent conforms 
with the Darwinian account of evolution. The majority of the ensuing Muslim 
thinkers, including Rumi, were receptive of Abn Maskoya's finding. 
However, there are distinctive differences between Darwin's theory of evolution 
and the Islamic notion of evolution. The former focuses primarily on the physical 
aspects of man and rejects any supernatural or metaphysical significance associated 
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with the human species. The Darwinian account of evolution is primarily concerned 
with the mechanical and passive natural forces that privilege the strongest and the 
fittest. The cycle of life of a typical Darwinian man begins as an ape and ends up 
with his biological death, which would then convert him to ashes or a fertiliser of the 
soil where his body is laid to rest. However, Rumi's notion of evolution is about 
how man could strive to achieve immortality through assimilation and submission to a 
higher quality. The Koran's account of the creation of man, in which God breathes 
from his spirit into man's body, constitutes the cornerstone of Islamic Sufism in 
general and Rumi's notion of evolution in particular. Rumi sets forth clearly the 
doctrine of the Divine origin of the soul, its descent to the material world, its life on 
earth, and its ultimate return to its true home. 
As the Koran has promised the reunion of man with God, Rumi argues that 
reunification with God is the driving force of human existence. He writes: 
"The desire of the body for green herbs and running water is because its origin is from 
those; 
he desire of the soul is for life and for the Living One, because its origin is the Infinite 
SOUL. "730 
Rumi's notion of evolution is about the journey of man's soul from his separation 
from the Divine to its final reunion with him. The key to complete this journey is the 
manipulation of the self. The self that manifests itself in carnal desires is yielding to 
temptation that would try to derail man from reaching the final destination. The self 
730 The first and most comprehensive translation of Rumi's principal books Mathnavi Ma'navi (6 
books) from Persian to English was undertaken by Reynold A. Nicholson between 1925 and 1944. All 
references in this thesis are from his tranaslation of the Mathnavi, in this order M (Mathnavi) followed 
by the number of the book, and number of verse(s). M: III, 4436-4437 
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tries to deceive man that one of the transitional stations is the final station and as such 
it would force him to terminate the journey. However, a person who has mastered his 
"self' is aware of the differences between the transiting stations and the final 
destination. 
One has to be careful not to misunderstand Rumi's advocacy for self-preservation 
as a call for quietism and withdrawal from society. The one quality which marks 
out Rumi from conventional Sufis is his repudiation of sackcloth - his utter 
opposition to quietism, withdrawal, and escape. 731 
In Rumi's view, man was not created to satisfy the material side of his being; rather 
the material being is a vehicle by which he should approach the frontier of Eternity. 732 
The completion of the journey requires passing through the transiting stations. One of 
Rumi's disciples has beautifully summarised Rumi's stance on this issue. He said: 
`It is not I who have left the world, it is the world that has left me. '733 
Unlike Darwin's theory of evolution, when the death terminates the life, Rumi 
regards biological death as a step towards salvation. The following verses reflect 
Rumi's account of biological death and also the evolution of the human species: 
I died to the inorganic state and became endowed with growth, and (then) I died to 
(vegetable) growth and attained to the animal. 
I died from animality and became Adam (man): why, then, should I fear? When have 
I become less by dying? 
731 Iqbal, op. cit., p. 225. 
732 Lewisohn, op. Cit., vol. I., p. 406. 
733 Cited in Nasr, op. Lit., p. 170. 
362 
At the next remove I shall die to man, that I may soar and lift up my head amongst the 
angels. 
And I must escape even from (the state of) the angel: everything is perishing except 
His Face. (this is a verse of the Koran) 
Once more I shall be sacrificed and die to the angel: I shall become that which enters 
not into the imagination. 
Then I shall become non-existence: non-existence saith to me (in tones loud) as an 
organ: Verily unto Him shall we return. (Another verse of the Koran) 734 
In Rumi's account of spiritual evolution and perfection, the notions of guilt, and fear 
are absent. Unlike many religions including the Orthodox interpretation of Islam, God 
and men's mutual relationship is not polarised as forgiver/Saviour and guilty/forgivee, 
but it is constituted as lover and beloved. 
In the words of Rumi, 
"Love is an attribute of God, but fear is an attribute of the servant (of God) who is 
afflicted by lust and gluttony"735 
"The timorous ascetic runs on foot; the lovers (of God) fly more quickly than the 
lightning and the wind 
How should those fearful ones overtake Love? -for Love's passion makes the (lofty) 
heaven its carpet... "736 
For Rumi sin/wrongdoings are not acts that displease God or grieve God, 737 but sins 
are acts that slow down man's spiritual journey/evolution. Rumi attributes the 
following sentence to God: 
734 M: III, 3900-10 
735 M_V, 2185 
736 Ibid., 2192-93 
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"I am not sanctified by their glorification (of me); 'tis they that become sanctified and 
pearl-scattering (pure and radiant). 15738 
As the chapter on the Islamic institution of punishment argued, Muslims do not 
believe in the notion of "original sin", but the Koran has spoken of God's covenant 
with Adam as this verse shows: 
"We made a covenant with Adam, but he forgot, and We found him lacking in 
steadfastness... "739 
The Koran rejects the idea that Adam and Eve's descendants should be held 
responsible for their ancestors' disobedience. Furthermore, according to the Koran, 
every man and woman have been appointed as God's Deputy on earth as this verse 
indicates: "... I am placing on the earth one that shall rule as My Deputy,... 11740 
The Koran speaks of a trust that God offered to his creatures: 
"We offered Our trust to the heavens, to the earth, and to the mountains, but they 
refused the burden and were afraid to receive it. Man undertook to bear it.. "741 
Or in the words of Rumi, 
"Man resembles a tree, and the root is the covenant (with God): the root muct be 
cherished with all one's might. "742 
A deputy that has been given the autonomy to choose his own path and faces the 
consequence of his action: 
738 According to 1` 738 ý: 1758,1: 6-7, sin grieves God. 
79 Koran 20: 115. 
Tao lb. 
, 2: 29. 741 
742 
lbid_, 33: 72. 
74 ,: 1166. 
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"God does not change a people's lot unless they change [themselves] what is in their 
hearts...,, 743 
Rumi also reminds us of our freedom and autonomy to pursue what is best for us: 
"From the World are coming two cries in opposition (to each other): (bethink thyself) 
for which (of them) thou are adapted. 
Its one cry is the (means of) quickening the devout with (spiritual) life; and its other 
cry is the (means of) cajoling the graceless. "744 
So, the journey towards perfection in the view of the Koran and thus Rumi, is a 
voluntary undertaking, but a laborious one. And an important component of it is the 
manipulation of the carnal desire such as anger, greed, arrogance, and impatience. In 
other words, a forgiving spirit and tendencies reflect and reinforce the agent's success 
towards the destination. Stubbornness can prevent one from overcoming anger. 
Resentment resembles a driver who suffers from a flat tyre on the middle of his 
journey, which would stop him continuing his journey. The Koran has differentiated 
the successful person from the failed one on the basis of their manipulation of their 
carnal desires: 
"Blessed shall be the man who has kept it [self] pure, and ruined he that has corrupted 
li. "745 
Or in the words of Rumi, 
"The fleshy soul and the Devil both have (ever) been one person(essentially); (but) 
they have manifested themselves in two forms"746 
743 Koran, 13: 12. 
744 M IV: 1623-64. 
745 Koran, 91: 9-10. 
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Rumi has beautifully described the Islamic notion of the Greater and Lesser Jihad 
(the former denotes the struggle to master one's carnal desires, whereas the latter is a 
struggle to defend against external aggression) to highlight the primacy of the former: 
"0 kings, we have slain the outward enemy, (but) there remains within (us) a worse 
enemy than he. 
When I turned back from the outer warfare, I set my face towards the inner warfare. 
.. We 
have returned from the Lesser Jihad, we are engaged along with the Prophet in 
the greater Jihad. "747 
Elsewhere Rumi warns of the tremendous power of one's carnal desires, which can 
enslave even the kings and ordinary people alike: 
"All kings are enslaved to their slaves, all people are dead (ready to die) for one who 
dies for them. 
All kings are prostrate before one who is prostrate before them, all people are 
intoxicated with (love for) one who is intoxicated with them. "748 
2. The Characteristics of a Perfect Man 
Jean Hampton has constructed a continuum. At one end are people who are "beyond 
resentment. " They, like Jesus on the cross, 749 have great confidence in their self- 
worth; they know that the wrongdoer's insulting message is wrong, and they do not 
746 M : 111: 4053. 
747 M : I: 1375 & 86-7. 
748 M: I: 1736-37. 
749 Hampton, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 
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worry that their real worth is jeopardised by the demeaning conduct. These people are 
properly indignant, and they may (and should) protest at the wrongful conduct, but 
they are not resentful. At the other end of the continuum are people who are unable to 
feel resentment because they lack self-esteem; they believe that they deserve what has 
happened to them. Thus the rape victim who feels no resentment may well be a 
woman who has been psychologically (if not, also physically and sexually) beaten 
down over the years, who consequently believes that women (or, at least, she in 
particular) "asked for it. " 
In the middle, then, are the resenters: they want to and partially do believe that they 
deserve better treatment, thus explaining their anger, but they fear that the criminal's 
message may be right, thus explaining their resentment. A victim's resentment, 
therefore, is not simply an indignant protest against a wrong; it is a sign that the 
criminal's actions have called into question in the victim's mind her own self- 
worth. 750 
Aristotle' s account of "pleasure" to some extent narrated the characteristics of a 
"perfect man" or someone who is "beyond resentment". Aristotle remarks that neither 
pity nor fear will be experienced by a person who believes that he or she is above the 
uncertainties of life and can suffer no serious reversal . 
751 Elsewhere Aristotle calls 
this state of mind a hubristike diathesis, an "overweening disposition. "752 
750 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
751 Aristotle, Politics , ch. 9. 752 See Aristotle, Rhetoric. 1382b3off., 1385b21-22,31. 
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For Rumi, every man and woman has been created to be "beyond resentment" 
similar to Jesus Christ and the Justice of God extends the equality of worth and 
opportunities to all of his deputies, as is reconfirmed by these verses of the Koran: 
"... Who created you from a single soul. From that soul He created its spouse, and 
through them he bestrewed the earth with countless men and women. "753 
"You people! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into 
nations and tribes, that you may to know one another. The noblest of you in God's 
sight is the most pious among you". 754 
Or in the words of Rumi, 
"Before this [before the prophets were sent] we were one community, none knew 
whether we were good or bad. "Iss 
Both the Koran and Rumi acknowledge that as a result of men's freedom, the 
majority of them belong to the middle group. Rumi also mentioned regretfully men's 
unfortunate move to the middle group: 
"Wretched Man does not know himself: he has come from a high estate and fallen 
into lowlihood. 
Man has sold himself cheaply: he was satin, he has sewn himself on (become 
attached) to a tattered cloak. "756 
753 Koran, 4: 1. 
754 Ibid., 49: 13. 
755 M : 11: 285. 
756M: III: 1000-1 
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The Koran, and thus the Sufism tradition, purport their aim to be to empower men to 
claim their original position and become once again "beyond resentment". This entails 
the mastery over one's natural instincts such as revenge. The perfect man sees himself 
as part of the cosmos. The cosmos also is his moral community and scope. In other 
words, a perfect man sees those who harm him as part of his family, not as strange 
evildoers. As such, his intrinsic bond with the wrongdoers helps him to forgive them. 
3. Rumi's Deliberation on "Love" 
Hannah Arendt, introduces "love" as the only factor that inspires forgiveness. 
According to her, " for love, although it is one of the rarest occurrences in human 
lives, indeed possesses an unequalled power of self-revelation and an unequalled 
clarity of vision for the disclosure of who, precisely because it is unconcerned to the 
point of total unworldliness with what the loved person may be, with his qualities and 
shortcomings no less than with his achievements, failings, and transgressions. Love, 
by reason of its passion, destroys the in-between which relates us and separates us 
from others. "757 
For Rumi, "love" is the foundational characteristic of the universe. Rumi argues that 
God created the humanity out of his generosity and compassion: 
"He made the world for kindness' sake: His sun caressed the motes (in its beams)"758 
Elsewhere, 
757 Arendt, pp. cit., p. 242. 758 M: II: 2633. 
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"I created to the intent that they (My creatures) might draw some gain from Me, and 
they might smear their hands with My honey; 
Not to the end that I might draw some gain (from them), and that I might tear off a 
coat from one (who is) naked. "7s9 
The above verses concur with the following verse of the Koran: 
" We have bestowed blessings on Adam's children... "760 
Divine love not only prompted the creation of the universe, Rumi argues that it is also 
the main force that maintains the motion of the universe: 
"If there had not been Love, how should there have been existence? How should 
bread have attached itself to you and become (assimilated to) you? 
Love makes the dead bread into spirit: it makes the spirit that was perishable 
everlasting. "761 
The absence of `in-between', which is one of the characteristics of "love", 
according to Hannah Arendt, is also present in God's relations with his creatures as 
the following verses of the Koran show: 
"... We are closer to him than his jugular vein"762 
"If my servant question you about Me, tell them that I am near. I answer the prayer of 
the suppliant when he calls to Me.. , 
"763 
759 Ibid., 2636-37. 
760 Koran, 17: 70. 
761 M: V: 2012 &2014. 
762 Ibid., 50: 16 
763 Ibid., 21: 186. 
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"Say: `If you love God, follow me. God will love you and forgive your sins. God is 
forgiving and merciful' 764 
Rumi's account of `love' shows that he does not regard it as a sensual faculty. For 
Rumi love is 
"In the verdant garden of Love, which is without end, there are many fruits besides 
sorrow and joy. 
Love is higher than these two states of feeling: Without spring and without autumn it 
is (ever) green and fresh. "765 
"Love is reckless, not Reason: Reason seeks that from which it may get some 
profit. "766 
"Since Love is loyal, it purchases (desires) him that is loyal: it does not look at the 
disloyal comrade. , 767 
"A beloved asked her lover, `Do you love yourself more or me? " He replied, "I am 
dead to myself and living by thee; I have become non-existent to myself and my own 
attributes and existent become knowing through thy knowledge; I have lost all 
thought of my own power and have become powerful through thy power. If I love 
myself, I must have loved thee, and if I love thee I must have loved myself. "768 
"The religion of Love is apart from all religions: for lovers, the (only) religion and 
creed is -God. "769 
764 Ibid., 3: 30. 
765 M: I, 1703-4 
766 M: VI, 1967. 
767 M: V, 1165. 
768 Preface to the verse 2020 in M: V 
769 M : 11,1770. 
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Rumi prescribes love as the only force that propels man in his spiritual evolution: 
"Love hath five hundred wings, and every wing (extends) from above the empyrean to 
beneath the earth. "770 
"He (alone) whose garment is rent by a (mighty) love is purged of covetousness and 
all defect. 
Hail, 0 Love that brings us good gain-thou that are the physician of all our ills. "771 
The most prominent attribute that Rumi attributes to "the perfect man" is the attribute 
of love: 
"He is a lover of the Universal, and he himself is the Universal: he is in love with 
himself and seeking his own love. "772 
" Are pure Love and justice and mercy; even as God, they are flawless (incorruptible) 
and unbribed"773 
Therefore an agent who has been created out of the "divine love", and survives on 
the power of love, and is striving to reunite with his beloved one, then for such an 
individual forgiveness and mercy are abundantly available for him. He is conscious 
that egoistic traits such as arrogance, vengeance, an inflated sense of self-worth, and 
stubbornness cannot be part of his moral vocabulary. In the words of Rumi, 
"If a perfect man take earth, it becomes gold; if an imperfect one has carried away 
gold, it becomes ashes. "774 
Or in the words of the Koran, 
770 M: V, 2191. 
771 M: 1,22-24. 
772 M : 1,1574. 
7" M: II, 1936. 
774 M: 1,1609. 
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"True servants of the Merciful are those who walk humbly on the earth and say: 
`Peace' to the ignorant who accost them. " 75 
Faced with a decision to forgive those who unjustifiably injured him, Rumi would 
say to such a person: 
"Do not say, `We have no admission to that King. ' Dealings with the generous are not 
difficult. " 776 
"... when thou doest ill to the ill-doer, then what is the difference? "777 
The next part looks at how the available sources tell us about the place of 
forgiveness in the Athens institution of punishment, which can also be relevant to 
those societies that resemble Athens. 
IV. The Place of Forgiveness in Classical Athens 
Comparatively little is known about pardons in ancient Athens; ironically, there is 
no Greek word for `pardon, ' even though the word `amnesty' is a gift from the 
Greeks. In Athens, the power of granting pardon rested with the people. To obtain a 
pardon, a supplicant had to have the signatures of 6,000 citizens. It will not surprise 
75 Koran, 25: 64. 
776 M: I, 221. 
777 Ibid., 1564. 
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anyone today to learn that only in the cases of famous athletes, popular actors, and 
disgraced rulers could that many interested people be found. 778 
As noted when considering the Athenian institution of punishment, "honour" played 
a central role in the Athenians' vocabulary and also in informing many of their 
institutions. Honour was a reflection of the Greek competitive characters. In the words 
of Dover: 
The Greeks tended to judge people not on a `pass or fail' criterion, but by deliberately 
imparting a competitive character to as many aspects of life as possible (e. g. plays, 
songs and dances at festivals), and the wide difference between the treatment of 
winners and the treatment of losers augmented the incentive to excel. 779 
In a competitive culture, where "honour" is the premier commodity, forgiveness is 
associated with "appeasement", "defeat", "weakness", or "unmanliness". 
The centrality of honour explains why there was no institutional provision for 
"forgiveness" in the Athenian institution of punishment. It also was the main reason 
for the absence of "forgiveness" in other aspect of Athenians' life and institutions. 
The closest notion to forgiveness that few Athenian philosophers have touched on is 
the notion of equity. Aristotle's account was examined in the preceding remarks. Here 
Plato's will be noted. Like Aristotle, Plato recognises the importance of epiekeia both 
in the judgement of whether a certain offence was committed and in the assessment of 
penalties. He suggests that laws should be written deliberately in such a way as to 
leave gaps to be filled in by the judgement of judges or juries. He compares the 
prescriptions of laws to the general instructions that an athletics trainer has to give 
78 Dean Moore, op. cit., p. 16. 
779 Dover, op. cit., p. 232. 
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when he cannot deal with each pupil one by one and, to a trainer or a medical doctor 
who has to go out of town and therefore leaves instructions that cannot anticipate all 
the circumstances that may arise. This being so, it is in the spirit of the law that when 
one does look into the particular case, one will modify the prescription to suit the 
differing conditions. 780 
Overall, it can be said to constitute that which most would regard as a conflict 
between the morally good and the socially useful; there is much to suggest that in an 
Athenian context social utility tended to emerge the victor of such a conflict. 781 
The concluding part looks at the place of forgiveness in the contemporary world. It 
begins by discussing the reasons for the marginalized place of forgiveness in today's 
world. It then proceeds to argue why forgiveness should be elevated into one of our 
pillars of moral vocabulary and also of our social institutions, including the institution 
of punishment. 
780 See Statesman 294A, Laws 757E, 867D, 876A, 925D-26D. 
781 Dover, op. cit., p. 290. 
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V. The Place of Forgiveness in the Contemporary 
World 
This part begins by drawing attention to some of the reasons for the marginalized 
place of forgiveness in contemporary vocabulary and practices. It then proceeds to 
argue why there is a pressing need to elevate forgiveness to be one of the leading 
components of our responses to wrongdoings. The epilogue chapter will also further 
elaborate this line of enquiry. 
A. Secularity and Forgiveness 
In 1962 philosopher P. F. Strawson described forgiveness as "a rather unfashionable 
subject in moral philosophy... ", 782 but there exist some plausible explanations and 
reasons for the unfashionable treatment of forgiveness not only in moral philosophy 
but also in other facets of life of modem societies, in particular in the secular west. 
A primary reason for the marginalisation of forgiveness in modernity and the 
undermining of its practices is Christianity's ambiguous legacy. 783 
In fact the Papal abuse of indulgences-the high price sinners were required to pay 
to the church for divine forgiveness-was one of the factors that led to the Protestant 
Reformation and the subsequent political upheaval in Europe. 784The power to pardon 
was one of the institutions swept away by the French Revolution in 1789. For ten 
turbulent years, all acts "tending to impede or suspend the exercise of criminal 
782 Quoted in Graf Haber, op. cit., p. viii. 
783 Greogory Jones, op. cit., p. 37. 
784 Dean Moore, op. cit., p. 7. 
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justice, " were abolished. 785 The secular world could not provide adequate space for an 
allegedly theological concept such as forgiveness. The triumph of Positivism was 
another factor that further undermined the concept of forgiveness. Anything that was 
remotely associated with "feeling" was treated as pre-modem. The general neglect of 
the "feeling" side of moral life was manifested in the prevailing moral philosophy. 
Moral philosophy has placed great emphasis on such concepts as "right" "wrong" and 
"duty"-concepts applicable primarily to actions. Even "the good" tends to be treated 
as something it is our duty to act to produce or a property of actions themselves. 786 
In the words of Gregory Jones, "modernity's emphasise on such terms as individual 
autonomy, isolated acts rather than character, inevitable progress rather than 
repentance, and the fascination with technique above all helped to undermine 
practices of forgiveness and marginalize conceptions of it. "787 
Hannah Arendt has identified more fundamental difficulties of modernity with the 
notion of forgiveness. She notes, "the remedy against the irreversibility and 
unpredictability of the process started by acting does not arise out of another and 
possibly higher faculty, but is one of the potentialities of action itself. "788 
She then concludes that, " the possible redemption from the predicament of 
irreversibility - of being unable to undo what was done through one did not, and could 
not, have known what was doing-is the faculty of forgiving. "789 But she believed 
that modem natural science presented difficulties to the embracing of forgiveness: 
"Modem natural science and technology, which no longer observe or take material 
785 Ibid., p. 24. 
786 Graf Haber, op. cit., p. 1. 
787 Gregory Jones, op. cit., p. 37. 
788 Arendt, op. cit. , pp. 236-37. 789 Ibid., p. 237. 
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from or imitate processes of nature but seem actually to act into it, seem, by the same 
token, to have carried irreversibility and human unpredictability into the natural 
realm, where no remedy can be found to undo what has been done. "790 
Furthermore, the Hobbessian' s account of men as intrinsically competitive and 
power-hungry cannot reconcile him to notions such as forgiveness. From such 
perspective forgiveness implies weakness and privileges the view that "whoever has 
the most guns wins. " 
The sociobiological perspective is another branch of modem science that implicitly 
concurs with those who see forgiveness as an unfashionable subject. Such a view 
draws an analogy from the violence and aggression in the animal kingdom to argue 
that men's tendencies to violence are genetically and biologically determined. 91 
Archbishop Tutu of South Africa has identified another reason for the unfashionable 
place of forgiveness, which is excessive emphasis on retributive justice. According to 
him, "Retributive justice is largely Western. The African understanding is far more 
restorative-not so much to punish as to redress or restore a balance that has been 
knocked askew. The justice we hope for is restorative of the dignity of the people. "792 
The procedural aspects of modem justice systems are another reason for the 
marginalized place of forgiveness. As Nils Christie has observed, "modern criminal 
control systems represent one of the many cases of lost opportunities for involving 
790 Ibid., p. 238. 
791 For a sociological perspective see, Edward 0. Wilson in On Human Nature (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1978). 
792 Quoted in Minow, U. cit., p. 80. 
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citizens in tasks that are of immediate importance to them. Ours is a society of task- 
monopolists. "793 
In modern criminal justice systems, the principal parties, victim and offender, are 
each represented by a lawyer who has been trained to win the case for their client. 
Administering justice in a modern justice system is a zero-sum game. But forgiveness 
is a win-win process. Therefore, there is an inherent incompatibility between the 
notion of forgiveness and modern justice systems. 
However, and despite the above difficulties, we have no choice but to embrace 
forgiveness. The concluding section of this chapter draws attention to two specific 
reasons for the elevation of forgiveness from its contemporary marginalized place: 
the requirement of justice and the capability of humanity to be forgiving. 
B. The Call from Justice and Humanity for Forgiveness 
One of the main arguments that have been cited against forgiveness is its perceived 
tension with justice. However, as the above section showed, such a tension is 
unfounded. This following section argues that not only is there no tension between 
forgiveness and justice, but also justice calls us to embrace forgiveness. 
Immanuel Kant is perhaps the most prominent advocate of retributivism, and it 
would not be an overstatement to regard him as the patriarchal figurehead of secularly 
793 Nils Christie, "Conflicts as Property" in The British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 17, (1997), p. 423. 
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oriented retributivism. The following remark indicates the extent of commitment of 
Kant to retributive justice: 
Even if a society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members (for 
example if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse themselves 
around the world), the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so 
that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt 
thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the 
punishment; for if they fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices in this 
public violation of legal justice. 794 
However, Kant recognised the impossibility of implementation and pursuit of such a 
degree of commitment to legal justice. Punishment as retribution (paying a debt to 
one's fellow-citizens) makes good sense with respect to a community of responsible 
individuals, of approximate equality, bound together by freely - adopted and 
commonly - accepted rules which benefit everyone. 
795 This is an ideal community, 
approximating what Kant would call a kingdom of ends. But surely existing human 
societies are not in fact like this at all. In his letters, Kant himself considers this 
problem and reaches a position which appears to be diametrically opposed to that of 
the Rechtslehre: 
In a world of moral principle governed by God, punishment would be categorically 
necessary (insofar as transgressions occur). But in a world governed by men, the 
necessity of punishments is only hypothetical, and that direct union of the concept of 
transgression with the idea of deserving punishment serves the ruler only as a 
prescription for what to do... [Criminal punishment], even if its goal is merely 
medicinal for the criminal and setting of an example for others, is indeed a symbol of 
something deserving punishment. 796 
794 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, translated by John Ladd (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 102. 
795 Murphy, `Retribution, Justice, and Therapy', op. cit., p. 86. 
796 Quoted in ibid., p. 86. 
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In fact Kant was not the first person to have recognised the reality of human 
societies with respect to legal justice. Retributive justice and pardon were bound 
together in the oldest known legal code - the Code of Hammurabi, developed by the 
Babylonians around the eighteenth century B. C. The Code is most famous for its 
startling list of punishments: mutilation or amputation of offending body parts, 
enslavement, drowning, and so one. But the Code is more remarkable for its efforts to 
put a limit on private revenge, blood feuds, and even official punishment. Accidents 
were not to be punished; people guilty of manslaughter, for example, were merely 
fined. Certain excuses and justifications were allowed; deserted, poverty-stricken 
wives, for example, were not punished for bigamy. Article 129 specified 
circumstances under which adulterers were pardoned. 797 
The Old Testament, often viewed as the story of a vengeful God, can be viewed also 
as a chronicle of mercy. Indeed, the oldest crime in history, Cain's murder of his 
brother, was not fully punished: God commuted Cain's murder of his brother. 798 
The Romans had a sophisticated and frequently used system of pardons-legislative 
and judicial, full and partial, pardon by the will of the Emperor or by accidental 
encounter with a vestal virgin. 799 
Despite the pretence of rationality that many modern criminal justice systems claim, 
the criminal law institutionalises certain feelings of anger, resentment, even hatred. 80° 
797 Dean Moore, op. Cit., p. 15. 
798 Gen. 4: 12,16. 
799Dean Moore, op. cit., p. 16. 
80° Murphy and Hampton, op. cit., p. 2. 
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If a society appreciates the benefit of the virtue of forgiveness/mercy it can 
institutionalise such a virtue by incorporating it into its justice system. And there are 
many non-Western traditions that have been inspired. In addition to the example of 
the Islamic penal code and Islamic Sufism, is the African concept of Ubuntu, which 
became the guiding principle of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. This concept denotes humaneness, or an inclusive sense of the 
community valuing everyone. 801 The word comes from the Bantu languages spoken in 
Southern Africa-and is related to a Zulu concept-"umuntu ngumtu ngabantu"-which 
means that a person is only a person through their relationship to others. Mr Tutu's 
identification with ubuntu has given rise to the idea of "ubuntu theology" - where 
ethical responsibility comes with a shared identity. If someone is hungry, the ubuntu 
response is that we're all collectively responsible. 
There is a spiritual as well as practical dimension to this - with ubuntu reflecting the 
idea that we're part of a long chain of human experience, connecting us to previous 
and future generations. Ubuntu has also entered the language of development and fair 
trade - with campaigners using the word in aid projects for Africa in ways that suggest 
this will be an African solution for African problems. 
The institutionalisation of forgiveness/mercy cannot proceed without its acceptance 
as a valuable virtue at the individual and societal levels. This necessitates recognising 
the limits and danger of an unrestrained thirst for revenge, which is often disguised 
behind the pretext of justice. Hatred and the quest for revenge can consume people, 
so' Minow, op. cit., p. 52. 
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turning them into mirrors of those whom they hate. Contrary to popular belief, the 
quest for retributive justice does not always guarantee a satisfactory sense of closure. 
Avenging the self can be too costly emotionally, by stoking consuming fires of hatred. 
Psychologist Judith Herman reports that "people who actually commit acts of 
revenge, such as combat veterans who commit atrocities, do not succeed in getting rid 
of their post-traumatic symptoms; rather, they seem to suffer the most severe and 
intractable disturbances. "802 As Andrew Rigby observes, in addition to peace and a 
general feeling of personal security, three other values need to be present for 
reconciliation as a process and a condition to reach a fruition: truth, justice, and 
mercy/forgiveness. 803 
But above all there is a need for commitment to an empathic identification with and 
a sympathetic view of those who have wronged us. It may make us susceptible to new 
ways of thinking and feeling. It helps us not just to understand their actions from their 
point of view but also, on occasions, to abandon some or all of the feelings of 
resentment and hostility that might previously have been occasioned by their actions. 
In the words of Bishop Creighton, "the good are not so good as they think themselves; 
"boa the wicked are not so bad as the good think them. 
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter, by quoting Seneca one of the earliest 
people who wrote on forgiveness. Towards the end of his address to Nero Caesar, 
Seneca asks him a pointed question: "what ... would living be if lions and bears held 
the power, if serpents and all the most destructive animals were given power over 
802 Quoted in ibid. , p. 13. 803 Rigby, oop cit. , p. 184. 804 Quoted in Murphy, `Retribution, Justice, and Therapy' op. cit., p. 92. 
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us? " These serpents, lions, and bears, as Seneca well knows, inhabit our soul in the 
forms of our jealous angers, our competitiveness, our retributive harshness. 805 
'05 Quoted and commented by Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 125. 
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Chapter 7 
If the world government were in the hands of hungry nations there would always be danger... The 
Peace would be kept by peoples who lived in their own way and were not ambitious. 
(Winston Churchill)806 
Epilogue 
The slogan and the phrase "Nothing works" summarises the crises of legitimacy and 
effectiveness of modern institutions of punishment. 807 As we saw in the ICC chapter, 
nor is international criminal justice immune from the charges of questionable 
legitimacy and effectiveness. The preceding chapter and forgiveness argued that an 
important reason for the crises of legitimacy and effectiveness in modem concepts 
and institutions of punishment is the weakened place and significance of forgiveness 
in our moral vocabulary and practices of punishment. It also proposed that the 
elevation of forgiveness would help us to acquire a rigorous and coherent theory of 
punishment. This chapter expands further this line of enquiry in the hope of finding 
ways and methods that "can work". 
In this chapter four distinct but interrelated issues will be highlighted. It will argue 
that a reconceptualisation of existing legal theory, policy, and practice should 
embrace the following four issues: a) cross-cultural approach, (b) submission to 
demands of justice, (c) hybridisation of the institutional accountability mechanism, 
806 Winston S. Churchill on the Tehran conference 1943, "Closing the Ring", The Second World War 
Vol. V., (London: Cassell, 1948-54), p. 300. 
807 The slogan refers to the celebrated article by Martinson which surveyed the treatment research and 
reached a largely negative conclusion about the general efficacy of treatment programmes in penal 
settings. See R. Martinson, "What Works? -Questions and Answers About Prison Reform", in The 
Public Interest. Vol. 35 (1974). 
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and (d), incorporating the assumptions and practices of "restorative justice". Although 
these four issues will be discussed in the context of international criminal justice and 
post-conflict justice, many of their assumptions and recommendations would be 
equally valid in considering national criminal justice systems. 
From the outset two points are in order. First, it should be borne in mind that, at the 
level of implementation each of the four issues is context-sensitive and should not be 
taken to mean as "one-size-fits-all". Secondly, in discussing each of the four issues, a 
great deal of material will be drawn from Islamic sources and the chapter on the 
Islamic institution of punishment. Such "disproportionate" reliance and selective 
choice of materials in comparison with other traditions are pursed in accordance with 
the spirit of Kenneth Dover' s advice, "... to avoid the mistake of comparing the 
theory of one culture with the practice of another... "808 
I. Impediment to Cross-Cultural Dialogue: Illusion of 
Superiority 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, there have been different modes of cross- 
cultural encounters (conquest, conversion, assimilation, cultural borrowing, minimal 
engagement, class-struggle, and dialogical engagement). Furthermore, and as Puchala 
showed, civilisational encounters have resulted in different outcomes such as 
absorption, hybridisation, hegemony, rejection/resurgence, genocide/cultural 
obliteration, isolation, suspicion, hostility, or creative cross-fertilisation. He attributed 
808 Dover, op. cit., p. 241. 
386 
different reasons for such a spectrum of outcomes, in particular among mature 
civilisations. 
An important reason why mature civilisations do not often produce "civilised" 
outcomes in their encountering one another, is the arrogance of their elite. As Puchala 
observed, "essentialistic ideologies, mutual illusions of cultural superiority, self- 
satisfaction with civilisational attainment, and mutual fear all mitigated against 
appreciatable cultural borrowing. , 809 Arrogance is a blinding attribute. Arrogance not 
only inhibits the ability of a person to appreciate others; it also blurs his vision and 
views about his own place in the cosmos. Arrogance makes one complacent about 
one's fallibility arid vulnerability, as such it becomes self-defeating. The Koran 
identifies Satan's arrogance as the main reason that God condemned him, as the 
following verse shows: 
"And when We said to the angels: `Prostrate yourselves before Adam, ' they all 
prostrated themselves except Satan, who in his pride refused and became an 
unbeliever. " 810 
Elsewhere, the Koran identifies arrogance as an evil character: 
"Evil is the abode of the arrogant"811; "Do not treat men with scorn, nor walk proudly 
on the earth: God does not love the arrogant and the vainglorious. Rather let your 
stride be modest and your voice low: the most hideous of voices is the braying of the 
ass. "8lz 
809 Puchala, op. cit., p. 138. 810 Koran, 2: 34. 
811 Ibid., 16: 29. 
812 Ibid., 31: 18. 
387 
It is interesting to note that the Koranic's condemnation of arrogance is not limited 
to worldly affairs. The belief and the display of one's moral or religious superiority 
and excellence are also condemned. The religious manifestation of the superiority is 
the belief about exclusive ownership of paradise. Such a belief denotes that only 
followers one's specific religion will enter paradise, the ultimate stage of salvation 
according to many religious. The Koran reminds Muslims not to repeat the mistake of 
some Jews and Christians who subscribed to such a sense of religious superiority by 
believing that only they would go to paradise: 
"They [the above-mentioned group of Christians and Jews] declare: `None shall enter 
Paradise but Jews and Christians. '... Such are their wishful fancies... "813 Also: 
It shall not be in accordance with your wishes [Muslims], nor shall it be as the People 
of the Book [the recognised religious minorities in Islamic law such Christians, Jews, 
Zoroastrians and some other] desire. He that does evil shall be required with evil... but 
814 the believers who do good works, both men and women, shall enter Paradise... 
If the notion of "original sin" has made Christianity a "guilt-ridden" tradition, it can 
be said that in the case of Islam it is "doubt" that constitutes the principal tension in a 
Muslim' life: the tension between doubt versus hope. The "doubt-ridden" feature of 
Islam is present in almost every aspect of Islam, including the life and the teaching of 
the Prophet Mohammed. According to the Koran even the Prophet Mohammed could 
not guarantee what would happen to him on Day of Judgement, as this verse shows: 
81 Ibid., 2: 111-12. 
814 Ibid., 123-24. 
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"Say: `I [Mohammed] am no prodigy among the apostles; nor do I know what will be 
done with me or you. I follow only what is revealed to me, and my only duty is to 
give plain warning. "815 
The defeat of the Muslim army led by the Prophet Mohammed is another vivid 
example that the Koran draws our attention to the danger of arrogance. The Meccans 
mobilised a huge army and confronted the Muslim Army in the battle of Uhud in year 
626 CE. However, thanks to the failure of some Muslim soldiers, the Muslim army, 
which was led by the Prophet Mohammed, was defeated with a great loss of 
combatant including the Prophet's uncle. The Koran blamed those Muslim soldiers 
who 
"Must have been seduced by Satan on account of some evil they had done... "816 
However, Islam as a "doubt-ridden" tradition has enabled Muslims to produce many 
of the world's great inter-cultural and inter-religious harmonies and coexistence. The 
Muslims' legacies in Persia, Syria, the Holy Land, Andalusia, India, Constantinople, 
Salonica, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc, are examples of how a "doubt-ridden" tradition 
can be enriched by its doubt, and uncertainty, and by its consciousness about its 
fallibility and vulnerability. 
The case of arrogant traditions can be best summarised by the former US chief 
{ 
Justice who stated, "great evil has been done on earth by people who think they have 
all the answers. "817 And history is full of the legacies of such "confident" people from 
815 Ibid, 46: 9. 
816 Ibid., 3: 155. 
81 Quoted in Minow, op. Cit., p. 7. 
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the genocide of 70 million native inhabitants818 following the conquest of the 
Americas by the "civilising" armies of European powers, to the Nazi holocaust of the 
1940s. 
An important way to confront one's illusion of superiority is to have an awareness 
of one's past and also that of others. And history abounds with stories from past 
generations that can remind us of our vulnerability and fallibility. Such awareness can 
make us more sceptical about many of the present cases and issues, in particular those 
that come from the "righteous" and "confident" voices. 
The following examples are two such historical case, the use by the Japanese of fake 
photographs and the US' presentation of satellite pictures. The former case relates to 
the Japanese occupation of China and the latter to the US occupation of Iraq. 
The 1931 railway explosion in Manchuria and the subsequent Japanese occupation 
of some Chinese provinces was of one of the handful railway explosions in history 
that attracted international concern and attention before the commencement of World 
War Two. Following mounting international pressure and criticism of the Japanese 
invasion of China, in order to buttress their account of their own actions and put the 
blame on Chinese provocative action, the Japanese delegation to the League of 
Nations released series of photographs to show the seriousness of the situation with 
which they had had to deal. 
One photograph, for example, showed the scene of the explosion that began the whole 
affair. Another one displayed the evidence that had been gathered at the scene of the 
818 Dallmayr, U. cit., p. 2. 
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explosion: some broken ties, two short pieces of rail, two garrison hats, and a bolt- 
action rifle with bayonet fixed. 819 However, not only were the photographs 
unconvincing and but the subsequent treatment by and policies of the Japanese 
discredited their attempt to mislead the international community. 
The former US Secretary of State, Colin Powel also tried to justify the US' 
prospective invasion of Iraq by "disclosing" classified information in the forms of 
high-resolution satellite pictures, and supposed secretly - recoded conversations of 
Iraqi officers about the Iraqi regime's systematic attempt to hide its weapons of mass 
destruction to the UN Security Council in February 2003.820As with the Japanese 
case, the subsequent developments showed not only the unreliability of the presented 
pictures and recorded voices presented to the Security Council, but also cast doubt on 
the basic justifications of the US invasion of Iraq. 
The above examples show how a historical consciousness can enrich our 
understanding many present cases and contemporary issues. A historical 
consciousness entails recognition of contributions by other cultures and traditions in 
shaping and making many historical events. Such an appreciation of other traditions' 
contribution and active roles should be pursued in the spirit of a "Socratic 
Understanding", to suspend one's own truth and seek others. It is only such 
understanding that can enable us to learn from one another and incorporate such 
learning into our social institutions, including the institution of punishment. 
819 Jones, op. cit., p. 49. 
820 For the full text of his speech and also the slides see, 
http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1. html 
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The next part discusses how elevating, the discourse of substantive justice and 
goodness to become one of our foundational and guiding principles of our moral 
vocabulary and practices can be beneficial in addressing the questions of crime and 
punishment. 
II. Submission to Justice 821 
A. The Perils of Egocentrism 
The introductory chapters argued that the modern institution of punishment faces 
crises of legitimacy and effectiveness. As the chapter on forgiveness discussed, there 
exist some important underlying reasons behind the insignificant presence of 
forgiveness in modem institutions of punishment. Egocentrism is one of the main 
factors that have contributed to the undervalued presence of forgiveness in our moral 
vocabulary. In the words of David Novitiz, "our ability to empathise with others 
depends on whether there are models of empathic thinking that are readily available to 
us", 822 and egocentrism cannot provide such models. 
This state of affairs is not exclusive to the institution of punishment. There has been 
growing and articulated criticism of many modem institutions, including modernity 
itself from different quarters. Prior to arguing the case for substantive justice, in this 
part, a summary of criticisms of modernity in its diverse manifestations will be 
examined, and in particular, what I call the "egoistic" nature of modernity that has 
821 The title of this sub-headline was inspired by President Truman, who is quoted as saying, "Justice 
remains the greatest power on earth. To that tremendous power alone, will we submit. " Quoted in 
Jones, op. cit., p. 217. 
822 Novitz, op. cit., p. 310. 
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isolated modern man from the rest of the cosmos. An important consequence of this 
separation, it will contend, is the undervalued place of substantive justice in the 
discourse of modernity and also the institutions that have been shaped by the premises 
of modernity. The concluding section will suggest that the way out of the current 
predicament of institutionalised fear and uncertainty, and the abundance of injustice 
and crimes, is reconciliation of man with the world. 
A practical consequence of such reconciliation would be the embracing of 
substantive justice at the personal, national, and international levels. In doing so, 
among other results, we might able to see differently our conceptions of crime and 
punishment. 
In the first years of the new millennium, those who hold an optimistic view of the 
world and humanity are in a minority and are hardly heard in the public space across 
different societies, countries, and continents. Crises of legitimacy and effectiveness 
have over-shadowed many social and political institutions from family, government, 
war, and religion to the growing concern about the environment, global economy, and 
energy sources. The growing uncertainty, fear and crises exist in the light of the 
West's unravelled military, economic and ideological superiority during the last five 
centuries. The cycle of the rise and decline of powers mainly provides an account of 
positive, tangible power such as that of the economic and military sectors. Taking into 
account the existing distribution of power on the global stage, and notwithstanding 
some differences between the US and the EU, the West continues to provide the 
dominant economic and military power globally. As such, the conventional theories 
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of cycles of power cannot account for the political, societal and moral crises that 
many Western-oriented institutions are subject to. 
From the geocentric perspective of the ancient world to the theocentric world of 
religions, modernity has transformed the world to an egocentric world. The positive 
values associated with such a world's view are well known: such as freedom, 
individual autonomy, limited government and so on. The focus of this part, however, 
is on the dark side of a world's view that is shaped by an egoistic ideology. 
The self-centredness of many modern institutions and assumptions can be seen in 
the case of modem philosophy. One of the most lasting trends in modern philosophy 
since Descartes, and perhaps its most original contribution to philosophy has been an 
exclusive concern with the self, as distinguished from the soul or person or man in 
general, in an attempt to reduce all experiences, with the world as well as with other 
human beings, to experiences between man and himself. 823 
However, the "self' implied in egocentrism is not the total "self'. It is a partial 
"self': the "self' that interested Darwin or Hobbes. Egocentrism has sidelined the 
Kantenian aspect of "self'. To use Socrates' account of the three-part soul, 
egocentrism has empowered the "appetitive" and to a lesser degree the "rational" 
parts of the soul, ignoring the "spirited" part of the soul. 
The manifestation of such partial egocentrism can be seen at different levels. In our 
social interaction, in the words of Nile Christie, we function each day, as migrants 
823 Arendt, op. cit., p. 254. 
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moving between sets of people which do not need to have any link - except through 
the mover. Often, therefore, we know our work-mates only as work-mates, 
neighbours only as neighbours, fellow cross-country skiers only as fellow cross- 
country skiers. We get to know them as roles, not as total persons. 824 
Even one of the most celebrated values of egocentrism, freedom, is also partial. As 
Murphy noted, `we lack the freedom of mind, the most important kind of freedom for 
a human being who would hope to be truly autonomous. "825 Jeremy Bentham's 
account of mankind's real sovereigns provided a utilitarian account of the nature of 
our autonomy. According to him, "nature has placed mankind under the governance 
"826 of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. 
Hannah Arendt' s critique of secularism, one of the manifestations of egocentrism, 
is more explicit about the loss that modern man has incurred as a result of his new 
freedom. She wrote that "modern man at any rate did not gain this world when he lost 
the other world, and he did not gain life, strictly speaking, either; he was thrust back 
upon it, thrown into the closed inwardness of introspection, where the highest he 
could experience were the empty processes of reckoning of the mind, its play with 
itself. "827 
In his comparison of today' crises with the previous cases, Tillich argued that, after 
the collapse of the ancient world, man experienced the threat of death; in the 
aftermath of the breakdown of medieval world, man experienced guilt; and in the 
824 Christie, op. cit., pp. 1-15, and 5 
$25 Hampton and Murphy, op. cit. , p. 9. $26 Quoted in Arendt, op. cit., p. 311. 
827 Ibid., p. 320. 
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present cultural crises man experiences a loss of meaning. 828 The current popularity of 
the cult of "Celebritism" in many industrial societies is an indication of such a cultural 
crisis. The case of the British popular entertainer Jordan's autobiography sheds light 
on the place of this new cult. Jordan, who has primarily been famous for the size of 
her breasts, wrote her autobiography, which became one of the best-selling non- 
fiction books in the UK for many months. 829 
Iqbal Lahouri, one of the founding fathers of modern Pakistan and also a Muslim 
scholar, concurred with his non-Muslim counterparts in highlighting the crises of 
modern man. According to him, "modern man has ceased living soulfully. In the 
domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself; in the domain of 
economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. Unable to control 
his ruthless egotism and his infinite gold-hunger has brought upon him life- 
weariness. "830 
Hussien Nasr, an Iranian scholar, is also critical of the type of freedom that 
egocentrism brought. He noted, "the Renaissance appears first as a gradual movement 
towards the attainment of freedom, but the only freedom, to lose the possibility of the 
attainment of the real freedom to man, namely the freedom of spiritual deliverance. 
Every other apparent freedom is no more than slavery either to outward natural forces 
or to inner passions. "831 
828 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven, 1952), pp. 40-63 
829 www. pOpmatters. com/books/reviews/b/being-jordan. shtml 
830 Quoted in Iqbal, op. cit., p. 265. 
831 Nasr, op. cit., p. 16. 
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Greogory Jones provides a Christian's critique of egocentrism, by observing that in 
today's world human life is not shaped and informed in relation to sound doctrines 
and teachings but rather in "a consumerist desire to pick and choose one's own 
spirituality through broad experimentations. " 832 The new Pope referred to such a 
trend as "DIY religion". 833 
Todorov's study of the outcome of the Spanish' conquest of the Americas can also 
shed light on the fate of many of modern man's conquests. He writes: 
The Spanish win the war. They are incontestably superior to the Indians in the realm 
of interhuman communication. But their victory is problematic, for there is not just 
one form of communication, one dimension of symbolic activity... The encounter of 
Montezuma with Cortes, of the Indians with the Spaniards, is first of all a human 
encounter, and we cannot be surprised that the specialist in human communication 
should triumph in it. 
But this victory, from which we all derive, Europeans and Americans both, delivers as 
well a terrible blow to our capacity to feel in harmony with the world, to belong to a 
preestablished order; its effect is to repress man's communication with the world, to 
produce the illusion that all communication is interhuman communication; the silence 
of the gods weighs upon the camp of the Europeans as much as that of the Indians. By 
winning on one side, the Europeans lost on the other; by imposing their superiority 
upon the entire country, they destroy their own capacity to integrate themselves into 
the world ... The victory was already big with its defeat. 
834 
The main reason for the very high recidivism rates of modem penal systems, is 
attributed by David Garland to the failure of the systems to produce moral attachment, 
which in turn serves to alienate further offenders from improving their conduct. 835 
832 Greogory Jones, opýcit., p. 43. 833 http: //Www. christianitytoday. com/ct/2005/134/31. O. html 834 Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), pp. 61,69,97, and 251. aas Garland, `Punishment & Modern Society', Q. cit., p. 75. 
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If the many dark sides of egocentrism can be summarised in one sentence, it would 
read that it is a system that demands "All For One (Me)". 
The next section argues that in order to mitigate the dark sides of egocentrism, "All 
For One" needs to be complemented by "One (Me) For All". "All" includes not only 
others, but also the suppressed parts of the soul and in this endeavour "substantive 
justice" will have to play a central role. 
B. The Goodness of Justice 
The concept of justice is one of the principal concepts that has been studied and 
commented upon from different angles throughout history and across different 
cultures and traditions. The focus of the ancient Greek philosophers, in particular of 
Plato's Republic was mainly on two questions: what is justice, and the goodness of 
justice. Rawls' elaboration of procedural and substantive justice and the differences 
within each category further expanded our understanding of justice. This section 
begins by arguing that liberal-oriented perspectives have given undue importance to 
procedural justice at the expense of substantive justice. 
Among the many treatises on justice, Socrates' defence of the goodness of justice 
still remains one of the most articulate. He attempted to prove that at all costs justice 
is good without reference to external rewards. Socrates' definition of justice is based 
on the existence of a strict parallelism between the justice of the city and the justice of 
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the individual. 836 To facilitate the discovery of the justice of the city, Socrates outlines 
a succession of cities: first, the city based on needs; next, the luxurious city; and, 
finally, the city purged of luxuries-a city that is characterised by the existence of a 
warrior class, the recipients of an extensive civic or moral education. 837 In parallel 
with the justice of the city, Socrates proceeds to describe the justice of the individual 
as involving each of the three parts of the soul-the rational, the spirited,. and the 
appetitive - minding its own business. 
838 By analogy with the health of the body, 
Socrates reasons that justice is intrinsically good because it is a kind of health of the 
soul. 
83, 
Kurt Baier presents five different conceptions of the concept of justice. The first one 
is probably the oldest and most widely held: on this view, justice consists in giving 
everyone his due, where something is due to someone if he has a right to it or if he 
deserves it. The second conception takes justice to be that part of morality, which has 
to do with what is morally required of one, for which others have a right against one, 
and what can justifiably be extracted. The third conception of justice is understood as 
impartial and conscientious administration by the institutions composing the basic 
structure of a society, that is, those institutions that determine people's rights and 
duties in a particular society. The fourth conception identifies justice with a certain 
excellence of institutions, namely, conformance with a certain principle, which we 
could call the principle of equitability. The fifth conception combines the first, third, 
and fourth. It ties justice to certain special institutions, but subjects these to the 
principle of equitability. At the same time, it makes justice applicable not only to 
836 Plato, Republic, Book 4: 368e-369a, 434d-435a-441d-e, 442d-443c 
837 Ibid., 369a-427c 
838 Ibid., 442d-e, 443c-e. 
839 Ibid., 444d-445b. 
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actions, persons, and institutions, but also to judgements, states of affairs, and the 
world. 840 
An important criticism of liberalism has been the primacy of procedural justice 
(Baier's third conception of justice) or "rightness" over "goodness" and liberal states' 
commitment to a neutral stance between the competing conceptions of goodness, and 
impartiality with respect to individual or group-based cultural traditions and religious 
beliefs. 
The shortcomings of liberal proceduralism have been frequently discussed. As 
Dallmayr noted, "on a logical-theoretical plane, the dilemma of proceduralism can be 
stated succinctly: either justice is truly neutral and universal, in which case it is 
abstract, devoid of content, and collapses into tautology; or else it is endowed with 
some content, in which case it is embued with cultural distinctness (where culture 
denotes a way of life and not merely a `subjective circumstance"'. He also adds that 
"under liberal-procedural auspices, differences of life-forms are either completely 
bracketed or else they are (more candidly) subordinated to the prevailing cultural 
engagement tends to be stifled or circumvented. "8a1 
Furthermore, proceduralism has proven fragile in the event of emergencies, either 
real or perceived. The records Of many Western governments after 9/11, reveal the 
extent of their commitment to procedural justice. The UK Prime Minister illustrates 
how procedural justice is hostage to political manipulation. Amid announcing new 
UK anti-terror measures, Tony Blair reminded us that, "the rules of the game are 
840 Baier, op. cit., pp. 771-790. 
94 1 Dallmayr, op. cit., pp. 25-6. 
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changing. "842 To find out some examples of such changes one can refer to the US' 
exclusion of Taliban and Al-Qaheda fighters from the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, the UK's detention without trial of terrorist suspects of foreign origin, 
the intrusive provisions of the 2001 US Patriotic Act, the Doctrine of the Pre-emptive 
strike, and many known and less-known examples. Or in the words of Chris Patten, 
former Europe's External Relations Commissioner, " Too often we've given the 
impression we're in favor of rules-based global governance, provided the rules suit 
US. "843 
The works of many of the world's greatest philosophers and thinkers also do not 
support neutrality and impartiality towards conflicting conceptions of goodness. 
Figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx were willing to see the 
state, not merely as an agency whose job is to let us be good, but as agency whose job 
is to make us good. 844 
When the advocates of the intrinsic goodness of justice speak of justice, one cannot 
interpret this as advocating only procedural justice. For example when Durkheim 
speaks of the just state, it cannot not be inferred that he only included procedural 
justice: 
"... Societies can have their pride, not in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in 
being the most just, the best organized and in possessing the best moral 
constitution. 845 
842 For the full text of Tony Blair's statement on anti-terror measures see: 8 
3PS: 
//politics. guaridan. co. uk/0,3858,5256088-116499,00. html 
844 
10 Questions for Chris Pattern in TIME, October 24 (2005), p. 26. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Retributivism, Moral education, and the Liberal State", in Criminal Justice Ethics Vol. 4, (1985), p. 9. Emile Durkheim Professional Ethics and Civil Morals. 2"a edn. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 75. 
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One of the consequences of the primacy of procedural justice has been the 
inadequate place given to social justice, in particular distributive justice, in the liberal 
tradition. Comparing the Islamic conception of justice with its liberal counterpart 
highlights the extent of the difference between the two traditions. As the chapter on 
the Islamic institution of punishment showed, justice is a supreme virtue and it is, in 
all its various manifestations, one of the overriding objectives of Islam to the extent 
that it stands next in order of priority to belief in the Oneness of God. As such, justice 
is a requirement for every single Muslim act and institution. The Islamic conception 
of justice is absolute, objective, all embracing, non-partisan, and universal. It ranges 
from one's inner world to one's relations with man and God. 
Comparing recent speeches by the Iranian President Ahmadinejad and the UK 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, shows the place of "Justice" in the political vocabulary of 
the two. In their speeches to the General Assembly of the UN on September 15,2005, 
the Iranian President referred to justice on five different occasions, 846 whereas the 
word "justice" was absent from Tony Blair's speech, which focused mainly on 
terrorism. 847 
As noted in the chapter on the Islamic institution of punishment, Islamic retributive 
justice is an extension and application of its distributive justice. Islam's account of 
distributive justice is a testimony to the all-embracing nature of the Islamic 
conception of justice. While the Western discourse on social justice is predominately 
philosophical, the Islamic approach is basically legal. Also, and unlike Christianity 
846 For full text of the Iranian President's speech to the UN, see http: //www. presidetn 
it/eng/ahmadinejad/cronicnews/1384/06/24/index-e. htm (16/09/2005) 
847 For the full text of the British PM `s speech to the General Assembly at the 2005 UN world summit, 
see: http: //www. number-IO. gov. uk/output/Page8195. asp (16/09/05) 
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and Judaism, which designated charity a moral duty of the rich, in Islam Zakah was 
elevated into a pillar of the faith and a legal obligation. Zakah is a tangible 
manifestation of fraternity and co-operation in the Muslim community. It is payable at 
the annual rate of about two and a half per cent on surplus assets, but the precise 
amount varies with reference to the type of assets. It is a special tax earmarked for 
distribution among specific groups, namely the poor, the needy, the insolvent debtor 
and a number of other classes of people. 848 The Shia tradition of Islam has imposed an 
extra tax on wealthy Muslims, Khoms payable to the needy members of society. 
In addition to the legally - enforced institution of Zakah, there are other occasions 
when Muslims are morally obligated to alleviate the hardship of their fellow human 
beings, such as their responsibility for looking after their close relatives, in particular 
the widowed, elderly, orphans, or providing hospitality for travellers. In addition to 
these cases of legal and moral obligations, Muslims have been encouraged to help 
others who are in need of help and assistance. 
The place of social justice in Muslim societies can be further seen in the structure of 
the public treasury of the early Muslim states. The typical public treasury was divided 
into four sections, namely the land and poll tax division, which provided funds for 
general state expenditures and assistance to the poor among non-Muslims; the spoils 
of war division, which was to fund general state expenditure and the maintenance of 
poor Muslims to the extent of supporting them for one year; Zakah collections, which 
were to be disbursed according to the Koran's requirement; and unclaimed assets 
including escheat and un - owned property, which are exclusively spent on the poor, 
848 Kamali, op. cit., p. 138. 
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including medical treatment, maintenance, funeral expenditure and so forth. 849 In 
contrast with the legally - enforced institution of Zakah and also the responsibility of 
the Islamic state to care for the welfare of the citizens, it is interesting to note that 
Islam has not made any legal provisions in respect to enforcing Islam's five pillars. 
The West's emphasis on legalism is an important and distinctive characteristic of 
the Western tradition, as is seen in this observation of Adda Bozeman: according to 
her, "beginning with ancient Rome, the Western nations have consistently engaged in 
the great quest for law as the measure of personal and governmental conduct. "85° 
However, as with the partial self of "egocentrism", the Western's tradition of 
legalism is also partial. As noted above, the absence of any legal requirement with 
respect to social justice and distributive justice casts doubt on the supposed primacy 
of law in the Western tradition. The rise of the welfare state in Western Europe after 
the end of World War Two, and also attempts by social - democratic governments to 
distribute wealth through taxation, can be seen as successful attempts to address some 
of the shortcomings of the early systems. But it is unlikely that the US will adopt the 
European social model, despite the growing gap between the rich and the poor in the 
US. The recent waves of hurricanes that shattered some of the US' southern states 
highlighted the extent of inequality of provisions for the poor and the rich. 
Even the European model is still far from the universally applicable Islamic 
conception of social justice. Europe and also many of the world's other richest nations 
do not feel morally or legally obligated to pay adequate attention to the plight of the 
849 Ibid., pp. 138-39. 
850 Bozeman, op. cit., p. 84 
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world's poor. The main criterion to learn of the global North' s commitment to help 
the global South is their pledge to contribute 0.7% of their GDP to the developing 
countries. This pledge was made 30 years ago via the UN' s Millennium goals. As in 
2005, the majority rich nations have failed to meet their obligation with respect to the 
UN's Millennium goals. The likelihood of the US to honour its commitment to the 
UN's Millennium goal is more uncertain. During recent discussions on how to meet 
the UN's Millennium goals, the US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, started a 
concerted campaign to remove the UN Millennium goals altogether from the UN's 
agenda. 85' 
Therefore, in a world where its richest nations cannot commit themselves to devote 
0.7% of their GDP to their poorest neighbours, not only will injustice be abundant, 
but also crimes. Such a state of affairs directs us to Socrates' parallel between the just 
city and the justice of individual, when he says just as a city that is under tyranny is 
poor and full of fear, the tyrannic soul is poor and full of fear. 852 We can expand 
Socratic's analogy between the individual and the city to state that any system that 
partially, embraces justice is bound to be poor and frightened. 
To paraphrase Churchill's warning about the danger of the world's government 
being in the hands of hungry nations (as quoted on the beginning of the chapter), it is 
more dangerous to have the world's government in the hands of unjust nations and 
individuals. 
851 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/americas/4247252. stm 
852PIato, Republic , Book 4: 557e-578a. 
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The next part of this chapter looks at the issue of hybridisation of institutional 
mechanisms of accountability for the systematic violation of human rights, and 
international humanitarian laws and norms in the context of post-conflict justice. 
III. The Hybridisation of Institutional Mechanisms 
As the chapter on the ICC discussed, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals face 
numerous challenges and have failed to play a constructive role in the process of 
reconciliation. Judging from the numbers of convicts, they have also failed in 
administering justice. Also, the in-built constraining provisions of the Rome Statute 
have weakened the ICC, inhibiting it from playing an important role in enforcing 
international criminal justice. This section advocates the hybrid court as being one of 
the most efficient, legitimate and inexpensive methods of prosecuting war criminals 
and other violators of international humanitarian laws. Advocating use of the hybrid 
courts is about translating one's commitment to cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary 
approaches into practice, in designing methods and institutional mechanisms for 
confronting the past in the aftermath of mass atrocities. 
The first section will briefly examine the concept of hybridisation, which can be 
seen as the juridical manifestation of commitment to cross-cultural approach. The 
second part looks at the three "hybrid domestic-international courts" in Kosovo, 
Sierra Leone and East Timor which are the result of a commitment to the concept and 
idea of hybridisation. From the outset, however, it must be stressed that advocacy of 
hybrid courts does not mean that they should replace other local and national methods 
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of reconciliation and accountability. As noted above, many non-Western traditions opt 
for non-legalistic methods, of conflict resolution and accountability. Hybrid-courts are 
only appropriate when the national and international partners decide to pursue a 
legalistic approach. 
A. The Concept of Hybridisation 
One's conceptual interpretation of an event/problem/phenomenon significantly 
determines the process of designing methods and institutional mechanism to deal with 
such an event/problem/phenomenon. With respect to designing social, political and 
judicial institutions both at the national and international levels, the designers' 
political and philosophical orientations will significantly influence the structures of 
the designed institutions. If architects privilege certain ideologies and political 
theories, the institutions will both reflect and simultaneously reinforce the value 
systems of the architects' ideology and political loyalty. The chapter on the Athenian 
institution of punishment drew attention to one of the most articulate cases of the 
political and ideological foundation of a social institution, such as the institution of 
punishment. 
One of the common characteristics, behaviours and policies of all totalitarian and 
revolutionary regimes, both secular and religious, is their systematic attempt to 
eradicate the institutional traces and legacies of the previous system, and replace them 
with new ones. For the new regimes, the perceived inferiority and decadence of the 
old institutions justify and necessitate their replacement with the new superior and 
advanced institutions, concomitant with the new superior ideology and political 
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system of the newly imposed regime. An important component of many colonial 
powers' policies has been their systematic committing of acts of "cultural genocide", 
thus destroying many social and religious institutions of the colonised nations. 
Moreover, it can be said that the imposition of the polity of the modem "nation-state" 
in many parts of the world, has resulted not only in dividing and separating many 
homogenous communities, but it has also sidelined many local institutions, in the 
name of a scientific and systematic organisation of the nations. 
However, if architects of social institutions, in particular those with an trans- 
national reach, believe that there is no one single and superior approach and also 
appreciate the vulnerability and fallibility of any manifestation of "particularism", 
they reflect their commitment to pluralism and the cross-cultural approach in the 
design of methods and institutional mechanisms. The attributes of an ideal man 
according to a tenth-century Muslim scholar, Ikhwan- al- Safa, exemplify the "doubt- 
ridden" approach and commitment to genuine pluralism and cross-cultural approach. 
According to Ikhwan- al- Safa an ideal man is: 
Persian by breeding, Arabian in faith, Hanafite [one of Islam's schools of law, which 
is known to be moderate] in his Islam, Iraqi in culture, Hebrew in lore, Christian in 
manners, Damascene in piety, Greek in the sciences, Indian in contemplation, Sufi in 
intimations, regal in character, masterful in thought, and divine in insight. 853 
Islamic jurisprudence also reflects the spirit of Ikhwan-al-Safa's recommendation, 
from the varied sources of legislation to jurists' freedom to resort to different schools 
of law to articulate their opinion. As the chapter on the Islamic institution of 
853 Quoted in Lenn E. Goodman, Islamic Humanism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 
24. 
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punishment showed, Muslim jurists recognised the following sources and techniques 
as valid sources of legislation: the Koran, the Sunna (the authentic transmitted sayings 
and practices of the Prophet Mohammed), the Ijma, (the consensus of opinion), the 
Qiyas (judgement upon juristic analogy), rational intuition, Istishan, (the deviation 
from certain rules based on precedents derived from other rules based on relevant 
legal reasoning), Istislah, (which is an unprecedented judgement explicitly covered by 
the Koran or Sunna and necessitated by public interest), Istishab (a presumption of 
legitimacy for ancient practices until the contrary is proved), Darura (necessity) and 
Urf (the custom). 
The jurists' freedom means that in cases when a jurist of a given school of 
jurisprudence cannot find relevant supporting materials within his own school, he can 
look for such materials in other schools of jurisprudence and based his opinion on 
their materials and the opinions of jurists of other schools. 
The permissibility of "shopping around" from different schools of jurisprudence 
was utilised by the Tunisian government in updating the Tunisian Family Law and 
Personal Status. The authors of the new legislation looked at all Islamic schools of 
Jurisprudence to enable them to change the Tunisian Family Law and Personal Status 
according to both the international norms and also Islamic laws. To the delight of its 
authors, the new laws satisfy both contemporary international norms and also Islamic 
law. 854 
854 Bounderman, op. cit., pp. 1184-1189. 
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Commitment to the idea of hybridisation is also present in many of the successful 
political and social changes throughout history, including some of the most recent 
developments. The extraordinary success of South Africa's transition from apartheid 
to a vibrant democracy, India's peaceful transition to independence from the British, 
and the successful adoption of Afghanistan's new Constitution are examples of the 
fruit of commitment to the concept of hybridisation and cross-cultural approaches. In 
all three cases the personalities of their respective leaders, Nelson Mandela and 
Archbishop Tutu, Gandhi and Karzai played an important role in effecting the smooth 
transition and success. However, one of the most important and crucial components 
of the personality of each was their commitment to and the utilisation of local 
traditions and means to achieve their goals. 
In the case of India, as Dallmayr observed: 
Whenever possible, Gandhi sought to articulate his views in the vernacular idiom of 
Indian languages and through appeal to indigenous traditions. Thus, the notion of 
Swaraj (self-rule) was borrowed from the tradition of arthashastras but, in the context 
of our century, acquired the connotations of resistance to colonial hegemony and of 
local governance recalcitrant to centralized managerial control. Similarly the concept 
of ahimsa (nonviolence) paid tribute to ancient Buddhist and Jain teachings (as well 
as to the Sermon on the Mount) but now gained strategic significance in the political 
process of liberative-transformative struggle. 855 
In the case of South Africa, the concept of ubuntu became the guiding principle of 
the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was articulated and 
promoted by its chairman, Archbishop Tutu. Essentially a restorative idea, ubuntu is 
about the understanding that we are all part of one community and that by creating a 
855 Dallmayr, op. cit., p. 173. 
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space within which the perpetrators of abuses might rejoin this community, they can 
be helped to regain something of their lost humanity and thereby enrich us all through 
the restoration of social harmony and wholeness. 856 
In the case of Afghanistan, the utilization of the traditional institution of Loyah 
Jirghah (grand council) was the most important factor that helped adoption of the new 
Afghanistan constitution. Originally Loyah Jirgah was an ad hoc 
institution/arrangement, which was convened to discuss important decisions by the 
senior members of the tribe. Gradually it has become an important institution of 
modern day Afghanistan and successive governments convened it to discuss 
important issues pertinent to the state. The last time it was conveyed was in December 
2002 to ratify the new Afghanistan constitution. 
A joint panel of Afghan and international scholars prepared the Draft Constitution, 
and it was then presented to the Grand Council. The Council comprised 
representatives of different groups such as tribal leaders, civil society, religious 
minorities, the Muslim clergy, Afghan intellectuals, leaders of political parties, 
leaders of private militia groups (warlords! ), Afghan refugees, women, disabled 
people and so one. The Council discussed the Draft Constitution over three-week 
periods and adopted the final Draft, which was different from the early draft on a 
number of points, and paved the way for the subsequent presidential and 
parliamentary elections. 
85 Rigby, op. cit., p. 10. 
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Architects of any institutional mechanism designed to deal with a global challenge 
can and should pursue a pluralistic approach and be proactive embracing of a cross- 
cultural dialogue with full confidence. This is because, as Benjamin Franklin stated 
the principles of universal morality can be found in the "essentials of every 
religion"857, and indeed every community, or, according to Socrates' assertion that all 
human beings strive for the good. 858 However, it should be borne in mind that an 
ecumenical approach is far different to a secularist indifference or "tolerance, " and 
should give primacy to substantive justice and not mere proceduralism. 
The concluding section of this part will briefly examine three cases of "hybrid 
domestic-international courts" in Sierra Leone, Kosovo and in East Timor. 
B. The Hybrid Courts 
The "hybrid" courts are the latest forms in the pursuit of accountability and 
reconciliation. Such courts are "hybrid" because both the institutional apparatus and 
the applicable law consist of a blend of the international and the domestic. Foreign 
judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended 
by teams of local lawyers working within international standards. The hybrid model 
has developed in a range of settings, generally post-conflict situations where no 
politically viable fully-fledged international tribunal exists, as in East Timor or Sierra 
85' Quoted in Puchala, o cit., 10. 
858 Plato, Book Six:. 505d-e. 
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Leone, or where an international tribunal exists but cannot cope with the sheer 
number of cases, as in Kosovo. 859 
In the case of Kosovo, following the announcement of the prosecutor of the ICTY 
that the Court had the resources to try only those who had committed the worst 
atrocities on the widest scale, it became clear the ICTY could not deal with all the 
atrocities that were committed in Kosovo. In the beginning the only option was local 
remedies. However, the conflict had destroyed much of the physical infrastructure of 
the judicial system. Moreover, there were only a handful of competent Kosovar 
Albanian judges, prosecutors, and lawyers because most ethnic Albanian had been 
barred from the judiciary for many years and Serbian judges and lawyers had mostly 
fled or refused to serve. 860 
Detainees suspected of committing atrocities, once apprehended by UN security 
forces, were crowding prison facilities with little prospect of trial. To address what 
were rapidly becoming crises of accountability and justice, UN authorities issued a 
series of regulations allowing foreign judges to sit alongside domestic judges on 
existing local Kosovar courts, and allowing foreign lawyers to team up with domestic 
lawyers to prosecute and defend the cases. Local law was only applicable to the extent 
that it did not conflict with international human norms. 
East Timor's case was also similar to Kosovo. As in Kosovo, the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was charged with establishing 
159 Laura A. Dickinson, "The Promise of Hybrid Courts" in The American Journal of International Law Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), p. 295. ' 
s6o Hansjorg Strohmeyer, "Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor" in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 46 (2001), p. 95. 
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a process to deal with serious violations of international humanitarian law. The 
capacity of the local judiciary, both in terms of the infrastructure and personnel was 
weaker than in Kosovo. And, while no domestic court system existed to allow for 
meaningful trials, unlike in Kosovo no international court existed either. UNTAET 
issued regulations providing that "serious crimes" would be tried before three judge 
panels, comprising of two international judges and one East Timorese judge. 861 
As with Kosovo and East Timor, Sierra Leone's domestic justice system faced a 
number of challenges including destroyed physical infrastructures and the active 
presence of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), despite the detention of its leader. 
Partly, as a result of the threat posed by RUF, the incoming Sierra Leonean President 
opposed a full-fledged international tribunal. Both the trial of the leader of RUF, 
Foday Sankoh or his continuous detention would have posed serious problems for the 
government of Sierra Leone. This forced the government to ask the UN to help set up 
a Special Court to try those who were accused of committing serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean Law 
within the territory of Sierra Leone, since November 30,1996. As with Kosovo and 
East Timor, all components of the court are staffed by a combination of international 
and domestic actors. 862 
As Laura Dickinson has argued, both purely domestic and purely international 
mechanisms of accountability for grave human rights abuses are faced with three 
challenges: problems of legitimacy; second, problems of capacity-building; and third, 
861 On the Organisation of Courts in East Timor, see: www. un. org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg11. pdf. 
862 Dickinson, op. cit., p. 300 
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problems of norm-penetration. 863 The chapter on the International Criminal Court 
drew attention to some of the reasons that justified Dickinson's observation with 
respect to international tribunals. The foregoing introduction to the three hybrid courts 
highlighted some of the challenges that many post-conflict societies face in the 
immediate aftermath of civil conflict and war. 864 
The hybrid courts have the potential to overcome many problems and shortcomings 
that are associated with both purely international and purely domestic tribunals. The 
hybrid courts can avail themselves of the best from the two forms of tribunal, such as 
local knowledge, local involvement, international assistance in terms of funding and 
expertise, and the rebuilding of the judicial capacities and capacity-building. No doubt 
as with any new entity and institution, the hybrid courts will encounter challenges 
both to their legitimacy and capacity, nonetheless their dual character will enable 
them to resort to their national and international constituents to help them overcome 
such challenges. This opportunity that is not readily available to either purely 
domestic tribunals or to purely international tribunals. In other words, practical and 
operational problems will be the main problems that the hybrid-courts are likely to 
face 
The concluding part of this chapter is an examination of the concept of "Restorative 
Justice". 
863 Ibid., p. 300. 
864 For a critical account of some of shortcomings of the existing hybrid courts see chapters 4 and 5 in, 
Chandra Lekka Sriram, Globalising Justice for Mass Atrocities: A Revolution in Accountability 
(London: Routledge, 2005) 
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IV. Restorative Justice 
As the introductory chapter briefly noted, as a result of the failure in recent years of 
the main justificatory theories of punishment, reformative, deterrence and 
retributivism, a new paradigm is gradually attracting interest among both scholars and 
the practitioners of criminal justice systems. The new trend is known under the rubric 
of "Restorative Justice". Restorative justice is primarily victim-oriented, in both the 
procedures and its normative assumptions. 
The victim-oriented nature of restorative justice is a response to the failure of other 
theories in addressing the needs of the victims, and to recognise adequately their 
voice. In the words of Nils Christie, "in the modem criminal trial, the victim is a sort 
of double loser; first, vis-a-vis the offender, but secondly and often in a more crippling 
manner by being denied rights to full participation in what might have been one of the 
more important ritual encounters in life. The victim has lost the case to the state. "865 
Victims also have less say and marginal position in the international criminal 
tribunals. For example, the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR overlook victims in 
two respects: victims cannot take part in a personal capacity in the criminal 
proceedings and are not entitled to obtain compensation for the harm they suffered. 
The first of those prerogatives is vested exclusively in the Prosecutor, who is deemed, 
throughout the course of the proceedings, to represent the interests of the international 
865 Christie, op. cit., P3" 
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community-including, therefore, those of the victim-whilst the second falls mainly 
within the jurisdiction of domestic courts. 866 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has recognised the importance 
of the role of victim. With regard to the reparation of the harm suffered, the 
provisions under the ICC represent a threefold advance compared with those of the ad 
hoc tribunals. First, the victim is entitled, on his own initiative, to apply to the Court 
for an order for reparation of his loss or damage, in the form of rehabilitation, 
restitution, or compensation. Second, in his absence, or even where he neglects to 
claim such reparations, the Court may take it upon itself to ensure that his rights are 
safeguarded. Lastly, reparation may be made in particular from money or other 
property held in that fund which has been collected through fines or forfeiture. 867 
However, with respect to the participation of victims in proceedings, the ICC Rules 
do not deal with the conditions governing theirs right to this. 
The insignificant place and role of victims in one modern criminal justice system 
was recently demonstrated by the plight of the victims of the July 7th London 
bombings. As of September 2005, the victims and their families have not received any 
financial support from the UK government. They have received assistance only from 
a charity that was set up by the mayor of London. 868 
It is interesting to note that, unlike the UK justice system's treatment of the victims, 
the UK government has been far more active and successful in its anti-terror drive. In 
866 Claude Jorda and Jerome de Hemptinne, "The Status and Role of the Victim", in `The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary', U. cit., pp. 1389-90. 
867 Ibid., p. 1408. 
868 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/uk/47/41/579. stm 
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addition to introducing different legislative and policy initiatives the UK government 
managed to pass a resolution in the Security Council condemning terrorist attacks on 
London. 869 
A victim-oriented perspective not only gives the victim a central role in the 
proceedings, it also helps victim and society to look at the whole procedure and 
players from a different perspective. This is because the meaning which a directly - 
involved person bestows upon a situation will influence his course of action. That 
course of action will also be influenced by the degree to which different strategies 
designed to deal with trouble are available and accessible to him. Laura Nader 
distinguishes the following procedures used by people in dealing with trouble: 
A. Lumping it: the issue of the problem that gave rise to a disagreement is simply 
ignored and the relationship with the person who is part of the disagreement is 
continued. 
B. Avoidance or exit: this option entails withdrawing from a situation or 
curtailing or terminating a relationship by leaving. 
C. Coercion: this involves unilateral action. 
D. Negotiation: the two principal parties are the decision makers, and the 
settlement of the matter is agreed by both parties, without the aid of a third 
869http: //www. guardian. co. uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1564998,00. htm1 
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party. They do not seek a solution in terms of existing rules, but try to create 
rules by which they can recognise their relationship with one another. 
E. Mediation: mediation, in contrast, involves a third party who intervenes in a 
dispute to aid the principals in reaching an agreement. 
F. Other procedural models that are used in attempts to handle trouble are 
arbitration and adjudication. In arbitration both principals consent to the 
intervention of a third party, whose judgement they must agree to accept 
beforehand. When we speak about adjudication we refer to the presence of a 
third party who has the authority to intervene in a dispute whether or not the 
principals wish it. 870 
The above list is by no means exhaustive as people resort to other means and 
individuals for help 
Hulsman's distinction between natural and social frames of interpretation is also 
useful in understanding how a single event, i. e. a crime, can be interpreted differently. 
According to him, within the social frame of interpretation we can distinguish 
between more person-oriented and more - structure oriented varieties. The more 
person-oriented frame can be subdivided according to different "styles" of social 
control: penal, compensatory, therapeutic, conciliatory, and educational. 871 
870 Quoted in Louk H. C 
Crises. Vol. 10, (1986) " Hulsman, "Critical Criminology and the Concept of Crime", in Contemporary 
87 Ibid, p. 73. ' p. 76. 
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In his recent comment on the Conservatives' and Liberals' responses to September 
11th attacks on the US, Karl Rove, Bush's senior political adviser, manifested how 
one's interpretation of an event influences the selected course of action. According to 
him, "Conservatives saw the savagery of 9/11 in the attacks and prepared for war; 
liberals saw the savagery of the 9/11 attacks and wanted to prepare indictments and 
offer therapy and understanding for our attackers. "872 
Restorative justice is, therefore, more person-oriented and is inclined less towards 
punitive styles of social control, by helping victims to see the event from more than 
one perspective. 
Lawrence Rosen's observation on Islamic law also draws attention to the primacy of 
"person-oriented" aspects of the law. He noted: 
... Islamic judges articulated general guidelines 
for particular issues, but instead of 
developing a logically consistent body of doctrine allowed local circumstance and 
individual instance to supply particular meaning and regularity to the concept in the 
local under their jurisdiction.. . As a moral and religious entity the law does not seek to 
create the details of these identifying and sustaining relationships; rather it provides a 
context for the peaceable formation by individuals of their own ties under an 
institutional umbrella that, in theory, gives the force of government to the preservation 
of the rights of man assured by Allah. 873 
Adda Bozeman's observation of the difference between Western and non-Western 
methods of conflict resolution also sheds light on "the restorative" nature of Islamic 
law and also many non-Western traditions. According to her, "of this Western 
872 See Raymond Herandez, "Democrats Demand Rove Apologize for 9/11 Remarks, " in The New 
York Times. June 4, (2005). 
873 Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 60-1. 
420 
tendency to look, first of all, for legal remedies the Asians are well aware, since it 
contrasts with their own antipathy to the settling of disputes by recourse to laws and 
processes of litigation. "874 
Another important but implicit assumption of restorative justice is a sympathetic 
view of the offender. As noted in the introductory chapter, different theories of 
punishment have different views of offenders. For reformists, the offender is either 
sick and therefore in the need of treatment, or he is ignorant and in need of education. 
For the deterrence theory of punishment, he is an object and the offender becomes the 
means to deter either himself or the larger public. According to retributive punisher, 
he is either a free agent and thus entitled to punishment or he is evil, deserving 
punishment. 
Thanks to the proceduralism of modern criminal justice systems as Nils Chistie 
observed, the offender has lost the opportunity to explain himself to a person whose 
evaluation of him might have mattered. He has thereby also lost one of the most 
important possibilities to be forgiven. 875 
The "victimhood" of offenders is also addressed in the following remarks by Kant: 
The inherent value of the world, the Summum bonum, is freedom in accordance with a 
will which is not necessitated to action.. . He who subjects his person to his inclinations, acts contrary to the essential end of humanity, ... if man gives free rein to his inclinations, he sinks lower than an animal.. .A man is then in contradiction with 
the essential ends of humanity in his own person, and so with himself. 876 
874 Bozeman, oo. cit., p. 84. 
875 Christie, op. cit., p. 9. 
876 Immanuel Kant, Lectures in Ethics, translated by Lois Infield (Gloucester: Peter Smite, 1975), 
pp. 122.23. 
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In other words, Kant advocates that those who submit to their immoral inclinations 
lose valuable benefits by choosing the apparent immediate gain of acting illicitly. And 
therefore, criminals may initially attract our hostility, but also their criminality 
prompts our pity. 
The biblical statement "let him who is without sin cast the first stone" also calls us 
to resist the temptation to demonise those who wrong us. In accordance with the spirit 
of this advice of Jesus of Nazareth, those who are committed to the premises of 
"restorative justice" aim to help victims to take a humane view of the offenders. 
We ought to incorporate Christ's message, not only because of our own fallibility, but 
also because of our inability to articulate any method of punishment that has ever 
achieved high rates of reform or of crime control - and no method ever will. As David 
Garland noted, "it is only the mainstream processes of socialization (internalized 
morality, and the sense of duty, the informal inducements and rewards of conformity, 
the practical and cultural networks of mutual expectation and interdependence, etc. ) 
"877 which are able to promote proper conduct on a consistent and regular basis. 
Conclusion 
The above four issues, the importance of cross-cultural studies; submission to 
justice; the hybridisation of international criminal justice institutions; and restorative 
justice are the four areas that this thesis identified as under-appreciated and under- 
877 Garland, `Punishment and Modern Society', op. cit. , pp. 
288-89. 
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invested in both academia and also on the international stage. By highlighting some of 
the shortcomings of the prevailing approaches and theories to the questions of 
accountability and punishment, this thesis drew attention to the resourceful non- 
western/non-eurocentric traditions that can enrich their western counterparts, in 
particular with respect to the discourses of international criminal justice and post- 
conflict justice. The thesis aimed to draw attention to many unrecognised humane and 
progressive features of non-western traditions, including Islamic one, and cautioned 
against an overestimated appreciation of western institutions. However, it was not the 
intention of the thesis to idealise the latter or to dismiss the former. Both non-western 
and western enjoy many good features. A hybrid and cross-cultural approach is the 
best approach that can enable us to benefit from the fruits of all traditions, in 
particular in the context of international criminal justice. . 
This thesis argued that retribution and impunity are not the only responses that are 
at the disposal of victims of wrongdoing. Victims are also capable of granting 
forgiveness to those who have wronged them. In our daily life, we are often engaging 
in the process of forgiving or being forgiven by our colleagues, family or friends. 
However, in dealing with wrongdoers from outside, speaking of forgiveness presents 
tough questions to many of us. An important reason is the theological underpinning of 
forgiveness, in particular in the Christian tradition. Such a perceived theological 
association has made the concept of forgiveness as unpopular in secular societies. 
Forgiveness has also an insignificant place in many modem criminal justice systems, 
which deprive both victims and perpetrators to contemplate on this issue. Another 
important reason for the unpopularity of forgiveness in some quarters is its association 
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with unmanliness. Those who subscribe to such a gendered view of forgiveness 
believe granting forgiveness is an indication of one's weakness. 
In order to elevate forgiveness as one of our main responses to wrongdoing, this 
thesis proposed that we should challenge those who deem forgiveness as a sole 
religious concept. Forgiveness is also a humanistic endeavour. To this end, criminal 
justice systems should incorporate forgiveness into their procedures by empowering 
and encouraging victims to consider forgiveness. Islamic criminal justice is among a 
handful of systems that has provided such provisions. 
This thesis also showed that the concept and the institution of punishment, as with 
many other societal concepts and institutions are multifaceted. Understanding such 
multifaceted concepts and institutions requires a multidimensional approach. To this 
end, the second chapter studied the concept of punishment from philosophical, 
sociological and also international criminal justice perspectives. However, in the end, 
the chapter came to the conclusion that there remain many questions unanswered with 
respect to a satisfying definition of the concept of punishment. 
In completing our transnational tour of conceptions of punishment and search for 
more humane, just and effective ways of responding to those who unjustly wronged 
us, I reiterate that the most humane and effective ways are those, which have been 
informed by our commitment to justice. In other words, only just punishments are 
both humane and effective. However, just punishments only flourish in a just society. 
Just society, is the best society according to the Koran, which reminds believers that 
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0. 
God has made them a just community. 878 The essence of a just society is captured in 
the concept of Ubuntu which underlay the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. It has been defined as "an environment of right relationships is one in 
which people are able to recognise that their humanity is inextricably bound up in 
others' humanity. , 879 
The justice of the just society envelops all aspects of its members and institutions. It 
consciously seeks to accommodate the requirements of commitments to distributive 
justice, social justice, substantive justice, reparative justice, restorative justice, 
personal justice, ethical justice and procedural justice. Ina just society, law is a pillar 
of justice, whereas in unjust societies law becomes an agent of injustice and a means 
of suppression and exploitation. 
The conception and institution of just punishment is then concerned with the cause, 
symptoms and consequence of wrongdoing. As such it commits itself to address all 
three dimensions of wrongdoing. 
The just conception and institution of punishment is a victim-oriented approach. But 
it also sees the perpetrators as a kind of victim and provides adequate measure to deal 
with them. A just society is also a forgiving society. Such a society incorporates 
forgiveness into its criminal justice system. But more importantly, a just society 
celebrates and promotes the culture of forgiveness. 
878 Koran, 2: 144. 
879 LynGrabill, "South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Ethical Theological 
Perspectives", in Ethics and International Affairs , 
Vol. 12 (1998), p. 47. 
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History and present empirical realities may tell us that a just society is a mere 
utopian dream which can only be constructed metaphysically. But the desire for a just 
society is found in manifold cultural and individual expressions. Our task is how to 
translate humanity's intrinsic sense and commitment to justice into realities and how 
to bridge our conception of just punishment with just institutions of punishment. A 
commitment to a cross-cultural approach, and our genuine consciousness of our own 
fallibility, can facilitate the construction of such a bridge. 
To conclude this research, citation of the first verse of the first chapter of the Koran 
can summarise the relation between judgment and mercy and compassion: 
In the name of God, The Compassionate, The Merciful, 
Praise be to God, Lord of the Universe, 
The Compassionate, the Merciful 
Sovereign of the Day of Judgement! 
You alone we worship, and to You alone we turn for help. 
Guide us to the straight path... 88° 
Barnet Rubin has interpreted the above verses as indicating that the attributes of 
God's rulership are preceded and followed by two attributions of mercy, four in total. 
Even after four attributions of compassion, judgment still follows and the invocation 
880 Koran, 1: 1-5. 
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ends with a humble prayer for guidance. "88' Many Muslims regularly invoke these 
verses about God's compassion and the need of humans for guidance. The message of 
these verses should also inspire and direct those who are seeking a just, humane and 
effective means of dealing with wrongdoings. This entails that humans, similar to the 
God of the Koran, submit their judgement to compassion and mercy. 
The reported last words of Ibn-Sina (Avicenna) the medieval Muslim philosopher, 
perhaps best summarise my quest for making sense of the institution of punishment. 
Ibn-Sina who is believed to have written over two hundred and eighty treaties, books, 
and monographs on diverse subjects, ranging from philosophy, theology, medicine, 
ethics, to Islamic Sufism, was asked to summarise the cream of his learning. He 
replied: "I have learnt that I know nothing. , 882 
881 Barnet R. Rubin, "Transitional Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan", in International Affairs 
Vol. 79, No. 3. (2003), p. 581. 
882 For an introductory view of Ibn-Sina in English language see David Burrell, Knowing tghe 
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